Africa in the Shifting Global Order

Lindsay: Hi, this is Lindsay Shingler, the host of Talking Policy. I’m proud to share that the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation is partnering with the University of California Press to take on the editorial management of Current History, one of America’s oldest journals of contemporary global affairs. The July issue, our first issue as editors, is now available online and free to read.

On this episode of Talking Policy, we’re excited to feature an interview between Steph Haggard, IGCC research director and Current History senior editor, and Folashadé Soulé, a scholar of international relations who contributed an essay in the latest issue, on “Africa in the Shifting Global Order.”

We are so happy to be able to share some of the fresh voices and insights from Current History with you here on Talking Policy. I hope you enjoy the conversation.

Steph: Greetings, everyone. My name is Stephan Haggard. I’m research director at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. And here today we’re talking with Folashadé Soulé, who is a senior research associate at the Blavatnik School at Oxford and a visiting scholar at the University of Ghana. She’s written widely on the international relations of Africa, and Africa’s relations with China and other parts of the Global South, and she contributed a terrific essay to the current edition of Current History on Africa’s position in the global order.

Folashadé, welcome to Talking Policy.

Folashadé: Thank you. Thank you, Steph, for having me.

Steph: One of the things we like to do is make it personal. How did you come to study the international relations of Africa? It’s a continent that frequently is adopted by development specialists and political economists, but the international relations is something we need to pick up, obviously.

Folashadé: Yes. Well, my interest first in international relations, more globally, stems from my own personal background. I come from a family of global citizens, and this has shaped my trajectory. I was born in the Netherlands, raised in Benin in West Africa, studied in France, and held different visiting PhD positions as a PhD student in South Africa, India, Brazil, and the U.S. as part of my field research.

But during my graduate years in France, there were almost no courses on Africa’s international relations [IR]. Traditionally, in the French context, the ‘Africanists’, as they are called, approached the study of Africa via a blend of sociology, political science, and anthropology. So the IR focus was very scarce, and that was already a frustration.

The exception to this came during my master’s year in international relations when I had the opportunity to attend a course on “Multilateralism: Perspectives from the Global South”, and that was co-taught by my then-thesis supervisor, Professor Bertrand Badie. This class provided the students with a very strong multidisciplinary focus, bringing in what I was looking for, the international relations of Africa from a historical, political, economic and social perspective. So it’s building on this background that most of my notable writings on Africa’s international relations, and more specifically negotiations with new strategic partners, came out.

My recent research focuses on African foreign policy analysis, diplomacy studies, and as you mentioned earlier, the study of agency in Africa’s international relations.  The underlying objective is really to provide a multi-sided perspective that reflects the voices, the strategies, the foreign policy practices of African actors. The goal is not to replace Global North perspectives with Global South perspectives per se, but to come up with a more global IR perspective and explain how various strategies and perspectives are also shaping global international relations.

Steph: Well, look, let me ask you a very wide lens question. The global agenda is super crowded at the moment. You have the war in Ukraine, you’ve got Gaza, you’ve got great power competition, you’ve got the Chinese.

What is the agenda of Africa in the international order at the moment? Can we even talk about an African agenda?

Folashadé: Well, I would say that you need to go back into history to understand better the present state of the world. And this also applies to the African context.

Africa’s role and position currently in this global order is very much marked by active participation in multilateral institutions, but also by critiques of the system’s hypocrisies and power imbalances.  The criticism of the liberal order by African state[s] is often that this order is seen as a tool for Western intervention in the Global South that fails to hold powerful nations accountable, while enforcing norms on weaker states.

In that context, as a result, African countries have acted very strategically, and they are still continuing to do so. They have sought out alternative partnerships, economic partnerships, political ones, security ones beyond the West, and also work to contest and balance and shape the global order and their role in it. And they have done so by using regional bodies to manage crises, assert their interest, and also lead efforts to reform the system in a more just way.

But today, in 2026, we can see that African countries are in a stronger position to define the terms of their political and economic engagement in the world. There’s an abundance of natural and human resources, including critical minerals. And as the global order shifts, the rise of alternative non-Western powers like China as key partners is allowing African countries to challenge these conditions that are tied to Western aid and loans by international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and to negotiate more flexible development and security agreements.

Now, these agreements are not always very well negotiated. And in some cases, we can ask ourselves whether we are not seeing some shifting dependencies here. But, yes, we are living in an age of choice, and it is certain that African actors will use this opportunity while at the same time trying to address the asymmetries of the international system.

