Dispatch from the 2024 STRATCOM Deterrence Symposium

A Conference on a New Era of Complex Challenges

With several major wars threatening to escalate into wider regional conflicts, the need to prevent miscalculation has once again come to the fore. In this context, the symposium on deterrence began with introductory remarks by STRATCOM commander General Anthony J. Cotton, who provided a candid assessment of the global security environment. Dispelling any notion of a “Cold War 2.0,” General Cotton emphasized that the current situation is far more complex than the world has ever seen. Unlike the Cold War, the economies of today’s geopolitical rivals are deeply intertwined, complicating deterrence strategies. He described the situation as a “two-peer-plus problem,” highlighting the challenge posed by not just one, but multiple near-peer adversaries.

In his keynote address on the second day, General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further analyzed the considerable challenges that the new security environment presents. Not only has the number of challengers to the rules-based international order grown, he pointed out, but their potential collaboration and collusion against the United States and its allies is cause for significant concern. The issue is exacerbated by the speed by which emerging technologies develop, many of which may add escalatory pressure. The current security landscape is of unprecedented complexity and nuance, which requires, General Brown said, a comprehensive yet flexible “symphony of power” that is capable of addressing these challenges jointly and severally.

The impact of emerging technologies on strategic stability was a key theme of the symposium. Speakers argued that while AI represents an evolution rather than a revolution in military affairs, it is already bringing significant changes in logistics and decision-making. The use of AI in human-machine teaming and decision support systems introduces both opportunities and risks. Concerns were raised about the quality of data feeding these systems—some training data is of questionable quality, which could lead to escalatory decisions based on flawed inputs.

Our Research on Emerging Technologies and Deterrence

The impact of emerging technologies was also the theme of our poster presentation. We argued in a policy brief for STRATCOM that the impact of these new capabilities will be nuanced and contingent on the beliefs and perceptions that respective leaders place on the value of emerging technologies, in addition to the physical properties of the technologies themselves. Actual capabilities are the joint product of intrinsic technological affordances and the perceptions and beliefs that drive military research, development, and program decisions. We previously presented similar research at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference in April 2024.

We applied our theory on technological abilities and perceptions to three emerging technologies in China and Russia: hypersonic weapons, quantum computing, and AI. We explored how these technologies will improve Chinese and Russian capabilities and potentially alter strategic stability. We found mixed results, with some technologies having greater impacts than others.

Regarding hypersonic weapons, we found notable differences between Russia and China. Russia’s hypersonic weapons do not significantly change the country’s abilities. They threaten neither America’s nuclear weapons nor its nuclear command, control, and communications systems any more than existing Russian weapons. As such, they are incapable of eroding American deterrence. They may have some impacts on Russian conventional warfighting capabilities, but Russia’s current use of the Kinzhal and Tsirkon missile systems in Ukraine have shown minimal impact on the battlefield, inflicting damage similar to non-hypersonic systems. Tsirkon may provide improvements to Russian naval capabilities, but not enough to drastically alter the regional or strategic status quo.

Chinese hypersonics also fail to threaten American strategic nuclear forces. However, they provide a greater improvement to Chinese regional capabilities. Chinese hypersonic weapons are likely to affect American warfighting capabilities in the Pacific should regional deterrence fail. These systems can blunt America’s regional missile defenses more significantly than current Chinese capabilities, undermining the ability of the United States to defend regional allies and partners such as Japan or Taiwan. The threat Chinese hypersonics pose to regional missile defenses could also reduce the ability of the United States to manage intrawar deterrence.

China has also made impressive progress in quantum computing, sensing, and communications. These advances contribute to broader goals such as improving real-time military planning. Continuing improvements in quantum communications and navigation systems could frustrate American and allied intelligence operations, allowing China to establish a more effective and better protected network for political and military communications. We found that Chinese quantum developments create a degree of uncertainty given the limited public information available on China’s strategic vision for quantum. Questions also remain regarding how, when, and why China would integrate quantum technologies into military operations and doctrine. Russia has not made similar strides in quantum research, and Moscow’s capabilities remain rudimentary.

In our conversations with delegates, we pointed out that Russia has made some gains in AI, although they continue to lag behind the United States. Russia may gain some real military advantages, especially in robotics and automated weapons. These gains may also strengthen Russian confidence in their nuclear deterrent by improving Russian early warning systems and making missile silos less vulnerable to sabotage or counterforce strikes. If these confidence gains materialize, Russian advances in AI would improve strategic stability, we argued, as Russia would face less pressure to use their nuclear weapons early in a crisis. Beyond military systems, Russia sees AI as a tool for improving misinformation and manipulation campaigns, potentially eroding public trust in adversary governments and complicating decision-making. Successful integration of AI into information warfare would complicate strategic stability.

Many Chinese commentators agree that AI will erode strategic stability and complicate China’s deterrence relationship with the United States. The Chinese establishment fears that AI could undermine China’s second-strike capability. In our policy paper for STRATCOM, we highlighted the potential problems that can arise from the opacity in China’s plans. Chinese leadership remains purposefully vague and obscure in defining “intelligence,” and “intelligentization,” key buzzwords in much of its AI-related communications.

A Call to Action

The symposium’s discussions frequently returned to the theme of strategic posture in a “two-peer-plus” environment that is driven by new advanced technologies. Panelists from the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States expressed their disappointment at the lack of urgency in addressing evolving threats, a point underscored by the repeated use of the word “urgent” in their October 2023 report. The panel stressed that U.S. nuclear and conventional capabilities are not in competition with each other and emphasized that, to prevent having to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons, the United States must get the conventional component right.

The 2024 Strategic Deterrence Symposium underscored the growing complexity of global security and the need for a more urgent and coordinated response to emerging threats. As the world grapples with the challenges posed by emerging technologies, nuclear proliferation, and the erosion of international norms, the discussions at the symposium highlighted the critical importance of maintaining credible deterrence and assurance across both the nuclear and conventional domains.

STRATCOM Commander General Anthony J. Cotton’s opening remarks set the tone for the event, reminding attendees that the current security environment is not a simple rehash of the Cold War. Instead, it requires new thinking, stronger alliances, and a willingness to act with urgency. As many panelists put it, we are doing too little too slowly. The message from Omaha is clear: the time to act is now.

Juljan, Kimberly, and Spenser would like to thank CGSR director Dr. Brad Roberts, deputy director Mike Albertson, and STRATCOM’s J5 Directory team for inviting them to present their work to such a large audience of high-profile members of the strategy community. More information about the symposium can be found here.