China, Russia, and North Korea’s “Axis of Upheaval”

Will China, Russia, and North Korea align more closely with one another? Will cooperation among the three continue to deepen, especially in defense and military affairs?

During their recent summit in Beijing, President Xi Jinping described China’s relationship with Russia as being at “the highest level in history,” while Putin described it as having reached a “truly unprecedented level.” Russia and North Korea have likewise elevated their relationship to one of “comprehensive strategic partnership,” with North Korea having sent troops and arms in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and Russia (possibly) providing strategic military technology to North Korea. Most recently, Xi visited North Korea and held a summit with Kim Jong Un, and the two countries vowed to “strengthen strategic coordination.”

These trends have led to growing concern in the United States and among its allies about the alignment of the three states, often described as the “axis of upheaval” or the “axis of autocracies.” There is increasing worry that cooperation among these states will enhance each state’s military capabilities and capacity to undermine U.S. power and interests. It has also raised fears that the United States could face simultaneous conflicts coordinated or opportunistically initiated by these actors, leaving it militarily overstretched and its allies vulnerable. These concerns are heightened by the revisionist aims that each of the three states could pursue.

Yet, this view overlooks the factors that will continue to limit deeper cooperation among the three. Despite the rhetoric, there are reasons to believe that current trends may not deepen or even continue. Policy decisions implemented on the assumption of an emerging axis or bloc risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, spurring cooperation among the three in ways that otherwise may not emerge.

As many regional experts have noted, relations between China and Russia have always been uneasy. The sources of tension between them predate the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Even during the early Cold War, when relations were at their strongest, they were marked by mistrust and realpolitik rather than unity. Soon after, ideological disputes, competition for influence within the socialist bloc, and personality clashes led to their split, culminating in a military clash in the 1960s. While ties between the two are growing, China’s support for Russia has also been carefully calibrated, indicating differences in their objectives. Evidence of suspicion persists, particularly within the Russian intelligence and security services.

North Korea, the most diplomatically isolated and weakest of the three, has perhaps benefited the most. It has secured a mutual defense treaty with Russia and Russian diplomatic support for its nuclear weapons program. These improvements in Russia-North Korea relations were followed by Chinese diplomatic engagement and a visit by Xi Jinping to the North, likely driven by Beijing’s interest in maintaining influence and a voice on Korea-related matters.

But North Korea’s history illustrates the limits to its developing closer cooperation with foreign powers. Chinese troops, for example, remained stationed in North Korea until the late 1950s. Despite the immediate deterrent value provided by their presence, these troops became a source of tension and a potential threat to Kim Il Sung’s grip on power. This was particularly true amid Kim’s domestic political struggles against those with ties to China and the Soviet Union and in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. There was an increasing desire within North Korea for the withdrawal of Chinese troops, which China carried out in 1958. During these years, Kim Il Sung removed all “conduits of Soviet and Chinese influence” through more purges, consolidating power in his own hands and, ultimately, those of his family. North Koreans would later describe this event as “the second liberation.” Similar dynamics reportedly played out under Kim Jong Un when his uncle, widely known for having close ties to China, was executed during Kim’s consolidation of power.

These incidents point to constraints on cooperation and deep roots of mistrust that will likely endure. Leaders of personalist regimes such as North Korea remain wary of external influences that could undermine their hold on power, including those from “friendly” states. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Kim Jong Un’s views of China are shaped, at least in part, by such concerns. Former CIA director and secretary of state Mike Pompeo recounted that Kim Jong Un dismissed the Chinese as “liars” when told of the repeated Chinese suggestions to U.S. officials that the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea would make Kim Jong Un “very happy.” According to Pompeo, Kim responded that the Chinese Communist Party “needs the Americans out so they can treat the peninsula like Tibet and Xinjiang.” Notably, while Chinese President Xi Jinping called for enhanced military exchanges between China and North Korea at the recent summit, North Korean state media remained silent on this specific point.

Seeking deeper military cooperation and political support comes with risks. It could embolden reckless actions that might entrap these countries in unwanted crises or conflicts. Military support, especially transfers of strategic military technology to North Korea, could destabilize the region by driving a more forward U.S. nuclear posture or even nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies, such as South Korea and Japan. And it could energize the U.S. alliance network.

Building a true axis can be more of a liability than a boon if mishandled. These factors explain why the three have refrained from undertaking more substantive measures of military cooperation, especially when compared to U.S.-led military alliances, which involve troop deployments, basing agreements, integration of military command structures, trilateral joint military exercises, or coordination of nuclear strategy. Confirmed cases of technology transfers from Russia to North Korea have also been quite limited, at least for now.

Cooperation among China, Russia, and North Korea will undoubtedly continue at some level, and the United States and its allies should quietly prepare so that no member of the group could achieve a rapid conventional military victory opportunistically while the United States is engaged in a major war elsewhere.

At the same time, policymakers and analysts should resist the temptation to view these actors and their behavior as “more centralized, planned, and coordinated than it is.” While rhetorically convenient, portraying China, Russia, and North Korea as a single axis or bloc risks overestimating the strength of their ties and overlooking opportunities, through a combination of both negative and positive inducements, to prevent deeper forms of military cooperation from materializing.

Jung Jae Kwon is a postdoctoral fellow in technology and international security at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) in Washington, D.C.

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