New Questions and Insights from the Launch of IGCC’s Climate-Democracy Incubator

Introduction

The workshop “Climate Change, Green Backlash, and Democracy” brought together scholars from diverse disciplines to discuss two interconnected challenges: the rise of green backlash and the broader consequences of climate change for democracy. One of the key takeaways from our discussions was that, while we have made significant progress in understanding these issues, there remains a critical gap in our knowledge about how climate change will shape the future of democratic institutions.

The discussion on green backlash highlighted how opposition to climate policies is not just about economic costs or ideological differences, but is deeply tied to broader political dynamics. Climate action is increasingly becoming a wedge issue, fueling polarization and distrust in democratic institutions. We explored how climate-related disinformation campaigns, elite politicization of climate policy, and public anxiety about economic transitions have contributed to resistance against environmental policies. This resistance is not only delaying meaningful climate action but also reshaping politics—eroding support for mainstream parties and amplifying populist and anti-pluralist narratives. One critical question that emerged is whether green backlash is primarily driven by top-down elite mobilization or if it also reflects genuine bottom-up grievances. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for developing strategies to counteract backlash without deepening societal divides.

Beyond green backlash, the broader conversation on climate change and democracy underscored the multifaceted ways in which environmental disruptions are already challenging democratic governance. Climate change is not just an environmental crisis—it is a systemic shock that exacerbates existing social and economic inequalities, strains institutions, and tests the adaptability of democratic systems. As extreme weather events, resource scarcity, and climate-induced migration increase, democratic governments will face growing pressures that could either reinforce or undermine their legitimacy. The discussions at the workshop highlighted concerns about whether democracies are institutionally equipped to handle these disruptions or if they are particularly vulnerable to instability, political radicalization, and authoritarian tendencies.

A key debate revolved around whether the political consequences of climate change resemble other crises, such as economic downturns or security threats, or if they introduce unique challenges that make democratic responses more difficult. While lessons can certainly be drawn from past political crises, climate change presents a sustained, compounding challenge that does not follow a single shock-and-recovery cycle. This raises questions about the long-term resilience of democratic institutions. What conditions make democracies more or less capable of responding effectively to climate stress? Can policy interventions to mitigate climate effects inadvertently backfire, deepening political instability rather than alleviating it?

The workshop showed the urgent need for interdisciplinary collaboration on these topics. While green backlash and the political effects of climate change have been studied separately, they are deeply interwoven and need to be analyzed in conjunction. Climate change is increasingly shaping political competition, while democratic backsliding can hinder effective climate governance—creating a perverse feedback loop with significant consequences for the future of democratic institutions. The workshop made it clear that these issues require a more systematic approach, one that moves beyond isolated case studies to understand the global dynamics at play.

Moving forward, these discussions have influenced my thinking in fundamental ways. They reinforced the need to consider not only how democracies can respond to climate change, but how climate change is altering the very nature of democratic politics. The challenge is not just about designing better climate policies but about ensuring that democratic institutions remain resilient in the face of mounting environmental and political pressures. This workshop was a step toward building a more comprehensive research agenda on these issues, and I look forward to continuing these critical conversations.

Christina Schneider is co-director of IGCC’s Future of Democracy initiative and professor of political science at UC San Diego.

Negotiating Trade-Offs at the Heart of Climate Change’s Two-Level Problem

Climate change is the quintessential “two-level” problem: it requires solutions at the international level that are consistent with constraints faced by governments at the domestic level—constraints that make many of the best policy options impossible for political reasons. Much of the most interesting research on climate change recognizes and grapples with these domestic-international interactions.

The workshop convinced me that democracy and climate change are fundamentally intertwined in ways that matter for international cooperation. Although global climate cooperation has been led by Western democracies for the last three decades, some of this leadership role has been ceded to autocratic states in recent years. I plan to investigate this possible shift away from democratic leadership in the global climate regime, and to consider its implications for the nature and quality of global climate governance in the coming decades.

