The United States Hit Iran: What Happens Next?

It’s hard to argue that taking out Iran’s nuclear capabilities is a bad thing or against U.S. interests. This is reflected in the absence of significant international condemnation for last week’s U.S. bombings against the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites as an unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation. However, one might have judged the attack before it occurred, once initiated, we should all want it to be successful. However, three questions remain unanswered.

First, did the strikes work? It now appears that Iran moved much of its fissile material to unknown locations before the bombing. In his many hints preceding the attack, President Trump certainly gave the Iranians sufficient forewarning. Moving the nuclear material out of the likely target zones was prudent on the Iranians’ part. But it reflects a failure of planning by the administration in not anticipating this move and not identifying alternative storage sites in advance. To be fair, the nuclear stockpile produced by Iran can fit into the trunk of a car, and could therefore be anywhere. But that raises questions about the wisdom and necessity of the attack in the first place.

The U.S. bombing also appears not to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear sites—as President Trump first declared—but only to have significantly damaged the facilities. U.S. military planners thought it would take several days of bombings to penetrate the underground sites, but the president halted the effort after only one round. Iran’s ability to leap to a nuclear weapon has been delayed by perhaps a few months to three years—far less than was agreed in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal abandoned by Trump in his first term.

Second, was the attack legal? Without consulting Congress and getting authorization to use military force in advance, Trump essentially started an undeclared war in violation of the Constitution. Given Trump’s tendency to centralize all authority in the presidency, this is not unexpected. Presidents often go to Congress for authorization to diffuse responsibility. During the Iraq War, for instance, President George W. Bush went to Congress and thereby implicated members in the decision—a move that damned Hillary Clinton and others in subsequent elections. After all, if Congress supported invading Iraq, how could the president alone be at fault? By acting alone in Iran, however, President Trump now bears sole responsibility for the result. He will get credit if things work out well—and carry the entire blame if they do not.

Third, what will Iran do next? International relations is a system of action and reaction. Iran was forced to respond to the U.S. bombing, but did so only in a symbolic way, firing missiles at a U.S. base in Qatar, and alerting the United States in advance in order to avoid casualties and further escalation. As of this writing, Israel and Iran have agreed to a ceasefire imposed by the United States. Whether the ceasefire will hold and how relations within the region will evolve is uncertain.

Iran’s military capabilities have surely been degraded by Israel’s offensive against Iran’s allies, Hamas and Hezbollah; the fall of the Assad regime in Syria; and now the bombings by Israel and the United States. But this does not mean that Iran has been entirely disarmed or lacks the means to continue the struggle against Israel or seek regional hegemony. To retain the support of its own hardliners, the regime in Tehran will almost certainly have to continue the struggle in some form.

Remember—this is just one episode in a 75-year conflict in the Middle East that is likely to persist into the unknowable future.

Indeed, the ceasefire imposed by the United States has calmed emotions in the region, but it has not solved the ultimate problem. By the logic of deterrence, nuclear weapons are little use against other nuclear powers. But a nuclear capability is the ultimate defensive weapon, as evidenced by the immunity enjoyed by North Korea’s Kim regime.

If it had not learned this lesson before, Iran certainly has now. To prevent Iran from choosing to build a nuclear weapon will take skilled diplomacy—or more force. The ceasefire is not the end of the conflict, but only the second step in what is likely to prove a long, drawn-out process.

As in other foreign policy actions since resuming office, President Trump does not appear to be very good at anticipating others’ responses to his policies. As reflected in the acronym TACO—or Trump always chickens out, spawned in reference to his backing down on tariffs—the president seems to act first and think later. He plays chess one move at a time. Much depends on the precise way in which Iran responds to the U.S. attack, and then how Trump responds to that response, and so on.

The president appears to assume that the bombing will cow the Iranians into submission and prompt them to give up their nuclear aspirations. It may well have the opposite effect. How the United States will respond to this possibility is unclear. Hopefully, some in the administration are thinking five or six steps into the future. But the president needs to do so as well. The Nobel Peace prize the president so desperately seeks requires that he do so.

David A. Lake is a distinguished professor of the graduate division at UC San Diego and a senior fellow at IGCC.

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