Five Questions on Regional Organizations in the Post-Soviet Space
In this interview, IGCC research director Stephan Haggard speaks with Murad Nasibov, a postdoctoral researcher in the Institute of Political Science at Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany, about his research focused on authoritarian regional organizations. In a recent article in Problems of Post-Communism, he considers how organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) can shape political norms and practices in an authoritarian direction.
Studies of authoritarian regionalism often deride these organizations as little more than talk shops, and this charge has been leveled at organizations in the post-Soviet space led by Russia. But you and others are showing how those organizations frequently act collectively to articulate common norms. Can you provide a brief outline of the CSTO and its core purposes?
The CSTO grew out of the 1992 Collective Security Treaty and became a formal regional organization in 2002. At its core, it is a military-security alliance, providing a framework for collective defense, military cooperation, joint exercises, and coordination on terrorism, extremism, narcotics, and other cross-border security threats. But these formal functions capture only part of what the organization does. It also provides a platform through which member regimes can project cohesion, legitimacy, and mutual solidarity, both outward to international audiences and inward to domestic elites, opposition forces, and broader publics.
My Problems of Post-Communism paper shows how CSTO joint statements can operate as a collective signaling device in response to challenges faced by member regimes. In a coauthored chapter currently in preparation for an edited volume on liberal scripts, we broaden the perspective to the CSTO, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO), showing an expansion of illiberal vocabulary and of their shared normative repertoire over the past two decades.
You offer an interesting critique of the literature on authoritarian regionalism. You argue that it finds authoritarian outcomes and then looks back to the challenges that such regimes face. You put the problem differently, asking what challenges organizations like the CSTO respond to.
My concern with much of the authoritarian regionalism literature is that it starts from the remedies regional organizations provide, such as legitimation, repression, material support, and signaling, and then explains how these may serve regime survival. This perspective has been extremely valuable in identifying the diverse ways authoritarian regional organizations can support incumbent regimes. My paper approaches the problem from the other direction. Rather than asking how a particular remedy benefits an authoritarian regime, I ask which kinds of regime challenges activate organizational responses.
The advantage of this challenge-driven approach is that it introduces variation that the broad notion of “regime survival” cannot provide. Parliamentary and presidential elections, constitutional referenda, mass protests, and cross-border clashes all create different kinds and degrees of vulnerability. These differences allow us to ask which types of challenges are associated with an organizational response, in this case through collective signaling in the form of joint statements.
What do you mean by collective signaling?
I use “collective signaling” in the sense developed in the international relations and crisis-signaling literature: communication intended to shape how others perceive the resolve, cohesion, or support of the sender. In the CSTO context, the signal can lie simply in member states appearing together and speaking collectively. The content of a joint statement does not necessarily have to address the domestic challenge directly. It may discuss CSTO cooperation or broader regional and international developments. What matters is the visible display of regional backing for the challenged party, which can reassure domestic elites, discourage opposition mobilization, and signal to external actors that the incumbent regime is not isolated.
A novel part of your paper is its research design. Tell us about the data, how you collected it, and the basic outlines of the model you test.
I built a country-year dataset covering Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan from 2002 to 2021 and five types of challenge that authoritarian regimes might face: war or cross-border clashes; presidential elections; parliamentary elections; constitutional referenda; and mass protests. I compiled these data manually from national electoral authorities, international monitoring organizations, and regional and international news sources. The dependent variable is the number of joint statements issued by the CSTO in a given year, collected from the organization’s official website.
Because CSTO statements are collective outputs, I do not treat any particular statement as a direct response to a particular country or event. Instead, each country-year records whether a member regime faced each of the five types of challenge, while the outcome measures the overall number of CSTO joint statements issued that year. The design therefore looks for systematic associations across countries and over time rather than assuming a one-to-one correspondence between individual events and statements.
Because the dependent variable is a count and is over-dispersed, I use a negative binomial regression with country fixed effects. I first estimate whether each type of challenge is associated with the frequency of CSTO collective signaling and then introduce interactions with mass protests to examine whether protests condition the organizational response to other types of challenge.
You find that the CSTO responded to some challenges but not others. What accounts for those differences in your view, and what does it tell us more generally about what such organizations do? What are the next steps in this research agenda, both for you and the community of scholars working on illiberal regimes and global governance?
The clearest finding is that the CSTO does not respond uniformly to different kinds of challenges. Cross-border wars or military clashes, parliamentary elections, and mass protests are all associated with increased collective signaling, whereas I find no statistically significant effect for presidential elections or constitutional referenda. The differences are also substantively sizable. In the baseline model, the expected number of CSTO joint statements is roughly twice as high when a member experiences a war or cross-border clash, around 68 percent higher in years with parliamentary elections, and around 59 percent higher in years with mass protests.
The differences probably reflect how particular challenges affect authoritarian vulnerability. Parliamentary elections can create greater openings for opposition participation and competition without directly confronting the incumbent leader. Presidential elections, by contrast, are usually much more tightly controlled, while referenda often function largely as formal exercises with relatively little political contestation. Mass protests and cross-border clashes are different again: they directly challenge regimes whose legitimacy rests heavily on narratives of stability, security, and effective rule.
But these challenges also matter for the organization itself. Cross-border clashes fall directly within the CSTO’s security remit and can test its credibility as a collective security organization. Political instability within a member state can likewise raise questions about regional cohesion and the organization’s capacity to support its members. Collective signaling therefore serves not only the immediate interests of the challenged regime but can also allow the organization to demonstrate solidarity, cohesion, and relevance. These interpretations remain tentative, but they suggest that what matters is not simply whether a challenge occurs, but what kind of vulnerability it creates for both the member state and the regional organization.
My next step takes this contingency further by examining what I call “under-signaling”: cases in which the CSTO signals less than the model developed in my earlier paper would predict given the challenges a member state is facing. In a coauthored manuscript currently in the publication pipeline, we use the first model as a baseline to identify such cases and then ask whether apparent under-signaling in the CSTO is related to political communication taking place through another overlapping regional organization, the CIS. In particular, we examine CIS security-related document activity together with leadership turnover in member states.
We find that when leadership turnover coincides with heightened security-document activity in the CIS, CSTO under-signaling becomes more likely. We interpret this as a conditional pattern of venue substitution. In other words, what appears as reduced signaling through the CSTO may not necessarily mean that regional communication has diminished; instead, it may have shifted to a different institutional venue.
For the broader scholarly community, a key next step is to understand authoritarian international cooperation as something more varied and conditional than a simple regime-support function. That means paying closer attention to how particular political challenges trigger collective responses from authoritarian regional organizations and why similar challenges can produce different responses across overlapping organizations and regional contexts.
Murad Nasibov is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Political Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany. Over the past five years, he has contributed to two large Horizon Europe research consortia on EU democracy support (SHAPEDEM-EU and REDEMOS), as well as a German Research Foundation–funded project on post-Soviet Eurasian regionalism. He is currently researching whitewashing in states’ qualitative reports on their implementation of and compliance with Council of Europe treaties, as part of a project led by Andrea Gawrich and funded by the Hessen Ministry of Culture and Science.
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