Steph: Yeah, one of the things I found particularly interesting about your essay is that I think Africa is frequently identified with a critique of the international order. But at the same time, one of the things your essay brings out is a preoccupation and interest in law, in making sure there are rules, exactly as the United States, the hegemon, is abandoning its commitment to multilateralism. It seems like Africa is standing up in important ways to pick up those ideas.

Am I interpreting you correctly?

Folashadé: Yes. International law has often been used as a tool that African states are regularly mobilizing when they seek to reshape the international order from a historical perspective. The evolution of some of the normative proposals that were advanced by African states in the context of the new international economic order shows how these states used international law to attempt to rebalance international economic relations and address structural asymmetries. In this respect, their work within the United Nations General Assembly was substantial.

But these initiatives also have certain limits. They are mostly carried out through the United Nations General Assembly, whose role is more normative than legally binding. And, as a result, the resolutions that were adopted in the ’60s carried significant political weight, but their binding force was limited, so African states sought to build a stronger legal framework in order to make their claims more effective.

Steph: So can you tell us a little bit about what norms Africa was seeking to advance?

Folashadé: What they were seeking to advance was mostly strict interpretations of non-intervention and sovereignty. You need to put this in historical context. We are talking here about a set of countries, a large set of countries that just gained independence. So it was very important to them to have this attachment to this strict interpretation and to contribute to the formation of rules of customary international law that would eventually acquire also binding force.

Steph: Yeah. And what about Ukraine? Is it worth talking about that briefly?

I remember a very moving speech that, if I remember correctly, was given by the Kenyan foreign minister, that basically talked about how the Ukraine action on the part of Russia was not the way that the international regime should be going. Did I read that correctly?

Folashadé: Yes, on Ukraine, it’s an important example here because the African perspectives on the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they are complex, but they also constitute an effort to maintain balance within the international legal order.

African countries have played a substantial role in shaping and supporting the prohibition against the use of force. But there was a reluctance of many African states to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and that has raised significant questions, especially based on this history.

But it’s important to indicate that it doesn’t mean that there’s a substantive shift from their traditionally strict interpretation of the rule prohibiting the use of force. They also don’t indicate approval or tacit endorsement of Russia’s action. So it is more accurately a refusal, in the global context, to align uncritically with Western narratives about the conflict and an assertion of their own agency.

Steph: Yeah, that’s interesting.

Let’s go back to the historical ground that you trace in your essay. One of the things that you say there that I think is interesting is the advanced industrial states or, you know, the Global North tends to see the Cold War in terms of the emergence of great power competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.

And of course, from the perspective of the Global South, the most important set of developments in the post-war period is decolonization. That’s a major focus naturally of both states that have become independent, but also those that were still seeking their independence. And you go back to the origins of the Non-Aligned Movement in your essay.

Can you say a little bit about what the Non-Aligned Movement was, what its objectives were, and how it ties to Africa’s current position in the international order?

Folashadé: Yeah, as you put it correctly, the international system as we know it today evolved out of a post-World War II world in which former colonies in Africa, South America, and Asia were gaining independence.

While power was simultaneously being centralized into these two competing blocs, East versus West, that vied for influence over the newly independent states of Africa and reducing them to pawns on the chessboard of international relations, it’s also during that period that ideas of the Third World was born, and then this dichotomy of North and South.

But coming to the Non-Alignment Movement—and before that, the 1955 Bandung Conference was initiated. The idea was really for these recently independent African states to implement a series of strategies of resistance through the formation of groups and coalitions. The Bandung Conference in 1955, which is a bit different from the Non-Alignment Movement, was a groundbreaking meeting in Indonesia that convened nearly two dozen Asian and African nations during a period when many African states were actually still under colonial administration.

Six African states, Egypt, Ghana, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Liberia participated and signified Africa’s burgeoning political agency and its resolve to act as an equal partner in constructing a post-colonial international framework. he Non-Alignment Movement, which was launched in Belgrade in 1961 brought also several of these countries together, and the ideas of Pan-Africanism played a pivotal role in African diplomacy by offering these independent states a platform to avoid Cold War entanglements and counter new colonial influences.

