Five Questions on China in Africa and the Middle East

China puts substantial diplomatic energy into its relations with the Global South. Your book shows that this is hardly new, as both of the main organizations you consider date to the early 2000s. What do they do and how have their activities evolved over time?

The PRC and African states established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. It encompasses all 53 states on the continent that recognize the PRC, as well as the African Union. In 2004, Arab States and China launched the China Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) with all League of Arab States member countries represented.  Both forums cover a broad range of functional issues and are expanding in scope.

The international political norms underlying these forums are China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with a particular focus on sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-interference; South-South cooperation; and the One China Principle, which supports Beijing’s position on Taiwan. In the CASCF, there is also a political focus on the PRC expressing support for the Palestinians and Arab states, and an expectation that the Arab states will refrain from criticism of China’s behavior in Xinjiang.

In contrast to liberal norms, the forums tend to emphasize a high level of state involvement in economic relations. At the same time, while there are many economic conditions on China’s foreign aid—including requirements to use Chinese firms for services associated with many of China’s concessional loans—the forums emphasize the absence of political conditions beyond recognition of the One China Principle. Since their creation, the most significant change in these organizations has been their increased focus on security, including anti-piracy activities, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism efforts.

The PRC has replicated this cooperation format in other regions throughout the Global South. In addition to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 2001), it has established the Forum Macau with Portuguese-speaking states (2003), the China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation Forum (China-CEEC, 2012), and the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum (China-CELAC, 2015).

Our project on Illiberal Regimes and Global Governance emphasizes China’s efforts to contest existing global norms. We now have these four global governance initiatives from Beijing: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilizational Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. How do you interpret these initiatives?

These global initiatives articulate China’s approach to the international order in several functional areas and build on the same norms visible in the regional organizations I studied; indeed, these forums pioneered many of the concepts in these new initiatives. Announced in 2021, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) promotes development projects focused on poverty alleviation, food security, COVID-19 and vaccines, financing for development, climate change and green development, industrialization, digital economy, and connectivity. The initiative also aims to accelerate the implementation of the United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The Global Security Initiative (GSI, 2022) focuses on what China calls common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security and again emphasizes a strict interpretation of Westphalian sovereignty, stressing non-intervention and non-interference; moreover, it consistently invokes the UN Charter to bolster these points. The GSI explicitly rejects what it calls the Cold War mentality, opposes “unilateralism” and “bloc confrontation,” and encourages the peaceful settlement of disputes through mediation.

While this initiative echoes China’s security behavior through FOCAC, CASCF, and Special Envoys for the Middle East, Africa, and Syria, one innovation is the inclusion of the concept of indivisible security in GSI statements starting in 2022. This term appears to mirror Russian usage, but China’s GSI narrative reflects concepts the PRC has long advocated in its security relations with the Middle East and Africa.

China announced the Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI) in 2023. The initiative asserts that “developing countries have a right and ability to independently explore the modernization path with their distinctive features based on their national interests.” It focuses on reforming the global governance system to make the international order more just and equitable and advocates respecting the diversity of civilizations. China considers itself the leader of the Global South, and this initiative articulates how it envisions incorporating developing countries into that order.

Finally, the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), launched in 2025, is of particular interest to the IGCC project. The initiative identifies three global governance deficiencies: underrepresentation of the Global South; erosion of the authoritativeness of global governance mechanisms, and the urgent need to address governance gaps in new frontiers such as artificial intelligence, cyber, and outer space. To build a more “just and equitable” global governance system, the GGI stresses the core concepts of sovereign equality, including greater democracy in international relations and increasing the representation of developing countries. Interestingly, the initiative puts particularly emphasis on the principles of the UN Charter.

Nothing about these global initiatives is particularly new, but packaging initiatives on development, security, culture, and governance indicates that Beijing is now ready to take a more robust leadership role in the Global South and the broader international system.

In Africa, China is clearly establishing a substantial economic footprint. But in the Middle East, there are also key security issues at stake for China. What role has China’s use of special envoys played in regional security dynamics in the Middle East?

