

Enlightened Dictators? Good Governance In Autocratic International Organizations

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Abstract

A large and growing number of international organizations (IOs) are made up and governed by illiberal or outright authoritarian regimes. Many of these authoritarian IOs (AIOs) formally adopt good governance mandates, linking goals like democracy promotion, anti-corruption policies and human rights to their broader mission. Why do AIOs adopt good governance mandates that appear to conflict with the norms and standards these regimes apply at home? We argue that AIOs adopt these standards when they face substantial pressure from inside or outside the IO to adopt them. Central to our argument is that not all aspects of good governance are inherently or equally threatening to autocratic regimes. They pursue strategies that minimize the threat by externalizing policy outside the membership and strategically defining the goals to avoid or enact. This allows autocratic governments to uptake good governance talk but lessen any deep commitment to the norms and sometimes even to use them strategically to project their own power outside of the organization. Using data on 48 regional IOs with primarily autocratic membership between 1945 and 2015, we demonstrate that AIOs facing pressure from external good governance promoters will adopt good governance mandates but strategically shape those mandates in their favor if they can form bargaining coalitions with like-minded governments. The findings have sobering implications for the future of good governance promotion through IOs.

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Introduction

Since World War II, international governmental organizations (IOs) have been a central component of the U.S.-led international liberal order. Today, they are ubiquitous. Within and beyond their membership, IOs have contributed to the rise and spread of both economic and political liberalization, providing the conditions and infrastructure for states to coordinate, regulate, and delegate their various efforts to promote, among other things, free trade, climate protections, democracy, and peace and security (Checkel 2001; Hafner-Burton 2005, 2013; Haftel 2007; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005; Poast and Urpelainen 2015, 2018). Many of these Western-driven organizations have adopted formal “good governance” mandates, which advance the liberal agenda by linking goals like democracy promotion, anti-corruption policies, and human rights to an organization’s broader mission (Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider 2020; Greenhill 2015; Hafner-Burton and Schneider 2019; Pevehouse 2002a, 2005). That is at least the goal.

In recent years, a large and growing number of organizations are made up and governed by illiberal or outright authoritarian regimes (Cottiero 2021; Cottiero and Haggard 2021; Debre 2021b, 2021a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019). While it may not be surprising that IOs dominated by highly democratic member states have led the charge to legalize good governance mandates into their organizations, it is surprising that many IOs that are composed of mainly autocratic states also formally adopt these standards. For example, the African Union (A.U.), an organization composed of many autocratic members, has steadily adopted formal standards pertaining to the protection of human rights, the promotion of democratic principles and institutions, and the rule of law. Given that so many of the African Union's members blatantly violate these norms, why would the organization adopt good governance mandates? More generally, why do authoritarian IOs (AIOs) with majority non-democratic membership adopt good governance mandates that would appear to conflict with the very norms and standards these regimes apply at home?¹

Our starting assumption is that authoritarian governments do not want their IOs to adopt formally institutionalized good governance mandates that create rules and procedures around democracy promotion, the rule of law, civil society, or human rights. These governments are sensitive to any potential sovereignty costs imposed by these mandates that create common rules and expectations (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2023; Panke, Stapel, and Starkmann 2020). The ability of AIO members to maintain these preferences in IOs depends on their ability to assert themselves against pressures from both within and outside. First, the likelihood that AIOs adopt good governance mandates, and especially those that target their own membership, depends on the autocratic members' ability to navigate the institutional decision-making process to their advantage. AIOs are quite diverse in their compositions. Some, like the Arab League, are comprised mainly of highly autocratic states, while others like the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) include a mix of autocrats, hybrid regimes, and other forms of electoral anocracies that may be more supportive of (or less resistant to) governance standards. This heterogeneity of membership types within an AIO shapes the winning coalition for adopting or rejecting governance mandates. AIOs with a greater share of autocratic members are less likely to adopt good governance standards. Second, the members of many AIOs face pressures from foreign good governance promoters, such as other states and organizations that seek to proffer these values and provide financial or other diplomatic benefits to members or the AIO itself. When a substantial portion of the membership is beholden to external good governance promoters, even autocrats in these organizations may be willing to adopt these otherwise unwanted mandates.

¹ Following the convention in the literature (Cottiero 2021; Cottiero and Haggard 2021; Debre 2021a), we use the term AIO broadly to include all intergovernmental organizations that are led predominantly by nondemocratic member states.

Our key insight is that AIOs will try to strategically minimize the costs of mandate adoption in two ways. First, they favor a portfolio of mandates with an externally focused jurisdiction, empowering the membership to act with an institutional reach beyond their collective borders, minimizing the potential domestic costs on the members. This allows AIOs to uptake good governance talk and even use it to project their own power and interests outside of the organization. Second, AIOs are also strategic about the issue areas that they are willing to adopt. Good governance is a broad category of norms, not all of which are necessarily or equally contrary to autocratic rule. These organizations will be very unlikely to adopt mandates that explicitly promote liberal modes of governance, such as democracy, human rights, free elections, or protection of civil society. Yet, they may be more willing to adopt mandates involving other forms of good governance talk, such as anti-corruption standards, that are less threatening to autocratic rule, could be more easily neutralized, or that could even be used against internal opposition to the regime.

To test the empirical implications of our argument, we leverage data on the uptake of good governance standards in 48 regional AIOs with majority autocratic membership between 1945 and 2015 (Panke, Stapel, and Starkmann 2020). We show that AIOs are more likely to adopt mandates when the winning coalition is less solidly authoritarian (more mixed) or dependent on promoters. But, crucially, they are less likely to adopt internal mandates than their less autocratic counterparts, favoring external jurisdiction to avoid potential sovereignty costs. They are also less likely to adopt mandates that explicitly promote liberal norms of democracy promotion, human rights, civil society, and free and fair elections, which have formal meaning and definition in international law. In line with our expectations, they appear agnostic about the adoption of more nebulous concepts such as political stability, corruption, transparency, or the rule of law.

