IGCC https://ucigcc.org Wed, 01 Jun 2022 23:39:47 +0000 en-US 1.2 https://ucigcc.org https://ucigcc.org 1 2 3 4 7 1 43 4 29 5 6 15 18 China’s rise as an advanced technological, innovation, and industrial powerhouse is one of the most profound developments of the 21st century and promises to reshape the global economic and technological order. IGCC research explores the implications of China’s rise and shifting geopolitical dynamics in Asia for the economic competitiveness and national security of the United States and the rest of the world. Our analysis and engagement spans geoeconomics, geopolitics, national security, the environment, defense modernization, technology, and innovation.]]> 40 19 20 China under Xi Jinping is a security-maximizing state that is building its power and prestige on an increasingly capable and expansive economic and technological foundation. Xi has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall agenda since taking charge in 2012. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state. Key areas of research in this space include Chinese security strategy, China’s relations with other major powers, and China’s efforts to modernize its defense innovation ecosystem. (Photo credit: Brandon Atkinson)  ]]> 35 23 16 36 (Photo credit: United Nations)]]> 25 7 13 8 21 12 24 22 IGCC’s research on regional security in the Asia-Pacific region investigates the regional security implications of more competitive Sino-American relations, Japan’s security policy towards China, the Republic of Korea’s security interests beyond the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia’s changing role in the midst of rising great-power competition, and new western security pacts in the region.]]> 17 14 9 45 26 st century aims to enhance understanding about competition in security, technology, innovation, and strategy; economic strategic rivalry; global supply chain dynamics; and the role of domestic politics and great power competition. (Photo credit: Eigenberg Fotografie)]]> 46 The rise of authoritarian regimes is reshaping global and regional organizations and posing challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Organizations once firmly under the control of democracies are being forced to manage authoritarian members. Elsewhere, regional organizations dominated by authoritarian members are cooperating in new ways. The latter problem is visible in Central Asia, where China and Russia play significant roles; in the Middle East; in Africa; in East and Southeast Asia; and even in the Western Hemisphere where democratic backsliding has challenged existing organizations.

Authoritarian organizations play roles as aid donors, election monitors, and even as partners with the west in counterterrorism and peacekeeping. The effect of authoritarian states on regional organizations is understudied, yet the entry of authoritarian regimes into democratic institutions—and particularly the outright control of such organizations—can augment the capabilities of autocratic powers, blunt prospects for democratic rule, and influence economic policy in ways that challenge an open world economy. This IGCC initiative catalogs the effects of authoritarian regimes and organizations on international cooperation, tracks the rising influence of autocratic institutions, and studies their activities and impact.