Non-alignment is a foreign policy doctrine that is often mistaken for a stance of rigid neutrality. But it actually allowed African countries to take positions on pressing issues of importance to them, particularly around sovereignty and non-interference, disarmament, economic development, poverty eradication. And it served as a diplomatic safeguard, enabling African countries to retain autonomy and resist participation in military blocs led by the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

Steph: Yeah, I’ve read accounts of Bandung, as I’m sure you have. And whenever I read them, I think of how incredibly exciting it must have been to have this collection of states that previously hadn’t coordinated at all. I mean, most coordination efforts prior to that time had occurred at the continental level or even sub-regional level. Some of them were imperial products in Africa, arrangements that had been set up by the British and the French. It was an incredible meeting, and the personnel, of course, who were there, it’s just striking.

Folashadé: I think that both the Bandung Conference and the Non-Alignment Conference and subsequent summits really represented not only a diplomatic milestone, but also foundational events in expressing a collective political vision in the aftermath of colonial subjugation and marginalization within very Eurocentric structures of power. But there were also other initiatives that followed. The Group of 77 was founded in 1964 as a developing country caucus at the United Nations. It still exists. And you had nations like Ghana, Egypt, and Algeria that were prominent in advancing Pan-Africanism with leaders like Kwame Nkrumah very much leveraging this moment to advocate for anti-apartheid policies, decolonization, sovereignty, and economic development. So this was very much a collective agency exercised by these nations.

Steph: Since you’ve mentioned Pan-Africanism, in the first new issue of Current History, we reviewed a fascinating political biography by Howard French of Nkrumah. And you have a personal connection to Ghana, as a visiting scholar at the University of Ghana, so I’m sure this is of personal as well as intellectual interest.

Can you speak a little bit about the legacy of Pan-Africanism? What was it? What were some of the debates? How is it still relevant for African thinking about international relations?

Folashadé: Yes, you can connect the history of Pan-Africanism with the idea of African unity. And the 1945 Pan-African Congress that took place in Manchester because it brought together not only the continent’s leaders, but also the diaspora, especially in the West Indies, also in the United States. So for people of African descent who had been separated from the continent, Africa became both a shared memory and a political idea. And that helped produce this vision of unity, even if many of its early advocates had limited direct experience of life in Africa itself.

But Pan-Africanism became more politically concrete after the Second World War as anti-colonial struggles intensified. The 1945 Congress helped turn Pan-Africanism into a language of decolonization and resistance. Under Kwame Nkrumah, that vision became even more ambitious, meaning Africa should not simply consist of independent states, but should move towards some form of political union. For Nkrumah, unity was the only way to protect real independence and prevent new forms of economic domination.

Bringing it back to the discussions on the global order, Pan-Africanism really mattered for African diplomacy because it gave these newly independent states not only a shared language, but also a sense of common purpose. It helped them avoid being pulled too deeply into Cold War rivalries while also pushing back against new forms of colonial influence. It was central also to campaigns against racism and apartheid in South Africa.

But that more radical vision quickly ran into political reality, as more African countries became independent. Some leaders disagreed over what unity should mean. Some favored a loose form of cooperation among sovereign states, while others wanted a much deeper political union such as the idea of the United States of Africa.

Critics argue that the language of Pan-Africanism can be misused by authoritarian leaders, as we see today in the Sahel, for instance, in West Africa. But others argue that the project has always been difficult because we’re talking here about 54 African states. They have different interests, and there are also limited mechanisms of collective accountability and varying levels of political will.

For many African leaders and citizens, Pan-Africanism still carries a very strong symbolic power. It may not always function as an organized political movement, but it continues to shape cultural life, public debates, and popular struggles for dignity and justice. So it is useful to see it today not only as a political program, but also a set of institutions, and something that has also become more pragmatic. The focus is less on grand ideological unity, but more on concrete goals, like deeper economic integration, making better use of Africa’s demographic strength, giving the continent a stronger voice in global forums.

And in that sense, Pan-Africanism remains relevant, but its meaning is now more about leverage, competitiveness, and collective influence in a changing global order.

Steph: Well, Folashadé, let’s look forward. My thinking is that Africa is not so much misunderstood, it’s more like it’s ignored. But you mention in your essay several things that I found really striking.

One is the demographic story, which is sometimes seen as a negative, but in fact could be a positive for Africa. You’ve still got robust population growth across the continent. Those are consumers, those are workers that are going to contribute to total output.

The diffusion of technology has been incredible. The cellphone has hit Africa for decades now and is in wide use. And then you’ve got all this mineral wealth, which plays into AI, and green technologies, and is extraordinarily important. How is Africa seeking to leverage these potential advantages in its diplomacy?

Folashadé: What we can see today is that there’s a clear shift in terms of the structural flows and relations between Africa and the world.