Our findings contribute to the emerging literature on AIOs (Cottiero 2021; Cottiero and Haggard 2021; Debre 2021b, 2021a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019). This work illustrates the rise of illiberal IOs and provides insights into some of the consequences for international cooperation and domestic politics. Like other works in this vein, we highlight that AIOs have heterogeneous membership. They can include members with various domestic political institutions, with important implications for the design of these AIOs, their scope, and cooperation outcomes. By acknowledging that jurisdiction of mandates might vary, we offer new insights into the strategies that autocratic member states pursue to assert their interests within AIOs, and the constraints that they encounter when doing so. Finally, we demonstrate that autocrats are not opposed to all forms of good governance talk. They are strategic in selecting the issues that best suit their interests, while avoiding those that are central to liberal democracy. In this way, they harness seemingly democratic rhetoric for undemocratic purposes.

The implications of these findings are both promising and perhaps ultimately sobering for the uptake of good governance mandates by AIOs. On a promising note, despite the odds, good governance promotion by powerful actors has a positive effect on the uptake of good governance mandates.² AIOs adopt mandates when beholden to foreign actors who seek to spread liberal principles. Although their member states espouse anti-democratic positions and policies at home, a growing number of AIOs embed some form of good governance into primary law, creating a legal basis for these AIOs to act in some areas of governance. Sobering, though, is the fact that these organizations are strategic in how they do so. They tend to avoid the core elements associated with democracy promotion and prefer to externalize policy, providing a potential tool kit to use these mandates to shame or bully others rather than to make commitments within the membership.

If the rise of authoritarianism continues, AIOs might become less willing to adopt internal good governance mandates with tremendous implications for good governance around the globe. Although beyond the scope of this paper, our analysis raises the critical question of whether these mandates have any positive effect on the actual good governance practices of their membership. At the end of the day, they may do little to affect positive change internally and may even be used perniciously against others.


Good Governance Mandates

Talk of “good governance” is common (Barnett, Pevehouse, and Raustiala 2021, Chapter 1; Keping 2018; Woods 1999). Starting with the defeat of the axis powers in World War II, and especially with the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, political calls for good governance have been made far and wide. U.N. secretary generals have claimed that it is “the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development,” while the bureaus of other powerful IOs like the World Bank have drawn attention to the concept (United Nations 1998; Wolfensohn 1996; World Bank 1992). While there is no singular or universally accepted definition, the United Nations identifies eight principles on which good governance should rest: participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and supports the rule of law. And it encompasses, at least in principle, a wide array of policies to protect human rights, fight corruption, and promote human development and well-being. Still, the concept is nebulous and has many interpretations, not all of which are in sync with standard features of democracy promotion.

² This is in line with other work that has focused on how dependency can affect policy outcomes in democratically led IOs (Börzel and Risse 2009; Gray 2009, 2013).

Over time, a growing number of IOs have put themselves at the forefront of efforts to promote good governance. Figure 1 illustrates the historical rise in the number of good governance standards adopted across all IOs in our sample, with a clear surge after the end of the Cold War. Many have by now crafted formal policies stating the intent to encourage better governance in some form or another. There are over 285 good governance mandates adopted and promoted across the 76 IOs in our full sample (Panke, Stapel, and Starkmann 2020). These policies, which we refer to as mandates, include the 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention making the bribery of foreign public officials involved in international business transactions a crime (Elliott 1997, 7–27); the Southern African Development Committee has adopted extensive democracy governance principles to implement the requirements of that organization’s founding treaty (Pevehouse 2002a, 212–13); and the many IOs that formally link human rights policies to their other economic or political missions (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015). Most famous in this regard is the European Union, where good governance is explicitly used to ensure applicants’ suitability for membership along many dimensions, including democracy and human rights (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig 2008; Schneider 2007, 2009).

Figure 1. Total Number of Good Governance Mandates in International Organizations




For reasons already well explored in the literature, it is not surprising that democratic IOs embrace formal good governance mandates that contain some degree of sovereignty costs. Many democracies already display some metric of good governance practices at home, and the additional sovereignty costs of an IO mandate may effectively be small on them. Good governance mandates can offer various benefits for democracies. Respect for the rights enshrined in these mandates, such as human rights, political liberties, and the rule of law, is a keystone of democracy. Democracies may want such policy competency within their IOs to (i) signal their commitment to those policies that underpin their own system of rule (Pevehouse 2005), (ii) tie the hands of other democratic members, especially those undergoing the challenging process of democratization (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015), (iii) publicize and spread their own democratic norms, values, and policies beyond their own borders (Checkel 1999; Finnemore 1993, 1996), and (iv) they may also take on these mandates in response to domestic political pressures and in support of broader foreign policy goals (Hathaway 2007).

Good governance mandates are not just a tool for democratically led IOs (DIOs); they vary in the types of states and organizations that adopt them. Figure 2 illustrates that the Western-led group of IOs like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the European Union are not alone in adopting these mandates. In fact, AIOs (plotted over year by the dotted line) are as likely to adopt good governance standards as are DIOs (plotted over year by the solid line).³ The largest share of these standards is adopted by regional organizations in Africa, such as the 2006 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, which addresses corruption in both public and private sectors among the membership. Many of these organizations are led by autocrats. AIOs from other regions are doing the same.

³ We define IOs as democratic if the majority of their membership is democratic, that is, exceed the V-DEM threshold for democracy (0.5), all other IOs are defined as illiberal. Although we use the convention to broadly define the sample of largely authoritarian IOs, we will account for the significant variations within IOs in our analysis. Another common practice is to define IOs as democratic when the average democracy score of the membership exceeds 0.5. Our findings are robust to using this alternative definition.