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23 Feb 2022 16:02:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=390 390 389 0 0 <![CDATA[Label]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=391 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:02:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=391 391 389 1 0 <![CDATA[Text]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=392 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:02:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=392 392 389 3 0 <![CDATA[Image]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=393 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:02:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=393 393 389 2 0 <![CDATA[Additional Text]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=394 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:02:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=394 394 389 5 0 <![CDATA[Brief Summary]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=398 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:10:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=398 398 120 5 0 <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=399 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:16:20 +0000 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18:58:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=450 450 120 0 0 <![CDATA[Guidance]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=451 Wed, 23 Feb 2022 18:58:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=451 451 120 1 0 <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential Large Image]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=508 Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:12:21 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=508 508 338 12 0 <![CDATA[SVG Icon]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=509 Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:12:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=509 509 203 2 0 <![CDATA[Alt Header]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=510 Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:12:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=510 510 203 3 0 <![CDATA[Featured]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=519 Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:11:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=519 519 338 0 0 <![CDATA[Featured Large]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=520 Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:11:45 +0000 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https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field-group&p=276 Thu, 17 Feb 2022 15:54:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field-group&p=276 276 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Homepage]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field-group&p=338 Mon, 21 Feb 2022 19:51:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field-group&p=338 338 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Report]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field-group&p=355 Tue, 22 Feb 2022 17:06:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=355 355 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Second Column Image]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=1316 Fri, 11 Mar 2022 20:12:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=1316 1316 389 4 0 <![CDATA[People]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=1513 Fri, 18 Mar 2022 00:47:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=1513 1513 252 6 0 <![CDATA[Related People]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=1514 Fri, 18 Mar 2022 00:47:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=acf-field&p=1514 1514 252 7 0 <![CDATA[Related Experts]]> 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https://ucigcc.org/events/conference-on-taiwans-security-and-domestic-politics/attachment/intl_security12x/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 17:39:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/intl_security1@2x.jpg 100 99 0 0 <![CDATA[cheung@2x]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/tai-ming-cheung/attachment/cheung2x/ Thu, 03 Feb 2022 14:14:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/cheung@2x.jpg 116 103 0 0 <![CDATA[cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=126 Fri, 04 Feb 2022 18:28:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/cheung.jpg 126 117 0 0 <![CDATA[news_geopolitics-book]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/geopolitics-supply-chains-and-international-relations-in-east-asia/attachment/news_geopolitics-book/ Sat, 05 Feb 2022 14:39:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/news_geopolitics-book.jpg 137 133 0 0 <![CDATA[news_trident-missile@2x]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/new-research-program-analyzes-public-perceptions-of-nuclear-weapons/attachment/news_trident-missile2x/ Sat, 05 Feb 2022 15:04:32 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/news_trident-missile@2x.jpg 144 141 0 0 <![CDATA[steph haggard_hi res_1]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/stephan-haggard/attachment/steph-haggard_hi-res_1/ Sat, 05 Feb 2022 20:12:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/steph-haggard_hi-res_1.jpg 148 146 0 0 <![CDATA[fellows_cottiero]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=151 Sat, 05 Feb 2022 20:15:16 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/fellows_cottiero.jpeg 151 149 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-working-paper_haggard-cottiero_aug-2021]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-rise-of-authoritarian-regional-international-organizations/attachment/igcc-working-paper_haggard-cottiero_aug-2021/ Sat, 05 Feb 2022 20:22:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-working-paper_haggard-cottiero_aug-2021.pdf 157 152 0 0 <![CDATA[img_rise-of-rios]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-rise-of-authoritarian-regional-international-organizations/attachment/img_rise-of-rios/ Sat, 05 Feb 2022 20:36:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/img_rise-of-rios.jpg 159 152 0 0 <![CDATA[james-lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/will-the-us-go-to-war-over-taiwan/attachment/james-lee/ Mon, 07 Feb 2022 18:56:34 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/james-lee.jpg 172 162 0 0 <![CDATA[news_ac-steven-lobell-aqua-2]]> https://ucigcc.org/news_ac-steven-lobell-aqua-2/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 14:49:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/news_ac-steven-lobell-aqua-2.jpg 184 0 0 0 <![CDATA[shirk]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/shirk/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:23:57 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/shirk.jpg 194 186 0 0 <![CDATA[rutherford]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/rutherford/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:24:22 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/rutherford.jpg 195 186 0 0 <![CDATA[money]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/money/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:25:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/money.jpg 196 186 0 0 <![CDATA[Helfand]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/helfand/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:26:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Helfand.jpg 197 186 0 0 <![CDATA[goldblum]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/goldblum/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:27:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/goldblum.jpg 198 186 0 0 <![CDATA[davidson_michael]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/davidson_michael/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:27:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/davidson_michael.jpg 199 186 0 0 <![CDATA[cowhey]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/cowhey/ Tue, 08 Feb 2022 15:27:54 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/cowhey.jpg 200 186 0 0 <![CDATA[intl-security]]> https://ucigcc.org/training/ppnt/attachment/intl-security/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 14:44:54 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/intl-security.jpg 205 425 0 0 <![CDATA[defense-transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/defense-transparency/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 15:47:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/defense-transparency.jpg 206 0 0 0 <![CDATA[defense-innovation-thumbnail]]> https://ucigcc.org/defense-innovation-thumbnail/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 16:03:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/defense-innovation-thumbnail.jpg 208 0 0 0 <![CDATA[defense-transparency-thumbnail]]> https://ucigcc.org/defense-transparency-thumbnail/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 16:04:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/defense-transparency-thumbnail.jpg 209 0 0 0 <![CDATA[maritime-futures-thumbnail]]> https://ucigcc.org/maritime-futures-thumbnail/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 16:04:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/maritime-futures-thumbnail.jpg 210 0 0 0 <![CDATA[nuclear-security-thumbnail]]> https://ucigcc.org/nuclear-security-thumbnail/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 16:06:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/nuclear-security-thumbnail.jpg 211 0 0 0 <![CDATA[strategy-deterrence-thumbnail]]> https://ucigcc.org/strategy-deterrence-thumbnail/ Wed, 09 Feb 2022 16:06:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/strategy-deterrence-thumbnail.jpg 212 0 0 0 <![CDATA[news_conflict-cooperation_thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=214 Thu, 10 Feb 2022 15:16:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/news_conflict-cooperation_thumb.jpg 214 117 0 0 <![CDATA[news_nuclear-weapons]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/new-research-program-analyzes-public-perceptions-of-nuclear-weapons/attachment/news_nuclear-weapons/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:27:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/news_nuclear-weapons.jpg 215 141 0 0 <![CDATA[news_rec-us-administration]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/attachment/news_rec-us-administration/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:38:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/news_rec-us-administration.jpg 216 186 0 0 <![CDATA[news_rise-authoritarian-rios]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-rise-of-authoritarian-regional-international-organizations/attachment/news_rise-authoritarian-rios/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:40:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/news_rise-authoritarian-rios.jpg 217 152 0 0 <![CDATA[news_geopolitics-globe]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/geopolitics-supply-chains-and-international-relations-in-east-asia/attachment/news_geopolitics-globe/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:48:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/news_geopolitics-globe.jpg 218 133 0 0 <![CDATA[news_china-us-taiwan]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/will-the-us-go-to-war-over-taiwan/attachment/news_china-us-taiwan/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:50:08 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/news_china-us-taiwan.jpg 219 162 0 0 <![CDATA[placeholder-image]]> https://ucigcc.org/placeholder-image/ Fri, 11 Feb 2022 15:18:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/placeholder-image.jpg 228 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Stocksy_comp_1178169_SanDiego]]> https://ucigcc.org/training/gp-workshop/attachment/stocksy_comp_1178169_sandiego/ Fri, 11 Feb 2022 16:00:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Stocksy_comp_1178169_SanDiego.jpg 244 232 0 0 <![CDATA[jeannette-money_hi-res_1]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jeannette-money/attachment/jeannette-money_hi-res_1/ Mon, 14 Feb 2022 18:48:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/jeannette-money_hi-res_1.jpg 265 263 0 0 <![CDATA[susan-shirk]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/susan-shirk/attachment/susan-shirk/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:10:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/susan-shirk.jpg 290 288 0 0 <![CDATA[etel-solingen]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/etel-solingen/attachment/etel-solingen/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:19:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/etel-solingen.jpg 293 291 0 0 <![CDATA[noel-foster]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/noel-foster/attachment/noel-foster-2/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:23:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/noel-foster.jpg 295 266 0 0 <![CDATA[anatol-klass]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/anatol-klass/attachment/anatol-klass/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:29:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/anatol-klass.jpg 298 296 0 0 <![CDATA[category-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/category-thumb/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 23:57:30 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/category-thumb.jpg 300 0 0 0 <![CDATA[news_shirk-part1]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=305 Fri, 18 Feb 2022 00:20:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/news_shirk-part1.jpg 305 303 0 0 <![CDATA[news_susan-shirk-igcc2]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=309 Fri, 18 Feb 2022 00:25:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/news_susan-shirk-igcc2.jpg 309 307 0 0 <![CDATA[timeline-example-image]]> https://ucigcc.org/about/attachment/timeline-example-image/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:04:51 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/timeline-example-image.jpg 395 273 0 0 <![CDATA[herb-york]]> https://ucigcc.org/about/attachment/herb-york/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:07:50 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/herb-york.jpg 396 273 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/tai-ming-cheung/attachment/igcc-tai-ming-cheung/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 21:37:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-tai-ming-cheung.jpg 453 103 0 0 <![CDATA[news_ac-steven-lobell-aqua]]> https://ucigcc.org/homepage/attachment/news_ac-steven-lobell-aqua/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 21:52:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/news_ac-steven-lobell-aqua.jpg 456 20 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-eli-berman]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/eli-berman/attachment/igcc-eli-berman/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 21:54:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-eli-berman.jpg 460 458 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-emilie-m-hafner-burton]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/emilie-m-hafner-burton/attachment/igcc-emilie-m-hafner-burton/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 22:08:32 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-emilie-m-hafner-burton.jpg 463 461 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-joshua-graff-zivin]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/joshua-graff-zivin/attachment/igcc-joshua-graff-zivin/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 22:19:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-joshua-graff-zivin.jpg 466 464 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-neil-narang]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/neil-narang/attachment/igcc-neil-narang/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 22:22:51 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-neil-narang.jpg 469 467 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-jeannette-money]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jeannette-money/attachment/igcc-jeannette-money/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:12:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-jeannette-money.jpg 470 263 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-alia-matanock]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/aila-matanock/attachment/igcc-alia-matanock/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:16:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-alia-matanock.jpg 474 472 0 0 <![CDATA[FPO]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/bronwyn-leebaw/attachment/fpo/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:23:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/FPO.jpg 477 475 0 0 <![CDATA[FPO]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/bronwyn-leebaw/attachment/fpo-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:26:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/FPO-1.jpg 478 475 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-christina-schneider]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/christina-schneider/attachment/igcc-christina-schneider/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:27:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-christina-schneider.jpg 481 479 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-courtney-conrad]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/courtenay-conrad/attachment/igcc-courtney-conrad/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:31:53 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-courtney-conrad.jpg 484 482 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-daniel-posner]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/daniel-n-posner/attachment/igcc-daniel-posner/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:36:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-daniel-posner.jpg 487 485 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-john-scott]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/john-scott/attachment/igcc-john-scott/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:40:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-john-scott.jpg 492 490 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-jonathan-robinson]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jonathan-robinson/attachment/igcc-jonathan-robinson/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:46:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-jonathan-robinson.jpg 495 493 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-kelsey-jack]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/kelsey-jack/attachment/igcc-kelsey-jack/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:52:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-kelsey-jack.jpg 498 496 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-mike-albertson]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/mike-albertson/attachment/igcc-mike-albertson/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:55:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-mike-albertson.jpg 501 499 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-stergios-skaperdas]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/stergios-skaperdas/attachment/igcc-stergios-skaperdas/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:58:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-stergios-skaperdas.jpg 504 502 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-t-j-pempel]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/t-j-pempel/attachment/igcc-t-j-pempel/ Thu, 24 Feb 2022 00:03:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-t-j-pempel.jpg 507 505 0 0 <![CDATA[icon-international-security]]> https://ucigcc.org/icon-international-security/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:13:34 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/icon-international-security.svg 511 0 0 0 <![CDATA[icon-asia]]> https://ucigcc.org/icon-asia/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:13:51 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/icon-asia.svg 512 0 0 0 <![CDATA[icon-environment]]> https://ucigcc.org/icon-environment/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:14:16 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/icon-environment.svg 513 0 0 0 <![CDATA[icon-nuclear]]> https://ucigcc.org/icon-nuclear/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:14:40 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/icon-nuclear.svg 514 0 0 0 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https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-eric-hagt.jpg 551 549 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-esteban-klor]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/esteban-klor/attachment/igcc-esteban-klor/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 21:38:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-esteban-klor.jpg 554 552 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-gerard-padro-i-miquel]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/gerard-padro-i-miguel/attachment/igcc-gerard-padro-i-miquel/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 21:40:39 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-gerard-padro-i-miquel.jpg 557 555 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-jacob-shapiro]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jacob-n-shapiro/attachment/igcc-jacob-shapiro/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:06:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-jacob-shapiro.jpg 560 558 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-joseph-felter]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/joseph-felter/attachment/igcc-joseph-felter/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:11:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-joseph-felter.jpg 565 563 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-kal-raustiala]]> 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https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-biana-freeman.jpg 615 613 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-chris-costello]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/chris-costello/attachment/igcc-chris-costello/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:37:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-chris-costello.jpg 618 616 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-frank-wyer]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/frank-wyer/attachment/igcc-frank-wyer/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:39:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-frank-wyer.jpg 621 619 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-juan-carlos-villasenor-derbez]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/juan-carlos-villasenor-derbez/attachment/igcc-juan-carlos-villasenor-derbez/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:41:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-juan-carlos-villasenor-derbez.jpg 624 622 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-ngoc-thoa-vinh-khuu]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/ngoc-thoa-vinh-khuu/attachment/igcc-ngoc-thoa-vinh-khuu/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:42:34 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-ngoc-thoa-vinh-khuu.jpg 627 625 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-phoebe-moon]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/phoebe-moon/attachment/igcc-phoebe-moon/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:52:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-phoebe-moon.jpg 630 628 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-raphael-frankfurter]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/raphael-frankfurter/attachment/igcc-raphael-frankfurter/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:56:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-raphael-frankfurter.jpg 633 631 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-seven-sagnic]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/sevin-sagnic/attachment/igcc-seven-sagnic/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:57:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-seven-sagnic.jpg 636 634 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-syeda-shahbano-ijaz]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/syeda-shahbano-ijaz/attachment/igcc-syeda-shahbano-ijaz/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:59:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-syeda-shahbano-ijaz.jpg 641 639 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-tauhid-s-bin-kashem]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/tauhid-s-bin-kashem/attachment/igcc-tauhid-s-bin-kashem/ Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:02:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-tauhid-s-bin-kashem.jpg 644 642 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-james-lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/james-lee/attachment/igcc-james-lee/ Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:06:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-james-lee.jpg 647 645 0 0 <![CDATA[disinformation2@2x]]> https://ucigcc.org/homepage/attachment/disinformation22x/ Sun, 27 Feb 2022 15:54:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/disinformation2@2x.jpg 650 20 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-do-young-lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/do-young-lee/attachment/igcc-do-young-lee/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 22:59:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-do-young-lee.jpg 654 652 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-edward-jenner]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/edward-jenner/attachment/igcc-edward-jenner/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:00:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-edward-jenner.jpg 657 655 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-noel-foster]]> https://ucigcc.org/igcc-noel-foster/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:07:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-noel-foster.jpg 660 0 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-do-young-lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/do-young-lee/attachment/igcc-do-young-lee-2/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:09:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-do-young-lee-1.jpg 661 652 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-shira-eini-pindyck]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/shira-elini-pindyck/attachment/igcc-shira-eini-pindyck/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:14:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-shira-eini-pindyck.jpg 664 662 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-so-yeon-ellen-park]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/so-yeon-ellen-park/attachment/igcc-so-yeon-ellen-park/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:15:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-so-yeon-ellen-park.jpg 667 665 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-marie-thiveos-stewart]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/marie-thiveos-stewart/attachment/igcc-marie-thiveos-stewart/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:29:36 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-marie-thiveos-stewart.jpg 674 672 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-siwen-xiao]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/siwen-xiao/attachment/igcc-siwen-xiao/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:31:30 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-siwen-xiao.jpg 679 677 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-yaosheng-xu]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/yaosheng-xu/attachment/igcc-yaosheng-xu/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:36:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-yaosheng-xu.jpg 682 680 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-yujing-yang]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/yujing-yang/attachment/igcc-yujing-yang/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:38:21 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/igcc-yujing-yang.jpg 685 683 0 0 <![CDATA[global-supply-chain-etel-solingen]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/reevaluating-the-politics-of-global-supply-chains/attachment/global-supply-chain-etel-solingen/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 00:43:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/global-supply-chain-etel-solingen.jpg 690 686 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-politics-of-global-supply-chain]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/reevaluating-the-politics-of-global-supply-chains/attachment/igcc-politics-of-global-supply-chain/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 00:48:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-politics-of-global-supply-chain.jpg 693 686 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-questions-on-development-and-conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/5-questions-on-development-and-conflict/attachment/igcc-questions-on-development-and-conflict/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 18:13:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-questions-on-development-and-conflict.jpg 703 701 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-5-questions-image]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/5-questions-on-development-and-conflict/attachment/igcc-5-questions-image/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 18:36:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-5-questions-image.jpg 705 701 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-5-questions-development-and-conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/5-questions-on-development-and-conflict/attachment/igcc-5-questions-development-and-conflict/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 18:36:13 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-5-questions-development-and-conflict.jpg 706 701 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc_great-power-series_intellectual-property]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/using-intellectual-property-to-inform-global-supply-chain-policy/attachment/igcc_great-power-series_intellectual-property/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 18:43:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/igcc_great-power-series_intellectual-property.pdf 709 129 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-using-intellectual-property-inform-global-supply-chain]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/using-intellectual-property-to-inform-global-supply-chain-policy/attachment/igcc-using-intellectual-property-inform-global-supply-chain/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 18:46:57 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/igcc-using-intellectual-property-inform-global-supply-chain.jpg 710 129 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-global-supply-chain-thm]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/using-intellectual-property-to-inform-global-supply-chain-policy/attachment/igcc-global-supply-chain-thm/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 18:59:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/igcc-global-supply-chain-thm.jpg 713 129 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-disinformation-image]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-disinformation-research-agenda/attachment/igcc-disinformation-image/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 19:05:19 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-disinformation-image.jpg 717 714 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-Disinformation-thm]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-disinformation-research-agenda/attachment/igcc-disinformation-thm/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 19:05:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-Disinformation-thm.jpg 718 714 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-tribute-john-ruggie-vert]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-tribute-to-john-ruggie/attachment/igcc-tribute-john-ruggie-vert/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 19:18:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-tribute-john-ruggie-vert.jpg 726 723 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-tribute-to-john-ruggie-horz]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-tribute-to-john-ruggie/attachment/igcc-tribute-to-john-ruggie-horz/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 19:19:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/igcc-tribute-to-john-ruggie-horz.jpg 728 723 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-john-ruggie-thm]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-tribute-to-john-ruggie/attachment/igcc-john-ruggie-thm/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 19:25:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/igcc-john-ruggie-thm.jpg 732 723 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-alumni-confidential-brenda-seaver]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-brenda-seaver/attachment/igcc-alumni-confidential-brenda-seaver/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 19:30:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-alumni-confidential-brenda-seaver.jpg 735 733 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+0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-kyrstin-m-andrews-interview.jpg 1086 1083 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-kyrstin-andrews-img]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/navigating-changing-oceans-human-health-and-poaching-in-the-caribbean/attachment/igcc-kyrstin-andrews-img/ Tue, 08 Mar 2022 23:58:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-kyrstin-andrews-img.jpg 1087 1083 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-neil-narang-interview]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/neil-narang-joins-igcc-as-research-director/attachment/igcc-neil-narang-interview/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 00:05:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-neil-narang-interview.jpg 1091 1089 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-catalyst-thm]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/new-igcc-initiative-catalyst/attachment/igcc-catalyst-thm/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 00:10:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-catalyst-thm.jpg 1095 1093 0 0 <![CDATA[brief_north-korea_igcc-july-2020]]> 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+0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/igcc-implications-of-covid19-thm.jpg 1109 1031 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-about-1981]]> https://ucigcc.org/about/attachment/igcc-about-1981/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 22:53:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-about-1981.jpg 1115 273 0 0 <![CDATA[timeline-fpo]]> https://ucigcc.org/about/attachment/timeline-fpo/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 23:45:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/timeline-fpo.jpg 1119 273 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-election-chad-img]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/not-free-or-credible-why-regional-election-observers-failed-chad-and-benin/attachment/igcc-election-chad-img/ Thu, 10 Mar 2022 00:03:08 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/igcc-election-chad-img.jpg 1127 1124 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-regional-election-chad-benin-thm]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/not-free-or-credible-why-regional-election-observers-failed-chad-and-benin/attachment/igcc-regional-election-chad-benin-thm/ Thu, 10 Mar 2022 00:03:13 +0000 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2241 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-proxy-wars-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/proxy-wars-suppressing-violence-through-local-agents/attachment/igcc-book-proxy-wars-thumb/ Thu, 05 May 2022 19:29:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-proxy-wars-thumb.jpg 2244 2241 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-chinas-emergence-as-a-defense-technological-power]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/chinas-emergence-as-a-defense-technological-power/attachment/igcc-book-chinas-emergence-as-a-defense-technological-power/ Thu, 05 May 2022 19:38:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-chinas-emergence-as-a-defense-technological-power.jpg 2248 2246 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-are-gender-inclusive-militaries-better-at-integrating-disruptive-technologies]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/are-gender-inclusive-militaries-better-at-integrating-disruptive-technologies/attachment/igcc-pdf-are-gender-inclusive-militaries-better-at-integrating-disruptive-technologies/ Fri, 06 May 2022 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https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-are-gender-inclusive-militaries-better-at-integrating-disruptive-technologies-thumb.jpg 2257 2252 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-blog-other-peoples-wars-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/other-peoples-wars/attachment/igcc-blog-other-peoples-wars-thumb/ Mon, 09 May 2022 15:00:34 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-blog-other-peoples-wars-thumb.jpg 2263 2261 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-backsliding-democratic-regress-in-the-contemporary-world-stephan-haggard-robert-kaufman]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/2250/attachment/igcc-pdf-backsliding-democratic-regress-in-the-contemporary-world-stephan-haggard-robert-kaufman/ Mon, 09 May 2022 16:48:31 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/igcc-pdf-backsliding-democratic-regress-in-the-contemporary-world-stephan-haggard-robert-kaufman.jpg 2268 2250 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-backsliding-democratic-regress-in-the-contemporary-world-stephan-haggard-robert-kaufman-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/2250/attachment/igcc-pdf-backsliding-democratic-regress-in-the-contemporary-world-stephan-haggard-robert-kaufman-thumb/ Mon, 09 May 2022 16:52:36 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/igcc-pdf-backsliding-democratic-regress-in-the-contemporary-world-stephan-haggard-robert-kaufman-thumb.jpg 2269 2250 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-innovate-to-dominate-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=2274 Mon, 09 May 2022 16:58:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-innovate-to-dominate-tai-ming-cheung.jpg 2274 2272 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-innovate-to-dominate-tai-ming-cheung-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=2275 Mon, 09 May 2022 17:03:16 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-innovate-to-dominate-tai-ming-cheung-thumb.jpg 2275 2272 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-forging-china-s-military-might-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/forging-chinas-military-might-a-new-framework-for-assessing-innovation/attachment/igcc-book-forging-china-s-military-might-tai-ming-cheung/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:05:52 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-forging-china-s-military-might-tai-ming-cheung.jpg 2279 2277 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-forging-china-s-military-might-tai-ming-cheung-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/forging-chinas-military-might-a-new-framework-for-assessing-innovation/attachment/igcc-book-forging-china-s-military-might-tai-ming-cheung-thumb/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:09:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-forging-china-s-military-might-tai-ming-cheung-thumb.jpg 2280 2277 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-china-and-cybersecurity-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/china-and-cybersecurity-espionage-strategy-and-politics-in-the-digital-domain/attachment/igcc-book-china-and-cybersecurity-tai-ming-cheung/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:13:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-china-and-cybersecurity-tai-ming-cheung.jpg 2284 2282 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-china-and-cybersecurity-tai-ming-cheung-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/china-and-cybersecurity-espionage-strategy-and-politics-in-the-digital-domain/attachment/igcc-book-china-and-cybersecurity-tai-ming-cheung-thumb/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:15:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-china-and-cybersecurity-tai-ming-cheung-thumb.jpg 2285 2282 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-gathering-pacific-storm-tai-ming-cheung-tomas-mahnken]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-gathering-pacific-storm-emerging-us-china-strategic-competition-in-defense-technological-and-industrial-development/attachment/igcc-book-gathering-pacific-storm-tai-ming-cheung-tomas-mahnken/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:29:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-gathering-pacific-storm-tai-ming-cheung-tomas-mahnken.jpg 2289 2287 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-book-gathering-pacific-storm-tai-ming-cheung-tomas-mahnken-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-gathering-pacific-storm-emerging-us-china-strategic-competition-in-defense-technological-and-industrial-development/attachment/igcc-book-gathering-pacific-storm-tai-ming-cheung-tomas-mahnken-thumb/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:33:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-book-gathering-pacific-storm-tai-ming-cheung-tomas-mahnken-thumb.jpg 2290 2287 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-changing-dynamics-behind-china-s-rise-as-a-military-technological-power-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-changing-dynamics-behind-chinas-rise-as-a-military-technological-power/attachment/cheung_chinas-tech-rise_dec-2010/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:37:39 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cheung_chinas-tech-rise_dec-2010.pdf 2294 2292 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-changing-dynamics-behind-china-s-rise-as-a-military-technological-power]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-changing-dynamics-behind-chinas-rise-as-a-military-technological-power/attachment/igcc-pdf-changing-dynamics-behind-china-s-rise-as-a-military-technological-power/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:41:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-changing-dynamics-behind-china-s-rise-as-a-military-technological-power.jpg 2295 2292 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-j20-fighter-aircraft-and-state-of-china-s-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-j-20-fighter-aircraft-and-the-state-of-chinas-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential/attachment/igcc-pdf-j20-fighter-aircraft-and-state-of-china-s-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:59:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-j20-fighter-aircraft-and-state-of-china-s-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential.jpg 2299 2297 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-j20-fighter-aircraft-and-the-state-of-china-s-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-j-20-fighter-aircraft-and-the-state-of-chinas-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential/attachment/cheung_j20-fighter-china_jan-2011/ Mon, 09 May 2022 17:59:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cheung_j20-fighter-china_jan-2011.pdf 2300 2297 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-innovation-in-china-s-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/innovation-in-chinas-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system/attachment/cheung_china-defense-research_sep-2011/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:04:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cheung_china-defense-research_sep-2011.pdf 2304 2302 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-innovation-in-china-s-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/innovation-in-chinas-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system/attachment/igcc-pdf-innovation-in-china-s-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system-tai-ming-cheung/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:05:31 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-innovation-in-china-s-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system-tai-ming-cheung.jpg 2305 2302 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-present-developments-and-future-trends/attachment/igcc-pdf-rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-tai-ming-cheung/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:12:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-tai-ming-cheung.jpg 2309 2307 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-tai-ming-cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-present-developments-and-future-trends/attachment/cheung_china-defense-econ_sep-2011/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:13:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cheung_china-defense-econ_sep-2011.pdf 2310 2307 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-measuring-us-china-innovation-gap]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/measuring-the-u-s-china-innovation-gap-initial-findings-of-the-ucsd-tsinghua-innovation-metrics-survey-project/attachment/igcc-pdf-measuring-us-china-innovation-gap/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:34:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-measuring-us-china-innovation-gap.jpg 2314 2312 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-measuring-the-us-china-innovation-gap]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/measuring-the-u-s-china-innovation-gap-initial-findings-of-the-ucsd-tsinghua-innovation-metrics-survey-project/attachment/anderson-et-al_us-china-innovation-gap_dec-2013/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:35:39 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Anderson-et-al_US-china-innovation-gap_dec-2013.pdf 2315 2312 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-chinese-defense-economy-s-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-chinese-defense-economys-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation/attachment/igcc-pdf-chinese-defense-economy-s-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:42:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-chinese-defense-economy-s-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation.jpg 2319 2317 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-chinese-defense-economy-s-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-chinese-defense-economys-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation/attachment/cheung_imitation-to-innovation_sep-2010/ Mon, 09 May 2022 18:42:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cheung_imitation-to-innovation_sep-2010.pdf 2320 2317 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-china-and-cybersecurity-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/china-and-cyber-security-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions/attachment/igcc-pdf-china-and-cybersecurity-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions/ Mon, 09 May 2022 20:31:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-china-and-cybersecurity-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions.jpg 2330 2328 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-china-and-cybersecurity-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/china-and-cyber-security-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions/attachment/lindsay_china-cybersecurity_apr-2012/ Mon, 09 May 2022 20:31:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Lindsay_china-cybersecurity_apr-2012.pdf 2331 2328 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue-2002]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue/attachment/igcc-pdf-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue-2002/ Mon, 09 May 2022 20:41:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue-2002.jpg 2336 2334 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue-2002]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue/attachment/igcc_neacd_2002/ Mon, 09 May 2022 20:41:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/IGCC_neacd_2002.pdf 2337 2334 0 0 <![CDATA[The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on National Security]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-on-national-security/ Tue, 02 Feb 2021 01:12:36 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=74 74 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Conference on Taiwan’s Security and Domestic Politics]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/conference-on-taiwans-security-and-domestic-politics/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 17:39:30 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=99 99 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Hybrid Training Program on Great Power Dynamics]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/hybrid-training-program-great-power-dynamics/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 17:45:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=101 101 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Democracy in Mexico: A Presentation and Analysis of the Results]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/democracy-in-mexico-a-presentation-and-analysis-of-the-results/ Tue, 15 Feb 2022 23:56:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1406 1406 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Herb York Memorial Lecture: Security for Israel and Her Neighbors]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/herb-york-memorial-lecture-security-for-israel-and-her-neighbors/ Fri, 01 Nov 2019 23:04:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1408 Speaker: Tzipi Livni, former Israeli foreign minister deputy prime minister Conflict and tensions in the Middle East have reached their highest point in years. Tensions and the risk of confrontation are growing between the U.S. and Iran, as well as between Iran and U.S. regional allies. At this year’s Herb York Memorial lecture, Tzipi Livni, former Israeli foreign minister deputy prime minister, reflected on whether increased tensions in the region can help create new opportunities for peace and stability. She explored, in particular, the threats Israel faces that may threaten an already fragile status quo.]]> 1408 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Human Security, Violence, and Trauma: Psychological Responses and Political Impacts of Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/human-security-violence-and-trauma-psychological-responses-and-political-impacts-of-conflict/ Sun, 02 May 2021 23:06:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1410 Talking Policy episode with the event organizer, Biz Herman. Read a summary of the research presented at the event.]]> 1410 0 0 0 <![CDATA[University of California Conference on International Cooperation]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/university-of-california-conference-on-international-cooperation/ Sun, 16 Feb 2020 00:08:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1412
  • 2016: UC Los Angeles (PDF)
  • 2017: UC Santa Barbara (PDF)
  • 2018: UC San Diego (PDF)
  • 2019: UC Berkeley (PDF)
  • ]]>
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    <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-north-korea-inside-out-case-for-economic-engagement]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/north-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagement/attachment/igcc-pdf-north-korea-inside-out-case-for-economic-engagement/ Mon, 09 May 2022 20:50:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-north-korea-inside-out-case-for-economic-engagement.jpg 2341 2339 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-north-korea-inside-out-case-for-economic-engagement]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/north-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagement/attachment/kartman-et-al_nk-inside-out_oct-2009/ Mon, 09 May 2022 20:51:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Kartman-et-al_nk-inside-out_oct-2009.pdf 2342 2339 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation/attachment/igcc-pdf-historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation/ Mon, 09 May 2022 21:30:53 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation.jpg 2346 2344 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation/attachment/herken_historical-perspectives_feb-1987/ Mon, 09 May 2022 21:31:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Herken_historical-perspectives_feb-1987.pdf 2347 2344 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-interdisciplinary-workshop-on-the-management-economics-and-biology-of-transferable-effor-rights-based-management]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=2351 Mon, 09 May 2022 22:36:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-pdf-interdisciplinary-workshop-on-the-management-economics-and-biology-of-transferable-effor-rights-based-management.jpg 2351 2349 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-pdf-interdisciplinary-workshop-on-the-management-economics-and-biology-of-transferable-effor-rights-based-management]]> https://ucigcc.org/?attachment_id=2352 Mon, 09 May 2022 22:36:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Bilbao_transferable-effort_sep-2012.pdf 2352 2349 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-podcast-how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-affecting-african-economies-prince-heto-head]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-affecting-african-economies/attachment/igcc-podcast-how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-affecting-african-economies-prince-heto-head/ Mon, 16 May 2022 18:19:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-podcast-how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-affecting-african-economies-prince-heto-head.jpg 2367 2365 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-podcast-how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-affecting-african-economies-prince-heto-head-thumb]]> 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https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-event-esoc-meeting-2022.jpg 2375 2361 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-podcast-ukraine-future-of-democracy-susan-hyde-thumb]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/what-does-ukraine-mean-for-the-future-of-democracy/attachment/igcc-podcast-ukraine-future-of-democracy-susan-hyde-thumb/ Mon, 16 May 2022 20:09:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/igcc-podcast-ukraine-future-of-democracy-susan-hyde-thumb.jpg 2378 2063 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-event-low-carbon-transition-challenges-of-chinese-soe-s-michael-davidson-barry-naughton]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/low-carbon-transition-challenges-of-chinese-soes/attachment/igcc-event-low-carbon-transition-challenges-of-chinese-soe-s-michael-davidson-barry-naughton/ Tue, 31 May 2022 15:49:31 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-event-low-carbon-transition-challenges-of-chinese-soe-s-michael-davidson-barry-naughton.jpg 2396 2394 0 0 <![CDATA[igcc-alumni-confidential-matthew-kroenig-1]]> https://ucigcc.org/homepage/attachment/igcc-alumni-confidential-matthew-kroenig-1/ Tue, 31 May 2022 20:49:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/igcc-alumni-confidential-matthew-kroenig-1.jpg 2399 20 0 0 <![CDATA[Dissertation Fellowship]]> https://ucigcc.org/funding/dissertation-fellowship/ Fri, 11 Feb 2022 19:05:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=funding&p=248
  • Food Security, Human Security, Global Health, Nontraditional and Emerging Threats: Threats from civil war, ethnic and/or state violence, corruption and governmental failures, drug smuggling, human rights, migration, refugees from natural disasters and failed states, global and public health, food security.
  • Terrorism and Political Violence: Nonconventional terrorist threats, root causes of terrorism, how climate change, human security, and international political economy affect terrorism.
  • Cybersecurity: Cybercrime, partnerships between hostile states and non-state actors in cyberspace, effects of technological innovation
  • Regional and Major Power Relations: Ethnic and religious conflicts, building regional multilateral institutions, dominant and rising powers, public versus public/private partnerships in governance.
  • Energy and Environmental Security: Energy security, climate change, climate refugees, effects of technological innovation.
  • Global Environmental and Health Cooperation: Incentives, policies, and technologies that foster international agreements on environmental and health protection as well as strategies to adapt to the threats that they impose.
  • Nuclear Nonproliferation: Proliferation, rules and norms, nuclear nonproliferation regime.
  • Defense and Military Issues: The roles of military establishments, nature and employment of military power, civil-military relations, arms competition, defense science, technology, and innovation.
  • Geo-economics and the Political Economy of Security: Economic sources of national security, security dimensions of industrial policy and trade relations, economic statecraft.
  • Democracy, Governance, and Institutions: Challenges to democratic representation, elections, inclusive democracy, technology and democracy, authoritarian international relations.
  • ]]>
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    <![CDATA[Postdoctoral Fellowship]]> https://ucigcc.org/funding/postdoctoral-fellowship/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=funding&p=299 Postdoctoral Fellowship in Technology and International Security Technology has always played a central role in international security. Technology shapes the ways states fight during wartime and compete during peacetime. Today, significant advancements in nuclear technology, autonomous weapons, artificial intelligence, remote sensing, cyber technology, hypersonic vehicles, additive manufacturing, stealth, precision guidance, and other areas have contributed to a widespread sense that the world is again on the precipice of a new technological era. We seek applicants whose research generates new theoretical and empirical insights into the relationship between technology, national security, and the global security environment. This Postdoctoral Fellowship in Technology and International Security supports postdoctoral fellows whose research generates new theoretical and empirical insights into the relationship between technology, national security, and the global security environment. The program is supported by IGCC, together with the UC-managed National Laboratories: the Center for Global Security Research at the Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the National Security and International Studies Office at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The joint program is directed by Prof. Neil Narang, Research Director at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California – Santa Barbara. If you have questions, please direct them to Marie Thiveos Stewart (mthiveos@ucsd.edu).]]> 299 0 0 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/325/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:39:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=325 325 0 5 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/326/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:39:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=326 326 0 3 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/327/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:39:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=327 327 0 7 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/328/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:39:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=328 328 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/329/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:39:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=329 329 0 6 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/333/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:41:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=333 333 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/336/ Sat, 19 Feb 2022 16:09:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=336 336 0 4 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/337/ Sat, 19 Feb 2022 16:09:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=337 337 0 2 0 <![CDATA[Other Grants]]> https://ucigcc.org/funding/other-grants/ Sat, 12 Mar 2022 17:36:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=funding&p=1352 Past Grants

    Academic Conference Competition

    The Academic Conference Competition awarded up to $125,000 to support the planning and implementation of major conferences on a theme related to the mission and research agenda. Multidisciplinary approaches and policy-relevant work were prioritized, as was the inclusion of non-academic experts. Past recipients include:
    • Fernandez de Castro Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy Project Title: Between War Making and Peace Building: Mexico’s War on Drugs Revisited (2007-2019)
    • Cecilia Mo Political Science Department, UC Berkeley Project Title: Human Security, Violence, and Trauma in the 21st Century: Psychological Response and Political Impacts of Civil War & Forced Migration

    University of California Conference on International Cooperation

    The University of California Conference on International Cooperation (UCCIC) is an annual conference that brings together International Relations scholars from across UC campuses to discuss research in progress, share ideas, and provide mentorship for junior International Relations scholars at UC institutions. Founded in 2016, UCCIC aims to cultivate a community of scholars who work in areas such as international security, foreign policy, international political economy and international organizations, to increase academic dialogue across UC campuses, and to support the next generation of International Relations scholars. All IR scholars from UC institutions are invited to attend the conference. Since 2019, UCCIC has been organized in cooperation with the IGCC, which has provided generous funding to make the conference possible.]]>
    1352 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[Conference on Great Power Competition in the 21st Century: The Struggle for Technological, Economic, and Strategic Supremacy]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/conference-on-great-power-competition-in-the-21st-century/ Sat, 12 Mar 2022 23:16:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1392 st Century that studied: the competition in security, technology, innovation, and strategy; economic strategic rivalry; the role of design and production networks in great power and regional cooperation and competition; and international dynamics and domestic politics of great power security competition. At this closed event, UC faculty, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and affiliated researchers will present their research and discuss a future research agenda.]]> 1392 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/public-policy-and-nuclear-threats-boot-camp/ Tue, 15 Mar 2022 22:22:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1395 Learn More and Apply.