China establishes special envoys to address issues it considers to be hotspots and threats to peace and security in the Middle East. Over two decades ago, in 2002, the PRC appointed the Special Envoy for Middle East Issues. Although the position is technically responsible for the entire region, it mostly works on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Beijing views that issue as the core threat to regional peace and security. Over the years, the special envoy has met with interested state and non-state actors throughout the region to discuss ways to resolve the conflict. China’s approach is not to provide its own solutions or to apply pressure to parties in a conflict. Rather, it considers its comparative advantage over other great powers to be its balanced stance, positive relations with all countries in the region, and its efforts to bring together all interested parties for mediation. Nonetheless, the Special Envoy for Middle East Issues has advocated for principles that are broadly in line with Palestinian interests: peaceful negotiations; an end to violence; a two-state solution that results in an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as the capital; land for peace based on pre-1967 lines and the return of the Golan Heights to Syria; a cessation of Israeli settlements in occupied territories; the establishment of an international supervisory mechanism; and the utilization of multilateral mechanisms to resolve the conflict. Since October 7, 2023, China’s Special Envoy for the Middle East has continued to stress these points, and the PRC has conceptualized the Israel-Hamas war as an extension of the broader Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The PRC has brought together various Palestinian factions for negotiations amongst themselves on the premise that Palestinian unity between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and other factions is important for the resolution of the conflict.

My book also examined China’s Special Envoy for Syria, established in 2016 to contribute to resolving the Syrian civil war and ceasing operations with the fall of the Assad regime.  One major driver for China in establishing the envoy was its concerns about the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an insurgency group in Syria during the civil war with links to the Uyghurs in the PRC. The Special Envoy advocated for a political solution to the civil war and a ceasefire, and the PRC participated in multilateral mechanisms to resolve the conflict, including the so-called Geneva, Astana and Vienna Processes. Again, the special envoy did not offer China’s own solution to the problem. Rather, the PRC sought to be perceived as a balanced actor, bringing warring parties together to negotiate a solution through multilateral mechanisms. China’s focus in Syria over the last year has been on cautiously establishing relations with the new government, while ensuring TIP does not threaten China’s interests in the future.

Since the publication of my book, China’s mediation activities in the Middle East have expanded beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Syrian civil war. Although it is not referred to as a special envoy, China’s efforts in 2023 to work with Iran and Saudi Arabia to renormalize their relations are the first example of the PRC successfully bringing together regional rivals for mediation. Although Iraq and Oman both played a significant role in the normalization before China became involved, and China’s ultimate contribution to formulating the deal was arguably limited, both the Kingdom and Iran chose to highlight the PRC’s role.

We see that China often uses regional organizations as complements to their activities at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations. You devote a chapter to these issues; what did you find?

The PRC leverages these forums not only to advance interests in the regions but to promote Beijing’s preferred norms throughout the UN system and other multilateral organizations. One important purpose of these forums is to build coalitions of states in the Global South to support China’s preferred norms and positions in international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Member states in these forums share or are socialized into advocating China’s preferred norms, stances, and initiatives, for example, a strict interpretation of sovereignty, opposition to sanctions, the One China Principle, South-South solidarity, countering criticism of the PRC’s behavior in Xinjiang, and building support China’s global initiatives (GDI, GSI, GCI, and GGI). Those norms are codified in formal cooperation forum documents, are incorporated into UN resolutions and statements and help coordinate it stances with regional organizations that are members of the forums, namely the African Union and the Arab League. Forum declarations and action plans also highlight how their activities align with the United Nations while advancing reforms of the UN system to better reflect the needs of developing countries.

You also devote a chapter to military relations with the two regions, including peacekeeping operations, antipiracy activities, arms sales, training, and China’s base in Djibouti. What are the core objectives in these areas?

China established its first declared overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017. The main objectives of the base are to enable the PRC to conduct non-combatant evacuations of its citizens more effectively from conflict zones, participate in anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, and contribute to the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Middle East.

But China engages in a much wider range of security activities in the Middle East and Africa, including peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy missions, arms sales, and professional military training. The PRC prefers to operate on these security questions through multilateral mechanisms, such as the United Nations, the African Union, FOCAC, CASCF, and SCO. It does not want to be seen by countries in these regions as a great power that acts unilaterally.

When the PRC participates in United Nations peacekeeping operations, it does so only with the consent of the host state. Over the last 20 years, it has participated in a wide range of UNPKO missions throughout both regions, including: Iraq, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon; the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization focused on Palestinian-Israeli ceasefires; and in a host of African contexts, including Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Burundi, Namibia and Sudan, Darfur and South Sudan.

Since 2008, the PRC has joined multilateral anti-piracy efforts off the Gulf of Aden to protect threatened Chinese ships. It has also expressed an interest in participating in anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea. To engage in military diplomacy and build stronger relations with countries in these regions, the PRC offers a wide range of professional military education opportunities for officers from Africa and the Middle East. The PRC also sells arms to countries in both regions. A profit motive drives Chinese companies, but over time, the PRC has kept arms sales relatively low compared to those of other great powers including the United States and Russia. That said, in recent years, due to falling Russian arms sales globally since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chinese arms sales to sub-Saharan Africa now surpass Russian sales.

Dawn Murphy is associate professor in the Department of Strategy and Policy at the National War College who specializes in Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics, U.S.-China relations, and international relations.

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