Figure 2. Number of Good Governance Mandates in Democratic and Autocratic IOs



One possible explanation is that good governance mandates are costless to adopt for members in AIOs, because they will never be enforced and are nothing more than cheap talk. That view would be consistent with a growing literature on the uptake of human rights treaties by autocratic regimes (Cole 2005; Hafner-Burton 2012; Lupu 2015; Neumayer 2005; Vreeland 2008). Yet, the cheap talk argument is inconsistent with the fact that even AIOs impose at least some degree of “sovereignty costs” on their membership when they surrender discretion over national policies to adhere to the standards set by an organization (Moravcsik 2000). Most IOs are characterized by some formal degree of legalism, which is promoted by rule specificity, issue linkage, membership restrictions, formal reporting, monitoring of behavior, and enforcement procedures. At least in the field of human rights, they place real constraints on members’ sovereignty, even among autocrats (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015, 2023). These mandates also serve as a focal point for international good governance promoters or the domestic opposition who can use them as a tool against the government. The mandates thus serve as a nascent weapon to be used against autocratic regimes at some time in the future. There are also non-trivial transaction costs associated with institutional contracting and bargaining over these policies (Abbott and Snidal 2000). If the answer to our puzzle is not simply that these mandates are entirely costless for AIOs to adopt and easy to circumvent, what then explains their growth?

Central to the argument we will articulate in detail is that not all aspects of good governance are equally threatening to autocratic regimes. We highlight two ways in which AIOs strategically seek to reduce the sovereignty costs that might come with organizational commitments to good governance. First, these good governance mandates have various audiences and jurisdictions. Some are internally focused on good governance among the membership of the organization. They create policies and procedures that apply only to the participants of the IO, for example, creating common rules and norms around anti-corruption policy within member states, as the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention does. They may even create the authority for members of an IO to coordinate actions within their borders. Others are externally focused, creating common positions for international actions and negotiations outside the scope of membership. One example is the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which has adopted several good governance mandates that target non-members. Similarly, the Arab League, the European Union, the African Union, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations have all adopted mandates on civil liberties, corruption, human rights, or the rule of law that target countries beyond their membership. Some, such as the European Union, have both internal and external jurisdictions on good governance. Figure 3 illustrates the number of internal versus external good governance mandates in the sample of 76 IOs over time. Although most mandates target the IO membership internally, increasingly IOs have also adopted good governance mandates with a jurisdiction beyond their membership. In 2015, 23 percent of good governance standards were externally focused, which is a marked historical shift.

Figure 3. Total Number of Internal vs. External Good Governance Mandates




Second, these mandates vary on substance. Good governance is a very broad and seemingly all-encompassing term that does not simply equate to democracy promotion alone. According to the United Nations, it “refers to all processes of governing, the institutions, processes and practices through which issues of common concern are decided upon and regulated.”⁴ This is an exceptionally broad definition, which means that different actors can use the term to encompass different substantive areas. Democracy, human rights, and civil society are all aspects of good governance policy. But so are transparency and accountability, the rule of law, and norms against corruption. Important to the argument we develop is that the substance of different types of mandates bears differently on the issue of democracy promotion. Some mandates are more explicitly tied to promoting core norms of liberal democratic governance than others.

Fortunately, our data allow us to distinguish the substantive focus of these mandates. Figure 4 graphs the number of adopted mandates, distinguishing between the group of mandates that have a direct connection to codified norms of democracy promotion (*Democracy*) and those mandates that are less centrally focused on liberal democracy per se but revolve around other aspects of bureaucratic good governance that may be more compatible with autocratic styles (*Bureaucracy*). Conceptually, the good governance data we depict in this figure as promoting *Democracy* include standard concepts such as civil and political rights, civil society, democracy, discrimination, freedom, freedom of the press, fundamental rights, basic rights, human rights, liberty, peoples’ rights, separation of powers, independent judiciary, and free and fair elections. By contrast, the data we depict in the category we call *Bureaucracy* are more connected to issues of corruption, good governance, political stability, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. Mandates that seek active promotion of democracy and human rights—that are concretely defined by international law—are more threatening to autocratic rule than are mandates in the latter category, which are less concretely defined, leave ample room for interpretation, and may even be valuable to an autocratic regime. The graph shows that even though IOs have focused on implementing democracy-promoting mandates, increasingly they have adopted more bureaucracy-focused mandates as well.

⁴ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/good-governance/about-good-governance>, last accessed: October 18, 2022.

Figure 4. Total Number of Democracy vs. Bureaucracy Good Governance Mandates



Enlightened Dictators?

We contend that autocratic governments tend to oppose good governance mandates and want to minimize the potential costs those mandates impose on them. However, AIOs tend to be heterogenous in membership, typically including a mix of democratic and autocratic members. This heterogeneity, coupled with the pressure from outside good governance promoters, can explain why some autocratic members are more successful than others in being able to avoid, externalize, or strategically define the costs and content of good governance mandates.

Why Autocratic Governments Oppose Good Governance Mandates

It is well established that states value and support governance styles that are like their own, for both normative and strategic reasons. Previous research shows that IOs composed of democratic, corrupt, or human-rights-advocating governments have created and attempted to enforce norms and policies designed to foster similar forms of governance within IOs. They have done so to push their collective values, assuage or

support like-minded domestic interest groups, and foster peace and security internally or abroad (Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider 2020; Greenhill 2015; Hafner-Burton and Schneider 2019; Pevehouse 2002a).⁵

None of this holds for highly autocratic states. For them, good governance is not a concept the leadership values, embraces, or seeks to spread domestically or abroad. The opposite—clamping down against good governance norms (especially against things like democracy promotion, human rights, civil society, and free and fair elections)—is how autocrats try to survive internally (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014, 2018). Most face little meaningful pressure and scrutiny from their domestic selectorates concerning the adoption of these standards, especially regarding foreign policy. In many cases, the domestic selectorate of an autocratic state does not represent or reflect the general will of the people but rather a small group of political or business elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Weeks 2008). Even if the average citizen had an opinion about their government’s foreign policy, it would be unlikely to generate negative externalities for a government that seeks to avoid making such commitments in IOs. It is not even clear that the kinds of standards autocrats adopt in IOs would even register in the public mind as something to care about. Moreover, public outcry or efforts to criticize the government through media would almost certainly be suppressed (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). Electoral consequences are highly unlikely or even impossible. Autocrats have utilized IOs to support their political survival at home (Cottiero 2021) and prevent democratization efforts (Debre 2021a; Obydenkova and Libman 2019), thereby fostering a process of authoritarian consolidation (Cottiero and Haggard 2021).

