Five Questions on How Dictators’ Clubs are Defending Autocracy

Your book argues that authoritarian regimes cooperate in “dictators’ clubs” to secure regime survival. How does this happen?

Authoritarian leaders have to manage domestic, regional, and international threats to their power. Surviving them requires managing key challengers: the population, fellow political and societal elites, dissidents, and regional and global actors. My book argues that autocrats increasingly rely on their own regional international organizations—what I call the dictators’ club—to help manage these relationships and mitigate risk.

To stay in power, autocrats employ domestic strategies of legitimation, repression, and co-optation. They try to legitimize their rule by holding staged elections or invoking ideology, tradition, or performance-based claims. They repress dissent through both soft and hard means, and they co-opt elites by offering access to wealth, patronage networks, or political positions.

But these strategies are increasingly insufficient in a globalized world. Since the end of the Cold War, autocracies have come under pressure from international democracy promotion, including conditionality in aid and trade, election monitoring, civil society support, and financial and diplomatic sanctions. In response, many regimes have adopted strategies of appeasement, performing compliance with democratic norms to divert attention from continued repression at home. At the same time, autocrats are increasingly confronted by regional threats. Protest movements can cross borders, and democratizing regimes may pressure their authoritarian neighbors to follow suit. As a result, many autocracies have adopted a strategy of noninterference politics: working to defend the principle of sovereignty to shield domestic politics from regional destabilization.

This is where dictator clubs come in. These clubs help regimes survive through three reinforcing mechanisms: they boost domestic survival strategies, constrain regional interference on the side of pro-democracy elites, and shield members from international pressure.

First, dictator clubs provide direct support to embattled regimes. By pooling resources, these organizations can help redistribute material and symbolic capital to members in crisis. They lend legitimacy by endorsing flawed elections, as the African Union (AU) or the Arab League have in countries like Uganda and Egypt. They provide economic and diplomatic support, such as when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) gave emergency aid and troops to Bahrain during the Arab Spring in 2011. They also offer security cooperation that enhances domestic repression through intelligence sharing or cross-border policing of dissidents, as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has done to support Chinese repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In short, dictator clubs boost the ability of authoritarian regimes to carry out their domestic survival strategies.

Second, these organizations can act to constrain challenges to authoritarian rule from within the region. Most of these clubs were shaped by postcolonial concerns and emphasize sovereignty, noninterference, and solidarity among incumbents as core norms. This allows regimes to pursue survival strategies such as repression or electoral manipulation without fear of regional intervention. During  the Zimbabwean election crisis in 2008, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) blocked the publication of independent election reports, constrained calls for military intervention by neighboring Zambia, dismantled the SADC human rights court when it ruled against Mugabe, and ultimately helped broker a deal that kept Mugabe in power despite blatant election fraud. Solidarity norms, consensus procedures, and noninterference within these organizations functions as a buffer, limiting the ability of democratizing neighbors to push for reforms.

Third, dictator clubs shield their members from international pressure, including reputational damage, sanctions, and calls for accountability. When regimes face condemnation for rights violations or antidemocratic practices, these clubs intervene in global forums, offer alternative narratives, or provide material compensation. The case of Nicaragua is instructive. President Daniel Ortega faced mounting international criticism and sanctions, but with support from the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) and the Central American development bank CABEI, he was able to maintain power. These regional actors discredited the Organization of American States (OAS), provided unconditional aid, and attempted to undermine international human rights mechanisms. Through such shielding efforts, autocratic clubs reduce the costs of employing autocratic practices.

Taken together, these three mechanisms turn regime survival into a regional project. The key argument of the book is that authoritarian cooperation is not just defensive or ad hoc. It is organized, institutionalized, and often remarkably effective. Far from standing alone, today’s autocrats survive with the help of their peers and have built organizations designed to ensure continuity.

When does support from these “dictator clubs” work, and when does it fail?

My research shows that the most important condition for success is autocratic density: the proportion of authoritarian regimes among the members. The higher the proportion of autocracies in a given club, the more likely it is that the organization can help regimes survive. In highly autocratic clubs like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), membership increases the chances of regime survival more than sixfold. This is because these organizations tend to pool their resources, coordinate defense of sovereignty norms, and close ranks when members are threatened by democratic uprisings or foreign criticism.

Interestingly, these effects hold even when the membership is heterogeneous. In regional organizations like the SADC, where democratic states like South Africa or Zambia coexist with authoritarian members, the clubs still function as bulwarks against democratization. This suggests that regime type alone does not determine how a member state will act. What often matters more are longstanding solidarity networks—for example, among former liberation movements—and the institutional primacy of sovereignty and noninterference. In these cases, democratic members may still uphold noninterference norms or oppose pressure on authoritarian peers.

