China’s Advanced Light Source Breakout

To develop better batteries, new medicines, and more advanced semiconductors, scientists need to understand how matter behaves at scales invisible to the human eye. Advanced light sources make that possible. These research facilities, some the size of sports stadiums, generate precisely controlled beams of light that reveal the structure of materials and capture chemical reactions as they unfold. In the United States, both Lawrence Berkeley and Argonne national laboratories host some of the most capable light sources globally—the Advanced Light Source and the Advanced Photon Source, respectively. But they now have to compete with China’s ongoing rapid expansion of light source infrastructure, which could reshape the scientific foundations of the U.S.-China strategic competition.

Synchrotrons and free-electron lasers are the machines at the center of this effort. They give researchers powerful tools for investigating the atomic building blocks of matter. Their beams can reveal the shape of a protein that a drug must target, show why a battery degrades during charging, or expose hidden stresses inside an aircraft component. Different kinds of light support different experiments, making researchers’ access to a broad range of facilities essential.

For decades, the United States, Europe, and Japan led the development of these facilities. China lagged behind, leaving its researchers dependent on trips abroad to conduct experiments. They had to compete for scarce research time on foreign machines, with access vulnerable to travel disruptions and restrictions driven by national security concerns. When China finally opened its Shanghai synchrotron in 2009, demand far exceeded available research time. In 2021, the facility’s director reported that roughly half of Chinese scientific publications using synchrotron light sources relied on facilities overseas.

IGCC’s new working paper, “Pursuing Photon Sovereignty: China’s Advanced Light Source Breakout,” is the first open-source assessment of China’s growing photon infrastructure. It identifies sixteen operational Chinese light sources and twenty-one additional facilities under construction or in active planning. Chinese state media describes advanced light sources as “foundational pillars of a great power” (大国重器), placed alongside other prestige infrastructure projects in China’s science and technology landscape. So far, the working paper finds, China has invested at least $13 billion in new projects. If current schedules hold, China will add roughly one major facility every other year into the early 2030s.

This rapid and broad expansion reaches across the country and covers a wide range of scientific capabilities. Beijing’s High Energy Photon Source, for example, will support detailed studies of materials and biological structures, while Shanghai’s SHINE project will use rapid X-ray pulses to investigate processes too fast to observe with conventional tools. Municipal governments and universities are supporting the Chinese Academy of Sciences to expand China’s light source facilities. Some are designed around local manufacturers’ needs: the planned Zhejiang Industrial Photon Source, for example, will support commercial battery research.

The objective of all this activity is to bolster China’s “photon sovereignty”—that is, domestic control over the scientific infrastructure needed to pursue strategically important research. More facilities mean more opportunities to run experiments, train researchers, and connect scientific discoveries to industrial problems. Reliable access also reduces dependence on foreign scheduling decisions, travel, and political relationships. Over time, those advantages could enable scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs while helping Chinese firms improve products and manufacturing efficiency. China could very likely win a Nobel prize in science for the research results conducted on the advanced light sources that are set to begin operation in as early as 2027.

Synchrotrons and free-electron lasers also provide the fundamental scientific capabilities that underpin many of the strategic technologies in which the United States and China are competing. They measure how materials behave under extreme heat, pressure, and radiation, helping scientists test computer models used to assess the reliability of nuclear weapons. In semiconductor research, light sources support work on the materials, optics, and inspection techniques required for advanced chipmaking.

The United States retains world-class facilities and deep scientific expertise. Argonne’s $815 million Advanced Photon Source upgrade (APS-U), completed in 2026, replaced its electron storage ring and added nine experimental stations, delivering X-rays up to 500 times brighter than before. Berkeley’s Advanced Light Source upgrade (ALS-U), originally budgeted at $590 million, is installing new accelerator rings to produce soft X-rays at least 100 times brighter, enabling more precise studies of materials and chemical reactions. These investments should help keep the United States at the scientific frontier.

However, total spending for these two advanced light source facilities represents less than 20 percent of China’s planned spending identified in IGCC’s new working paper. The United States’ pipeline of new projects is also notably smaller than China’s. If the United States hopes to maintain light source leadership, it will need sustained investment in facilities, specialized experimental equipment, and support for the highly skilled scientists, engineers, and technicians who operate them.

The United States may also benefit from a new generation of private companies developing advanced light sources. Some, such as Substrate, a U.S. semiconductor startup, aim to use these technologies to improve semiconductor lithography, while others, such as TAU Systems, are developing new ways to produce the powerful light needed for advanced scientific and industrial applications.

China’s investment in these facilities began well before today’s access debates. Nonetheless, its buildout also changes the value of restrictions on access to American laboratories. Protecting sensitive research remains important, but limiting access offers less leverage as comparable capabilities become available inside China. For U.S. policymakers, that makes investment at home increasingly consequential. The challenge is to sustain the research capacity that supports American innovation and national security while assessing how China’s expanding infrastructure will affect competition across strategic industries. The United States’ willingness to compete with China’s ramped up light source buildout will help determine where the next generation of scientific discoveries takes place.

Jimmy Goodrich is a senior fellow at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). Jackson Martin is an independent, multilingual open-source intelligence researcher specializing in technology supply chains and Chinese political economy.

Thumbnail credit: Trey Ratcliff (Flickr)