For other, less autocratic regimes, good governance standards may not seem so antithetical to their interests. Autocrats or other hybrid regimes seeking legitimacy through domestic elections might favor IO standards that signal to voters (or others) that the leadership is conscientious (whether truthfully or not) to publicize norms of good governance externally. If they do not rule with an iron fist, these types of illiberal regimes may face genuine threats to their hold on power at the polls (or elsewhere) if public opinion does not support them. In fact, there is significant evidence to suggest that these types of mixed regimes—neither fully democratic nor autocratic—are precisely the ones committing to norms such as democracy or human rights (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015; Pevehouse 2005). While these regimes may not all be equally enthusiastic about adopting good governance mandates, they are less resistant than stable autocrats to the idea and there could be real benefits.

⁵ Similar arguments have been made with respect to investor risk (Gray 2013).

Why Illiberal IOs Adopt Good Governance Mandates

The preferences over good governance policies are reflected in governments' attempts to use IOs to proffer their preferred policies and norms at home and abroad. We argue that whether they succeed depends on the ability of authoritarian states to assert themselves against pressures within and outside the AIO.

Internal Pressures: Given the difference in preferences over good governance policy across different types of illiberalism, both the multilateral context and the decision-making process within most IOs matters. While the multilateral nature of negotiations can minimize strategic interests, state interests can still manifest themselves when powerful states or groups of states are present or when member states have homogenous interests (Schneider and Tobin 2013). Groups of autocratic states negotiating policy in an IO are not likely to adopt good governance standards that they themselves do not support or are willing to implement domestically. That probability increases, however, when an AIO becomes decidedly less dominated by a strictly autocratic winning coalition that can dominate the policymaking process. Therefore, *AIOs are less likely to adopt good governance mandates when the winning coalition within the AIO becomes more solidly authoritarian, meaning that autocrats dominate the membership composition* (Hypothesis 1). They are more likely to do so when the AIO includes a mix of hybrid regimes and other forms of electoral anocracies that are not solidly democratic but may be less resistant or even amendable to standards that counteract democratic backsliding or send external signals about intent.

One prominent example is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an organization that includes a heterogeneous mixture of more and less democratic member states.⁶ Since 2005, ECOWAS has been a regional leader in adopting good governance mandates, especially on the promotion and protection of human rights within the organization's jurisdiction. In part, this has been driven by the desire among the more democratic members of the organization to create credible commitments to reign in autocratic-leaning members when they violate basic governance norms. The organization has been active in implementing its mandate. The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has issued path-breaking judgements against the IO's own membership, imposing sanctions on Mali when the military postponed the 2022 presidential elections (Avoulete 2022) and taking punitive actions against members such as Niger for condoning certain forms of slavery and Gambia for torturing journalists (Alter, Helfer, and McAllister 2013).

⁶ ECOWAS includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

External Pressures: In addition to the internal decision-making process, which is crucial in explaining decisions by AIOs with respect to good governance, we argue that external pressure can lead AIOs to sway toward the adoption of mandates. Many regional IOs have received significant pressure and funding from external good governance promoters. Since World War II, the promotion of good governance has become a central pillar in the U.S.-led international liberal order, and many countries and IOs—most notable in this respect are the European Union, the World Bank, and the United States—have tried to promote good governance around the globe using carrots and sticks such as foreign aid and trade (Hafner-Burton 2005, 2009; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Mesquita and Smith 2009; Schneider and Urpelainen 2013). If members of IOs are dependent on those actors, external good governance promoters can support the adoption of good governance mandates, promising rewards for adopting them and threatening recalcitrant states with punitive consequences. Promoters can offer foreign aid (or threaten withdrawal thereof), they can apply trade or military sanctions, use strategic issue linkages, or offer special deals to increase third parties’ incentives to adopt good governance mandates. In addition, powerful promoters also benefit from indirect or passive influence. If members of an IO have close security ties to the promoter or are dependent on the promoter’s foreign aid, they will be inclined to align with the promoters’ preferences because they anticipate that undermining the promoter’s strategy may ultimately have consequences for future aid allocation (or other relevant) decisions.

Empirically, a plurality of members of AIOs are more likely to be beholden to foreign good governance promoters than a small number of wealthy autocratic states such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Many autocrats in developing countries seek financial, diplomatic, or security-related support of promoters like the European Union, the OECD, or the United States. Many receive foreign aid or are heavily trade dependent on governments and institutions that want to see evidence that good governance issues are being talked about. These promoters, of course, also spearhead the movement to adopt these standards in the first place and seek to use their influence to spread their norms and values. Sometimes, they even directly fund the IOs in question (Gray 2018), making the uptake of good governance standards all but a necessity. That is why (Hypothesis 2), *AIOs are more likely to adopt mandates when the membership is beholden to foreign good governance promoters.*

A prominent example of this hypothesis is the African Union and its deep historical dependence on the European Union and its legacy of colonization (Nagar and Nganje 2016; Stout 2020). As far back as the European Union’s Cotonou Agreement in 2000 with the 79-country bloc of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states, Europe has formally tied its own vision of good governance into almost all aspects of its relations with the regions, ruled by many longstanding dictators amidst sporadic efforts at democratization (Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn 2008; Carbone 2012: 13; Hafner-Burton

2005). Today, the African Union, which was modeled in many ways on the European Union's own institutions, is a prime example of an AIO that has embedded many forms of good governance standards into its institutions, in part pressured and guided by European requirements for development aid, trade, assistance, and diplomacy to the continent (TNI 2000). Another prominent example is the adoption of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, with both mandatory and voluntary reporting disclosures, by the Asian Infrastructure Bank, which was required to get European buy-in. These first two hypotheses provide the foundation on which we now develop the more novel contribution of the paper. Given that AIOs will at times adopt good governance mandates, how exactly will they design them to minimize unwanted costs?