The workshop demonstrated the value of bringing together scholars from different disciplines, and with diverse expertise, to discuss a set of common issues with obvious importance for policy and real-world outcomes. I am grateful to IGCC for providing such a productive forum for exchange. Our discussions pointed to many possibilities for collaboration and pathbreaking research.

Alexander Thompson is professor of political science and a senior fellow of the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University.

Is Climate Impacting Democracy from the Top-Down or Bottom-Up?

Climate change and democratic erosion are two major challenges facing countries around the world, yet we know relatively little about how these two phenomena interact. To the extent that the connections between climate politics and democratic outcomes have been studied, the emphasis has been primarily on voters and public opinion, with far less attention paid to elites and democratic institutions. Specifically, the focus has been on public support—or lack thereof—for policies designed to address climate change and, relatedly, the determinants of individual attitudes regarding climate science. In some cases, opposition to climate-related policies and initiatives has been linked to increased support for far-right populists, who have in many cases adopted platforms hostile toward climate-friendly policies.

While voter preferences are undoubtedly an important factor linking climate policy to the quality and strength of democracy, a more complete understanding of how climate change impacts democracy requires greater attention to its effects on democratic institutions. Theories of democratic backsliding have repeatedly emphasized that democracy ultimately “erodes from the top” when political elites deliberately disassemble democratic institutions as citizens stand passively by. But what effect, if any, do climate policies and the other consequences of climate change have on executive power, the structure of party systems, and the relative strength of legislatures and judiciaries? Is there evidence that efforts to address climate change impact the domestic institutional balance of power? What effects do these issues have on party platforms and more broadly the representative channels linking citizens and the state?

Disentangling how climate policies impact—and in turn are influenced by—democratic institutions will be a critical step toward assessing the consequences of climate policies for democracy.

Anna Meyerrose is an assistant professor at the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University.

Amid Discouraging Developments, Reasons for Optimism

It was exciting to see the study of climate politics continue to spread to international relations and other subfields in political science, and, conversely, how climate scholars see the importance of engaging with political scientists. While some of our substantive takeaways may have been dire and dispiriting—such as the seeming inevitability of green backlash across the globe, or the enduring power of entrenched interests—it was reassuring to witness genuine scholarly enthusiasm for research to identify the central ways that politics impacts climate policy and climate change impacts politics. Having a larger base of scholars across disciplines will be critical in this aim.

At the close of the workshop, there was still disagreement over what exactly constitutes green backlash—whether it applies more narrowly to a reversion of enacted policies, or more broadly to any opposition to climate policies yet to be implemented or even proposed. Another big question was how green backlash differs or does not differ from other kinds of policy backlash. While the answer is far from settled, there was much enthusiasm for research to investigate this question and its implications for the drivers of green backlash and its consequences for democracy.

Finally, perhaps the most consensus was on the importance of collaboration: whether it be creating teams of researchers to conduct large-scale simulations combining climate models with political science theories, or to establish and maintain multicountry public opinion panels in a “climate barometer,” or on the assembly of global databases tracking climate action. Indeed, future workshops will be essential to inspire and facilitate successful collaboration.

Paasha Mahdavi is associate professor of political science and affiliated professor of environmental science and management, director of the Energy Governance and Political Economy (EGApe) lab, and co-founder of the 2035 Initiative at UC Santa Barbara.

Climate Change and Democratic Erosion Risk Becoming a Vicious Circle

The workshop was an extremely engaging and productive conversation. I was struck by how many of the processes that we discussed had the characteristics of a vicious circle.

Two seem worth highlighting as major takeaways. First, there seemed to be a consensus that, as an outcome of green backlash, anti-climate—often anti-democratic—politicians are more likely to be elected, leading to relatively more unchecked climate change. This in turn will lead to further instability that may make these leaders more likely to hold power. There was some disagreement about whether “green backlash” is the right way to think about this phenomenon, since many anti-climate politicians have been elected for reasons other than climate. The end result may be the same, however, and one important conclusion from the workshop is that the mere threat of a green backlash hinders climate policy as much as its actual manifestation.

The second vicious circle is that climate shocks are likely to lead to political instability and potential regime change that make enacting meaningful climate mitigation more difficult, exacerbating the frequency of severity of those same climate shocks.