    ]]>
    1395 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[The Authoritarian Turn in International Relations]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/the-authoritarian-turn-in-international-relations/ Tue, 15 Mar 2022 22:34:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1400 Christina Cottiero, Emilie Hafner-Burton, and Christina Schneider.]]> 1400 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Workshop on The Evolving Relationship Between Geoeconomics, Innovation, National Security, and Great Power Strategic Competition]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/workshop-on-the-evolving-relationship-between-geo-economics-innovation-national-security-and-great-power-strategic-competition/ Tue, 15 Mar 2022 22:36:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1403 1403 0 0 0 <![CDATA[IGCC Steering Committee Meeting]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/igcc-steering-committee-meeting/ Tue, 15 Mar 2022 23:10:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1414 1414 0 0 0 <![CDATA[War in Ukraine: Perspectives and Comments from UC San Diego Experts]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/war-in-ukraine-perspectives-and-comments-from-uc-san-diego-experts/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 19:56:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=1670 ]]> 1670 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Advantage of Disadvantage: Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/the-advantage-of-disadvantage-costly-protest-and-political-representation-for-marginalized-groups/ Tue, 03 May 2022 17:47:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=2181 The Advantage of Disadvantage makes a provocative claim: protests are most effective for disadvantaged groups. The author of the book The Advantage of the Disadvantage, LaGina Gause, will be interviewed by San Diego Union-Tribune columnist Lisa Deaderick on her new book, racial and ethnic politics, and representation. The interview will be followed by remarks by Councilmember Marni von Wilpert of District 5. This event is co-sponsored by the Future of Democracy initiative at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.]]> 2181 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Empirical Studies of Conflict 2022 Annual Meeting]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/empirical-studies-of-conflict-2022-annual-meeting/ Mon, 16 May 2022 19:53:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=2361 The Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) 2022 Annual Meeting brings together scholars of political violence, conflict, comparative politics, and international relations to explore a range of topics, including: policing and order provision in fragile contexts, disinformation and misinformation, refugees and forced migration, climate-related conflict and upheaval, domestic political violence, election violence, and small wars, cyber warfare, and other unconventional tactics in the context of great power competition. The fall meeting is supported by IGCC, Princeton University, and the Center for Effective Global Action at UC Berkeley. This workshop is led by IGCC research director Eli Berman and IGCC affiliate Aila Matanock.

    Submit your paper here.

    To learn more about IGCC-supported research and engagement on political violence and conflict, see:

    ]]>
    2361 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[Low-Carbon Transition Challenges of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/low-carbon-transition-challenges-of-chinese-soes/ Tue, 31 May 2022 15:45:53 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=events&p=2394 Michael Davidson leads IGCC research on renewable energy pathways to support carbon neutrality in China, and Barry Naughton co-leads IGCC research on Chinese science, technology, innovation, and industrial policy. This event is sponsored by the 21st Century China Center and UCSD’s School of Global Policy and Strategy.]]> 2394 0 0 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/315/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:36:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=315 315 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/316/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:36:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=316 316 0 3 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/317/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:36:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=317 317 0 4 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/318/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:36:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=318 318 0 5 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/330/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:40:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=330 330 0 2 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/331/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:40:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=331 331 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/334/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:41:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=334 334 0 3 0 <![CDATA[Everything]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/everything/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:28:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=381 381 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/383/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:28:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=383 383 0 2 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/384/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:28:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=384 384 0 3 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/385/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:28:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=385 385 0 4 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/386/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:28:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=386 386 0 5 0 <![CDATA[View All]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/view-all-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:23:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=407 407 0 7 0 <![CDATA[Our Work]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/our-work/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=408 408 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/444/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:39:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=444 444 0 2 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/882/ Mon, 07 Mar 2022 21:26:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=882 882 0 6 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/963/ Tue, 08 Mar 2022 14:58:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=963 963 0 1 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/964/ Tue, 08 Mar 2022 14:58:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=964 964 0 2 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/1463/ Thu, 17 Mar 2022 01:42:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1463 1463 0 2 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/1549/ Sat, 19 Mar 2022 19:31:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1549 1549 0 3 0 <![CDATA[Core Themes]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/core-themes/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=409 409 0 2 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/410/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=410 410 0 3 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/411/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=411 411 0 4 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/412/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=412 412 0 5 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/413/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=413 413 0 6 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/414/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=414 414 0 7 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/415/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=415 415 0 8 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/416/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=416 416 0 9 0 <![CDATA[Grants & Fellowships]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/grants-fellowships/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=417 417 0 10 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/418/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=418 418 0 12 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/420/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=420 420 0 11 0 <![CDATA[Training]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/training/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=422 422 0 14 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/423/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=423 423 0 15 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/424/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:29:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=424 424 0 17 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/427/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:34:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=427 427 0 16 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/429/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=429 429 0 18 0 <![CDATA[View All]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/view-all-3/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=430 430 0 19 0 <![CDATA[Leadership]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/leadership-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=431 431 0 20 0 <![CDATA[Steering Committee]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/steering-committee-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=432 432 0 21 0 <![CDATA[Researchers]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/researchers-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=433 433 0 22 0 <![CDATA[Homepage]]> https://ucigcc.org/ Thu, 26 Sep 2019 12:31:38 +0000 http://ucigcc.org/?page_id=20 20 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Events]]> https://ucigcc.org/events/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 16:44:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?page_id=94 94 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Leadership]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/leadership/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:38:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=320 320 0 1 0 <![CDATA[Steering Committee]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/steering-committee/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:38:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=321 321 0 2 0 <![CDATA[Affiliated Researchers]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/researchers/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:38:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=322 322 0 3 0 <![CDATA[Fellows]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/fellows/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:38:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=323 323 0 4 0 <![CDATA[Staff]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/staff/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 18:38:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=324 324 0 5 0 <![CDATA[View All]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/view-all/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:23:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=406 406 0 6 0 <![CDATA[Fellows]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/fellows-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=434 434 0 23 0 <![CDATA[Staff]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/staff-2/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=435 435 0 24 0 <![CDATA[Analysis]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/analysis/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=436 436 0 25 0 <![CDATA[View All]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/view-all-4/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=437 437 0 26 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/438/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=438 438 0 27 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/439/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=439 439 0 29 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/440/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=440 440 0 30 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/441/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=441 441 0 31 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/442/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=442 442 0 28 0 <![CDATA[About]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/about/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:38:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=443 443 0 33 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/1464/ Thu, 17 Mar 2022 01:42:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1464 1464 0 13 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/1553/ Wed, 23 Mar 2022 01:07:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1553 1553 0 32 0 <![CDATA[Tai Ming Cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/tai-ming-cheung/ Thu, 03 Feb 2022 13:34:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=103 Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy (Cornell University Press, 2009), editor of Forging China's Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), co-editor of The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging US-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development (Cambria Press, 2018), and author of Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State (Cornell University Press, 2022). He was based Hong Kong, China, and Japan from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic, and strategic developments in Greater China and East Asia, first as a journalist for the Far Eastern Economic Review from 1988-1993 and subsequently as a political and business risk consultant for a number of companies, including PricewaterhouseCoopers. Dr. Cheung has a PhD in War Studies from King’s College, London.]]> 103 0 2 0
  • China
  • Technology and national security
  • Defense innovation
  • East Asian security
  • Geoeconomics, innovation, and national security
  • Great power competition
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Stephan Haggard]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/stephan-haggard/ Sat, 05 Feb 2022 20:12:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=146 Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (2007), Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea (2011), and Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea (2017). Haggard is the current editor of the Journal of East Asian Studies, maintains the "North Korea: Witness to Transformation" blog and has a regular column with the Joongang Daily.  He has a PhD in political science from UC Berkeley.]]> 146 0 24 0
  • International relations
  • Political economy
  • Asia-Pacific
  • North Korea
  • Globalization
  • Economic reform
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[The Latest]]> https://ucigcc.org/latest/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 21:58:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?page_id=221 221 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Our People]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/ Mon, 14 Feb 2022 18:31:52 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?page_id=260 260 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Jeannette Money]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jeannette-money/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 18:48:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=263 Compendium of Nationality Legislation (International Office for Migration, 2016) and co-author (with Sarah Lockhart) of Migration Crises and the Structure of International Cooperation (University of Georgia Press, 2019). Money received her BA in international relations from San Francisco State University, followed by her MBA from the American Graduate School of International Management and her Ph.D. in political science from UCLA.]]> 263 0 38 0
  • Immigration
  • International relations
  • International political economy
  • European Union
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Noel Foster]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/noel-foster/ Mon, 14 Feb 2022 18:52:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=266 266 0 55 0 <![CDATA[About IGCC]]> https://ucigcc.org/about/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 15:46:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?page_id=273 The UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) is a network of researchers from across the University of California and the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national labs who produce and use research to help build a more peaceful, prosperous world. We conduct rigorous social science research on international security, the environment, geoeconomics, nuclear security, and the future of democracy; help to educate and train the next generation of peacemakers; and strive to ensure that what we are discovering contributes to a safer world.  The Institute is based at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego, where several members of the leadership team and a number of researchers are on the faculty.

    ]]>
    273 0 0 0
  • Army Research Office
  • California Seismic Safety Commission
  • Carnegie Corporation of New York
  • Charles Koch Foundation
  • Domestic Nuclear Detection Office via Los Alamos National Laboratory
  • Ford Foundation
  • John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Minerva Initiative
  • National Nuclear Security Administration
  • National Science Foundation
  • Naval Postgraduate School
  • Office of Naval Research
  • United States Institute of Peace
  • University of California Office of the President
  • University of Chicago
  • University of Virginia
  • U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
  • Smith Richardson Foundation
  • ]]>
    A Special Committee on Global Security and Cooperation recommended in March 1982, that the Institute on Global Conflict & Cooperation (IGCC) be formed. In defining IGCC’s research focus, the committee stated that: “The focus of the Institute’s research program should be the study of global situations sufficiently severe so as to threaten their escalation into large-scale war, especially, but not exclusively, nuclear war.”]]> Suggested research topics included: The military-political context of relations among the major powers as a source of conflict and war; Nuclear energy and nonproliferation; and the global context of major power conflict and cooperative modes of managing conflict.]]> Dr. Herbert York was appointed IGCC’s first director in July 1983, and served until 1989. A renowned physicist, Manhattan Project participant, and first director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (19521958), York was instrumental in launching IGCC’s Public Policy and Nuclear Threats program. York was the first chancellor of UC San Diego (19611964); and interim chancellor (19701972). He advised five presidents on science and technology issues, and was the first chief scientist, Advanced Research Projects Agency (later DARPA) and first director of Defense Research and Engineering (under Eisenhower) (1958–61).]]> In 1972, York established an academic program within the Department of Physics at UC San Diego, on science, technology and public affairs that sponsored research and teaching on international security policy issues.]]> John Ruggie was appointed director of IGCC. A deeply engaged scholar-practitioner, while director of IGCC, Ruggie put global climate change and environmental policy on IGCC’s long-term agenda and led path-breaking research on multilateralism as an organizing principle for security and economics.]]> Susan Shirk became director of IGCC in 1991. An influential voice on U.S.-China relations and Chinese politics, Shirk served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs from 1997-2000, with responsibility for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia. She is currently the chair of the 21st Century China Center and a research professor at the School Global Policy & Strategy at UC San Diego]]> Stephan Haggard was appointed interim director of IGCC in 1997. Steph is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies, director of the Korea-Pacific Program, and distinguished professor of political science at the School of Global Policy & Strategy at UC San Diego. He works on the political economy of developing countries, with a particular interest in Asia and the Korean peninsula, and currently leads IGCC’s project on authoritarian international organizations.]]> Peter Cowhey became director of IGCC in 1999. The dean and Qualcomm chair emeritus at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, Cowhey served in both the Clinton and Obama administrations in positions involving international economic and technology policies. Under Peter’s leadership, IGCC continued NEACD and began a similar dialogue for the Middle East. IGCC added a multi-year project on biological threats and public policy to broaden its work on security and address global public health and funded projects on trade and technology competition. During this period IGCC prioritized support of the individual campus programs affiliated with IGCC.]]> Public Policy and Nuclear Threats summer boot camp in-residence, which gives students and early career professionals the knowledge and analytic tools to contribute to the debate on future U.S. nuclear policy.]]> Eli Berman was appointed IGCC Research Director for International Security Studies in 2006. Eli leads a broad program of theoretical, empirical, and field research studying terrorism, insurgency, governance, and development to understand how economic and political development might help stabilize conflict or post-conflict zones.]]> Joshua Graff Zivin was appointed research director for environmental studies in 2008. Josh’s projects focus on quantifying the effects of environmental changes on human capital development. His work brings to light some of the tensions between environmental and economic priorities, with an emphasis on global-level policy considerations.]]> Tai Ming Cheung joined IGCC as director in 2012. A professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego and expert in Asian security and Chinese security and technology, Cheung was based in Asia from the mid-1980s to 2002 covering political, economic, and strategic developments in greater China.]]> Eli Berman launches the Deterrence with Proxies Project, a major initiative bringing together scholars at universities in the U.S., Europe and the Middle East. The project studied the use of incentives in proxy relationships to address international terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics and other threats.]]> Great Power Competition in the 21st Century. The multi-year project brings together scholars from across UC campuses and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to look closely at new rivalries between the United States, China, Russia and other emerging powers, and the intersection of economics, strategy, security, technology and politics in this dynamic new political landscape.]]> Neil Narang is appointed research director for U.S. and Global Security Initiatives. Neil manages projects on grand strategy and great power competition, including projects on international reputation/credibility, the future of alliances, emerging technologies and strategic stability, nuclear security and extended deterrence, and the impact of economic interdependence on international security.]]> Emilie Hafner-Burton, research director for democracy studies and launches the Future of Democracy Initiative. The cross-campus initiative aims to better understand urgent threats to democracy and democratic representation at all levels of governance, while suggesting practical solutions and supporting new generations of thought leaders.]]>
    <![CDATA[Susan Shirk]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/susan-shirk/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:10:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=288 288 0 7 0
  • China
  • Northeast Asia
  • Security
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Etel Solingen]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/etel-solingen/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:20:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=291 Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East won the American Political Science Associations Woodrow Wilson Award for best book in the discipline of political science, and the ISAs Jervis and Schroeder Award for best book on International History and Politics. Solingen studies the reciprocal influence between international political economy and international security, regional orders, and international diffusion, among other topics. Her other books include Regional Orders at Century's Dawn; Comparative Regionalism; Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining, and edited collections on Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, The Politics of International and Regional Diffusion, and Scientists and the State. Her articles on international relations theory, political economy, international and regional security, international institutions, nuclear proliferation, democratization, and science and technology appeared in International Security, American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Global Governance, Review of International Studies, Journal of Democracy, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, and New Political Economy, among others. Solingen also served as Chair of the Steering Committee of the University of California's systemwide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, President of ISA's International Political Economy Section, President of APSA's International History and Politics Section, and member of the APSA's Presidential Taskforce on U.S. Standing in World Affairs. She received a MacArthur Foundation Research and Writing Award on Peace and International Cooperation, Social Science Research Council-Mac Arthur Foundation Fellowship on Peace and Security in a Changing World, Japan Foundation/SSRC Abe Fellowship, Center for Global Partnership/Japan Foundation fellowship, APSA Excellence in Mentorship Award, Distinguished Teaching Award from UC Irvine's Academic Senate, and grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, United States Institute of Peace, Sloan Foundation, Columbia Foundation, University of California's Office of the President Laboratory Fees Research Program, Univ. of California's IGCC, and Univ. of California's Pacific Rim grants, among others. She served as Review Essay Editor for the journal International Organization and in the editorial boards of the APSR, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, International Interactions, Global Governance, Stanford University Press Studies in Asian Security; Social Science Research Network; Columbia University Press International Affairs Online, Latin American Research Review, European Review of International Studies, Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, and Nonproliferation Review, among others.]]> 291 0 45 0
  • International Relations Theory
  • International Political Economy
  • International Cooperation
  • Macropolitics/Institutions
  • Comparative Politics
  • World Politics
  • Regional Orders
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Anatol Klass]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/anatol-klass/ Thu, 17 Feb 2022 22:29:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=296 Proposal Title:  State-building, International Thought & the Construction of the Chinese Diplomatic Corps]]> 296 0 67 0 <![CDATA[Eli Berman]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/eli-berman/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 21:58:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=458 professor of economics at UC San Diego. He co-directs the Economics of National Security group at the National Bureau of Economic Research and helps lead the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. He is president of the Economics of National Security Association. Publications include Publications include Proxy Wars (with David Lake, 2019),  Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict (with Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, 2018) and Radical, Religious and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (2009). Recent grants supporting his research have come from the Minerva Research Initiative and the National Science Foundation. Berman received his PhD in economics from Harvard University.]]> 458 0 3 0 <![CDATA[Emilie M. Hafner-Burton]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/emilie-m-hafner-burton/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 22:14:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=461 Laboratory on International Law and Regulation at GPS. At IGCC, she leads a broad program of theoretical, empirical, and field research studying challenges to democratic representation, elections, inclusive democracy, technology and democracy, and authoritarian international relations. Hafner-Burton is a leader in policy-relevant research on international law, studying when and why international laws work and don’t work. She is author of “Making Human Rights a Reality” that looks at the emergence of a massive body of legal norms and procedures aimed at protecting human rights and why it has been so hard for these international laws to have much impact in parts of the world where human rights are most at risk. It was awarded the best book of 2015 by the International Studies Association. She has published widely on these and other research subjects, including social network analysis and international relations, economic sanctions and gender mainstreaming in international organizations.]]> 461 0 5 0 <![CDATA[Joshua Graff Zivin]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/joshua-graff-zivin/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 22:20:36 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=464 Center on Global Transformation and co-director of the Global Health Institute at UC San Diego. Graff Zivin is an internationally renowned economist whose broad research interests include the environment, health, development and innovation economics. He has published numerous articles on a wide range of topics in top economic, policy and science journals. Much of his current work is focused on three distinct areas of research: the relationship between the environment, health and human capital, the economics of innovation with a particular eye toward the role of institutions, social networks and financial incentives, and the design of health interventions and their economic impacts. At GPS, he teaches courses including Environmental and Regulatory Economics and Economies of the Pacific Rim. Graff Zivin received his Ph.D. from UC Berkeley and his B.A. from Rutgers University. Prior to joining UC San Diego in 2008, he spent 11 years on the faculty at Columbia University, where he served as professor of economics in the Mailman School of Public Health and the School of International and Public Affairs and directed the Ph.D. Program in Sustainable Development. In 2004-05, he served as Senior Economist for Health and the Environment on the White House Council of Economic Advisers. For more information, please visit Joshua Graff Zivin’s personal site.]]> 464 0 4 0
  • Environment
  • Development economics
  • Health and human capital
  • Innovation economics
  • Health interventions
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Neil Narang]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/neil-narang/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 22:23:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=467 467 0 6 0
  • International relations
  • International security and conflict management
  • Political violence
  • International institutions
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Aila Matanock]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/aila-matanock/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:20:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=472 Electing Peace: Credibly Transitioning from Civil Conflict to Political Participation, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2017. It is based on her dissertation research at Stanford University, which won the 2013 Helen Dwight Reid award from the American Political Science Association. Her forthcoming publications include: “How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals” (Annual Review of Political Science); “Third-Party Policymakers and the Limits of the Influence of Indicators,” in The Power of Global Performance Indicators (Cambridge University Press); and “Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” (Comparative Political Studies). Matanock was a W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow and the Arch W. Shaw National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University (2015–2016), a postdoctoral scholar at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California San Diego (2012–2013), and a predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (2010–2012).She received her Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and her AB magna cum laude from Harvard University.]]> 472 0 34 0
  • Civil conflict
  • International intervention
  • Statebuilding
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Bronwyn Leebaw]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/bronwyn-leebaw/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:27:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=475 Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Theory. She currently serves as co-organizer of the UC Humanities Research Institute-funded UC Human Rights Collaboration. For the 2014-2015 year, she will be a fellow with the American Council of Learned Societies. Leebaw has published articles on human rights, humanitarianism, and transitional justice in journals such as Perspectives on Politics, Human Rights Quarterly, Polity, Humanity, and Journal of Human Rights. Her first book, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change (Cambridge, 2011), won the 2012 award for best book on ethics and international politics, given by the International Ethics Section of the International Studies Association. She is currently working on two new projects. One project, A Trace of Hope: Human Rights and the Memory of Resistance, critically examines how human rights and transitional justice practices have conceptualized, documented, judged, and avoided various forms of resistance to the abuses that they confront. A second project, entitled, Scorched Earth: Environmental Justice and the Legacies of War, traces efforts to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate wartime environmental devastation from just war theory through the contemporary environmental justice movement, with attention to the way in which claims about the meaning and legitimate destruction of nature have been informed by changing ways of defining “humaneness” and vice versa.]]> 475 0 19 0
  • Human rights
  • Humanitarianism
  • Transitional justice
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Christina Schneider]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/christina-schneider/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:28:52 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=479 American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of European Public Policy, and Public Choice.]]> 479 0 42 0
  • Domestic politics of international cooperation
  • International bargaining
  • Democratic representation in international organizations
  • European Union
  • Regional organizations
  • International development organizations
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Privacy Policy]]> https://ucigcc.org/privacy-policy/ Tue, 08 Mar 2022 14:57:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?page_id=957