Under Pressure? How Autocratic IOs Minimize the Costs of Adoption

Our argument about variation in good governance mandate adoption across AIOs assumes that autocratic regimes, such as the many autocratic members of the African Union, face at least some costs for adopting and then violating good governance mandates, especially when they impose domestic costs on governments. However, our central argument is that not all good governance mandates impose similar costs, which provides incentives and opportunities for autocratic governments under pressure to be strategic about the types of mandates and the targets of the mandates they agree to adopt. The costs of the mandates may vary in two ways: jurisdiction and substance.

First, to minimize the potential costs of good governance mandates, illiberal regimes will be strategic about the jurisdiction of the rules they support in their AIOs. Some rules are inward facing, providing the organization with the jurisdiction and competence to apply the rules internally with respect to the AIO membership, as the ECOWAS and AIB examples illustrate. Others, however, are outward facing, developing common positions and articulating them, for instance, in international negotiations or with other states. These external jurisdictions empower AIOs and their members to act beyond their own borders. These categories are not mutually exclusive but rather operate as a portfolio, as many AIO mandates include both internal and external jurisdictions. External mandates are not only less likely to impose direct costs on illiberal regimes within the AIO, but they can even offer added benefits through the ability to impose costs on other states and as an avenue to project state power and sovereignty outside of the organization.

Because groups of highly autocratic states are the least likely of all to adopt good governance standards that impose any sovereignty costs on their own regimes, they should be less likely to favor internal mandates than their democratically elected counterparts. When autocratic members are more able to form a winning coalition, they should be more likely to implement external mandates, if any mandates at all.

Consequently, we hypothesize that *AIOs will be more likely to adopt a portfolio that leans toward good governance mandates that provide more external leverage and application when the winning coalition within the AIO becomes more solidly authoritarian* (Hypothesis 3).

The African Union again provides a relevant illustration of the argument. Partly at the directive of global governance norm promoters, such as the European Union, the African Union has adopted a variety of internally focused policies on human rights, anti-corruption and other good governance standards for the continent. But the African Union has also strategically crafted a series of good governance mandates with external intentions and jurisdiction in order to impose costs on other countries that have harmed the continent's interests, as well as to better promote and project the organization's authority in world affairs. For example, in 2020, as a part of the African Union's good governance theme to win the fight against corruption, it adopted the Common African Position on Asset Recovery (CAPAR), which is a policy to combat and reverse illicit financial flows out of Africa. It calls for the detection and identification of assets; the recovery and return of assets; management of recovered assets; and cooperation and partnerships to recover and return African assets. Among other things, the mandate calls "upon international partners and allies to agree on a transparent and efficient timetable for the recovery and return of stolen assets to Africa."⁷ According to the organization, today, "CAPAR is the bedrock for our continent's legal instrument and technical framework for negotiating the return of our stolen assets and illicit capital flights, taken illegally out of our shores and hosted in foreign jurisdictions."⁸ It's an externally focused mandate that seeks to change other states' behavior, and is explicitly labelled as a "good governance" policy.

The African Union has also been strategic in adopting good governance mandates to project power and influence. Its Agenda 2063 was crafted with the express intention of "adding African voices to global governance policy formulation and decision making," as well as to further the African Union's goal to become "a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner." This overtly includes the desire to boost the organization's collective action in global negotiations through pooling sovereignty and better integration.⁹ One of the core pillars of this mandate includes "good governance."

⁷ <https://au.int/en/newsevents/20191007/3rd-edition-african-anti-corruption-dialogue>, last accessed: October 18, 2022.

⁸ <https://papsrepository.africa-union.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/559>, last accessed: October 18, 2022.

⁹ <https://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/advocacy/onevoice.shtml>; <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar-30-2.pdf>.

Spoken aspirations include efforts to mobilize support for the endorsement of African candidates for top posts in the international system and to better integrate A.U. members into global diplomacy. Effectively, the mandate is an effort to project greater international influence and power to better represent the African people and continent, all in the name of good governance.

The A.U. examples suggest another way in which AIOs may behave strategically to minimize the potential costs of good governance mandates, by targeting certain issue areas within the concept of “good governance” that are less associated with democracy and liberal rule. Of the diverse substantive areas covered by global governance mandates, we might expect AIOs to avoid some at all costs (whether internal or external in focus), especially those focused on standard elements of democracy promotion such as human rights, free elections, civil rights, and protection of civil society. As described earlier, these concepts are defined by international law, thus have at least some common standing and formal interpretation. And they are all directly antithetical to the very systems that underpin authoritarian rule.

Other issues that commonly fall into the bucket of “good governance,” by contrast, may be less inimical to autocratic rule. Mandates against corruption or for liberty, the rule of law, political stability or transparency could be innocuous for most autocrats and in theory may even be advantageous for some autocratic states. Anti-corruption or transparency standards are often used by autocratic governments to disempower their political opposition. For example, dictators frequently imprison their political opposition on corruption charges (whether true allegations or not). And terms like “liberty” have no direct classification in international law and so can be broadly interpreted to a regime’s advantage—for example, liberty from interference. That is why we expect that *AIOs are less likely to adopt mandates involving more directly pro-democratic issues when the winning coalition within the AIO becomes more solidly authoritarian* (Hypothesis 4), opting instead for more malleable bureaucratic concepts that are open to greater interpretation.

Research Design

To assess our hypotheses, we turn to observational data on good governance mandates adopted by 76 regional intergovernmental organizations from 1945 to 2015 (Panke, Stapel, and Starkmann 2020).¹⁰ Our level of analysis is the AIO-year. Since we are interested in the behavior of AIOs, our sample is restricted to AIO-years in which the membership is autocratic. We define an AIO as an organization each year when more than 50 percent of the IO membership is autocratic (below 0.5), as measured by the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-DEM) using their polyarchy index (which ranges from 0 to 1). This leaves us with a sample of 48 AIOs.

