What New Russian Nuclear Weapons Mean

The global nuclear order has shifted markedly since the conclusion of the Cold War. This new order is increasingly multipolar. New nuclear powers have emerged in the past 30 years, including India, Pakistan, and North Korea. China has improved its arsenal qualitatively and is drastically expanding it, emerging as a second near-peer nuclear competitor of the United States. The last few decades have also seen the emergence of new technologies, including improvements in precision-strike weapons and remote sensing that undermine strategic stability by threatening states’ nuclear capabilities. Adding to these changes, the global arms control regime is collapsing and the nuclear taboo—the normative prohibition against nuclear use—is eroding.

Against this backdrop, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of its neighbor, Ukraine. Russia has not conducted nuclear strikes as part of its expansionist war, but its actions have accelerated the decline of the global nuclear order. U.S. officials claim that Russia seriously considered nuclear first use to halt a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russia has used nuclear blackmail to deter direct U.S. and NATO intervention, dissuade Western arms shipments to Ukraine, and coerce Ukraine into capitulation. Moscow failed on the third objective, had mixed results on the second, but succeeded on the first. Russia has also employed conventional variants of weapons that could carry nuclear payloads. Beyond action in Ukraine, Russia has contributed to the decline of global arms control by cheating on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and suspending its participation in the New START that limited the number of deployed Russian and American strategic nuclear weapons.

Russia is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal, fielding multiple new nuclear systems over the past few years. These novel weapons include hypersonics capable of traveling at speeds greater than five times the speed of sound. In two recent articles, I explore what these new systems mean for Russia’s warfighting capabilities and for the future of nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia. I find that Russia’s novel systems have mixed effects; they are not revolutionary capabilities, they do not give Moscow a significant strategic advantage, and they do not threaten nuclear deterrence.

However, Russia’s new weapons do incrementally improve its warfighting capabilities and may strengthen Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons

Russia’s new nuclear weapons are part of a broader effort to modernize its nuclear arsenal that has been underway for the past quarter century. Vladimir Putin announced their development in a 2018 address to Russia’s Federal Assembly. The weapons were novel military technologies—systems that no state had yet deployed in its military in a meaningful way—at the time of the announcement. The weapons include three hypersonic systems—Avangard, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon—and two nuclear-powered delivery systems: Burevestnik and Poseidon. Russia has deployed versions of all three hypersonic weapons. The nuclear-powered systems remain in development.

The hypersonic systems allegedly travel at speeds greater than Mach 5—five times the speed of sound—over their entire flight path. There is some debate regarding Kinzhal’s ability to maintain this speed, however. Kinzhal also follows a predictable ballistic trajectory, unlike the other two hypersonic systems. Avangard and Tsirkon both maneuver as they approach their target, making them harder for missile defenses to intercept. Despite claims to the contrary, Kinzhal’s speed and lack of maneuverability may make it not a true hypersonic weapon.

Burevestnik and Poseidon do not travel at hypersonic speeds. Their novelty comes from the use of a nuclear engine for propulsion. Once developed, they would be the first nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered weapons. Burevestnik is a cruise missile, while Poseidon is an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV), a cross between a drone and a torpedo.

Several of these systems are dual capable, meaning they have nuclear and conventional variants. Russia has used conventional versions of Kinzhal and Tsirkon as part of its war against Ukraine.

Novel Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence

Russia’s new weapons strengthen its nuclear deterrent without posing a threat to America’s. Specifically, these weapons strengthen Russia’s second-strike capabilities, or their ability to respond to an American nuclear attack with nuclear retaliation. They do this in two ways. First, in a case where Russia was attacking, for instance, the United States—a country with highly developed systems to detect, track, and intercept incoming missiles—Russia’s new weapons systems can penetrate missile defenses better than others. Second, in a case where Russia faced an attack, its new mobile systems would be harder to for the United States (or another adversary) to destroy. (Elsewhere, I argue that such American threats drove Russia’s nuclear modernization efforts over the past few decades.)