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    This policy was last updated on March 28, 2022.

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    <![CDATA[Education and Training]]> https://ucigcc.org/education-and-training/ Wed, 16 Mar 2022 19:02:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?page_id=1430 Subhead Education Here Donec sed odio dui. Etiam porta sem malesuada magna mollis euismod. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla vitae elit libero, a pharetra augue. Morbi leo risus, porta ac consectetur ac, vestibulum at eros. Fusce dapibus, tellus ac cursus commodo, tortor mauris condimentum nibh, ut fermentum massa justo sit amet risus. Cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Maecenas faucibus mollis interdum. Nulla vitae elit libero, a pharetra augue.

    Subhead Education Here

    Donec sed odio dui. Etiam porta sem malesuada magna mollis euismod. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla vitae elit libero, a pharetra augue. Morbi leo risus, porta ac consectetur ac, vestibulum at eros. Fusce dapibus, tellus ac cursus commodo, tortor mauris condimentum nibh, ut fermentum massa justo sit amet risus. Cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Maecenas faucibus mollis interdum. Nulla vitae elit libero, a pharetra augue.

    Subhead Education Here

    Donec sed odio dui. Etiam porta sem malesuada magna mollis euismod. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Nulla vitae elit libero, a pharetra augue. Morbi leo risus, porta ac consectetur ac, vestibulum at eros. Fusce dapibus, tellus ac cursus commodo, tortor mauris condimentum nibh, ut fermentum massa justo sit amet risus. Cum sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Maecenas faucibus mollis interdum. Nulla vitae elit libero, a pharetra augue.]]>
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    <![CDATA[Courtenay Conrad]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/courtenay-conrad/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:33:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=482 , Contentious Compliance: Dissent and Repression Under International Human Rights Law (with Emily Hencken Ritter), was published in 2019 by Oxford University Press. Conrad’s research has been published in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Journal of Peace Research, among others. She received her MS and PhD in political science from Florida State University.]]> 482 0 12 0
  • Political violence
  • human rights
  • International organizations
  • Comparative political institutions
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Daniel Posner]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/daniel-n-posner/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:37:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=485 American Political Science Review (2008), the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best article in Political Economy (2008), the best book award from the African Politics Conference Group (2006), and the Sage Award for the best paper in Comparative Politics presented at the APSA annual meeting (2004). Posner has been a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (2010-11), a Carnegie Scholar (2003-05), a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution (2001-02), and a Harvard Academy Scholar (1995-98). During 2011-13, he was Professor of Political Science and the holder of the Total Chair on Contemporary Africa at MIT. He is the co-founder of the Working Group in African Political Economy (WGAPE), a member of the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network, a faculty associate of the Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA), a research affiliate of the International Growth Centre (IGC), and, formerly, a USAID Democracy Fellow for Research and Policy. Best paper award from the Experimental Section of APSA (2019).]]> 485 0 39 0
  • International development
  • Africa
  • Comparative politics
  • Ethnic bias
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[George Rutherford]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/george-rutherford/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:39:51 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=488 Journal of Infectious Disease June 21, 2020), and Estimation of effects of contact tracing and mask adoption on COVID-19 transmission in San Francisco: a modeling study (medRxiv June 11, 2020). Educated at Stanford University and the Duke University School of Medicine, Rutherford is board certified in pediatrics and in general preventive medicine and public health. Following training in epidemiology in the Centers for Disease Control's Epidemic Intelligence Service, he spent the majority of his professional career in public health practice, with a primary emphasis on the epidemiology and control of communicable diseases. He has held a number of positions in public health agencies.]]> 488 0 50 0
  • Global health
  • Epidemiology
  • Tuberculosis
  • HIV prevention
  • Public health
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[John Scott]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/john-scott/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:42:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=490 490 0 52 0
  • Nuclear weapons
  • Nuclear policy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Jonathan Robinson]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jonathan-robinson/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:48:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=493 493 0 43 0
  • Development economics
  • Randomized controlled trials
  • Digital financial services
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
  • Agriculture
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Kelsey Jack]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/kelsey-jack/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:54:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=496 Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, Santa Barbara; and director of the Poverty Alleviation Group at the Environmental Market Solutions Lab (emLab). Kelsey conducts research at the intersection of environmental and development economics, with a focus on how individuals, households, and communities decide to use natural resources and provide public goods. Much of her research uses field experiments to test theory and new policy innovations. She has conducted research in numerous countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and has ongoing work in South Africa, India, Ghana, Zambia and Niger. She joined the Bren School at UC Santa Barbara after seven years as an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at Tufts University and a postdoc position at MIT, with the Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative (ATAI) at J-PAL. She holds a bachelors degree in Public and International Affairs from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University. Before graduate school, she spent two years in Lao PDR working for IUCN.]]> 496 0 15 0
  • Environment
  • Development
  • Economics
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Mike Albertson]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/mike-albertson/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 23:56:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=499 499 0 13 0
  • Deterrence
  • Military-security issues
  • Security policy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Stergios Skaperdas]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/stergios-skaperdas/ Thu, 24 Feb 2022 00:01:19 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=502 s and political science journals, including the American Economic Review, the American Political Science Review, Economic Journal, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Economic Theory, and the Journal of International Economics. He received a BA in economics from Reed College and an MA and PhD, also in economics, from the Johns Hopkins University.]]> 502 0 53 0
  • Economic theory
  • Political economy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[T. J. Pempel]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/t-j-pempel/ Thu, 24 Feb 2022 00:04:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=505 Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region; Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (both by Cornell University Press); Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia and The Economic-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia (both by Routledge). In 2015, he co-edited a book entitled Two Crises; Different Outcomes (Cornell University Press) which analyzes the negative Asian experience in the 1997-98 crisis and the positive outcome in 2008-09. In addition, he has published over one hundred twenty scholarly articles and chapters in books. Professor Pempel is on the editorial boards of a dozen professional journals, and serves on various committees of the American Political Science Association, the Association for Asian Studies, and the International Studies Association Council. He is a presidentially-appointed Commissioner on the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission and is active in the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue. His current research involves Asian adjustments to the rise in global finance and the decline in security bipolarity.]]> 505 0 9 0
  • Comparative politics
  • Political economy
  • Contemporary Japan
  • Asian regionalism
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Andrew Reddie]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/andrew-reddie/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:27:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=527 Science, the Journal of Cyber Policy, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists among other outlets and has been variously supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, MacArthur Foundation, and the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Science and Security Consortium.]]> 527 0 37 0
  • Information policy
  • Security
  • Social and cultural studies
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Barbara Walter]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/barbara-f-walter/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:29:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=530 Political Violence @ A Glance, winner of numerous blogging awards since its inception in 2012.]]> 530 0 51 0
  • International security
  • Civil war
  • Rebel groups
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Barry Naughton]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/barry-naughton/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:34:56 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=533 533 0 32 0
  • China
  • Economics
  • Economic reform
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Bethany Goldblum]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/bethany-goldblum/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:43:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=535 535 0 23 0
  • Fundamental nuclear physics for nuclear security applications
  • Nuclear-plasma interactions
  • Scintillator characterization
  • Nuclear energy and weapons policy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Brad Roberts]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/brad-roberts/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:46:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=538 538 0 40 0
  • Nuclear security
  • Defense
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Cesi Cruz]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/cesi-cruz/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:50:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=541 541 0 18 0
  • Democracy
  • Elections
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[David Laitin]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/david-laitin/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 20:54:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=543 Politics, Language and Thought: The Somali Experience (1977), Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba (1986), Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa (1992), Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (1998), Nations, States and Violence (2007), and Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies (2016). Over the past decade, mostly in collaboration with James Fearon, he has published several papers on ethnicity, ethnic cooperation, the sources of civil war, and on policies that work to settle civil wars. Laitin has also collaborated with Alan Krueger on international terrorism and with Eli Berman on suicide terrorism. Laitin received his PhD in political science from UC Berkeley.]]> 543 0 29 0
  • Comparative politics
  • Political culture
  • Ethnic conflict
  • Civil war
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[David Lake]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/david-lake/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 21:04:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=546 The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of External Intervention (2016). In addition to nearly 100 scholarly articles and chapters, he is the author of Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of US Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939 (1988), Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century (1999), and Hierarchy in International Relations (2009). He has also co-edited 12 volumes on a variety of topics in international political economy, security studies, and international organizations. He is co-author of a comprehensive textbook on World Politics: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions (3rd ed. 2016). Lake served as president of the American Political Science Association in 20162017. He has served as research director for international relations at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (1992‒1996 and 2000‒2001), co-editor of the journal International Organization (1997‒2001), chair of the Political Science department (2000‒2004), and associate dean of social sciences at UC San Diego (2006‒2015). He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2006 and was a 20082009 fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He received his PhD from Cornell University in 1984 and taught at UCLA from 1983 to 1992.]]> 546 0 30 0
  • International relations
  • International political economy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Eric Hagt]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/eric-hagt/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 21:34:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=549 549 0 25 0
  • China
  • Civil-military integration
  • Defense
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Esteban Klor]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/esteban-klor/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 21:39:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=552 552 0 28 0
  • Terrorism
  • Political violence
  • Political economy
  • Taxation
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Gerard Padro I Miguel]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/gerard-padro-i-miguel/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 21:43:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=555 555 0 33 0
  • Political economy
  • Political and economic development
  • Civil war and conflict
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Jacob Shapiro]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/jacob-n-shapiro/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:07:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=558 The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations and co-author of Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict. His research has been published in broad range of academic and policy journals as well as a number of edited volumes. He has conducted field research and large-scale policy evaluations in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, and Pakistan. Shapiro received the 2016 Karl Deutsch Award from the International Studies Association, given to a scholar younger than 40 or within 10 years of earning a PhD who has made the most significant contribution to the study of international relations. He is an associate editor of Journal of Conflict Resolution, World Politics, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, a faculty fellow of the Association for Analytic Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies, a research fellow at the Center for Economic Research in Pakistan, and an associate fellow of the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives. Prior to graduate school Shapiro served in the United States Navy. He received his PhD in political science and MA in economics from Stanford University.]]> 558 0 44 0
  • Political violence
  • Economic and political development
  • Security policy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[James Cross]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/james-cross/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:09:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=561 561 0 17 0
  • Venture capital
  • Aerospace industry
  • Defense industry
  • Science and technology
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Joseph Felter]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/joseph-felter/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:14:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=563 Journal of Political Economy), and Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict (with Eli Berman and Jacob N. ShapiroPrinceton, 2018). Felter holds a BS from West Point, an MPA from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and a PhD in political science from Stanford University.]]> 563 0 22 0
  • Insurgency
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Terrorism
  • Political violence
  • Conflict
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Kal Raustiala]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/kal-raustiala/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:18:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=566 Burkle Center for International Relations. From 2012-2015 he was also UCLA’s Associate Vice Provost for International Studies and Faculty Director of UCLA’s International Education Office. A graduate of Duke University, Professor Raustiala holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School and Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, San Diego. Professor Raustiala's research focuses on international law, international relations, and intellectual property. His recent publications include “The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming and the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity,” NYU Law Review (2019, with Chris Sprigman of NYU Law School); “An Internet Whole and Free: Why Obama Was Right to Give Up Control," Foreign Affairs (2017); “The Council and the Court: Law and Politics at the International Criminal Court," Texas Law Review (2016, with David Kaye of UC Irvine Law School); and "Governing the Internet," American Journal of International Law (2016). His books include Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (Oxford, 2009) and The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks Innovation (Oxford, 2012), written with Chris Sprigman, which has been translated into Chinese, Korean, and Japanese. In 2016 Professor Raustiala was elected Vice President of the American Society of International Law. He has been a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School, Princeton University, the University of Chicago Law School, Melbourne University in Australia, and Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In 2016, he was the Yong Shook Lin Visiting Professor of Intellectual Property at the National University of Singapore. Prior to coming to UCLA, Professor Raustiala was a research fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, a Peccei Scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems, and an assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Professor Raustiala has served on the editorial boards of International Organization and the American Journal of International Law and is a frequent media contributor whose writing has been featured in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the New Republic, the New Yorker, Wired, Slate, the International Herald Tribune and Le Monde. Along with Catherine Amirfar of Debevoise & Plimpton, he is co-host of the International Law Behind the Headlines podcast.]]> 566 0 36 0
  • International law
  • International relations
  • Intellectual property
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Linton Brooks]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/linton-brooks/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:21:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=569 569 0 10 0
  • Nuclear policy
  • Military strategy
  • Technology
  • Submarine programs
  • Arms control
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Michael Callen]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/michael-callen/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:23:50 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=571 571 0 11 0
  • Political economy
  • Development economics
  • Experimental economics
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Michael Davidson]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/michael-davidson/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:25:32 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=574 Michael Davidson’s personal site.]]> 574 0 20 0
  • Renewable resource assessment
  • Power systems operations
  • Political economy of markets
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Margaret Roberts]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/margaret-e-roberts/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:27:34 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=577 American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Political Analysis, and Science.]]> 577 0 41 0
  • Political methodology
  • Politics of information
  • Propoganda and censorship in China
  • Automated content analysis
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Oliver Vanden Eynde]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/oliver-vanden-eynde/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:29:16 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=580 580 0 49 0
  • Political economy of development
  • Development economics
  • Economic history
  • Conflict
  • Civil-military institutions
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Peter Cowhey]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/peter-cowhey/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:31:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=582 “Digital DNA: Disruption and the Challenges for Global Governance” and “Transforming Global Information and Communication Markets: The Political Economy of Innovation.” Cowhey has extensive experience in government. In the Clinton Administration, he served as the chief of the International Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and negotiated many of the U.S. international agreements for telecommunications and satellite services. He had responsibility for antitrust decisions involving the communications and satellite industries. In 2009, he served a 12-month assignment as the senior counselor to Ambassador Ron Kirk in the Office of the United States Trade Representative, playing a key role in the strategic agenda for trade policy. Subsequently, Cowhey served on a bi-national experts group appointed by the U.S. and Chinese governments to research and advise on innovation policy. Cowhey has served in many leadership positions in the nonprofit word. He served as the chief policy officer for the Aspen Institute’s International Digital Economy Accords project to update policies involving the Internet and global communications markets. Cowhey is currently the chair of the board of directors for both the California Council on Science and Technology and the Grameen Foundation USA, the U.S. foundation supporting the work of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Dr. Muhammad Yunus. Cowhey is a member of the Global Competitiveness Council and the Council on Foreign Relations, Co-chair, Research Council, Institute of International Economic and a Board Member and Director of the Cecil H. and Ida M. Green Foundation for Earth Sciences. Cowhey joined the UC San Diego faculty in 1976. He was director of the University of California's system-wide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation from 1999-2006 and Associate Vice Chancellor-International Affairs from 2007-2009. He was the Interim Executive Vice Chancellor of UC San Diego in 2016-2017. Cowhey became dean of the School in July 2002.]]> 582 0 16 0
  • Future of communications
  • Information technology markets
  • U.S. trade policy
  • Foreign policy
  • International corporate strategy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Pierre Yared]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/pierre-yared/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:34:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=585 585 0 54 0
  • Macroeconomic policy
  • Growth
  • Development
  • Political economy
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Robert Thomas]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/robert-thomas/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:36:22 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=591 591 0 47 0
  • Naval operations
  • National security
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Robert Trager]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/robert-trager/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:39:22 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=594 594 0 48 0
  • Diplomacy
  • Terrorism
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Scott Tait]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/scott-tait/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:47:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=597 597 0 46 0
  • National security
  • Strategic studies
  • Indo-Pacific region
  • U.S. Navy
  • War games
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Stephen Biddle]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/stephen-biddle/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:49:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=600 Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton University Press, 2004) and numerous journal articles in top-tier academic journals. He is a frequent commentator on US foreign policy for major news outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and the Guardian, among others. He received his PhD from Harvard University.]]> 600 0 8 0
  • U.S. national security policy
  • Military strategy and the conduct of war
  • Technology in modern warfare
  • Recent operations in the war on terror
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Susan Hyde]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/susan-hyde/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:51:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=603 603 0 27 0
  • International Relations
  • Comparative Politics
  • Elections
  • Electoral Violence
  • Field Experiments
  • Foreign Policy
  • Democracy Promotion
  • International Norms
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Vinod Aggarwal]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/vinod-aggarwal/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 22:53:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=606 Business and Politics, and Co-Chair of the U.S. Consortium of APEC Study Centers. From 1991-1994, he chaired the Political Economy of Industrial Societies Program at UC Berkeley. He has held fellowships from the Brookings Institution, Rockefeller Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, East-West Center, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and was a Japan Foundation Abe Fellow.  He has also been a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, the University of Geneva’s IOMBA program, INSEAD, Yonsei University, NTU Singapore, and Bocconi University. He is also an elected lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations and founding member of the U.S. Asia Pacific Council. Dr. Aggarwal consults regularly with multinational corporations on strategy, trade policy, and international negotiations, including Sutherland Global Services, Merck, Russell Investments, the Investment Management Consultants Association, Cisco, Statoil, ING Clarion, Genentech, Hewlett Packard, Qualcomm, Herman Miller, Italcementi, ARCO, and Nestle. He has been a consultant to the Mexican Government, the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Defense Department, U.S. State Department, World Trade Organization, OECD, the Group of Thirty, FAO, IFAD, the International Labor Organization, ASEAN, and the World Bank.  In 1990, he was Special Adviser on Trade Negotiations to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and has worked with the APEC Eminent Persons Group. In 1997, he won the Cheit Outstanding Teaching Award at the Haas School of Business for Ph.D. teaching; in 2003 he was first runner up for the Cheit Award for MBA teaching and won first place for the MBA program in 2005.]]> 606 0 1 0
  • International Political Economy
  • Comparative Regionalism
  • Business and Politics
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Bianca Freeman]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/bianca-freeman/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:34:21 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=613 Proposal Title:  Race and Extraterritoriality in Status of Forces Agreements]]> 613 0 63 0 <![CDATA[Chris Costello]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/chris-costello/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:38:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=616 Proposal Title:  A Vast Consolidation: Everyday Agents of Empire, the United States Navy, and the Processes of Pacific Expansion, 1784–1861]]> 616 0 61 0 <![CDATA[Frank Wyer]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/frank-wyer/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:40:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=619 Proposal Title:  Defending the Peace: Causes, Consequences, and Responses to Postconflict Violence]]> 619 0 71 0 <![CDATA[Juan Carlos Villaseñor Derbez]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/juan-carlos-villasenor-derbez/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:41:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=622 Proposal Title:  Designing Conservation Markets for International Cooperation]]> 622 0 70 0 <![CDATA[Ngoc-Thoa Vinh Khuu]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/ngoc-thoa-vinh-khuu/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:42:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=625 Proposal Title:  Governmental Support, Pre-settlement Traumas, and Race Structure: Offsetting Dynamics in Refugee Integration?]]> 625 0 66 0 <![CDATA[Phoebe Moon]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/phoebe-moon/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:55:08 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=628 Proposal Title:  When the Target Fights Back: Economic Coercion and Interstate Conflict in the Era of Global Value Chains]]> 628 0 68 0 <![CDATA[Raphael Frankfurter]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/raphael-frankfurter/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:56:36 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=631 Proposal Title:  Global Health Securitization in Kono District, Sierra Leone: Social Repercussions and The Work of Affect]]> 631 0 62 0 <![CDATA[Sevin Sagnic]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/sevin-sagnic/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:57:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=634 Proposal Title:  The Role of Foreign Policy in Refugee Governance in the Middle East]]> 634 0 69 0 <![CDATA[Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/shikha-silliman-bhattacharjee/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 23:59:19 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=637 Proposal Title:  Corridor as Method—Migration Governance in the Global Economy]]> 637 0 60 0 <![CDATA[Syeda ShahBano Ijaz]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/syeda-shahbano-ijaz/ Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:01:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=639 Proposal Title:  From Aid to Accountability: Tracing Last-Mile Access in Developing Countries]]> 639 0 64 0 <![CDATA[Tauhid S. Bin Kashem]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/tauhid-s-bin-kashem/ Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:02:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=642 Proposal Title:  Unlikely Refuge: International Regime Complexity and Refugee Protection]]> 642 0 65 0 <![CDATA[James Lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/james-lee/ Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:07:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=645 U.S.-Taiwan Next Generation Working Group. He received his Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University in 2018, and he was a fellow in the Max Weber Program for Postdoctoral Studies at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy in 2018-2019. He also previously served as the Senior Editor of Taiwan Security Research (TSR) from 2017-2020. Lee’s research interests are at the intersection of international security, international political economy, and international history. He studies grand strategy and great power politics in periods ranging from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War to the present day. He is particularly interested in geoeconomics and economic statecraft. His academic research has been published in the Journal of East Asian Studies, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and the Journal of Chinese Political Science. He is currently working on a book that compares the United States strategy toward economic reconstruction and development in Western Europe and East Asia during the Cold War. His research connects the creation of the East Asian developmental state to the history of the Marshall Plan. Lee is also interested in public policy. He has served as a contributor for East Asia Forum, with opinion pieces on Taiwan’s security. At IGCC, he has published a policy brief on 5G and U.S. national security. At the European University Institute, he published a policy brief on the Taiwan question in U.S.-China relations and its implications for the European Union. Listen to James Lee discuss his research interests in Taiwan here: ]]> 645 0 31 0
  • U.S. grand strategy
  • U.S.-Taiwan relations
  • Europe and East Asia
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Christina Cottiero]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/christina-cottiero-2/ Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:08:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=648 Authoritarian International Organizations project, Christina has created a dataset of authoritarian regional organizations that includes information about the scope of these organizations’ activities. She is also managing ongoing data collection on authoritarian election monitoring and lending by authoritarian regional organizations for use in a series of papers around this issue. Christina is currently working on a book that explores why many illiberal leaders cooperate through regional integration organizations, which are widely associated with liberal international order and democracy promotion. The book presents a new theory of illiberal cooperation and tests propositions derived from the theory using a multi-method approach focused on African regional organizations and security cooperation in the post-Cold War period. In addition to new data, the book relies on interviews and archival research conducted in Nigeria. This research has recently been supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation, IGCC, and jointly by the U.S. Institute of Peace-Department of Defense Minerva Program, where Cottiero was a 2019-2020 Peace and Security Scholar. Christina earned a Ph.D. in 2021 from the UC San Diego Department of Political Science.]]> 648 0 14 0
  • Regional intergovernmental organizations
  • Security cooperation
  • Elite politics
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Do Young Lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/do-young-lee/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:00:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=652 652 0 57 0 <![CDATA[Edward Jenner]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/edward-jenner/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:02:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=655 655 0 56 0 <![CDATA[Shira Eini Pindyck]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/shira-elini-pindyck/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:14:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=662 662 0 59 0 <![CDATA[So Yeon (Ellen) Park]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/so-yeon-ellen-park/ Mon, 28 Feb 2022 23:16:36 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=665 665 0 58 0 <![CDATA[Lilly Dunn]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/lilly-dunn/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:28:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=668 Political Violence At A Glance, which answers questions on the most pressing problems related to violence and protest in the world’s conflict zones. Lilly copyedits blog submissions, and analyzes PVG’s analytics on a quarterly basis. She recieved a BA in comparative politics with a minor in Russian literature from UC San Diego.]]> 668 0 76 0 <![CDATA[Lindsay Morgan]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/lindsay-morgan-2/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:28:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=670 670 0 21 0 <![CDATA[Marie Thiveos Stewart]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/marie-thiveos-stewart/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:30:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=672 672 0 73 0 <![CDATA[Misty Cervantes Nguyen]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/misty-cervantes-nguyen/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:31:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=675 675 0 74 0 <![CDATA[Siwen Xiao]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/siwen-xiao/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:33:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=677 677 0 77 0
  • China’s political economy
  • Industrial policy
  • U.S.-China relations
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Yaosheng Xu]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/yaosheng-xu/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:37:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=680 680 0 75 0
  • Innovation policy
  • Political economy
  • China
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Christina Cottiero]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=149 Sat, 05 Feb 2022 20:15:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=149 Authoritarian International Organizations project, Christina has created a dataset of authoritarian regional organizations that includes information about the scope of these organizations’ activities. She is also managing ongoing data collection on authoritarian election monitoring and lending by authoritarian regional organizations for use in a series of papers around this issue. Christina is currently working on a book that explores why many illiberal leaders cooperate through regional integration organizations, which are widely associated with liberal international order and democracy promotion. The book presents a new theory of illiberal cooperation and tests propositions derived from the theory using a multi-method approach focused on African regional organizations and security cooperation in the post-Cold War period. In addition to new data, the book relies on interviews and archival research conducted in Nigeria. This research has recently been supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation, IGCC, and jointly by the U.S. Institute of Peace-Department of Defense Minerva Program, where Cottiero was a 2019-2020 Peace and Security Scholar. Christina earned a Ph.D. in 2021 from the UC San Diego Department of Political Science.]]> 149 0 14 0 <![CDATA[Yujing Yang]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/yujing-yang/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:39:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=683 683 0 72 0 <![CDATA[Deborah Ogle]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/deborah-ogle/ Thu, 24 Mar 2022 17:29:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=1569 1569 0 78 0 <![CDATA[Lauren Prather]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/lauren-prather/ Tue, 29 Mar 2022 21:11:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=1606 Lauren Prather is an Associate Professor of international relations at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. Her work focuses on the domestic determinants of foreign policy, U.S. foreign policy, democracy promotion and democratization, Middle East politics, and experimental methods. Her research is supported by the National Science Foundation, the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, the Europe Center, and the Laboratory for the Study of American Values at Stanford University. Prather’s work has or will appear in Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies and Election Law Journal. She also has written in The Monkey Cage and An Africanist Perspective and been featured by the Center for Global Development, Chris Blattman's blog, ThinkProgress and The World Bank Development Impact blog.]]> 1606 0 35 0
  • International relations
  • Comparative politics
  • Democracy promotion
  • Democratization
  • International aid
  • Migration
  • Experimental methods
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[The Republic of Korea’s Perspective on Defense Transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-republic-of-koreas-perspective-on-defense-transparency/ Sat, 01 Oct 2011 18:22:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1743 1743 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Harnessing the European Experience in Defense Transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/harnessing-the-european-experience-in-defense-transparency/ Sat, 01 Oct 2011 18:55:39 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1756 1756 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Cognitive-Linguistic-Organizational Aspects of Field Research in International Relations]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/cognitive-linguistic-organizational-aspects-of-field-research-in-international-relations/ Sun, 09 Aug 1987 15:00:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2016 2016 0 0 0 <![CDATA[What Russian Military Disloyalty Means for the War in Ukraine]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2088 Mon, 25 Apr 2022 15:00:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2088