Dependent Variables. We generate four dependent variables about scope (or the number of mandates), externalization (or jurisdiction), and mandate type (or substance) using good governance mandate data from Panke et al. (2020). This dataset codes good governance mandates in IOs with respect to 14 indicators of good governance: civil or political rights, civil society, corruption, democracy and democracy promotion, discrimination, free and fair elections, freedom of the press, (fundamental) freedoms, human rights, liberty, people's rights, political stability, rule of law, separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, transparency, and accountability. It also codes the jurisdiction of these mandates, which can apply to the membership of the IO (internal mandates) or beyond the membership of the IO (external mandates). First, we measure the total number of good governance mandates to analyze the determinants of the *Scope* of good governance mandates in Hypotheses 1 and 2. These hypotheses establish the foundation for analyzing our central claim: When AIOs adopt good governance mandates, they do so strategically by engineering both jurisdiction (Hypothesis 3) and substance (Hypothesis 4) to minimize the sovereignty costs on their own members.

We evaluate this claim using three variables. To analyze the determinants of the portfolio of good governance mandates regarding jurisdiction, we create the variable *Externalization* by subtracting the number of internally oriented governance conditions from the number of externally oriented good governance mandates. To analyze whether more autocratic AIOs are more likely to avoid mandates involving directly pro-democratic issues, we count the total number of governance conditions for all mandates that involve issues of civil rights, political rights, civil society, democracy, discrimination, freedom, freedom of the press, fundamental rights, basic rights, human rights, liberty, peoples' rights, separation of powers, judiciary, and elections (*Democracy*). We also generate a variable (*Bureaucracy*) to group the mandates that should be less costly to autocratic member states. The variable counts mandates involving issues of corruption,

¹⁰ A list of IOs with their abbreviations can be found in the Appendix.

good governance, political stability, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability. As previously discussed, we expect those mandates that are more explicitly tied to core norms of democratic governance—like democracy promotion, human rights, civil society, and free and fair elections—to be eschewed by AIOs versus those mandates that focus on more general issues like corruption or other categories of good governance that could more readily be used by autocratic regimes against their internal opposition, or just neutralized through interpretation.

There is a great deal of variation in the scope of good governance mandates across AIOs and time. Although some AIOs have no mandates, surprisingly many have adopted a range of good governance standards. In fact, the average number of good governance standards adopted in AIOs is four (ranging from 0 to 23), which is slightly above the average number of good governance mandates adopted in democratic IOs (three, ranging from 0 to 18). Similarly, there is significant variation in the extent to which AIOs choose external over internal mandates and bureaucracy over democracy mandates.

Explanatory Variables. To establish the influence of bargaining coalitions (Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4), we measure the percentage of autocratic members within each AIO. We take the average of each country member's democracy score as measured by V-DEM, using their polyarchy index (Coppedge et al. 2022). We then compute the percentage of countries that can be considered autocratic according to the V-DEM coding (those with polyarchy values less than 0.5). If our hypothesis is correct, the resulting variable, *% Autocratic Members*, should be negatively correlated with the adoption of governance mandates. Even though we are analyzing a set of organizations that are already mostly autocratic, our theory suggests that within this subset of AIOs, homogeneity of regime type will slow the adoption of good governance standards, increase incentives to externalize mandates, and shift to mandates that focus on rule of law issues. There is significant variation in *% Autocratic States* across IOs, but also within IOs over time. Over IOs and time, on average 84 percent of IO member states are fully autocratic, but there is significant variation across organizations with some composed fully of autocratic states (i.e., the African Union for much of its existence) and some with much more mixed membership (i.e., the Andean Community with 51 percent of its members classified as not fully autocratic).

To test whether powerful good governance promoters play a role (Hypothesis 2), we measure external dependence by member states on those promoting good governance standards. We begin with a broad measure of total receipts of overseas development assistance from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. We compute the total amount (in millions) of promised aid to all state members of the organization on a yearly basis. We break down our operationalizations of external dependence to official development assistance (ODA) pledged to member states from two different donor sources: the European Union and the United States.

While we suspect that both measures (*Total US ODA* and *Total EU ODA*) will be positively correlated with adoption of governance standards, past research on democracy governance suggests that the United States has been less demanding of a country's compliance with these standards (Pevehouse 2002a), especially when other geopolitical or security issues arise. Thus, we entertain the possibility that there could be differential effects across the two major promoters of good governance standards.

Control Variables. We include three additional variables in our model to control for possible confounding factors. First, as seen in the descriptive data in both Figures 1 and 2, there was a marked rise in the number of good governance standards in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. To control for this trend in the data we introduce *Post-Cold War* which is an indicator variable for the post-1989 period. Second, we are concerned that the number of members in the organization could serve as a predictor of total ODA (more members leading to more aid) but also an inverse predictor of governance mandates (more members leading to fewer mandates due to more difficult majorities). We measure *Number of Members* as an annual count of the total number of members in the organization. Lastly, we are concerned that economically wealthier states could more easily resist international pressures to adopt good governance mandates. We therefore control for the sum of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the organization (*Sum Per Capita Wealth*).¹¹ We use the Penn World Table to measure the real dollar-denominated GDP of each state in the organization each year (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). *Former Colonies* is measured as the number of member states that are former colonies. To control for any time-invariant characteristics of regional organizations, we also include AIO fixed-effects in the analysis (not reported in the Tables 1 and 2). The unit of analysis is the AIO-year, thus each of the 48 organizations in our sample yields one observation per year as long as they fulfill the criteria of an AIO.

¹¹ Using the average of per capita GDP yields very similar results to those discussed.

Empirical Results

Table 1 presents the results of an OLS estimation with IO fixed effects and clustered standard errors to analyze the determinants of the scope of mandate adoption (Hypotheses 1 and 2). We first illustrate our baseline intuition that more homogenously autocratic states are less likely to adopt any type of governance mandate (Model 1).