Identifying these two related vicious circles was eye-opening. A ripe area for future analysis is asking what can break these dynamics. What has disrupted vicious circles in the past? Might technological breakthroughs, or perhaps the direct experience of increasingly severe climate impacts, help shift the outcomes? As other attendees pointed out from historical cases, green backlash is not inevitable. Identifying and understanding cases where it has not manifested seems critical to shaping a politics that will avoid these negative outcomes moving forward.

Austin Beacham is a postdoctoral fellow at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

Digging into the Causes and Consequences of Green Backlash

This was a very insightful conversation with a range of scholars. The key questions of the conference, around green backlash and the impacts of climate change on democracy, are understudied and incredibly important. Green backlash—and perhaps, more importantly, how to design green policies to minimize backlash—has been in my own crosshairs for a while. The workshop did a great job at surfacing a broad set of sources and consequences of green backlash. While I am skeptical that either climate policies or climate change itself is actively eroding democratic governance in favor of authoritarianism, there are certainly some sources of concern. I am personally more worried about the fracturing of democratic regimes, which could lead towards less democratic systems. This is an excellent area for sustained theoretical and careful empirical work.

Dustin Tingley is the Thomas D. Cabot professor of public policy at Harvard University.

Local Action, Global Challenge

As my work has not centered on climate change, I learned a tremendous amount at the workshop. The interaction with scholars of international relations, climate politics, and climate science created an outstanding conversation.

Two facets of the conversation stood out. First, I was struck by how much excellent work has been done on the topic—including by many people in the room—and how new the field is. This means we need to figure out how to coordinate efforts on data collection and generating initial conceptual frameworks.

Second, we spoke very little about the international cooperation challenges for addressing climate change, focusing instead on the domestic obstacles. This was certainly appropriate, but it was also ironic given that the group was centered around scholars of international relations. It just drives home how complex the issue of climate change is to academics and policymakers alike.

Jon Pevehouse is Mary Herman Rubinstein professor of international relations and political methodology. He is also the development chair of the University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Political Science Department.

Five Key Questions Raised

The workshop highlighted key areas of debate and missing perspectives that warrant further exploration. In particular, five discussion themes resonated.

The first was on what far-right parties’ entry into the political mainstream means for democracy and climate policy. This conversation has shaped how I think about the early weeks of the Trump administration, particularly in terms of how these parties frame climate policies, often using them as a wedge issue to mobilize broader opposition to liberal democracy itself.

Second was the debate over whether there has been a genuine backlash to green policies. Some participants argued that public resistance to climate policies, along with the rise of populist leaders, reflects a clear backlash. Others believed that opposition to green policies was largely incidental, driven by broader political or economic concerns rather than direct resistance to environmental action. A third perspective suggested that the idea of backlash itself was overstated, with climate policies continuing to advance despite political turbulence. My own view is that there is a broader, real trend against democracy, and green politics have become caught up in that dynamic.

A significant gap in our discussion was the absence of perspectives from the countries most affected by climate change. This is an issue that needs much more attention in future discussions, as perspectives from the Global South and frontline communities could challenge some of our assumptions and offer a more global understanding of how climate change interacts with governance. Without incorporating these voices, we risk having an incomplete or distorted picture of the political consequences of climate change.

Another issue that resonated was the debate around whether climate change leads to democratic breakdown. While some participants speculated that climate change could destabilize autocratic regimes by creating new pressures on governance, I remain skeptical. I strongly believe that climate change and democratic backsliding are connected, but primarily in one direction. Climate-induced economic crises, resource scarcity, and migration can erode democratic norms, particularly when leaders exploit these crises to justify restrictive policies. But democratic breakdown does not necessarily accelerate climate change in the same way.

Finally, I was struck by how much of the discussion focused on mitigation rather than adaptation. This may reflect participants’ expertise, but it also suggests an underlying optimism that the worst effects of climate change can still be prevented. While mitigation remains crucial, I think more attention should be given to adaptation, particularly given the inevitability of certain climate impacts. A more balanced approach could help address the realities of a changing climate.

