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The Shadow of the Thucydides Trap after China’s Fifth Plenum

November 05, 2026
James Lee

Blog
James Lee headshot photo

Last week, the Chinese Communist Party concluded its Fifth Plenum, part of a series of secretive meetings convened by each Central Committee to deliberate on prospective five-year plans. Although five-year plans typically focus on economic issues rather than political and military issues, the focus of the Fifth Plenum was on purges aimed at cementing Xi Jinping’s control over the Communist Party and punishing party members perceived to be disloyal. Among the senior officials targeted by the purge, more than half were from the upper echelons of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), suggesting a lack of confidence in the military on Xi’s part and leading analysts to conclude that a military conflict with Taiwan is less likely in the near term.

But the so-called “Davidson window” of a potential PRC invasion of Taiwan is looming. This term was coined in 2021 after Admiral Philip S. Davidson, then-commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, indicated a timeline—centered around 2027—during which the PLA could possess the military capability to attempt an invasion of Taiwan. Washington and Beijing are still incorporating this date in their planning as a way to assess the readiness of their respective militaries for great power conflict. After all, it will be impossible for the PRC to achieve Xi’s plan for a so-called “rejuvenation” if it engages in a costly and devastating war with Taiwan, the United States, and U.S. allies and partners. Even so, with both China and the United States actively preparing for war, the end of this decade is likely to be marked by ongoing (and even pronounced) tension between Washington and Beijing in the Taiwan Strait.

In this context, it is worth considering how insightful political science theory can be as a guide for the future. One theory that has been particularly prominent in public debates is the “Thucydides Trap,” a term coined by Harvard professor Graham Allison and cited by Xi as recently as May 2026, following Xi’s summit with President Trump in Beijing. The Thucydides Trap is a revival of power transition theory, a school of thought established by scholars such as A.F.K. Organski, Robert Gilpin, and Paul Kennedy about how rising powers come into conflict with established powers. It is associated with Thucydides because of his argument in the History of the Peloponnesian War that, contrary to the publicly stated cause of the war, the “truest cause” was “the rise of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta.”

But the association between Thucydides and power transition theory is more tenuous than it might seem. As I have argued elsewhere, the connection between Thucydides and power transition theory has been inadvertently exaggerated by translators who weren’t thinking of political science theory. Perhaps the most important difference between Thucydides and power transition theorists lies in how they consider agency and structure. The Thucydides Trap and other formulations of power transition theory place considerable emphasis on structure—exogenous changes in the distribution of material capabilities, often resulting from differential rates of economic growth—as an explanation for war. Thucydides also considered structural change, but his account of the events leading to the Peloponnesian War placed considerable emphasis on agency as well. Individual leaders such as Themistocles and Pericles were responsible for the expansion of the Athenian Empire and the eventual outbreak of war, suggesting that war could have been avoided under different leadership making different strategic choices.

What kinds of strategic choices can the United States make to avoid war with China? Part of the answer can be found in Thucydides. As I have argued, Thucydides’ explanation of the cause of the war centered on Athens’ acquisition of the necessary capabilities for what, in modern terms, would be classified as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy centered on denying freedom of access to and maneuver in the operational area of the Aegean Sea. Sparta failed to counter this strategy until all of its requisite elements were in place, giving the Athenians the confidence to refuse the Spartan ultimatum to rescind the Megarian Decree and ultimately leading to the outbreak of the war.

Applied to U.S. strategy, the lesson of Thucydides is not to make the same mistakes that the Spartans made, and to continue investing in the capabilities, alliances, and partnerships that will deter Beijing from using force or coercion. With the Fifth Plenum seeming to indicate that Xi lacks confidence in his party, his government, and his military, the United States can prevent war by making it prohibitively costly for the Chinese Communist Party.

James Lee is an assistant research fellow/professor at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, and an affiliated researcher at IGCC.

Thumbnail credit: Wikimedia Commons

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