    Since the invasion of Ukraine, there have been many flashpoints of Russian military disloyalty. In one of the more dramatic displays, Russian Colonel Yuri Medvedev was run over by a tank and killed at the hands of his own brigade. Other examples include intercepted phone calls with Russian soldiers expressing grievances, complaining of frostbite and a lack of food.

    The quagmire that the Russian military now finds itself in is a far cry from the assertive dominance over Ukraine that many observers expected. Putin, being a forward-thinking, regime-securing strategist, has taken serious measures to ensure that his top generals cannot stage a military coup against him. Given these measures to secure power, consensus is forming that it is unlikely that Putin will be ousted at the hands of his own military in the immediate future.

    However, coups are not the only meaningful form of military rebellion.

    Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.

    ]]>
    2088 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Jaclyn Johnson, Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Kentucky, analyzes what defection from the Russian military means for the conflict in Ukraine.]]>
    <![CDATA[Patrick Hulme]]> https://ucigcc.org/people/patrick-hulme/ Thu, 05 May 2022 17:26:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=people&p=2235 Patrick Hulme is a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at the University of California, San Diego. He is a Junior Scholar at the Carnegie International Policy Scholar Consortium and Network (IPSCON), and for the 2020-2021 academic year he was a Hans J. Morgenthau Fellow (non-resident) at the Notre Dame International Security Center. His research and teaching interests include congressional-executive relations in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S.-China relationship, and international security. He has been a graduate student researcher for the Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), the 21st Century China Center, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). His work has been published by International Studies Quarterly, The National Interest, and Lawfare, and he holds a B.A. in economics with a minor in Chinese from the University of California, Davis, and a J.D.—with a specialization in international and comparative law—from the UCLA School of Law.
    ]]>
    2235 0 26 0
  • Congressional-executive relations
  • U.S. foreign policy
  • U.S.-China relations
  • International security
  • ]]>
    <![CDATA[Innovate to Dominate: The Rise of the Chinese Techno-Security State]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2272 Mon, 15 Aug 2022 16:54:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2272 Innovate to Dominate is a timely and analytically rigorous examination of the key strategies guiding China's transformation of its capabilities in the national, technological, military, and security spheres and how this is taking place. The book authoritatively addresses a burning question being asked in capitals around the world: Can and, if so, when will China become the dominant global techno-security power?]]> 2272 0 0 0 Innovate to Dominate, Tai Ming Cheung offers insight into why, how, and whether China will overtake the United States to become the world's preeminent technological and security power.]]> <![CDATA[The Changing Dynamics Behind China's Rise as a Military Technological Power]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-changing-dynamics-behind-chinas-rise-as-a-military-technological-power/ Wed, 01 Dec 2010 18:36:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2292 2292 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The J-20 Fighter Aircraft and the State of China's Defense Science, Technology, and Innovation Potential]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-j-20-fighter-aircraft-and-the-state-of-chinas-defense-science-technology-and-innovation-potential/ Sat, 01 Jan 2011 18:42:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2297 2297 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Innovation in China’s Defense Research, Development, and Acquisition System]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/innovation-in-chinas-defense-research-development-and-acquisition-system/ Thu, 01 Sep 2011 18:01:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2302 2302 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Rejuvenating the Chinese Defense Economy: Present Developments and Future Trends]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/rejuvenating-the-chinese-defense-economy-present-developments-and-future-trends/ Thu, 01 Sep 2011 18:08:53 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2307 2307 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to Innovation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-chinese-defense-economys-long-march-from-imitation-to-innovation/ Wed, 01 Sep 2010 18:38:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2317 2317 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Current State of Defense Innovation in China and Future Prospects]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2325 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2325 2325 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue/ Sun, 15 Sep 2002 20:36:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2334 2334 0 0 0 <![CDATA[North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/north-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagement/ Fri, 09 Oct 2009 20:44:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2339 2339 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Historical Perspectives on Global Conflict and Cooperation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/historical-perspectives-on-global-conflict-and-cooperation/ Thu, 05 Feb 1987 22:27:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2344 2344 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Psychological Research on International Conflict and Nuclear Arms Issues: Possible Directions]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2354 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2354 2354 0 0 0 <![CDATA[2013‒14 IGCC White Paper on Defense Transparency in Northeast Asia]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/2013-14-igcc-white-paper-on-defense-transparency-in-northeast-asia/ Sun, 30 Nov 2014 16:00:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1662 1662 0 0 0 <![CDATA[2012 IGCC White Paper on Northeast Asia Defense Transparency, Summary Version]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/2012-igcc-white-paper-on-northeast-asia-defense-transparency-summary-version/ Sat, 01 Dec 2012 16:18:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1693 1693 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Japan’s Approaches to Defense Transparency: Perspectives from the Japanese and Chinese Defense Establishments]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/japans-approaches-to-defense-transparency-perspectives-from-the-japanese-and-chinese-defense-establishments/ Thu, 01 Mar 2012 16:00:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1710 1710 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Japan’s Defense White Paper as a Tool for Promoting Defense Transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/japans-defense-white-paper-as-a-tool-for-promoting-defense-transparency/ Thu, 01 Mar 2012 16:10:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1715 1715 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Japan’s National Defense Planning for the New Security Environment: The 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/japans-national-defense-planning-for-the-new-security-environment-the-2010-national-defense-program-guidelines/ Thu, 01 Mar 2012 18:45:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1720 1720 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Japanese Bureaucratic Transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/japanese-bureaucratic-transparency/ Thu, 01 Mar 2012 19:50:13 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1725 1725 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Role of the Japanese Diet in Promoting Defense Transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-role-of-the-japanese-diet-in-promoting-defense-transparency/ Thu, 01 Mar 2012 18:53:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1731 1731 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Chinese Perspectives on Japan’s Defense Transparency]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/chinese-perspectives-on-japans-defense-transparency/ Thu, 01 Mar 2012 19:21:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1738 1738 0 0 0 <![CDATA[A Civilian Perspective on Defense Transparency in the Republic of Korea: The More, the Better?]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/a-civilian-perspective-on-defensetransparency-in-the-republic-of-korea-the-more-the-better/ Sat, 01 Oct 2011 18:55:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1761 1761 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Measuring Transparency in Military Expenditure: The Case of China]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/measuring-transparency-in-military-expenditure-the-case-of-china/ Sat, 01 Oct 2011 18:59:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1766 1766 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Defense Transparency: Seeking a Definition for a Paradoxical Concept]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/defense-transparency-seeking-a-definition-for-a-paradoxical-concept/ Sat, 01 Oct 2011 19:03:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1771 1771 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Why Ungoverned Space? A Political Economy Approach]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/why-ungoverned-space-a-political-economy-approach/ Sat, 01 Sep 2012 12:00:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2021 2021 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Election Fairness and Government Legitimacy in Afghanistan]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/election-fairness-and-government-legitimacy-in-afghanistan/ Sat, 01 Mar 2014 18:17:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2026 2026 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/small-wars-big-data-the-information-revolution-in-modern-conflict/ Tue, 12 Jun 2018 15:00:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2168 2168 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign Intervention]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-statebuilders-dilemma-on-the-limits-of-foreign-intervention/ Mon, 20 Nov 2017 21:55:30 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2173 book by David Lake seeks to make sense of these disasters. Proceeding from the observation that statebuilding “fails more often than it succeeds,” Lake seeks to explain why and to impress upon scholars and policymakers the irresolvable difficulties that foreign interveners face in building states through coercive force (p. 3). The Statebuilder’s Dilemma should be read by all international relations scholars for the clear logic of its microfoundations and for the innovative ways in which the author applies the insights of relational contracting to a major problem in contemporary international relations.]]> 2173 0 0 0 <![CDATA[China's Emergence as a Defense Technological Power]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/chinas-emergence-as-a-defense-technological-power/ Fri, 21 Dec 2012 20:33:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2246 volume provides a wide-ranging and detailed assessment of the present state of the Chinese defense economy at a time of rapid change and accelerating advancement in its innovation capabilities and performance. This collection of articles has three main goals: (1) to locate China’s defense innovation dynamics within broader historical, technological and methodological frameworks of analysis; (2) to assess the performance of the Chinese defense economy’s six principal subsectors; and (3) to compare China’s approach to defense industrialization with major counterparts in the Asia-Pacific region. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies.]]> 2246 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Forging China's Military: Might A New Framework for Assessing Innovation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/forging-chinas-military-might-a-new-framework-for-assessing-innovation/ Mon, 24 Feb 2014 18:05:40 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2277 Forging China's Military Might develop an analytical framework to evaluate the nature, dimensions, and spectrum of Chinese innovation in the military and broader defense spheres. Forging China's Military Might provides an overview of the current state of the Chinese defense industry and then focuses on subjects critical to understanding short- and long-term developments, including the relationship among defense contractors, regulators, and end-users; civil-military integration; China’s defense innovation system; and China’s place in the global defense economy. Case studies look in detail at the Chinese space and missile industry.]]> 2277 0 0 0 Forging China's Military Might develop an analytical framework to evaluate the nature, dimensions, and spectrum of Chinese innovation in the military and broader defense spheres.]]> <![CDATA[China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/china-and-cybersecurity-espionage-strategy-and-politics-in-the-digital-domain/ Wed, 01 Apr 2015 17:12:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2282

    Chinese cyber espionage is commonly portrayed in the West as a major threat to economic and national security. From China’s perspective, the United States poses a major cyberthreat to other countries because of its outsized influence over the Internet, willingness to use cyber weapons against its adversaries, and exploitation of major firms like Microsoft and Google for intelligence. Mistrust and confusion have complicated Internet politics on both sides of the Pacific. To get beyond the hype, an understanding of China and cybersecurity requires a combination of international and interdisciplinary perspectives. This book brings a balance of technical, political, economic, legal, and strategic analysis by authors from China, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Even though the contributors to this volume do not always agree with one another—an important point in itself—they reveal underlying political and economic dynamics that will remain relevant even as new facts and opinions emerge in a fast-changing domain. This volume contributes substantively to our understanding of China and cybersecurity, both complex topics on their own, by exploring how China’s domestic political and economic system shapes its cyber activities. The collaboration also stands as an example of how Chinese and Western experts can work together to improve trust and understanding in an area of great mutual concern.

