Two Ways Trump May Attack the UN

Dramatic shifts were underway at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September. Officially, the 80th session will tackle some of the world’s most intractable problems: climate change, poverty, artificial intelligence governance, and the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine. The UNGA theme, “better together,” is a sign that UN officials believe success depends on broad multilateral cooperation.

Yet overshadowing these efforts is an existential question: can the UN muddle through when the leader of its most powerful country is upending an institutions-based world order?

Despite the Trump administration’s grandiose declarations, its intended path forward remains unclear. In February, when the U.S. withdrew from several UN organizations and cut funding to others, the administration also announced a review of all U.S. participation in international organizations; seven months later, major policy changes have yet to manifest.

Given that Trump questioned the very purpose of the United Nations in his speech last week to the General Assembly, a U.S.-UN clash seems likely in the months ahead. Such hostility could take several possible forms, but two are most likely: hostile disengagement or Trump-first unilateralism.

Two Directions of Attack

The most direct attack on the UN system would be through hostile disengagement—encompassing funding freezes, nonparticipation or boycotts, and speeches, rhetoric, and actions that disrupt day-to-day business. The United States is already employing this strategy—when it submitted its intention to withdraw from the World Health Organization in January, for example, it also stopped the transfer of resources to the organization. A full cancellation of financial support would be devastating to the UN’s work and finances, already rocked by U.S. foreign aid withdrawal. The Trump administration recently announced a massive reduction in funding for the UN, which is now scrambling to cut $500 million from next year’s budget, hitting UN peacekeeping efforts particularly hard.

Alternatively, the United States might remain engaged in the UN system but work to bring the international community to heel. In this familiar Trump-first case, the administration would work through the UN to advance its own interests and foreign policy objectives. But while previous unilateralist administrations had guiding principles or ideology, Trump 2.0 is focused on material gains (however fleeting), dealmaking, and public success. This instrumental, bilateral approach can be seen in American diplomacy regarding tariffs. In each case, Trump requires that world leaders appear in person to show fealty and heap praise to curry favor for their preferred policy. The difficulty lies in figuring out where the United States will stand on a particular issue—and whether it will remain consistent in that stance or not. Political scientists Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum describe this as part of Trump’s wider project of “ungoverning” to suit his own personal whims.

Looking at the Data

Using our data on voting in the General Assembly, we look at state responses to the first Trump administration for clues about how each approach might affect voting dynamics within the body. Each year, the UNGA holds roll-call votes on approximately 90 resolutions for which there is insufficient consensus to pass on a voice vote alone.

Previously, we noted that the United States is less isolated when it comes to the UNGA than is generally believed. While the United States votes in opposition to the majority on topics like Israel and nuclear weapons, it aligns with the majority on other issues, and many more resolutions pass by consensus.

But the Trump administration is following a very different approach to allies and adversaries than previous administrations. In February, the United States sided with Russia against a European-drafted resolution condemning Moscow and supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Geopolitically weak states have always found themselves struggling to appease multiple powerful actors in venues like the UN. But whereas such faceoffs have traditionally occurred when the United States and Russia opposed each other on resolutions, we may see a new U.S.-Europe dividing line.

Abstentions and absences offer insight into such dynamics. The United States votes “no” more often than any other state in the UNGA, so it typically tries to get states to join it in voting against resolutions. As such, the United States often considers abstentions to be “wins,” particularly on controversial issues like Israel where only a handful of states oppose resolutions.

Abstentions are reported in the voting results, but a state can also be strategically absent from voting as a way to discretely appease competing powers. In the case of the U.S.-opposed UNGA resolution on Ukraine, most articles reported that 65 states abstained from voting, but few mentioned that another 16 were absent entirely.

Hostile Disengagement: Fewer Absences and Abstentions?

If the Trump administration pursues a strategy of hostile disengagement, then UNGA will proceed without American leadership, cautious not to provoke the United States into full withdrawal. Within UNGA, a disinterested U.S. delegation may lead smaller states to feel more freedom in voting, producing a shift in voting patterns that is more consistent with states’ underlying preferences. Geopolitically weak states might shift away from abstention or be less inclined to opt for strategic absence on controversial votes.

Highly lopsided, successful votes in the past—those in which there were few to no formal abstentions—could even be obscuring the true level of dissent. A 2017 resolution on the rights of the child, for example, passed 162-0-1, with the United States as the lone “no” vote. But 30 states were absent on that day. If these states were to show up to vote, the resolution could pass with a larger margin, or it might reveal cracks in the broader coalition of support.

If other states begin to engage more proactively, this strategy could ultimately backfire if the Trump administration shifts course and renews interest in the UN. American indifference may lull states into a false sense of security that they will not have to pay for their votes down the line. Concerningly, there has been little signaling to other states about precisely how the administration’s priorities will manifest on the docket, nor about how the United States plans to vote.

Trump First: More Controversy, Less Voice

If the United States follows a Trump-first strategy, the UNGA chamber may become a venue through which the administration pursues high-pressure dealmaking diplomacy. American politicking would produce U-shaped participation by other states—while more would align with the United States to seek its favor, there could also be more absences where states cannot vote their national interests but also cannot afford to cross the United States.

In this scenario, U.S. isolation on votes related to Israel might also increase. From 2017–20, the UNGA adopted 94 resolutions criticizing specific states, and 53 of these targeted Israel. The Trump administration voted against all but one, where it abstained. The United States was usually joined by only a handful of other countries on these resolutions. With many European countries recognizing a Palestinian state and increased political opposition to Israeli actions in Gaza, the United States faces significant hurdles in attempting to rally support for its views on the Middle East.

On the other hand, the Trump administration’s willingness to punish other countries for slights could make geopolitically weaker states less interested in taking a stand. Anticipating the American embassy’s move from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2017, the General Assembly reaffirmed prior Security Council resolutions and its stance against unilateralism. Weeks later, after the United States formally recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moved its embassy there, the UNGA rebuked the decision, but support was sharply lower, with only 128 in favor, 9 against, 35 abstentions, and 21 absences. Many countries changed their votes due to extensive lobbying, threats by the president to cut foreign aid for those voting against him, and letters from U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley to most delegations putting them on notice that they would be “taking names” for those on the other side. The second Trump administration’s strong pro-Israel stance may lead to many such repeats. Indeed, because of the institution’s rules, even an isolated United States facing near consensus on the other side of an issue can compel a roll-call vote to target retribution.

Looking for Signposts

Ultimately, the U.S. approach to UNGA over the next year will be linked to broader political trends. Trump will almost certainly continue his attacks on the organization, criticizing it for bloat, waste, and ineffectiveness.

But beyond rhetoric, Trump’s policy remains unclear. Regardless of approach, evidence of the changing world order will show up in UNGA voting data, and scholars will be ready to tell the story.

Bridget L. Coggins is an associate professor of political science at UC Santa Barbara. Jungjae Hong is a graduate student in the department of political science at UC Santa Barbara. Julia Morse is an associate professor of political science at UC Santa Barbara.

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