Table 1. Determinates of Governance Mandates in Illiberal IOs

	(1)	(2)
	Scope	Externalization
% Autocratic States	-5.700*	2.821+
	(2.507)	(1.489)
Number of Members	-0.185	0.123+
	(0.193)	(0.069)
Sum Per Capita Wealth	0.039*	-0.017*
	(0.016)	(0.007)
Total US ODA	-5.032	-35.001
	(303.611)	(161.022)
Total EU ODA	672.743*	-256.405*
	(268.233)	(96.550)
Post-Cold War	0.991	-0.803+
	(0.620)	(0.400)
Former Colonies	3.205	2.474
	(6.800)	(1.847)
Constant	3.814	-3.047
	(4.295)	(1.925)
Observations	1,119	1,119
R-squared	0.828	0.780

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

As shown in Column 1 of Table 1, *% Autocratic States* is negative and statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The effect is substantively large. A 1 percent increase in the number of autocratic states leads to a decline in the scope of mandates by about five mandates. AIOs that have a strong democratic membership (51 percent of members are autocratic) adopt about four good governance mandates. This drops to less than two good governance mandates for AIOs that are composed almost entirely by

autocratic governments. This result provides support for Hypothesis 1 that as autocratic organizations become more dominated by their purely autocratic members, they are less likely to adopt good governance mandates of any kind. Yet, they sometimes do.

We now turn to Hypothesis 2 concerning vulnerability of AIOs to those states pushing good governance standards. The results indicate that ODA provided by the United States has little bearing on the propensity of illiberal IOs to adopt mandates. Conversely, ODA provided by the European Union is positively correlated with the adoption of mandates. The effect is sizeable: IOs that are not highly dependent on foreign assistance from EU donors adopt on average about two good governance mandates. This increases to over 12 mandates for AIOs where members are highly dependent on aid from European donors. This suggests different responses depending on which state (or group of states) pushes the mandate: AIOs seem to respond to incentives provided by the EU, but those same incentives do not appear to arise from the United States.

Model 2 evaluates our claim about jurisdiction and the externalization of governance standards. Hypothesis 3 predicts that more homogeneously autocratic organizations will be more likely to adopt external governance standards. The estimates of % *Autocratic States* bear out this idea—more homogeneously autocratic organizations adopt external mandates targeted at non-members at a higher rate than those targeted internally. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.¹²

Turning to the control variables, the post-Cold War period is correlated with greater adoption of good governance mandates and a tilt toward internal standards, as is the average wealth of the IO. The size of the organizations and the number of former colonies within the IO show no correlation with the adoption of good governance mandates or balance of internal versus external governance standards.¹³

Table 3 presents the results to evaluate Hypothesis 4 regarding mandate substance. Recall that we expect highly autocratic AIOs will be less likely to adopt overtly pro-democracy mandates. Model 1 reports our estimates on the effect of autocratic membership on mandates with a focus on democracy promotion, while Model 2 analyzes whether an increase in the percentage of autocracies within AIOs covaries with an increase in what we are calling bureaucracy-related mandates. As expected, we find that as the share of autocratic members within the AIO increases, the scope of more directly democratic focused mandates decreases. The effect is significant at the 10

¹² The mean of the dependent variable is negative, suggesting that internal mandates are generally more common than external ones. The positive coefficient implies a move toward a balance of external mandates over internal ones as predicted by Hypothesis 3.

¹³ Moving to an AIO sampling strategy that includes AIOs where the average V-DEM score is below 0.5 yields similar results.

percent level. We do not find any evidence that more autocratic AIOs are more likely to shift toward bureaucratic mandates. These organizations appear to be wary of democracy standards but are indifferent to the adoption of standards such as anti-corruption policy or the rule of law; the coefficient in Model 2 is negative and insignificant.

Although we did not theorize whether this strategic choice to avoid liberal democratic norms of good governance also relates to the choice of jurisdiction, we explore that relationship empirically here. We find no increase in the likelihood of externalization of democracy promotion mandates (Model 3), but do find that externalization is at play for more bureaucratically focused norms (Model 4). These findings imply that more-autocratic IOs avoid democracy-oriented mandates altogether, and that the externalization effect concerns more bureaucratically oriented mandates.

Table 2. Autocratic International Organizations and Mandate Type

	(1) Scope (Democracy)	(2) Scope (Bureaucracy)	(3) Externalization (Democracy)	(4) Externalization (Bureaucracy)
% Autocratic States	-3.354+ (1.796)	-1.734+ (0.970)	1.858 (1.183)	0.963+ (0.499)
Number of Members	-0.190 (0.129)	-0.030 (0.065)	0.096+ (0.050)	0.027 (0.026)
Sum Per Capita Wealth	0.025* (0.012)	0.015** (0.005)	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.005* (0.002)
Total EU ODA	440.948* (178.471)	234.498* (96.067)	-174.550* (67.656)	-81.855* (33.348)
Total US ODA	23.819 (222.941)	-59.531 (97.897)	-45.273 (127.911)	10.272 (51.182)
Post-Cold War	0.922+ (0.509)	0.082 (0.216)	-0.702+ (0.370)	-0.101 (0.087)
Former Colonies	0.417 (3.883)	1.418 (2.564)	1.476 (1.529)	0.997+ (0.509)
Constant	2.613 (2.875)	1.134 (1.562)	-1.822 (1.531)	-1.225+ (0.612)
Observations	1,119	1,119	1,119	1,119
R-squared	0.789	0.758	0.765	0.762

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Taken together these models provide support for the argument that more homogeneously autocratic AIOs are less likely to adopt governance standards, but when they do (largely for reasons of dependence), those standards are more likely to be targeted at non-member states rather than the internal behavior of member states. In addition, more-autocratic IOs are more likely to avoid mandates that focus on human rights and other issues that are directly related to democracy promotion but are less averse to mandates that address bureaucratic issues associated with good governance such as transparency and corruption. These autocratic-slanted AIOs are strategic, both in terms of where they choose to ground the jurisdiction of the good governance mandates they do adopt, and which good governance concepts are acceptable, perhaps because they can be used in the regime's favor or perhaps because they are so broad as to be essentially meaningless and subject to interpretation. Clearly, some issues are more toxic for these types of AIOs than for those with a higher proportion of democratic members, and they fall along the more concrete features of what it means to be a genuine democracy, as defined by international law.

Robustness Checks

To assess the robustness of our findings we re-estimate our models with additional covariates to guard against omitted variable bias. First, there could be a concern that a potential confounder is the human rights practices of the IO members themselves. It could be that autocratic states who poorly protect human rights may be accounting for the resistance to democracy governance standards. We introduce a variable that measures the average level of respect for human rights across all IO members. We use the latent variable data from Fariss (2014) to measure human rights practices at the state level. As shown in Table 3 of the Appendix, this variable has no bearing on our previous findings.