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    2282 0 0 0 China and Cybersecurity is the first scholarly volume available on the topic of China and cybersecurity to offer perspectives from both Western and Chinese scholars]]>
    <![CDATA[Measuring the U.S.-China Innovation Gap: Initial Findings of the UCSD-Tsinghua Innovation Metrics Survey Project]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/measuring-the-u-s-china-innovation-gap-initial-findings-of-the-ucsd-tsinghua-innovation-metrics-survey-project/ Sun, 01 Dec 2013 19:14:13 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2312 2312 0 0 0 <![CDATA[China and Cybersecurity: Political, Economic, and Strategic Dimensions]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/china-and-cyber-security-political-economic-and-strategic-dimensions/ Sun, 01 Apr 2012 20:25:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2328 2328 0 0 0 <![CDATA[5 Questions on Development and Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/5-questions-on-development-and-conflict/ Tue, 28 Apr 2020 17:14:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=701 David Lake, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, poses five questions about development and conflict to Eli Berman, research director at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and professor of economics at UC San Diego. Read the full article at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 701 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, David Lake, Distibguished Professor of political science at UC San Diego, interviews IGCC Research Director Eli Berman, Professor of economics at UC San Diego, on the conflicts to watch 2020 onwards.]]> <![CDATA[As Governments Dither on COVID-19, Jihadists and Gang Leaders Step In]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/as-governments-dither-on-covid-19-jihadists-and-gang-leaders-step-in/ Wed, 15 Apr 2020 21:09:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=859 several prominent jihadist groups, including the Islamic State, the Taliban, and several al-Qaeda affiliates, have presented official responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Afghanistan, the Taliban stepped in before the government to offer public health guidelines and local support in areas under their control, and even in government-controlled territory through limited cooperation with government forces. In Brazil, some gang leaders operating in favelas largely outside the government’s policing power announced curfews and social distancing guidelines on the same week that the country’s president downplayed the crisis and refused to enact a public health response. This is puzzling. Non-state armed groups often lack the resources and credibility to mount an effective public health response. ISIS doesn’t have a Centers for Disease Control. Brazilian gangs aren’t known for their deep reserves of healthcare experts. Why are some jihadist and criminal leaders responding more swiftly, and taking COVID-19 more seriously, than dozens of government leaders? Read the full article at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 859 0 0 0 <![CDATA[China: Fragile Superpower Revisited]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/china-fragile-superpower-revisited/ Mon, 01 Jun 2020 21:16:32 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=883 You are one of the most influential experts working on U.S.-China relations and Chinese politics. How did you become interested in Asia and China? I went to Nagano Japan as an exchange student right after I graduated from high school and lived with a Japanese family above their small grocery store, and that just opened my eyes to Asia. I had no high school education about Asia but then I started taking college courses and got interested in China. Pure serendipity.

    Your book “China: Fragile Superpower” helped frame the policy debate on China and the U.S. How has the world and China changed since you wrote that book? Do you still consider it a fragile superpower?

    Yeah, I do actually. China’s economy, its military and its global influence have all grown, but the fragility that comes from this deep insecurity of the Communist Party leadership is still there. They’re even more insecure because the more affluent, open to the world, and better educated the Chinese public is, the more pressing is the question: can an autocratic, communist party rule a vibrant open market economy? The Chinese leaders saw the fall of the Soviet Union, which happened very suddenly, and of course they also experienced the Tiananmen protests, which was quite a trauma. Under Xi Jinping, not only do they have to worry about a bottom-up upheaval, but also a possible split in the leadership. I think the split in the leadership, even though there’s no sign of it, is the greatest potential risk, even more than some bottom up opposition.

    Are we at the low point in U.S.-China relations?

    We are definitely at a low point in the post-Mao period. This is as bad as it’s ever been. During the time I’ve been studying China, life for Chinese people has improved. It’s not a straight line—it hasn’t improved as fast politically as many people in China would like—but still. There’s a lot more individual freedom, living standards have increased dramatically, opportunities to move, travel, pick your job, all that. U.S.-China relations have also been managed pretty well. That all ends in the mid-2000s, even before Xi Jinping. The global financial crisis tainted the image of the United States in the eyes of many people in China. It’s been a downward spiral ever since. Compared with his predecessors, Xi Jinping is a much more ambitious leader internationally, and also more focused on Chinese Marxist ideology, party rule, party discipline, and social control. Under Xi Jinping, it no longer looks like China is gradually converging to global norms. And of course, the pandemic has revealed how hostile relations have become. Previously, the U.S. and China have coordinated very well on public health threats. This time they did not.

    It’s interesting to see how the leadership in China recast the pandemic as a win for a centralized system. Do people in China buy that?

    Yes, it looks like they do. We’ve been doing some polls, and it looks like they do despite their earlier anger at the cover up when the disease first emerged.

    Is there anything that gives you a glimmer of hope in China-U.S. relations, or are you feeling bleak these days?

    I am hoping that after the election here in the United States, the new administration might take a more practical approach to China. That’s what I would say—a practical approach—because our approach has become highly ideological. Both Xi Jinping and the Trump administration are stoking a Cold War type contest of systems and values.

    What was it like to go from academia to government and back again? Many students have ambitions to be relevant in a policy space. What advice would you give them?

    Going into the policy world, in a job in the State Department, was extremely challenging. I didn’t know how to play the game at all. I got a lot of good advice from people, but it was a pretty steep learning curve. There are some academics who just really love being academics. They love being the lonely monk sitting in their office and writing books. I like research and writing too.  But if you have other skills like working well in teams with people, it’s really great to have the opportunity to do it and use the parts of your personality that are not used that much as an academic. Teaching is a social activity but you’re not working collectively with people in order to achieve something. I really liked doing that. I liked managing things. I liked being entrepreneurial, I liked to start new things. So being in policy was a great opportunity to use parts of me that weren’t getting used in academia. I also think that what you learn in academic life substantively and theoretically helps you think about policy in a more sophisticated and rigorous way. You just have to communicate it to others without jargon. And then when you go back to academia, you have to produce good work in order to prove to people you aren’t totally braindead. ••••• Susan Shirk is research professor and chair of the 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. She served as director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 1991-1997 and 2006-2010. Shirk first visited China in 1971, and has been teaching, researching and engaging China diplomatically ever since. From 1997-2000, Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, with responsibility for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. Shirk's publications include China: Fragile Superpower; The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China; Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China; and her edited book, Changing Media, Changing China. She co-chairs a task force of China experts that issued its second report Smart Competition: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy in February 2019. She also co-chairs the UC San Diego Forum on U.S.-China Relations.]]>
    883 0 0 0 Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and leading U.S.-China relations expert, revisits her book, China: Fragile Superpower, discusses the prospects for U.S.-China relations, and shares how she became interested in Asia. The interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[CliffsNotes: Empirical Studies of Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/cliffsnotes-empirical-studies-of-conflict/ Mon, 08 Jun 2020 21:39:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=890 Repression and dissent around a potential critical juncture: Panel data evidence from Zimbabwe By Adrienne LeBas and Lauren Young Q. What’s the problem to solve? A. Authoritarian regimes often use repression against their citizens, but social scientists have an imperfect understanding of how repression affects political behavior. Repression sometimes inhibits protest, either by inducing fear or raising the costs of organization. Under some conditions, though, repression strengthens citizens' resolve and makes protest more likely. Our research sheds light on how information, citizens' understanding of the likelihood of repression, and the actions of others affect their willingness to express dissent. This helps us better understand when and why citizens overcome the fear of repression and challenge authoritarian states. Q. Describe your research. A. We use face-to-face surveys and WhatsApp-implemented phone surveys to track individual attitudes during the critical July 2018 general elections in Zimbabwe. These elections—the first since the ouster of Robert Mugabe—were characterized by a more open period of campaigning and seemed to be an indicator of political opening. Yet the military opened fire on protesters the day after the election, and a state campaign of repression followed. Our unique panel data allows us to observe how ordinary citizens updated their views on repression and willingness to express dissent in real-time. Q. What have you learned? A. We find that exposure to both repression and protest by others increased citizens' willingness to engage in protest and other acts of dissent. This suggests that repression is not as effective a tool in dissuading protest as conventional wisdom suggests. Though exposure to repression does induce fear and other mobilization-dampening emotions, it also generates emotional responses that favor mobilization. Our research suggests that citizens' exposure to both repression and dissent by others makes them feel more positive toward opposition actors, an effect that is particularly potent for those who were previously less politically committed. Repression and protest lay the groundwork for further confrontation by increasing levels of political polarization among ordinary citizens. Q. What led you to become political scientists? A. Initially planned to be an agronomist. While working in a lab on fungal control of rice pests as an undergrad, I learned that access to inputs and new technology was a deeply political problem. I did coursework in economics and political science, and eventually went to graduate school in political science, because I was interested in how transnational actors and political institutions impact the success of policies to redress food insecurity and poverty. [LeBas] I had planned to work in humanitarian assistance, but I decided to do a social science PhD after getting the chance to run a survey in northern Liberia as an intern for an international NGO. I loved the process of doing a survey—traveling in close quarters with a team of researchers, trying to get inside someone else’s life experience—and developed a better understanding of just how little evidence policymakers usually have when designing policies to alleviate violent conflict. [Young] Q. Why do you care about this stuff? A. In many circumstances, citizens participate in collective action despite significant risks. We tend to avoid normative judgments in the social sciences, and often view decisions as the outcomes of structural forces. At a human level, though, we have to recognize that participation in collective action can be quite brave and prosocial. The fact that we still don’t have a sufficient model of how and when it works is also motivating at an intellectual level. We also both conducted fieldwork in Zimbabwe during periods of state-sponsored violence and economic crisis, and these experiences shaped our research and made us more committed to understanding popular mobilization and political change. ••••••

    Refugee Return and Food Insecurity: Explaining Increases in Violence in Ongoing Civil Wars

    By Kara Ross Camarena What is the problem to solve? Refugees are often blamed for destabilizing the places where they seek refuge. If this is true, and we can understand how it happens, then we may be able to prevent it. Describe your research. My research focuses on refugees who return home while a civil war is ongoing. I ask: do large return flows during the civil war make violence worse? To answer this question, I examine refugee return using quasi-experimental methods in sub-Saharan Africa with a ten-year panel beginning in 2000. I find that unexpected, large returns in the midst of a civil war cause additional violence. More limited evidence suggests some violence may be due to demand for food. What have you learned? Large, unplanned for migrant flows can make ongoing civil wars worse. Humanitarian interventions that provide basic needs upon arrival of migrants could mitigate the violence. What led you to become a public policy researcher? One evening while I was living in Arusha, Tanzania, I went to have a quick dinner alone at a hotel restaurant. I was seated by a lawyer who was representing a defendant in the Rwandan War Crime Tribunal, and we had a fascinating conversation. I got a glimpse of the perpetrator's side of the Rwandan genocide, and it made me question a lot of what I had learned about Rwanda. I realized that how people respond to conflict depends in part on political, economic, and social context. I later learned that public policy could shape this context. Why do you care about this stuff? There are millions of people in the world who embark on extraordinary journeys in order to save themselves and their families from violence and persecution. My research provides guidance on how policy can help these people in search of safety. ••••••

    How Repression Affects Public Perceptions of Police: Evidence from Uganda

    Travis Curtice What is the problem to solve? My work seeks to understand two problems. First, what drives cycles of political violence and insecurity? And second, why don’t people trust police to keep them safe? By understanding these problems, I hope my research contributes to policies that help reduce the fear and insecurity that people face. Describe your research. I study political violence and its effects on people’s perceptions of the police. Most of my work focuses on policing in unconsolidated democracies and conflict-affected states. I’ve worked in Kenya, Liberia, Nepal, and Uganda. I use diverse methods, including survey experiments, field research, qualitative interviews, and cross-national comparisons, to navigate the ethical challenges of researching such socially sensitive topics and the demands of causal inference. What have you learned? When political authorities rely on the police to repress political dissent, it undermines people’s confidence in the police, making them less likely to support the police or cooperate with them. What led you to become a political scientist? In many ways, I stumbled into becoming a political scientist, in part because it offered some of the theoretical and empirical tools I was looking for to understand patterns of conflict. In 2004, I was teaching English in Zenica, Bosnia. While working there, I witnessed victims from a mass grave in Srebrenica being buried at the memorial in Potočari. It’s the kind of experience that stays with you. I knew then that I wanted to study conflict. But it was three years later, when I was working in IDP camps in northern Uganda, that I knew I wanted to pursue my doctoral studies. Why do you care about this stuff? Bridging the gap between academia and policy motivates my work. Outside of academia, I worked in development in conflict-affected communities and as an election analyst for several election observation missions. These experiences shaped the questions I ask and my approach to research. Having one foot in the policy/practitioner world reminds me why the stakes to understanding political violence and conflict are so high. ••••••

    Do Commodity Price Shocks Cause Armed Conflict? A Meta-Analysis of Natural Experiments

    Darin Christensen, Graeme Douglas Blair, and Aaron Rudkin What is the problem to solve? Many countries—often low-income countries—depend heavily on primary commodity exports, things like palm oil or iron ore. As global demand for these commodities fluctuates, the ensuing price swings can have large economic and political consequences. Our interest is in whether and under what conditions these global price swings generate instability and conflict. Describe your research. We conduct a formal meta-analysis of 46 high-quality empirical papers in economics and political science that address the question of whether commodity prices shocks impact armed conflict. These papers collectively study more than 200 countries. What have you learned? When you pool together all different types of commodities, there’s no effect of prices shocks on armed conflict. But when you break out the different types of commodities, we find that price increases for a capital-intensive commodity, such as oil, increases armed conflict. The opposite is true of agricultural commodities, which are labor-intensive. We also find that prices increase for artisanal minerals—think gold and diamonds produced in small-scale mines—increase the likelihood of conflict. This confirms past claims that such minerals are highly lootable and, thus, a lucrative target for attacks when prices are high. What led you to become political scientists? I like how social scientists think—how we combine theory and data to better understand why social problems arise and, thus, what might be done about them. [Darin] I got interested in the politics of natural resources talking to Albert Brownell, a Liberian environmental lawyer and activist, who works with communities that have shut down timber production and use that leverage to bargain with the government and the companies for fair operating terms and compensation. I found the idea that ordinary people can affect social change through disrupting an important source of government revenue really powerful. I spent my graduate work studying how communities living near oil infrastructure in Nigeria organized around the same logic: interrupting oil production through fighting and protests to demand a fair share of oil profits. [Graeme] Why do you care about this stuff? We work with a number of NGOs and governments in resource-rich countries, where these are pressing questions. It’s motivating to think that our research findings could inform the problems they target and the policies they put in place. [Darin] Policymakers are increasingly looking to implement evidence-based policies but are faced with an array of mixed if not contradictory evidence. When two sets of prominent scholars publish papers that come to the opposite conclusions, as in this space, it's hard even for experts to figure out how to make policy decisions. Meta-analysis is one tool to help cut through these disputes and guide decisions about when and where, for example, commodity shocks are likely to be a problem for economic and social policy. It's a tool that's very common in medical research, but hasn't been adopted quickly in the social sciences. If we want policymakers to take academic research seriously, we need to provide tools that guide decision-making. [Graeme] ••••••

    The Ethnicization of Syria’s Conflict: A Social Media Analysis

    Alexandra Siegel and Yael Zeira What is the problem to solve? Ethnic conflicts are often seen as especially violent and intractable. But how do conflicts become ethnic in the first place? Our research explores when and why some conflicts are "ethnicized"—how ethnic interpretations of conflict become dominant in the war of ideas. The goal of this work is to improve our understanding of what drives and what mitigates ethnic conflict. Describe your research. We analyze the online and real-world spread of ethnic narratives, frames, and interpretations of the Syrian civil war, which began as an anti-regime revolution and took on an increasingly ethno-sectarian hue. We develop a new framework that systematically maps Syria's pre-conflict ethnic structure, and, using Twitter data, crowdsourced surveys of Syrians, and machine learning methods, we measure ethnicization. Drawing on this framework, we empirically demonstrate the ethnicization of the Syrian conflict and plan to conduct network and spatial analysis to identify the key drivers of this process. What have you learned? We are in the early phases of this project, but our preliminary analysis suggests that ethnic frames and narratives of the Syrian conflict first gained traction outside of Syria, before becoming more prominent domestically, showing the important role that external actors may play in fueling ethnicization. What led you to become a public policy researcher. Ethnic conflict is part of my family’s history. My grandmother was a Holocaust survivor, and my grandfather fought in the 1948 War that simultaneously resulted in the creation of Israel and the dispossession of the Palestinian people. From a young age, I was aware of the ways that conflict impacts the lives of ordinary people, and that made me want to know about how different groups come into conflict and how we can bridge intergroup divisions. [Yael] I became interested in using social media to study politics when I was living in Cairo during the Arab Spring. While using Twitter and Facebook to figure out which streets were closed, how to avoid teargas, and other day-to-day logistics, I became fascinated by the political discussions unfolding online. This experience motivated me to pursue a PhD, using social media data to answer policy relevant questions about political behavior in the Arab World. [Alex] Why do you care about this stuff? What keeps me motivated is puzzling out an answer to a question we haven’t fully been able to answer before and knowing that the answer matters—that it has consequences. When there are new and clear policy implications that come out of my work, that’s what’s most exciting to me. [Yael] I’m excited by the opportunity to bring new tools and data to help us answer policy-relevant questions. From clerics and royal family members to elected officials and everyday citizens, millions of people use online platforms to talk about politics. They leave behind digital footprints that enable us to map their behavior in real time, offering new means of understanding the dynamics of conflict and political behavior. [Alex] ••••••

    The Economic Value of Crime Control: Evidence from a Large Investment on Police Infrastructure in Colombia

