What Donald Trump Doesn’t Understand About Alliances

President Trump’s animosity towards our traditional allies is well known. As he sees it, Europe, Japan, South Korea and others have been ripping the United States off for decades by relying on the American security umbrella and failing to pay their fair share of the costs. They are free riders on U.S. defense efforts and must be made to increase their military spending—or suffer the consequences.

What Trump does not understand, however, is that our alliances give the United States unprecedented influence over the foreign policies of our allies. Under the security umbrella, allies become dependent on U.S. defense efforts. Yes, they underpay their way, but this dependence gives Washington influence over what they can and cannot do in foreign policy. Their free riding, so to speak, is the price we pay for control. Even if France, one of the largest countries in Europe, were to almost double its military spending as a percent of GDP to U.S. levels, this would add only approximately $46 billion to our annual defense spending of almost $842 billion. The influence we acquire over our allies is far more beneficial to the United States than another percent or two of GDP spent on defense.

U.S. control is often subtle and disguised by euphemisms. Allies speak of shared values,  interests, and commitments. The United States eschews the language of command and describes itself as the “leader of the free world.” When a high-level advisor to President George W. Bush slipped and declared the United States is “an empire now,” he was roundly criticized for speaking the quiet part out loud. But there is little doubt the United States sets the agenda for its alliances and limits the foreign policy options available to its allies.

In the Cold War, for instance, the United States prohibited independent military and diplomatic action by its allies. When Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt in the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower threatened to bankrupt Britain if it did not withdraw. Eisenhower was furious—not because he wanted to protect the regime of President Gamal Nassar, but because neither London nor Paris had gotten approval in advance for the invasion. As Eisenhower declared at the time, “nothing justifies double-crossing us.” Britain immediately capitulated.

Likewise, when Charles de Gaulle sought to lead Western Europe toward a more autonomous foreign policy and even visited Moscow in 1967, the United States isolated France. Recognizing their dependence on Washington, other European states failed to support the French president’s initiatives. The dependence of Western Europe on the United States allowed Washington to control the foreign policy agenda within and outside of NATO.

Today, it is the continued dependence of Europe on U.S. security policy that allows Trump to control negotiations with Russia over Ukraine. The Europeans, as they admit, do not have the defense industrial capacity to replace America’s weapons supplied to Ukraine. They will also have a hard time coming up with the possibly 100,000 troops necessary to police any ceasefire. Since they have little to contribute, they are easily excluded from the negotiating table. This allows the United States to set the terms and pace of any peace agreement unilaterally—or in association with Russia. Limited by their inability to defend themselves, the allies become bit players on the stage.

If Trump succeeds in forcing U.S. allies to expand their defense capabilities, Europe, Japan, and others will be able to act more independently. Does the president really want to give up the leverage their dependence provides? 

The second thing that Trump does not understand is that to lead an alliance requires attention to the interests of our allies and partners. This is the most basic rule of leadership: leaders need followers, and others will follow only if they are confident the leader is taking them where they want to go. To accept U.S. influence over their foreign policies, allies must have some confidence that Washington will be attentive to their needs. Allowing another country to exert authority over one’s policies is an awesome choice, and one made only if the ally is confident that this authority will be wielded in the common interest. In ignoring Europe, in the case of Ukraine; initiating trade wars and putting tariffs on our allies even before our geopolitical competitors; disparaging NATO; threatening to seize the Panama Canal, Greenland, and possibly Canada; and intervening in the domestic politics of our allies, Trump is flouting the basic rule of leadership.

Trump’s bullying may succeed in the short run by forcing U.S. allies to increase defense spending or make other concessions, notably on trade. But he is squandering U.S. influence in the long run. The risk is that our allies ignore U.S. leadership, develop greater autonomy, and act independently. Do we really want, for instance, South Korea or Saudi Arabia “freelancing” in regions where the United States still has strong interests? Do we want partners cutting side deals with China on trade and investment at our expense? At an extreme, do we want our allies developing their own nuclear arsenals with the potential to entrap the United States into broader conflicts?

The United States has invested in its alliances for the last 75 years for a reason. Should we forfeit our influence and control for short term transactions?

David A. Lake is a distinguished professor of the graduate division at UC San Diego, and a senior fellow at IGCC. His most recent book is Indirect Rule: The Making of U.S. International Hierarchy (2024).

Thumbnail credit: NATO (Flickr)