Could a U.S. Peace Initiative Backfire in Ukraine?

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is nearing its third anniversary, and the humanitarian toll has been brutal. Following Russian attacks on apartment buildings, Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, and even a children’s hospital, the United Nations records that more than 12,300 civilians have died during the war.

The destruction of the war has reverberated far beyond Ukraine. The war’s disruption of grain and energy supplies has saddled some of the world’s poorest countries with sky-high food and fertilizer import prices. Meanwhile, the resulting surge in inflation has rocked the political status quo across the developed world.

No war occurs in a vacuum; countless third parties are impacted by conflict. They also have the potential to influence its trajectory.

Donald Trump campaigned on a promise to end the war in Ukraine.  As that war marks a grim third anniversary, it is natural to ask: what role can—and should—third parties play in ending the destruction and trying to restore peace? 

Inconvenient Truths About Waging Peace

Bystanders to war often assume that the best role of third parties is as mediators, spearheading peace initiatives. Examples abound of this behavior. The United States has long played the role of peace broker in the Middle East, numerous countries have sought to intervene in the war in Sudan, and countries like the United States and Angola have played mediation and diplomatic roles in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although mediation often fails, externally led peace efforts are common because there appears to be little downside in trying—and a massive upside if the endeavor is successful. Indeed, many academic studies of war, diplomacy, and conflict resolution assume that, at least, external interventions do not make wars worse.

My research, however, draws a different conclusion. Statistical analysis of daily-level data on battles and negotiations from 92 interstate wars between 1823 and 2003, paired with qualitative case studies, reveals an inconvenient truth: negotiations driven by external actors are not only likely to fail; they are also liable to be exploited in service of belligerents’ war efforts.

The data show a consistent pattern where failed peace negotiations are frequently followed by battlefield trends that strongly differ from those that existed prior to talks. In some circumstances, diplomacy is not used to end wars, but rather to help fight them.

The first Arab-Israeli War of 1948–49 is a useful case in point. As soon as hostilities erupted on May 15, the inexperienced United Nations sprang to action, calling for a temporary ceasefire that would permit mediator Folke Bernadotte to engage in shuttle diplomacy between all belligerent states. From May 30 to July 7, Bernadotte flew between capital cities, making take-it-or-leave-it offers that he could compile into a comprehensive agreement. Unbeknownst to him, both Israel and the Arab states used this respite to rearm, remobilize, and regroup for more intense hostilities once the ceasefire came to an end. 

When Does Peace Have a Chance?

Peace initiatives do not always fail, of course, and there are at least two conditions that improve the prospects of success. First, the battlefield must clearly and consistently favor one side. This makes it more likely that all sides will come to a shared understanding of the war’s trajectory and likely outcome. Without that shared understanding, belligerents may falsely believe that things could change in their favor or that no enforceable deal realistically exists, making negotiations something to either avoid or exploit.

Peace is also more likely when outside pressures to negotiate are low. Belligerents are often hesitant to negotiate with an enemy because doing so could be seen as a sign of weakness. If negotiations happen even when outside pressure for diplomacy is low, that is a strong sign that the sides have a real interest in settling. But third-party pressures create political cover for belligerents to negotiate even when they have no interest in peace. Instead, opportunities arise to exploit diplomacy to promote their own war effort.

Early diplomatic efforts during the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrate this point. Externally motivated talks in Belarus and Turkey during late February and early March 2022 laid bare massive gaps in the belligerents’ bargaining positions, and both sides agreed to temporary humanitarian corridors for fleeing civilians. Despite this early success, Russian forces repeatedly attacked Ukrainians in these corridors, attempting to gain the upper hand in the war.

The painful march of hostilities since then has led some policymakers to consider whether the United States should push Ukraine into renewed negotiations with Russia, or even whether Washington should directly negotiate a settlement with Moscow.

Either strategy would be deeply naïve. If the goal of negotiations is to end the war, then diplomacy should only restart once either Russia or Ukraine has heavily and undeniably demonstrated superiority over the other on the battlefield. If the belligerents express interest in negotiations when the fighting is indeterminate or stalemated, policymakers should be wary of the ways in which diplomacy could be manipulated by the warring parties to advance their own interests and continue the war.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent conversations in Riyadh with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, which explored the possibility of negotiating an end to the war, are therefore a misguided effort. External influence from the United States could get both Ukraine and Russia back to the table, but those efforts will not resolve the war. The Trump administration’s pressure campaign is instead more likely to permit Moscow to shift blame for the war on Ukraine and to regroup Russian forces for further hostilities.

As renewed initiatives to end the war in Ukraine develop, as well as efforts to end other active conflicts, such as the war in Sudan, the United States should proceed cautiously to ensure that such efforts are not twisted in a way that undermines U.S. interests. In the absence of judicious diplomatic strategy, it can actually hurt to negotiate.

Eric Min is an assistant professor of political science at UC Los Angeles.

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