Here We Go Again: The U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO

Last week, State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce read a terse statement withdrawing the United States—yet again—from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The stated reasons included longstanding opposition—across Democratic as well as Republican administrations—to the organization’s 2011 decision to admit Palestine as a member. But according to Bruce’s statement, UNESCO also “works to advance divisive social and cultural causes and maintains an outsized focus on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, a globalist, ideological agenda for international development at odds with our America First foreign policy.” White House deputy spokesperson Anna Kelly told the New York Post that UNESCO is “woke,” faulting the organization for diversity, equity, and inclusion policies and “pro-Palestinian and pro-China bias.” Kelly noted that China has become a driving force in UNESCO, but did not acknowledge that China’s growing assertiveness has been enabled by U.S. disengagement.

On its own, the UNESCO withdrawal may not seem consequential, as the organization has had to contend with oscillating American commitment for some time. The United States has now withdrawn from UNESCO three times, including a lengthy absence from the organization between 1984 and 2003. But the implications of this reexit are broader. The Trump administration has already withdrawn from the UN Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization, and has launched a wide-ranging review of all international organizations—a move anticipated in Project 2025 (see pp. 190-193)—that is due to drop in August. Could more withdrawals from international organizations be coming? And what are the implications?

A close reading of the Project 2025 document and recent statements from Trump administration officials suggest either divisions within the administration about how to move forward, or a likely sorting of how the United States will approach different international bodies. The administration’s actions have already established complete withdrawal from the UN system as an option, and those more forcefully opposed to multilateral institutions see a win simply from redirecting dollars to altogether different purposes.

But in Michael Waltz’s confirmation hearing as U.S. ambassador to the UN, potential differences of opinion within the Trump administration were on display. Ranking member Jeanne Shaheen forcefully advanced the proposition that U.S. withdrawal at the UN would only advance the interests of illiberal regimes and China in particular. Waltz agreed that countering China is “absolutely critical,” noting that China seeks to define standards in functional areas such as aviation and telecommunications while increasing its representation among UN staff at all levels. Such a view suggests that pushing for reform by threatening exit is not enough: the United States has to play the diplomatic game through sustained engagement. However, Waltz also previewed major cuts in U.S. contributions to the UN, particularly to organizations dealing with climate change.

How do these arguments play out with respect to UNESCO? The organization has a relatively small budget of about $1.4 billion divided across four major themes—education, the environment, social cohesion, and technology in the digital age. The United States has secured some reforms of the organization during previous cuts. After the United States withdrew in 1984 citing mismanagement, UNESCO undertook management reforms.

But more recently, UNESCO has openly sought to protect itself from what might be called “America risk.” In her statement responding to the latest withdrawal, UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay noted that the U.S. financial contribution to UNESCO had fallen to only 8 percent of the organization’s overall budget, compared to contributions in other organizations (like the World Food Programme and UN High Commissioner for Refugees) as high as 40 percent. She argued that the organization is “better protected in financial terms, with the steady support of a large number of member states and private contributors” since pivoting after the first Trump administration withdrawal in 2018.

What are the implications? First, China has been provided with yet another opportunity to position itself as a more reliable partner. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun critically noted that “it’s the third time the U.S. has withdrawn from UNESCO. The country hasn’t paid arrears for a long time. This is not what a major country should do,” and went on to call on all countries “to reaffirm their commitment to multilateralism and take concrete action to support the UN-centered international system.”

Where influence really operates, however, is at the intersection of money, attention, and programmatic outputs. Xi Jinping’s interest in UNESCO is not new—after his 2014 visit to UNESCO, Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, was named as a UNESCO special envoy. By 2020, China was already the largest contributor to the regular UNESCO budget and was increasing voluntary contributions as well. These so-called “voluntary” contributions include those from the private sector and foundations. But they also reflect a broader trend within multilateral institutions of countries earmarking funds. In the case of China, these include education projects in Africa in partnership with Chinese educational institutions, support for world heritage sites in the country, and activities in support of so-called Silk Road projects that are complementary to the Belt and Road Initiative. The projects of international organizations ultimately forge very concrete linkages, as voluntary funds are earmarked for Chinese companies to secure contracts for particular projects, which in turn create opportunities for lock in. This is certainly what China hopes to accomplish with its UNESCO educational partnerships in Africa.

China’s contributions to UNESCO also pay dividends in China’s efforts to reframe its history and advance national cultural policies at the expense of ethnic minority groups. This effort manifests in one of UNESCO’s highest profile initiatives: the designation of world heritage. In 2017, Tibetan activists expressed outrage at UNESCO’s approval of China’s application to designate the Hoh Xil plateau in the western Qinghai province as a world heritage site. The activists claim that Beijing was seeking cover to assert greater control over nomadic Tibetans living in the area, and likely to relocate them under the guise of conservation management. China has also come under fire for interfering with Tibetan Buddhist practices, attempting to indoctrinate monks, and building Chinese-style pavilions in front of the Jokhang Temple at the Potala Palace World Heritage Site in Lhasa, Tibet—all in contravention of UNESCO operational guidelines. Beyond the World Heritage program, China has meddled in UNESCO events involving minority rights activists; in February, a Uyghur linguist was removed from the speakers list at UNESCO’s Language Technologies for All conference after he criticized China’s treatment of Uyghurs. China is almost certain to face no pushback from the second Trump administration in these efforts.

But the problems are much wider because the goals China pursues through multilateralism are often quite at odds with norms traditionally touted by the United States—and the West more broadly. Within UNESCO, China is able to take the lead on setting standards for the uses of artificial intelligence (AI) in education that could be at odds with the preferences of many Western countries. Whereas the European Union tends to prioritize privacy and consumer protection, China is preoccupied with maintaining control over online content creation and dissemination within China, and its conceptions of cybersecurity more broadly. China recently proposed a new global AI cooperation organization to govern AI development going forward; For now, China’s multilateral cooperation on AI remains largely contained within existing UN institutions like UNESCO, but those institutions are testbeds for China’s future proposals.

Multilateral institutions are—by their very structure—unwieldy and difficult to influence. Yet the core question for U.S. policy is whether we are better off inside these organizations—wrangling policy in directions that correspond with U.S. interests—or are left on the outside as these organizations are steered in altogether different directions. Leaving UNESCO may seem like a costless step. But if multiplied across other institutions—including those that the United States itself had a hand in creating—we risk loss of leadership, isolation, and a global commons governed increasingly by others.

Christina Cottiero is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah and a former IGCC postdoctoral fellow. Stephan Haggard is distinguished research professor at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy and research director for Democracy and Global Governance at IGCC.

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