Russian leaders worried that future American missile defenses and counterforce capabilities could, in tandem, eliminate Russia’s ability to respond to an American attack, thus ending the state of mutual vulnerability—or mutual assured destruction (MAD)—that has existed between Moscow and Washington for decades, can breathe a little easier with these novel weapons systems in place.

While Russia’s novel weapons may be useful for evading counterforce strikes and penetrating missile defenses, they do not enhance Russia’s ability to conduct a counterforce attack of its own against the United States. They do not significantly increase the accuracy of Russia’s nuclear weapons—a feature that would make them better counterforce options—and Russia would need to drastically increase the size of its nuclear arsenal to pose a serious threat to the American nuclear deterrent.

Moreover, these weapons are not particularly useful for striking nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) assets. Russia may opt to use some for a counter-NC3 strike, but they do not meaningfully improve on the capabilities Russia already has. Other developments, including a possible space-based nuclear weapon or improvements in Earth-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, would be far more problematic for protecting vital American NC3 capabilities.

Warfighting

Russia’s novel nuclear-capable systems will have a more pronounced impact on Russian warfighting capabilities, although even here they provide a minor evolution of current abilities instead of a radical revolution in military affairs.

Most of these systems have nuclear and nonnuclear variants. Russia could use either for various warfighting purposes and for escalation management or in naval operations.

One potential use of nuclear or conventional versions of these weapons is for escalation management during a regional conflict with one or more NATO members. Russian escalation management has four goals: to deter direct aggression against Russia, prevent the expansion of a lower-level conflict, prevent the use of weapons that jeopardize state survival, and terminate a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Potential targets include transportation nodes, energy facilities, and other critical military, logistical, or economic targets that would reduce the ability of an adversary to expand or win a war against Russia.

Whether Russia would use a nuclear weapon for an “escalate to de-escalate” strike—to borrow a contentious term that some Western analysts use—is a source of significant debate. Regardless, Russia could choose to use one of their novel weapons to carry out a strike for escalation management purposes because of their ability to penetrate missile defenses. Russia can already overwhelm regional missile defenses, but a strike with novel weapons may involve fewer missiles, reducing the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Tsirkon provides the most utility for naval warfighting purposes. Russia has used land-based variants of Tsirkon in Ukraine, but the weapons is primarily for naval operations. Tsirkon is a precise ship-launched cruise missile that Russia would use to attack an adversary’s surface ships. Russia may use the missile to attack sea-based missile defense assets or vital naval warfighting capabilities, including aircraft carriers.

Possible Responses

Russia’s novel weapons provide minor but real improvements to Russia’s warfighting capabilities. The United States should address these threats. However, Washington should not overreact to them. There are other, more pressing threats that require American resources and attention. For example, Russia’s ASAT capabilities may prove more detrimental to American nuclear deterrence.

The United States should respond by continuing to develop advanced regional and sea-based missile defense capabilities. Kinzhal has proven vulnerable to Patriot air and missile defense systems in Ukraine. Tsirkon may also be vulnerable to systems such as Patriot or the European SAMP/T. The United States should deploy Patriot batteries, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense capabilities, or other advanced missile defense systems such as newer SM-6 variants to counter the threats from Kinzhal and Tsirkon.

The United States may also benefit from continued investment in the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Satellite (HBTSS). HBTSS would improve the American ability to detect and track hypersonic weapons such as Avangard, increasing the effectiveness of ground and sea-based missile defenses.

Spenser Warren is a 2023–25 IGCC postdoctoral fellows in international security and technology and an expert in Russian foreign policy and nuclear strategy. This post is based on his article in Parameters, “Russian Novel Nuclear Weapons and War-Fighting Capabilities,” Parameters 55, no. 1 (2025), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3330; and his article in Comparative Strategy, Russian novel nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia. Comparative Strategy, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2025.2499828.

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