Small States are Defending Democracy

In the days following Venezuela’s disputed presidential election, the role of the international community in the crisis has drawn increasing attention. The United States has a long history of sanctioning the Maduro regime, while Russia and China have long supported the government in Caracas. Meanwhile, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—regional heavyweights with left-wing governments—have called for further transparency of the results.

A number of smaller democratic countries in the region have also responded, taking important steps to support the Venezuelan opposition by refusing to validate Maduro’s claims of victory, recognizing the opposition as the rightful winner, and pushing the Organization of American States to hold emergency meetings to address the crisis. Chile, currently led by a left-wing government, was among the first countries to cast doubt on the results released by Venezuela’s electoral body. Other countries such as Uruguay, Panama, and Costa Rica have also supported the democratic opposition across successive governments. In recent days, Panama has offered Maduro safe passage to facilitate a transition, while Costa Rica has offered political asylum to Venezuelan opposition members.

During an era of norm contestation between the United States and China—including over democracy and human rights—as well as weaker international support for democracy in general, the behavior of smaller democratic countries to support free and fair elections in Venezuela might seem unexpected. But these smaller countries are far from alone in adopting a pro-democratic foreign policy. Though their actions may look different than those of larger democracies like the United States, smaller countries can and do seek to support democracy abroad, even if they may face stark repercussions for doing so.

Some smaller countries may engage in democracy promotion. This sometimes includes giving aid, as Taiwan does via the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. But smaller countries often instead serve as diplomatic advocates for pro-democratic actors. Timor-Leste, a country of 1.3 million that only gained its independence from Indonesia in 2002, has emerged as one of the  staunchest defenders of the opposition to the military junta in Myanmar, holding meetings with its members and continually making the case for supporting the pro-democratic movement to more powerful countries and international organizations. Similarly, Lithuania has served as a hub for the Belarusian democratic movement in exile and has worked to encourage further democratization in countries like Armenia and Georgia. In West Africa, Ghana has sought to counter the spate of military coups in neighboring regimes.

Beyond democracy promotion, other countries have supported democratic resilience in established democracies. Estonia has emerged as an advocate for media and Internet freedom abroad, pushing to secure these rights in international law across different international organizations. Several other small countries have convened meetings to address threats to democracy, such as Cabo Verde and its summit to address governance deficits in developing and established democracies. Building ties with other democracies to address shared challenges is another strategy that small countries pursue. For example, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Ecuador formed the Alliance for Development in Democracy in 2022.

Smaller democracies have good reason to embrace a foreign policy that centers democratic values. There are internal factors—pro-democracy domestic political actors who can influence the foreign policy apparatus play a role. But in an era of democratic anxiety, it is important to note that for smaller democracies, a world in which the norm of democratic governance is stronger is beneficial to their survival in international politics.

In such an international context, smaller democratic countries facing external security threats can increase their security by improving ties with powerful democratic countries. These bigger democratic countries are also more likely to resolve disputes via international law and less likely to abrogate international agreements, both of which serve the interests of smaller countries. Furthermore, autocratic countries are likely more constrained in the actions they can take abroad—especially against democratic countries—when democracy is valued.

Similarly, democracy can be an important aspect for status recognition of countries when the norm of democratic governance is strong. This can grant smaller democratic countries a better position in international networks and lead to greater roles within international organizations and increased support among key domestic audiences. There are also intangible but valuable benefits such as respect in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relationships.

It remains to be seen how the crisis in Venezuela will proceed—and if international actors like Costa Rica and Chile can succeed in promoting free and fair elections in the country. Yet it is important to recognize that these smaller democratic countries have an important role to play by providing diplomatic and material support to pro-democratic oppositions. Countries facing security threats or status concerns may be among those most willing to stand up for democracy abroad.

For smaller democratic countries, embracing a pro-democracy foreign policy is a strategy to maintain access to security and status. If democracy becomes less valued in regional and international politics, they may have a lot to lose.

Jennie Barker is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at UC Berkeley, and a 2023-24 Dissertation Fellow at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC).

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