Another common assumption—that regional hegemons are necessary for authoritarian cooperation to work—does not hold up in the data. Dictator clubs do not require a dominant power to be effective. China has used its influence within the SCO to facilitate the cross-border repression of Uyghurs and other dissidents, but its success lies in the collective operation of the club rather than unilateral dominance. Regional pressure by authoritarian powers, like Russia’s attempt to pull Ukraine into its orbit, has at times backfired, strengthening liberal actors rather than empowering pro-authoritarian coalitions.

Dictator clubs are also limited in what kinds of threats they can neutralize. Their protective power is primarily geared toward preventing democratic regime change, especially in moments of mass mobilization, opposition protest, or electoral contestation. Because democratic challenges often spread across borders, regional organizations act preemptively to contain them. However, they do not shield authoritarian leaders from intra-elite threats such as military coups or elite reshufflings that maintain authoritarian rule but replace the incumbent. A case in point is Zimbabwe, where SADC repeatedly defended the Mugabe regime against democratic challengers but did not intervene when Mugabe was removed by his own party’s military wing in 2017 once it became clear that the broader regime would remain intact.

This distinction is crucial: dictator clubs protect regimes, not individual leaders. Their overriding interest is in preserving the authoritarian order, not necessarily in defending every incumbent.

One strength of the book is you do case studies at the country level, showing how organizations like the GCC, the SCO, and ALBA operate to support autocrats. What are some of the similarities and differences across these diverse regional contexts?

At first glance, these organizations seem vastly different: they operate in regions with very different gross domestic product (GDP) levels, political histories, and cultural contexts. Yet what the book shows is that across all of these cases, regional organizations serve as platforms to reinforce authoritarian rule through similar mechanisms: legitimizing incumbents, redistributing resources, managing contentious relationships with fellow members, and shielding them from external pressure.

One striking commonality is the centrality of legitimation. Whether through election monitoring, public statements, or symbolic diplomacy, these clubs work to present regimes as legitimate, both to their populations and to the international community. This helps deflect criticism and reduce the effectiveness of internal opposition and external pressure. Moreover, these organizations often act as vehicles for identity-building and elite solidarity, where loyalty to fellow incumbents takes precedence over democratic norms.

Another shared feature is that regional hegemons are not necessarily dominant. While powerful states like China, Saudi Arabia, or Venezuela may lead these organizations, they are often just as dependent on the institutional shield and mutual support these clubs provide. One example is China’s use of the SCO to repress Uighur dissidents abroad. Another is Saudi Arabia’s hesitancy to intervene militarily unless all GCC members support its decision. In all cases, financial redistribution and internal security cooperation play key roles. These mechanisms help members finance patronage networks and coordinate efforts to contain dissent, but rarely involve conventional military alliances.

At the same time, regional variation shapes the kinds of threats regimes face, and thus the emphasis of their cooperation. In Sub-Saharan Africa, electoral regimes are more vulnerable to legitimacy crises due to multiparty elections and regional democratic challengers, so organizations like SADC focus on managing elections and insulating incumbents. In Eurasia, where many regimes face high internal security threats, clubs like the SCO prioritize surveillance and cross-border repression. Latin American organizations such as ALBA have shielded member regimes from U.S. and OAS pressure. And in wealthy settings like the Gulf, where regimes can rely on rents, cooperation centers more on co-opting loyal elites and distributing resources to prevent dissent.

Despite these differences, the overarching logic remains consistent: these clubs exist to manage the political survival of their members. They do so by adapting familiar tools to local conditions, but their purpose, structure, and effects are strikingly aligned across regions.

You note that countries tend to sort into organizations: democracies join democratic clubs when they can, while authoritarian regimes also flock to their own. But you also suggest that many regional organizations—in Africa and in Latin America for example—have mixed memberships. What does this mean for how regional cooperation takes place?

During the third wave of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s, many transitioning democracies deliberately sought out membership in democratic clubs as a way to lock in reforms. This was particularly visible in Europe, where institutions like the European Union (EU), NATO, and the Council of Europe offered not just symbolic membership, but also concrete mechanisms including conditionality, monitoring, and technical assistance, that supported democratic consolidation. A similar, albeit more limited, dynamic played out in Latin America. The OAS stands out as a rare case of a regional organization that gradually transformed from a club with authoritarian members into one with clear democratic norms and human rights mechanisms.

But these examples are the exception, not the rule. In most parts of the Global South, regional organizations emerged in the context of postcolonial nation-building and were shaped by the experience of external domination. Many of them, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, were founded by authoritarian regimes, are built around principles of sovereignty protection rather than shared democratic norms, and continue to be dominated by autocracies.

