Rethinking South Korea’s Failed Martial Law Declaration

The anniversary of the martial law declaration in South Korea suggests two contending questions—and their related emotions. The first centers on how an advanced industrial democracy like Korea could see such a blatant assault on democratic norms? The second, more hopeful question is why democracy in Korea proved so resilient: why this episode proved so fleeting? But even that question is tinged with anxiety, as relations across the partisan divide—particularly among elites—remain strained by many of the same forces that contributed to this episode in the first place.

Before offering some thoughts on these two questions, we first need to identify what happened. How should we talk about the martial law declaration? Current research on the vulnerability of democracy—including my own—has noted that democracy around the world has been challenged in a new way. Prior to the last 20 years or so, democracy typically fell to the military coup. However, coups in middle income countries became increasingly rare and in the advanced industrial states they were virtually unknown.

Rather, democracy was challenged by duly-elected executives—in both presidential and parliamentary systems—who attacked core features of democracy from within. These episodes of what we now call “backsliding” often began with attacks on civil liberties and political freedoms, including efforts to intimidate and control the press. A second feature of backsliding were efforts to collapse the separation of powers, and to reduce the independence of the judiciary. In the United States—and in Korea—a related risk has been the weaponization of prosecutors.

Finally, and most problematic, is when the executive undermines the integrity of the electoral system, ultimately making it difficult for publics to check the government at the ballot box. Note that the undermining of the electoral system can take place directly—through actual meddling—but also indirectly: by challenging elections that are in fact free and fair. Both the United States and Korea have seen this equally disturbing indirect assault on electoral institutions, despite both systems having strong election monitoring bodies.

We have seen backsliding in recent years across a wide array of governments, including in the United States, with some descending into full-blown autocratic rule: Hungary, Brazil, Turkey, and more egregious cases such as Russia and Venezuela.

But the Korean martial law declaration did not entirely fit this pattern, and that made it even more shocking. I personally don’t think the term “insurrection” is either helpful or accurate. Rather, the defining feature was civilian use of the military, intelligence community, and police in ways that violated the provisions of both the Constitution (Art. 77) and the Martial Law Act. The declaration of martial law thus had elements of the classic coup, but at the instigation of the civilian leadership.

We now know that some lower-level commanders had doubts about the legality of this bid for power, and we owe them gratitude. But rectifying politics will not only involve replacing complicit officers. Training—and appropriate sanctions—are critical for restoring normative guardrails. Particularly given Korea’s geostrategic position, senior military officers must remain committed to principles of civil-military relations under democratic rule: that the military will neither intervene in politics of its own accord nor be used by executives for illegal political ends.

Although not fitting the backsliding model entirely, the Korean case does validate some of the things we have learned about regress from democratic rule. To be sure, idiosyncratic elements are always in play: personality, individual interests, corruption, and above all miscalculation. But typically these factors play out on a broader political canvas.

Perhaps the most significant factor at work is the well-known problem of political polarization. That parties differ is of course axiomatic to democratic politics. But when perceptions of political rivals devolve into stark “us-them” divides, political life is in trouble. Political differences are seen as engaging existential challenges to the nation. Institutions will not function well, and particularly, as in Korea, where government was divided between the two branches. The arguments that President Yoon deployed to justify his illegal move centered in large part on frustrations with the National Assembly.

When polarization is high, trust in institutions falls and support can rise for extreme solutions. These include emergency measures by the executive justified by the need to “get things done.” Extreme partisans will support or even embrace these measures. In my view, political and cultural elites bear significant responsibility for these developments. Research shows clearly that the Korean electorate has historically not been particularly polarized. Yet recent elections have overturned this legacy, with elites—including in both legacy and social media—fueling the flames.

Scholarly consideration of backsliding has now spawned a renewed interest in resilience: the factors that allow polities to rebound and my colleague Aurel Croissant has useful things to say about them. Here we find good news. Research shows that legislatures play a critical role in checking executive overreach. Not only did opposition to martial law coalesce quickly, but as in 2016 some members of the president’s party also had doubts and that fact mattered. Second, as noted, important elements of the executive branch also harbored doubts, including in the military.

Finally, however, we cannot ignore the sheer power of peaceful resistance, which has a powerful history in Korea going back to the protests in Myongdong that contributed to the initial transition to democratic rule and running through the difficult events of 2016. Had those protests and counterprotests proved more disorderly—as they were in the attacks on the Seoul Western District Court in January—the path back to democracy would have been much more difficult.

Where does Korea go from here? I am an outsider, but it seems to me that both parties have work to do. The new government has political advantages that make supporters of the opposition nervous. Will the power of united government, with control over the executive and legislature, now be used for retribution, as we are seeing in the United States? Will prosecutorial functions be weaponized? Or will the ruling party exercise restraint and provide assurances and above all making sure that reformed institutions such as those surrounding prosecutorial functions work fairly, efficiently and in the interests of all Koreans?

And for the opposition, we know that right parties play a crucial role in the health of contemporary democracies; historically, they are more likely to veer into authoritarian temptations. Just like the government, the opposition needs to pause and rethink where it wants to go. Like the government, it needs a substantive policy agenda that appeals to the interests of the average voter, not one focused solely on political divisions and the interests of the extreme partisan.

I have to close on a sober note. Evidence across many cases unfortunately suggests that recovery from backsliding does not magically occur with the ouster of its perpetrators. Rather, trust needs to be rebuilt. Democracy does not rest on parties looking alike, but finding areas of compromise is crucial for convincing voters that parties and democratic institutions can actually work. To state the obvious, the National Assembly will play a crucial role in this regard.

Stephan Haggard is distinguished research professor at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy and research director for Democracy and Global Governance at IGCC.

Thumbnail credit: Jonathan O’Donnell (Flickr)