William Nomikos is assistant professor of political science and director of the Data-driven Analysis of Peace Project (DAPP) lab at UC Santa Barbara.

Climate Change Isn’t Just an Environmental Problem—It’s a Political One

One of my biggest takeaways from the workshop was that the places most affected by climate change are also the most at risk of democratic decline. Climate change isn’t just an environmental problem—it’s a political one. Many of our discussions focused on how climate disasters can weaken democracy. When people lose trust in government, they may turn to violence or stop participating in the democratic processes. But we do not have nearly enough research on how climate impacts shape political attitudes and behaviors, particularly in low-income settings where climate shocks will be worst.

If climate shocks lead to frustration with leaders or a breakdown in social trust, they could open the door for authoritarian responses and violence. Our discussions also revealed that we know very little about how to address the risk of democratic decline in the face of climate impacts.

This raises important questions that could be the focus of a broad and collective research agenda. Can foreign aid help? Does better disaster preparedness make people more likely to trust their government? How can public investment in adaptation protect both lives and democratic institutions in the face of growing impact? I was encouraged to see the academic community come together to think about promising research approaches to address these fundamental questions.

Mark Buntaine is a professor at the Bren School of Environmental Science & Management at UC Santa Barbara.

More Data and More Perspectives Are Still Needed

I left the conference with three key takeaways. First, we cannot ignore the politicization of climate policy. While this isn’t new, policy entrepreneurs continue to leverage environmental policies to advance ideological agendas, and the strategic utility of supporting or denouncing environmental policy will continue to expand.

Second, it’s hard to measure support for or opposition to climate-related policies. Just as in the study of migration, politicization shapes public perceptions and responses. Similarly, the costs and benefits of climate policies are different for different people—elites versus the public, individuals versus groups. And they may require high costs for people today with only uncertain benefits later. All these things complicate how we understand people’s approval or disapproval of green policies.

Finally, we must not ignore that the study of democracies and regime change has mainly been shaped by examples and scholars from the Global North. Whereas the Global North had until recently not felt the full effects of poor environmental policies, developing countries are all too familiar with droughts, floods, pollution, water contamination, and other climate-related events that exacerbate domestic tensions, deteriorate institutions and infrastructure, and lead to migration. Scholars must actively engage with communities directly affected by the implementation—or retraction—of environmental protections.

Perhaps the most pressing challenge will be defining green backlash and its implications for democracy. Understanding how backlash operates—whether as an organized movement or a more diffuse set of reactions—requires balancing normative concerns with empirical rigor. Defining green backlash too broadly risks diluting its analytical usefulness, while defining it too narrowly may obscure critical threats to democratic governance. Striking this balance will be essential for future research.

Jesús Rojas Venzor is a 2024–25 IGCC dissertation fellow and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego.

The Battle Between Climate Winners and Losers Heats Up

The most important takeaway for me is the notion that we must strive to improve democratic resilience in the face of emerging threats. Climate change poses myriad threats to human security. While this requires international coordination to address, governments must also be prepared to meet the challenges posed by escalating natural disasters, food insecurity, and other climate impacts.

An intriguing discussion focused on how resistance to the green transition manifests domestically, with coalitions of “winners” and “losers” fighting over how the costs and benefits are distributed from the shift to new industries. How much of this green backlash can we trace back to talking points from politicians or economic elites, and how much of it is by citizens who stand to lose economically in this transition?

While emerging research shows there is genuine resistance from citizens impacted by the transition, at the workshop, there was great consensus that populist and anti-pluralist leaders have co-opted the green backlash to foster nationalist sentiment in the name of protecting domestic industries.

Moving from brown to green industries necessarily entails risk. Few countries want to be first movers if that means going it alone, allowing other industrialized countries to free ride and benefit from decreasing competition. Understanding how to bolster democratic resilience in the face of genuine green backlash that has been co-opted by nationalists is critical to ensuring equitable and responsive reactions to the emerging threats posed by climate change.

Evan Mann is a PhD student in UC San Diego’s Department of Political Science and School of Global Policy and Strategy.