The SADC is a case in point. Despite including democratic members like South Africa, Botswana, and Zambia, strong ties between long-ruling incumbent elites, norms of noninterference, and consensual decision-making structures have enabled SADC to repeatedly protect authoritarian incumbents, as described above in the case of Zimbabwe. In such settings, democratic members may struggle to build coalitions for reform, and authoritarian incumbents can prevail.

What this means for new democracies embedded in these clubs is still an open question. One concern is that these “hybrid” regional organizations might undermine democratic consolidation by reinforcing old patterns of elite cooperation and offering opportunities to learn and revert to bad habits. This is the focus of a new research project I am conducting with my colleague Daniëlle Flonk. We’re exploring whether newly democratic members of hybrid organizations are more likely to revert to autocracy, focusing particularly on the question of digital sovereignty diffusion. The stakes are high: from content moderation to misinformation regulation, these organizations may shape whether the Internet becomes more open or more authoritarian across entire regions.

What can international organizations do to counter the growth of dictators’ clubs—or at least check autocratization among their members—at a time when democratic backsliding is on the rise?

The findings of The Dictators’ Club offer little cause for optimism when it comes to the ability of international organizations to halt democratic backsliding within their ranks. While some international organizations have historically played important roles in supporting democratic transitions and consolidating liberal norms, there is little evidence that these institutions can systematically prevent democratic backsliding among their members. The findings from the book and other research in this area suggest that regional organizations reinforce domestic regime trajectories—both democratic consolidation and authoritarian stability—but can’t necessarily shape regime change.

Recent developments in the EU illustrate the depth of this challenge. Despite its legal instruments and financial leverage, the EU has struggled to prevent or reverse democratic erosion. At the same time, its own policy shifts—for instance, toward closed borders and externalized asylum policies—reflect a growing normalization of illiberal positions even in the political mainstream. Populist and far-right parties have entered government in several member states and reshaped debates across party lines. This has eroded the EU’s internal cohesion and undermined its ability to enforce liberal norms.

International organizations committed to democratic principles thus find themselves operating in an increasingly contested space. Nonetheless, they are not powerless. Several strategies offer at least partial pathways forward.

First, liberal actors must remain institutionally present and politically engaged. One major risk of growing authoritarian influence is the hollowing out of liberal norms from within, often through co-optation of the language of democracy and human rights. Most dictator clubs are well versed to speak the language of democracy and employ procedures associated with democratic decision-making such as election monitoring to entrench their systems. If liberal actors withdraw from contested institutions, there may be no one left to call out these inconsistencies. Yet rhetorical commitments alone are not enough. Member states must uphold core principles and address structural inequalities—and be prepared to invest the necessary resources.

Second, liberal democracies must avoid reproducing authoritarian narratives or becoming complicit in repression. Cooperation with authoritarian regimes for short-term strategic gain—whether on energy, migration, or security—risks reinforcing the very dynamics liberal actors claim to oppose. EU energy dependency helped fund an increasingly hostile Russian regime, enabling the invasion of Ukraine. Likewise, the EU’s cooperation with authoritarian governments in North Africa on migration has enabled practices that directly contradict its human rights commitments. International organizations cannot preserve legitimacy if they actively support or turn a blind eye to such outright atrocities.

Third, international organizations should invest more actively in cross-regional coalitions that connect democratic states, reform-oriented elites, and civil society actors. Despite recent backsliding, support for liberal and democratic values remains significant, both among citizens and elites. In the United States, Donald Trump won elections in 2016 and 2024 by narrow margins. In Europe, far-right parties usually require coalition partners to govern. In Latin America, support for populist leaders quickly declines once they fail to deliver on their promises.

As the book emphasizes, many dictator clubs remain contested spaces, rather than closed authoritarian systems. And they also serve many practical functions important to the everyday lives of citizens that make them legitimate and popular: coordinating humanitarian responses, managing regional security, or facilitating vaccine access. Supporting reformist actors from within these organizations is one way to prevent authoritarian norms from becoming entrenched.

In the face of autocratization, complacency would be a mistake. The book shows that autocratic cooperation is not new. What has changed is its growing institutionalization across the world, as well as its ambition. Autocracies are not only more active in their own regional organizations, but also increasingly assertive in global fora. China, for instance, has used its position in the United Nations Human Rights Council to promote alternative interpretations of rights and weaken monitoring mechanisms, all backed by increasingly cohesive regional coalitions.

Liberal democracies and international organizations cannot afford to be passive observers. They must adapt, clarify their commitments, and invest strategically. If dictators’ clubs are becoming more effective at protecting their own, defenders of democracy must be willing to do the same.

Maria Debre is a professor at Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen (Germany) where she holds the chair for International Relations.

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