    Miguel Angel Morales Mosquera What is the problem to solve? I hope my research will help policymakers around the world who are trying to be more effective in alleviating the consequences of urban crime. My research provides a deeper understanding of the efficient deployment of police resources, and the role that infrastructure can play in moderating crime. It proposes a measure for the benefits of spending public money to reduce offenses, giving policymakers an estimation of the costs created by crime. Describe your research. My research is largely focused on uncovering the benefits and costs of crime policy and society’s responses. My current work is focused on estimating an individual’s willingness to pay for crime reductions. I combine theory with new sources of granular data to better understand the economic consequences of urban crime in developing countries. In my most recent paper, I use the housing market to develop estimates of the local welfare of individuals after a large investment in police infrastructure in Colombia. Applying a research design based on the openings of hundreds of police stations in the three largest cities, I study the effects of public safety investments on crime and housing markets. I assembled a detailed spatial dataset on the location and operation of police stations and linked this information with administrative data that provides information on reported crime, policing, census and property values. What have you learned? I’ve learned that localized policing led to important reductions in crime, mainly explained by deterrence effects. Yet, these reductions in crime are highly localized with no evidence of crime displacement in the surrounding area where police are deployed. I also learned that there are significant economic benefits and they translate to increases in property values. Now, I am studying what are the consequences on residential sorting and neighborhood composition. What led you to become a public policy researcher? Two events promoted my vocation to understand the world and contribute to improving society’s conditions. I was born and raised in Cali, Colombia during the time that drug cartels (Cali and Medellin) were fighting against each other and against the government, a period of extremely high levels of violence in Colombia. This experience deeply influenced me and sparked my interest in understanding the causes and consequences of crime. Later, I had the opportunity to work in the Colombian Central Bank during the 2008 global financial crisis. During that time, I saw firsthand how public policies and rapid responses have an enormous impact on society. Why do you care about this stuff? I am passionate about what I do. Doing research in public policy has the extra motivation that research results have an important and faster impact in society. For instance, policymakers and agencies in Colombia have shown interest in the results of my research. They are interested in data-driven analysis to improve the design of their crime policy.]]>
    890 0 0 0 Q. What’s the problem to solve? A. Authoritarian regimes often use repression against their citizens, but social scientists have an imperfect understanding of how repression affects political behavior. Repression sometimes inhibits protest, either by inducing fear or raising the costs of organization. Under some conditions, though, repression strengthens citizens' resolve and makes protest more likely. Our research sheds light on how information, citizens' understanding of the likelihood of repression, and the actions of others affect their willingness to express dissent. This helps us better understand when and why citizens overcome the fear of repression and challenge authoritarian states. Q. Describe your research. A. We use face-to-face surveys and WhatsApp-implemented phone surveys to track individual attitudes during the critical July 2018 general elections in Zimbabwe. These elections—the first since the ouster of Robert Mugabe—were characterized by a more open period of campaigning and seemed to be an indicator of political opening. Yet the military opened fire on protesters the day after the election, and a state campaign of repression followed. Our unique panel data allows us to observe how ordinary citizens updated their views on repression and willingness to express dissent in real-time. news_esoc-young.jpgQ. What have you learned? A. We find that exposure to both repression and protest by others increased citizens' willingness to engage in protest and other acts of dissent. This suggests that repression is not as effective a tool in dissuading protest as conventional wisdom suggests. Though exposure to repression does induce fear and other mobilization-dampening emotions, it also generates emotional responses that favor mobilization. Our research suggests that citizens' exposure to both repression and dissent by others makes them feel more positive toward opposition actors, an effect that is particularly potent for those who were previously less politically committed. Repression and protest lay the groundwork for further confrontation by increasing levels of political polarization among ordinary citizens. Q. What led you to become political scientists? A. Initially planned to be an agronomist. While working in a lab on fungal control of rice pests as an undergrad, I learned that access to inputs and new technology was a deeply political problem. I did coursework in economics and political science, and eventually went to graduate school in political science, because I was interested in how transnational actors and political institutions impact the success of policies to redress food insecurity and poverty. [LeBas] I had planned to work in humanitarian assistance, but I decided to do a social science PhD after getting the chance to run a survey in northern Liberia as an intern for an international NGO. I loved the process of doing a survey—traveling in close quarters with a team of researchers, trying to get inside someone else’s life experience—and developed a better understanding of just how little evidence policymakers usually have when designing policies to alleviate violent conflict. [Young] Q. Why do you care about this stuff? A. In many circumstances, citizens participate in collective action despite significant risks. We tend to avoid normative judgments in the social sciences, and often view decisions as the outcomes of structural forces. At a human level, though, we have to recognize that participation in collective action can be quite brave and prosocial. The fact that we still don’t have a sufficient model of how and when it works is also motivating at an intellectual level. We also both conducted fieldwork in Zimbabwe during periods of state-sponsored violence and economic crisis, and these experiences shaped our research and made us more committed to understanding popular mobilization and political change.]]>
    <![CDATA[Conference Shines a Light on New Problems and Persistent Challenges Affecting International Cooperation]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/conference-shines-light-on-challenges-for-global-cooperation/ Tue, 10 Mar 2020 21:51:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=893 Julia Morse (UC Santa Barbara) and Tyler Pratt (Yale) opened the conference by discussing the sophisticated ways in which countries protect their reputations and credibility when they are accused of wrongdoing abroad. Applying a framework from the field of public administration, the paper assessed how various forms of governmental contestation influence the way that domestic audiences perceive violations of international law. Ryan Brutger (UC Berkeley) and Siyao Li (University of Pennsylvania) led a discussion about public frustration in response to international trade policy. They argued that the American public may see trade more favorably if it is facilitated by an international organization. Specifically, Brutger finds that Republican voters are more likely to support a trade agreement if the U.S. has veto power (i.e., the ability to unilaterally walk away from the treaty) within the organization. Weiyi Shi (UC San Diego) and Lauren Prather (UC San Diego) discussed how the role of China influences Americans’ views on globalization. They questioned if a perceived rivalry with China makes Americans less likely to support trade with China, with allies, and with the world more generally. Several papers addressed another changing aspect of the global economy: financial globalization. Today, national economies are large and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can no longer reliably stabilize all countries during a crisis on its own. Coordinated sovereign lending has emerged. In this new system of lending, Paasha Mahdavi (UC Santa Barbara), Christina Schneider (UC San Diego), and Jennifer Tobin (Georgetown) demonstrated that lenders take cues from early entrants and the IMF: if investors offer loans, and the IMF lends with strict fiscal conditionality, other lenders are likely to follow. Erin Lockwood (UC Irvine) presented a paper that investigated the non-material forms of power associated with financial authority. To assess the power associated with financial authority, Lockwood argued, it is important to pursue empirical research that investigates the practices of authorities—particularly in their response to crises. Puzzles associated with conflict and security were also a major focus of several papers. Barry O'Neill (UCLA) presented a paper on what scholars refer to as the “stability-instability paradox (SIP).” When two countries have access to nuclear weapons, this decreases the likelihood of a major conflict between them, yet paradoxically increases the likelihood that smaller-scale conflicts might arise. Using game theory, O'Neill discussed how we might clarify the logic of the SIP, and thereby create a bridge for academics to help policymakers navigate the paradox. Andrew Shaver (UC Merced) closed the workshop with a paper that investigated media bias in the reporting of political violence. Specifically, Shaver presented a new dataset that demonstrates the dramatic difference between actual battle injuries and those that are shown in the media. It is vital for scholars to investigate such biases, Shaver observed, because so many scholars and policymakers rely on databases that rely heavily on media reporting to assess the costs of war and to evaluate the causes and consequences of political violence. •••••• The UC Conference on International Cooperation (UCCIC) was founded in 2016, by Christina Schneider and Leslie Johns for the purpose of connecting junior and senior scholars of international relations across the University of California system. Supported by the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), UCCIC aims to cultivate a community of scholars who work in areas such as international security, foreign policy, international political economy and international organizations, to increase academic dialogue and support the next generation of international relations scholars. This year's 5th annual UCCIC was made possible thanks to generous funding and support from IGCC and UC Riverside’s Department of Political Science.]]> 893 0 0 0 <![CDATA[COVID-19 Disinformation is on the Rise: Here’s What We Know]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/covid-19-disinformation-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-we-know/ Mon, 27 Apr 2020 22:00:39 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=903 academic and civil society organizations alike. Major technology companies are ramping up operations to combat the “infodemic” on their platforms. Concern is warranted. Health misinformation is associated with higher rates of preventable infection and ultimately death. During the Ebola outbreak, mortality rates were much higher in countries where misinformation was rampant, in part because their populations were less willing to adhere to public health guidelines. By contrast, the disease was contained in countries with strong communications strategies, such as Nigeria. Maliciously orchestrated, deliberate campaigns are well-documented during pandemics. During the rise of HIV/AIDS, the Soviet Union launched Operation Infektionwhich planted a series of fake scientific papers on the origin and transmission of the virus, and was arguably responsible for hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths and long-lasting conspiracy theories among at-risk populations. Recent reports show that Russia, along with other countries, is actively spreading disinformation about COVID-19. So what kind of disinformation is out there, and who’s propagating it? Read the full article at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 903 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, IGCC expert Jacob Shapiro, Professor of politics at Princeton University, Kristen DeCaires, Program Manager for the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC), and Jan Oledan, a consultant at the World Bank, analyze the wide range of COVID-19 disinformation. ]]> <![CDATA[COVID-19 in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: What does the future hold?]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/covid-19-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-what-does-the-future-hold/ Tue, 10 Mar 2020 22:06:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=907 What toll will the spread of COVID-19 have on global development—people, systems, economies? The toll of COVID-19 on global development is extremely heterogeneous—some countries are being hit extremely hard by a combination of high virus transmission rates and/or very aggressive policy responses. There was a fair amount early in the pandemic of what looked like copycat responses, where countries were looking to how Europe, and to a lesser degree the United States, was responding and were adopting some of the same restrictions on mobility and economic activity, even before LMICs started to see virus counts increase. That was a very understandable reaction; but the restrictions on mobility, for example, led to massive numbers of migrants being stuck and needing to find alternative ways to get home, often in violation of laws. It led to excuses for police brutality related to enforcing stay at home orders. There were news stories about that happening in South Africa, in Brazil, and in India. The biggest toll of COVID-19 is going to be on the poor, unsurprisingly. It will likely be the result of some combination of mis-matched policy restrictions, combined with the macroeconomic flows that in turn affect commodity prices, trade flows, and access to markets.

    Experts and practitioners have long discussed the waning influence of the U.S. in the development space. Has the U.S. response to COVID-19 done further damage to our ability to play a positive role in global development?

    It almost certainly has, for at least two reasons. One is, even as countries around the world are starting to ease travel restrictions, the U.S. is still on the red list for many countries. As it becomes easier for, say, Germany to begin to engage again with a given country, the U.S. is considerably further behind. These physical limitations will likely have lasting ramifications. Countries able to step in quickly and collaborate constructively to support recovery are going to be building relationships that will likely be persistent. Second, the way the U.S. has dealt with the pandemic, and the likely lasting impacts on our economy, has the potential to upset the entire world order. The United States’ position as the globally dominant country was already precarious. This may be the thing that topples it. If we are recovering from this onslaught for a very long time, it will be hard to get the general public on board with having resources go overseas. That’s always been a struggle in this country, even in times of surplus. The combination of a very serious and long-lasting recession in this country, and the potential struggle to maintain a global position, is probably going to distract pretty heavily from any serious positive influence on global development on the part of the U.S.

    What are the biggest challenges that COVID-19 presents to global development, and specifically to your area of expertise: the environment?

    There are many unfortunate things about COVID-19, and one of them was that it undermined some of the momentum that was starting to build around climate change. It did so in a few ways. One was, in the midst of the most serious phase of lockdown, there were stories in the media celebrating how much CO2 emissions had fallen, and how foxes were retaking the Montreal waterfront. That was really misguided. The 17% reduction in CO2 emissions in April could be interpreted very differently, as: we basically shut down everything for a couple of months, and we only got a 17% reduction?”—and at an astonishing cost? The economic shutdown was so astronomically large, and the reduction in CO2 emissions so far from what is needed, that it should be a terrifying statistic, not an exciting one, if you care about the environment. The other issue is, it’s one thing to think about environmental investments when you have resources to invest. When you have no resources to invest, it’s a lot harder. Anything that’s viewed as a threat to jobs is suddenly going to be untouchable. Anything that’s seen as a threat to the higher cost input for industry is going to be untouchable. Yet these are the things that are crucial for transforming to a cleaner set of economic activities. The economic costs of this pandemic are going to be long lasting, which is going to make it very hard to get back to the point of a serious conversation about tackling climate change.

    There is a conversation happening right now that suggests that policy responses and cooperation around COVID-19 can inform thinking and action on climate change. Do you agree?

    I think that’s a very interesting conversation, and yes, there are probably some things to learn. But there are some things that are not particularly generalizable or suggest challenges. One is, as a private actor, the benefit to me of going outside without a mask is potentially large, and the cost to me are quite small. The private cost/benefit tradeoff with climate change is very different. For me to take public transportation instead of driving my car is quite inconvenient, and I get effectively none of the gain. Whereas with COVID-19, maybe the costs are still quite high in some cases, like staying home from work, but I recoup a lot more of the benefits, because the virus is a local externality. It’s increasing transmission in my immediate vicinity. Whereas carbon is a global public good, distributed around the world. The fact that it’s been so hard and so costly to do preventative policy in the case of COVID-19, where the behavior change is relatively easy to justify to the individual, highlights the challenge of climate. That said, it’s not above our capabilities to do preventative policy, which is a good thing.

    How do you think global development institutions should respond to help lower income countries weather this—and how do you actually think they’ll respond?

    That’s a really good question. I think there are three things that are really important in terms of development cooperation and global institutions. One is, things are so globalized at this point in terms of economies. Even in rural Zambia where I’m working, farmers are selling commodities priced ultimately by the global market. When the global economy falls, even the most rural farmer in Zambia is affected by it. What that means is that it’s important for the global economy to grow and for it to recover for everybody. Second, we are all so interdependent; if major global players continue to suffer, it’s going to have implications for everybody. Aid flows and development assistance and development cooperation, done and coordinated in an efficient way, is going to be really crucial. Getting that to the places where it’s most needed is crucial. A dollar in the hand of developing country communities is more useful than a dollar in the hands of a richer community and a richer country. That is particularly true right now. The third thing is, there has been a knee-jerk reaction by donors to redirect a lot of investment toward COVID. That is short sighted. Now more than ever, continuing to invest in the recovery of institutions and investments we know have long-run payoffs—like basic health care, education—is essential. How do we get kids back in school as soon as possible? How do we make sure that women are not afraid to come to the clinic to give birth because of COVID? This is where the real risks arise—if those types of things stop working in developing countries, not if personal protective equipment is in the village. If I were a social planner, I would encourage development cooperation to keep priorities set on the big, fundamental development investments.

    Will COVID-19 facilitate cooperation or make it even harder than it already is?

    We’ve already seen it hindering it hugely. The British who have been an amazing source of support both directly and indirectly to global development have now embedded DFID with their foreign office, which is leading to an enormous contraction around the world. That is one very salient instance of this, but that’s going to be happening all over the place.]]>
    907 0 0 0 In this interview, Kelsey Jack, an associate professor in the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, Santa Barbara; and director of the Poverty Alleviation Group at the Environmental Market Solutions Lab (emLab), discusses the impact of COVID-19 on low- and middle-income countries; why the pandemic may undermine support for climate change efforts; and what are the prospects for cooperation among global development institutions.]]>
    <![CDATA[Implications of COVID-19 for Global (In)Stability]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/implications-of-covid-19-for-global-instability/ Thu, 04 Jun 2020 21:16:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1031 1031 0 0 0 Is the COVID-19 crisis comparable to any other crisis in history? What are the biggest dangers ahead? And what should be the role of the state and international organizations in responding? Experts from across the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation weigh in.]]> The Plague, I’ve been impressed from a sociological perspective by how many details of this classic novel correspond to the present COVID-19 crisis: initial denial, awareness of the problem by medical personnel but attempts to minimize by government officials, initial panicked solidarity when quarantine has to be imposed but later attempts to evade and resist, talk of “flattening the curve,” physical and psychological exhaustion of health care workers. This pandemic is certainly not unique in human history. Yet certain aspects of the crisis do seem unique to the current system of global interdependence. The coronavirus is inflaming the preconditions of economic, political, and cultural tension that are currently afflicting that system, particularly tensions among science, politics, economics, and religion—the ligaments that tie the system together in patterns of cooperation and conflict. The global economy was already arousing resentments because of the inequalities it was fostering within nations and the disproportionate affliction of the virus on the poor will probably intensify these resentments. There is a global scientific community whose members generally espouse universal values of research integrity and international cooperation. At least initially, the government in China suppressed the findings of such scientists, a tragic example being the case of Dr. Li Wenliang. But in the U.S., too, there is tension between the Trump administration and its scientists, and also tension with WHO scientists who are allegedly compromised by politics. Such political tensions undermine global trust in both science and governments. Meanwhile geopolitical tensions are exacerbated by the impulses toward nationalism engaged in by leaders seeking to rally their populations both to defend against the virus and to protect their power, and this comes into tension with an open market economy. The global economy was already arousing resentments because of the inequalities it was fostering within nations and the disproportionate affliction of the virus on the poor will probably intensify these resentments. Finally the virus increases tensions between world religious leaders who see the crisis as a call to direct their followers toward ecumenical care and solidary and those who would call for a purification of their communities under the judgment of God.  An example of this can be seen in the harsh criticism of some Catholic traditionalists toward Pope Francis for participating in an interfaith ecumenical prayer service for deliverance from the pandemic. The virus is therefore straining to the breaking point many strands of an already weakened global fabric. One good thing that could come out of it would be new awareness of the necessity to repair those stands—especially before they are afflicted by even more severe strains caused by global climate change.]]> fastest depression ever. In less than two months the effective unemployment rate in the U.S. went from less than 4 to 20 percent—by far the greatest level and increase since the Great Depression. Comparable effects have been seen in most of the rest of the world, with East Asian countries perhaps getting a milder case because of their more effective early response. However, since no single country has been unaffected and the world is more interdependent than ever, this is also a very synchronized depression, without a big country or a continent remaining as a robust source of demand for goods and services to help ameliorate its effects in the rest of the world. Even more seriously, the modern economy is also highly service based, which has also contributed more than anything else to the speed and depth of the economic crisis. Restaurants, hotels, hair salons, cleaning services, all brick-and-mortar stores, conventions, airline travel, cruises, and tourism typically require personal contact. Most people avoid such contact during a pandemic, bringing about the precipitous decline in demand for such services thus resulting in layoffs for a significant fraction of their personnel. Even in the absence of lockdowns, the effects would be large. For example, airlines have been allowed to fly throughout the crisis but airline passenger traffic, as of April, was down by more than 90 percent. Even if the pandemic were to end in a month—a highly unlikely proposition—its economic effects would be long-lasting. Some businesses that were on the edge of existence will never come back. The reduced spending of their former employees and the lower profits and likely losses of their creditors will have knock-on effects on the rest of the economy. Will people rush into packed airplanes like they did in the pre-coronavarius world? Will they fill cruise ships like they did before? Will Airbnb rentals be booked the same way? Unlikely. The pandemic will not end in a month and flare-ups are likely, especially in the U.S., given inadequate testing, contact tracing, and other measures that would help contain the spread of the virus. A significant part of the population, especially those who are vulnerable, are unlikely to feel safe to spend as before the crisis and will feel unsafe to do so for some time. That, again, spells reduced economic activity and unemployment. One important effect of the economic crisis that has been obscured by the numerous interventions by the Federal Reserve is that many individuals, corporations, and financial institutions had already been close to the edge in terms of their debt levels. Will the Federal Reserve be able to plug all financial emergencies as they come up? If not, there is a danger of uncontrolled financial contagion such as the one that emerged after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and that was barely contained then. Financial contagion from abroad, especially the Eurozone and highly indebted emerging markets, is also a potential danger. But even if the Fed plugs all the holes, there is the problem of possibly rewarding some institutions that have been clearly irresponsible by making big bets that result in large profits when things go well but when things go really badly they are bailed out, thus creating perverse incentives for continuing this irresponsible, but profitable, strategy. Lastly, I should mention the danger of food security, throughout the world as well as in the U.S. With tens of millions unemployed, those who live paycheck to paycheck already have very limited funds for food, shelter, and other necessities. We have seen the long lines at food banks. This will continue and even become worse as people’s reserves dwindle while the economic crisis continues. Without support for the unemployed, the economically vulnerable, and for the integrity of financial systems, there could be no recognizable modern economy left after the panic produced by the pandemic. International organizations such as the WHO are important for disseminating all needed and new information about drugs, vaccines, and policies across the world and for coordinating better responses across countries. But we have seen that the response of the state has been absolutely essential throughout the world. Without support for the unemployed, the economically vulnerable, and for the integrity of financial systems, there could be no recognizable modern economy left after the panic produced by the pandemic. States are also essential in the nuts-and-bolts of testing, contact tracing, keeping the health care system functioning, developing and enforcing policies for quarantines and lockdowns, and helping with the development of vaccines and drugs to combat the virus.]]> <![CDATA[Media, Influence and Power in Modern Extremism]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/media-influence-and-power-in-modern-extremism/ Mon, 01 Jun 2020 22:39:21 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1077 You study the ways in which armed extremist groups use the media to influence audiences and generate legitimacy. What got you interested in political violence and communications? I was doing fieldwork in Jordan, and was predominantly based in Amman, the capital. One of the seminal sets of experiences I had were in cabs.