Second, although we have accounted for aid from the European Union and United States, it could be the AIOs where any of those states have membership that are more likely to adopt mandates. In other words, it is not the aid but the presence of certain states that may encourage the adoption of governance mandates. To examine this possibility, we introduce in Table 4 of the Appendix an indicator coded as a "1" if the United States or any European Union state is also a member of the AIO. The inclusion of this variable has little bearing on our previous findings.

Third, other forms of influence may link countries that promote good governance to the adoption of reforms. We therefore re-estimate our previous models including two new measures in Table 5: one for the number of preferential trade agreements countries in the AIO have signed with the United States; a second measuring the average (among AIO members) U.N. voting score similarity. Neither of these variables achieve statistical significance in any model and do not influence our previous results.

Finally, some may be concerned about the measurement of ODA—namely that we do not normalize this amount by the overall economic size of the AIO. Larger ODA sums could reflect larger economies and their ability to absorb aid. Table 6 of our Appendix reports re-estimates of our models using ODA divided by total AIO GDP. No major changes are found in our previous results.

Conclusions

We addressed the puzzling adoption of good governance standards by many AIOs. We argue that whenever possible, autocratic governments shy away from the adoption of good governance mandates, but their ability to do so depends on the existing winning coalitions within the organization and the AIO's dependence on powerful external good governance norm providers. AIOs that are composed of mainly autocratic members are less likely to adopt mandates in the first place. If they do, they favor external mandates over mandates that target the internal membership directly. And they tend to eschew standards that are more clearly associated with modern features of democracy promotion and that have written basis in international law.

We analyzed decisions about the adoption of good governance mandates in 48 AIOs between 1945 and 2015. We find that heterogeneity in regime type within AIOs allows some organizations to skirt the sovereignty costs of good governance but foreign dependence can minimize their ability to do so. Interestingly, we find that the United States has been a less effective promoter of good governance mandates in those AIOs as opposed to the European Union.

The findings contribute to our understanding of AIOs and the rise of autocracy on the world stage. Whereas existing research has explored the rise and consequences of this new type of IO, or the variation in non-democratic regime types at the national level, our paper highlights the importance of acknowledging that most of these AIOs are composed of members that are very different with respect to regime type. They are heterogeneous. And that is why member preferences toward good governance within these AIOs vary with the composition of the membership and why some AIOs have been more willing to adopt seemingly liberal good governance mandates than others.

By highlighting the variation in sovereignty costs of institutional mandates we further show how members can agree to an adoption of formal norms and rules they might otherwise oppose, all while minimizing the costs of these norms on themselves. In doing so, we underscore the extent to which the spread of good governance norms and talk is not monolithic, certainly not across states and AIOs, but also not across types of mandates. From the perspective of good governance promoters, it may be common to assume that any uptake of such standards is a victory, especially among autocratically inclined IOs. Our work joins a growing body of work that suggests that this might not be the case (Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider 2020; Hafner-Burton and Schneider 2019) and not simply because mandates are cheap talk. They very well may be cheap talk, but that is a question for another paper. Here, we suggest that they may also be used strategically to promote an autocratic agenda—or at least projection of autocratic power—on the world stage through IOs whose member states seek to avoid the uptake of concrete policies for their own democracy promotion in favor of weaker or less well-defined norms of global governance. If good governance promotion can be effective—at least in the uptake of formal rules and rhetoric—the effect is both conditional and strategic.

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Appendix A: List of Included Regional Organizations

- African Union
- Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization
- Andean Community
- Arab Cooperation Council
- Arab League
- Arab Maghreb Union
- Arctic Council
- Asia Cooperation Dialogue
- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
- Association of Caribbean States
- Association of South East Asian Nations
- Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
- Benelux Economic Union
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation
- Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas
- Caribbean Community
- Central European Free Trade Agreement
- Central American Common Market
- Central American Integration System
- Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
- Collective Security Treaty
- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
- Commonwealth of Independent States
- Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale
- Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale
- Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
- Community of Sahel-Saharan States
- Conseil de l’Entente
- Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States
- Council of Arab Economic Unity
- Council of Europe
- Council of the Baltic Sea States
- East African Community
- Economic Community of West African States
- Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region
- Economic Cooperation Organization
- Eurasian Economic Union
- European Economic Area

- European Free Trade Association
- European Union
- G5 du Sahel
- Gulf Cooperation Council
- Gulf of Guinea Commission
- Indian Ocean Commission
- Indian Ocean Rim Association
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
- Lake Chad Basin Commission
- Latin American Economic System
- Latin American Integration Association
- Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development
- Mano River Union
- Mekong River Commission
- Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
- Melanesian Spearhead Group
- Mercado Commun del Sur
- Nordic Council
- North American Free Trade Organization
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
- Organization for Security and Cooperation
- Organization of American States
- Organization of Central American States
- Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
- Pacific Alliance
- Pacific Community
- Pacific Islands Forum
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
- Southern African Customs Union
- Southern African Development Community
- UN Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia
- Union of South American Nations
- Warsaw Treaty Organization
- West African Economic and Monetary Union

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Scope	2.381197	4.316795	0	23
Democracy Mandates	1.652991	3.142348	0	16
Bureaucracy Mandates	.6017094	1.386849	0	7
Democracy (Ext)	-1.123077	2.007743	-8	1
Bureaucracy (Ext)	-.350427	.8191071	-4	1
Externalization	-1.473504	2.467527	-11	2
% Autocratic States	.8805512	.1384606	.5185185	1
Number of Members	9.918803	8.098796	1	39
Avg GDP	49006.78	75298.96	0	638832.1
Total US ODA	619.5815	1099.672	-94	12764.55
Total EU ODA	1134.809	1752.746	-2.92	16661.79
Post-Cold War	.6264957	.4839411	0	1
Number of Former Colonies	.2924439	.3053391	0	1
<i>N</i>	1170			