So over the last 25 years, South-South trade flows were one of the objectives of the new international economic order, to push for more trade flow between Africa and also rising economies. That has expanded dramatically, with trade between developing countries rising from roughly 15 to 20 percent, to over 40 percent of all trade according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development data, UNCTAD.

And in this context, the emergence of the so-called BRICS nations, together with other Asian economies has given African governments more leverage through options for trade and investment, helping them to diversify and lessen reliance on traditional partners.

Today, China, for instance, stands out as Africa’s largest trading partner and fifth largest source of investment. In 2025, trade between China and Africa reached nearly $350 billion. Africa’s trade is driven by demands, as you said, for critical minerals, but this also comes from markets like China, India, Brazil, and it provides a fast-growing alternative and leverage to traditional North-South economic ties centering on natural resources, manufacturing, and regional integration.

However, it’s important to also bring some nuance here, because most of Africa’s exports to Asia are industrial raw materials and fuel. In exchange, Africa increasingly imports affordable manufactured goods, technology, especially from Asia, making these household items more accessible. So this shift that I mentioned, while it helps African nations reduce reliance on Western economies and have more leverage, it also poses its own challenges with respect to diversification, by creating new dependencies, and also the pursuit of extractivist practices in Africa’s natural resources, especially when it comes now to critical minerals.

That is the big challenge here. How not only to be a continent that exports raw materials, but also to industrialize more, produce more technology. But this would imply, also, more investment from African governments in research and development, which is still at a very low level.

Steph:. There’s so much there to unpack. Let’s just pick up two final themes here, related to Africa’s international politics. One, you mentioned China, and of course, China has been very attentive and forward-looking in its relationship with Africa.

Has there been a backlash to China playing a role that in some ways looks neocolonial in its own right? Or am I exaggerating?

Folashadé: There has been a backlash, although the word neocolonial would not be the right term to use here from a political science perspective. Because we are talking here about independent states that are choosing solely and independently to engage with China. But we can see clearly some hegemonic practices going on.

It’s balanced. The positive perspectives on China say that China allows for partnership diversification, more accessible, more affordable trade.

But there are of course nuances to this. First of all, there are some countries that are in debt distress. And when there are external shocks like COVID, or the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war, then it becomes more difficult for them to reimburse. And many African citizens also consider that their countries are way too much indebted to China.

But I see the relationship changing. There’s more agency from African nations here at various levels to ask for more diversification, more investment, less loans, also more access to the Chinese market, which is not always easy.

It’s still [a] work in progress at the biannual FOCAC, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation meetings. The next one will take place in Brazzaville, in Congo. But there is where all these discussions are taking place and where we can see the different progresses that are being made beyond the big pledges that we often hear at these summits.

Steph: Folashadé, this conversation has been so instructive for me. I’ve really enjoyed talking to you, and want to recommend to our listeners your essay in Current History.

Let me close by asking a very general question. For those who don’t watch Africa, what do you think they’re missing? What is it that you would say requires the attention of anyone who’s interested in international relations, who wants to incorporate the African perspective?

Folashadé: I would say it is important to look more specifically at Africa’s role in shaping the shifting global order. African countries are increasingly positioning themselves as the set of strategic actors in this fragmented global system.

We can see this especially in the emphasis on resource sovereignty and the search for different partnerships. So it would be interesting to see in that context how Africa’s relationship with the international system will be that of a shaper and a challenger, but also a balancer. And in some areas also a leader, when it comes to international norms.

I think one of the key things to watch is how they will continue to challenge, balance, shape, within this disrupted global order, and to keep in mind that Africa’s role is not simply to say no to the existing order. It’s not only a naysayer. They’re also active players seeking to reshape that order and push it towards principles of justice and rules-based governance. That will be one of the most important and enduring features to watch in the current international moment.

And secondly, equally important is African public opinion. Afrobarometer is a leading African organization, and they carry out public opinion surveys regularly across the continent. They show that African citizens do not want their countries to be forced to choose between competing partners, whether that means the United States versus China, or Russia versus Ukraine. They tend to prefer engagement with different partners depending on national interests. For example, the 2024/25 survey that covered 38 African countries found that African citizens that had heard about the Russia-Ukraine war, more than 72 percent, said that their country should remain neutral.

So I think that the extent to which African diplomacy will reflect African citizens’ voice and opinions in this shifting global order is also a key component to observe.

Steph: Folashadé, again, thanks so much for joining us and taking the time from Accra. We look forward to seeing you again on Talking Policy.

Folashadé: Thank you so much, Stephan, for having me. I very much enjoyed it.