    Lots of good conversations happen in taxis.

    This was 2014 and, across the Middle East, one of the hot topics was the Islamic State—a huge organization that pops up virtually out of nowhere and starts taking down the Iraqi government and capturing territory in a way that groups before had been completely unable to do. They’re not just taking over rural areas on the outskirts of town. They are taking over large cities. Two of the most interesting interactions I had were with taxi drivers who were sympathetic to—and quite enthusiastic about—the Islamic State. When they talked about the Islamic State, they weren’t talking about the things they do to Westerners or to minorities, but rather the things they would do for them. I remember asking how they knew what the Islamic State was doing, like: had they been over there? And both of them said: “Oh, no, no. I see what they do on the Internet.” I was struck by how effective their online persona and branding was at influencing people hundreds and thousands of miles away, not just to believe something, but also to speak about it. And mind you, these were views that could get them in very deep trouble in Jordan.

    The Islamic State produces myriad video and other content—which must be a treasure trove of data, from a research standpoint.

    Usually, as an empirical phenomenon, propaganda causes a lot of problems: It doesn’t tend to survive very long because until 25 years ago it was all paper; it tends to occur in conflict zones where things don’t survive very well; and rebels have a very difficult time disseminating things. So it’s not surprising that we don’t have a lot of empirical work on propaganda because the survival of the data is fraught. But even when their physical presence was waning, the Islamic States’ online presence grew over an extended period of time. And yes, one of the great things for a scholar is continuity of data.

    How is the Islamic State unique relative to other groups?

    Unlike Al Qaeda, the Islamic State is quite centralized in its leadership, and maintains a decent amount of control over what is done in its name. But, at the same time, it is a multi-state organization, with presence in radically different environments, and it has different goals and target audiences in these environments. While it is heavily invested in territorial acquisition in Iraq and Syria, their goal in Western Europe is quite different. They’re not trying to build an army to storm the barracks in Berlin. They are trying to get people who are vulnerable to pack their bags and come to Iraq and Syria. Figure 2 The ISIS flag as graffiti. Photo courtesy of Thierry Ehrmann.

    Why is the Islamic State so good at influencing people? They come across as seasoned political operatives.

    They invest considerably in messaging campaigns that are not only high quality, but also show the group investing in things people care about. So, they might produce a series of messaging campaigns, videos, and texts showing them rebuilding religious infrastructure or paving roads or putting up power lines. Extremists face a dilemma: on the one hand, their leadership has committed itself to ideas that are much more extreme than the average person in the society is comfortable with, right? In order to gain followers from outside the group of people who share those ideas, the Islamic State needs to show people credibly and persuasively that it is willing to do things that have nothing to do with extremism. And they’ve done that very well.

    Is there a way to effectively counter the influence of groups like the Islamic State?

    You can do two things. One, you can stop their messaging from reaching people. And that’s easier to do if you know where that messaging is happening. If we invest our time in trying to prevent the dissemination of propaganda in Western European countries on YouTube, which is what Google and other tech companies are spearheading, we miss the fact that the Islamic State is most active among audiences in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where we are not necessarily launching these efforts. Until we can effectively counter the information warfare that these groups bring to the table, I don’t think we are going to be effective in the long run at stemming their influence. Second, if we know that we are dealing with an organization that’s not marketing itself as the most extremist group on the block, but rather as a viable alternative to an ineffective government, then we can strategically counter that message by bolstering the perception of governance, instead of just saying “extremist groups are bad.” We don’t have a lot of evidence on the effectiveness of counter messaging on the ground, but when the U.S. government has done internal reviews of its own counter messaging strategies, it has found them to be woefully ineffective. And I think this is part of the reason why.

    There are many ways to contribute to the world. What made you choose the academic route?

    I have always been deeply interested in knowledge production. The way I tackle problems is usually pretty intensely analytical. The world economy could change and leave me, and all academics, with different choices. But I’ve wanted to be at the frontier of knowledge production and intellectual debate.

    Do you think academic research can have an impact in the so-called “real world”?

    I don’t believe in doing research that isn’t policy relevant. If I didn’t think what I was doing was relevant to what’s happening in the world, I wouldn’t be motivated.

    What about being a Ph.D. student have you found most surprising?

    I’ve had to find ways to make academia a social discipline. I wasn’t prepared for the isolation that comes with academia. That’s been the biggest challenge of being a researcher: balancing the need for community. I’ve learned to invest in surrounding myself with people.

    What are some of the pitfalls of being a researcher?

    Studying something that is steeped in a culture and a background that I do not share, I have to be very careful and very mindful of the ways I characterize people. So, for example, I personally find the Islamic State morally abhorrent, but I can’t spend my time as a scholar honing in on that. On the civilian side, I am very careful not to make assumptions about ideology or religion or culture when discussing the incentives they face. Making assumptions about why people support a group is a really dangerous game and can lead us to some really bad places.

    Is the pandemic re-shaping how you think about life after Ph.D.?

    With 26 million people unemployed [at the time of the interview], universities everywhere have cut their hiring lines. I would like to end up at a large public research university continuing to do work like this, and teaching on political violence in the information age. And I’m going to fight and apply for those positions. But I’m also thinking more about other ways to make a difference with the skills and knowledge I have that I would not have thought about four months ago.]]>
    1077 0 0 0 In this interview, Gregoire Phillips, a fifth year Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, San Diego and a 2019/2020 IGCC Herb York Dissertation Fellow, talks about why the Islamic State’s media campaigns have been so effective, what can be done to counter their influence, and a conversation with a taxi driver in Amman that changed the trajectory of his academic career. This interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Navigating Changing Oceans, Human Health and Poaching in the Caribbean]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/navigating-changing-oceans-human-health-and-poaching-in-the-caribbean/ Mon, 01 Jun 2020 22:58:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1083 Your research analyzes the experiences and decision-making process of coastal communities—fishermen, divers—in the Dominican Republic as they grapple with the effects of climate change. What drew you to that particular community and landscape? I’m interested in equitable environmental policies. I work with a fishing community in the northwestern Dominican Republic with people who have expert, intricate knowledge of the underwater world, and what is going on in terms of changes to water temperature and marine life. Conservation programs and environmental initiatives say that these communities are the problem because of overfishing. Changing water temperatures means that nearby shores and reefs are quickly depleted, so fishermen take boats into international waters and across borders and fish illegally, in order to make the same amount of money that they used to make closer to the shore. I wanted to figure out how these people who are underwater on a daily basis and seeing these changes first-hand, and sometimes embodying these changes, navigate state, regional, and NGO policy restrictions of the environment in which they work.

    Why did you decide to study this topic through the lens of anthropology?

    I’m fascinated by stories and anthropology allows me to think about people as individuals—as people who have life histories and feelings. And it allows me to live in the experience, to share that experience with them. For me, that’s a really important part of my own learning and understanding.

    Talk to me about the fisherman you work with—who are they?

    There are two kinds of fishermen: there are free diver fishermen and there are compressor divers. The free diver fishermen are an old-school group who are on the frontlines of changing climates because they can’t physically reach the depths where the fish are increasingly going. They are entirely men, between the ages of 16 and 50, almost none of whom have finished high school. They’re all semi-literate. They’re all fascinated by water. Sometimes I think that fishing is more of an addiction than anything else, which I completely understand because if you spend time surfing or diving, it has a pull on you.

    How do you actually carry out your research?

    Anthropologists do a lot of interviews. We do a little bit of archival research, but our bread and butter is the participant observation. I’m studying diver fishermen, so that means I go diving with them. Figure 1 Kyrstin Mallon Andrews on a fishing boat off the coast of the Dominican Republic.

    Being a young woman in a community of all men divers must be tricky.

    I’m a surfer. When I came into this community, I knew how to talk water, in a way that was different from the biologists, who tend to think about water in technical terms. For me and the fishermen, it’s all about what your body can do in water.

    How long do you go out diving for?

    Five or six hours at a time, sometimes more. When you have your head underwater for hours, your perspective on everything changes.

    How does your perspective change when you’re underwater for that long?

    You learn to see in new ways. When you first get into the water in the Caribbean, you expect to see all of these beautiful, colorful corals. But after 5-10 feet, color disappears. When you’re looking at reefs 20 feet below, you’re really just seeing green-gray, and you don’t see any fish at the beginning. I would watch my interlocutors spear a fish that I had not even seen until it was on the end of their spear.

    You’ve been working in this community in the Dominican Republic since 2015—what are you learning?

    We often disregard people we see as risk takers. When things go wrong, we think it’s their fault because they’ve taken these risks and we think they ought to know what the consequences are. But we have to contextualize how we think about risk. When you’re dealing with people who are heads of families, they’re the breadwinners for anywhere from 2 to 6 kids, and there are no other options for work, and they’re dealing with environments that don’t allow them to work in safe spaces, the stakes are very different. Changing environments put people at risk in explicit and direct ways. That environmental conservation policies often put people at further risk in their attempts to conserve resources or protect fragile environments. And that the way we understand how to fix fragile environments creates geographies where certain people and certain ways of engaging with the environment become criminalized. The fishermen who decide to fish in marine reserves are considered poachers. What allows us to think of them as environmental criminals instead of environmental refugees?

    IGCC’s research covers development, conflict, security and cooperation—where does your work fit in that space?

    In ocean environments effected by changing global temperatures, we’re seeing conflicts both at the level of people who are used to accessing ocean spaces and are no longer able to because of environmental regulations, and also in a broader sense—conflicts over marine resources in territorial waters of other countries.

    What are some of the pitfalls of doing this kind of research?

    It’s important to reflect on the power structures that bring us as researchers to these places. I also used to get frustrated because I couldn’t convince fishermen who had gotten the bends to go to the hospital, even after I gave the hospital first aid training in how to deal with decompression accidents. It made me reflect on the fact that I cannot force people, as much as I may care about them, to do what I suggest. I’ve learned that knowing something is not as much power as we might think it is. That’s been one of the hardest parts about doing this research.

    What made you decide to pursue the life of an academic?

    Writing is, for me, the best form to communicate really complicated ideas, and at the level of tenure track professor and researcher, you’re able to do that for a living. I wasn’t interested in going into non-profit or NGO work because, when I first visited the Dominican Republic, I saw the hierarchies and structures of power that were inhibiting their work. I wanted to spend time talking with people who were not normally talked to. That was the other reason I decided to go into the academic field.

    Besides a tenure track gig at a great university, what do you hope to accomplish over the next few years?

    I’ve been working on storytelling through film. I originally started doing this because the community I work in is semi-literate, and I wanted to share my findings with them. I’ve turned to documentary storytelling, and that’s one of the projects that, aside from my career goals, I will be working on.]]>
    1083 0 0 0 In this interview, Kyrstin Mallon Andrews, a fifth year Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Irvine and a 2019/2020 IGCC Dissertation Fellow, talks about re-conceiving the notion of equitable environment policies, what it’s like to spend hours diving in the Caribbean. This interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[New IGCC Initiative—Catalyst—Supports UC San Diego COVID-19 Response]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/new-igcc-initiative-catalyst/ Mon, 20 Apr 2020 23:10:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1093 Catalyst, a new initiative of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) that aims to drive more and better investment in and adoption of innovations that can strengthen US national security and global prosperity. A network of researchers, entrepreneurs, investors and established companies, Catalyst connects brokers relationships and provides practical policy recommendations to improve U.S. national security competitiveness. Catalyst’s first COVID-19 related effort supported the Jacobs School of Engineering’s Medically Advanced Devices Lab in its innovative respirator project. Following the release of a Department of Defense (DOD) Technology Innovation Challenge—which called on the scientific and innovation community to develop a low-cost, mechanical ventilation support system that can be rapidly produced at local levels—DOD’s Office of Naval Research approached Scott Tait, executive director of Catalyst, encouraging Catalyst to disseminate the challenge among its extensive networks of innovators, incubators, and accelerators. Catalyst reached out to Miroslav Krstic at the Office of Research Affairs, and Paul Roben at the Office of Innovation and Commercialization, who pointed him to the Jacobs School of Engineering’s MAD Lab. The MAD Lab had several innovative, multi-disciplinary ventilator efforts in progress under the leadership of James Friend, Lonnie Petersen and Caspar Petersen. With several promising solutions, the MAD lab needed funding to advance to prototyping and testing. Catalyst got to work, reaching out to its network of investors. Things began to move quickly: IGCC immediately contributed $10,000 to assist in the development of prototypes. Thirty-six hours later, Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc., which develops and fields systems, platforms and products for national security and communications needs, contributed $100,000. This was followed less than a week later by another $144,463 contribution from DOD’s Office of Naval Research, working through the Naval Air Force Science Advisor. All in all, Catalyst’s efforts generated more than $250,000 in funding for the MAD lab in less than a week.
    “We’re humbled, grateful and encouraged by the response of the Catalyst partners and the entire UC San Diego team in rising to meet the challenges of this crisis,” says Tait. “While we’re working hard to meet the demands of the COVID-19 pandemic, we are also mindful of seizing the many opportunities it presents to make us a better and more effective team going forward.”
    With Catalyst support, the MAD lab submitted four proposals to DOD as part of the innovation challenge.  One of the four made it to the final round of judging. Although the UCSD submission was not ultimately chosen, it will proceed to production for local use and possible export to developing countries. Catalyst has brokered a number of other partnerships aimed at addressing the COVID-19 challenge:
    • With the surge in demand for personal protective equipment (PPE), and limited supply, Dennis Abremski of the Rady-Jacobs Institute for the Global Entrepreneur (IGE) and Eric Shnell of Craitor, a UC San Diego start-up that builds ruggedized 3D printers, developed a project to 3D print personal protective masks for first responders. Closure of the UC San Diego campus hampered their ability to access printers, so Catalyst reached out to Strategic Operations, a local partner, who, within 24 hours, opened their substantial 3D printing and silicon modeling facilities to the Craitor team. Strategic Operations also provided staff time and raw materials. The Strategic Operations team is now ramping production of silicon masks for donation to local hospitals and first responders, shouldering the cost of materials and labor (volunteers to help with production are needed: stait@ucsd.edu). They will soon be producing approximately 160 per day.
    • While the fight to control COVID-19 continues, some have begun to losok ahead to the needs of returning society to work. That effort will entail ensuring the virus is eradicated from public spaces to prevent a reoccurrence of the outbreak. As both government and private organizations plan for this reality, Catalyst has connected one of its associate companies BioLargo, with business, health and military practitioners. BioLargo’s CupriDyne cleanser is a safe, iodine and cuprous iodide based liquid that can be dispersed as an aerosol as well as a liquid, so it can quickly be used to treat large areas and ventilation systems.
    Catalyst’s network-of-networks is designed to rapidly find and field solutions in order to improve U.S. national security. By complimenting and supporting existing national security innovation initiatives, and leveraging San Diego’s unique security, technology, business and university environment, Catalyst is advancing UCSD Chancellor Pradeep Khosla’s priority to make UC San Diego the “go-to” source of improved linkages between the academy, the private sector, and with national security resources in Southern California and beyond. Learn More: Visit catalyst.ucsd.edu]]>
    1093 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[The Political Economy of Environmental Public Goods and Land Use Change]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/the-political-economy-of-environmental-public-goods-and-land-use-change/ Mon, 01 Jun 2020 19:37:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1205 Tell me a little bit about who you are. I grew up in Colorado loving the outdoors, loving being in nature. I was really interested in math and physics, and I was also on the policy debate team, so I spent a lot of time doing research about policies and politics. Those two areas—science and politics—seemed to have totally incompatible approaches to understanding the world. Political science had a qualitative understanding of the world. Statistical understandings of the world or mathematical models were left to the physical sciences.

    After working in Sri Lanka and China, a stint as a ski instructor, and a Boren Fellowship, in 2015, you began a Ph.D. program in Political Science at UC San Diego. As part of your dissertation, you are looking at the effects of political decisions on natural resources. Talk to me about that.

    I’m looking at how political institutions affect the incentives of actors in such a way that either preserves or consumes natural resources. And I’m studying this using satellite imagery, which has a record of basically everything that’s taken place on the Earth’s surface since the mid-1980s at varying resolutions, and in varying qualities. Very little political science research is devoted to environmental topics, and there is very little quantitative research devoted to the study of environmental politics. I found a place where I could satisfy the urge to learn how to mathematically model things, and merge that with things I’ve learned about incentives and political behavior.

    One of your projects looks at how elections affect deforestation. What have you found?

    In election years, we see increased rates of deforestation compared to non-election years. Figure 1 Deforestation. Photo courtesy of crustmania

    Does this mean citizens don’t care about the environment?

    The people who are most important to politicians become really clear in election years. And politicians try to target those people to win the elections. In developing democracies, one way to target those people is to give them additional land by cutting it out of protected forests. That’s why deforestation really picks up in the 12 months surrounding an election.

    How can your research contribute to tackling this problem?

    Deforestation is one of the leading drivers of climate change, responsible for up to a third of total carbon emissions when you take into account the decrease in carbon sequestration from forests and all of the greenhouse gases they give off when they are cut down or burnt. We know that elections are good for a lot of normative reasons, right? But it’s also important to understand the tradeoffs and the incentives that elections create. My hope is that this evidence will change how policymakers think about deforestation. Hopefully when there’s a competitive election coming up in a young democracy, international institutions can help to swing the incentives the other way and prevent forests from being given away for votes.

    You’ve got another project in Benin, West Africa—what’s that one about?

    The second project is trying to understand how improved formal land tenure security affects both what people do with the land and what happens to nearby land. We expect, if property rights are more secure, that people should be more willing to make productivity enhancing investments in their land. And this is a normatively good outcome because it means those people’s income goes up, and their food security should be improved. The World Bank collaborated with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and community leaders across 300 villages to figure out who owned which plot of land and give out about 75,000 land titles. Figure 2 A farmer in Benin. Photo courtesy of the Creative Commons.

    Does securing formal rights over their land change what people do with their land?

    We have almost 10 years of observation and changes in behavior were quite small. The one thing that holds across a variety of context is that there was a larger affect for women property holders than for men. Under customary land titles, women often have their property rights taken by male family members, so it makes sense that, if you’re a woman and you get a formal, legal property right, you might do something more with the land than you would under customary land property tenure. You might plant perennial crops, or crops that take multiple years to grow, that often provide higher value outputs.

    What’s the hardest thing about research?

    People are smart and they’re complicated and it’s hard to model people’s behavior. When you’re thinking about what drives people’s behavior, you write a model and identify a limited number of things you can measure. But people are making decisions based on a huge number of factors and are almost certainly making the best decisions they can with the information they have. It’s really hard to believe that the model I’m writing does a good job of taking into account all of the possible pieces of information driving decisions. Plus, I don’t travel to these places. I use satellite imagery to observe and there are a ton of things you can’t see. But we do the best we can with the data we have, and I believe that we can still uncover real and important truths from this kind of research.

    How do you hope things will look, career-wise, in a couple of years?

    A dream job would be at a policy school because I love teaching, especially people who are going to go be policymakers or influence policymakers. I love doing research, but I put a lot of weight on the policy implications of research and I think that’s something where my values align with the values of a policy school.]]>
    1205 0 0 0 In this interview, Luke Sanford, a fifth year Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, San Diego and a 2019/2020 IGCC Dissertation Fellow, talks about growing up in Colorado, how satellite imagery is being used to analyze the impact of political decisions on natural resources, and why deforestation increases around elections. This interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Violence In Mexico May Be Worse Than You Think]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/violence-in-mexico-may-be-worse-than-you-think/ Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:00:31 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1270 allegedly by her partner. The story was widely covered in the news and provoked protests across the country. Escamilla’s murder was not an aberration. The reported rates of killings of women and girls in Mexico have increased 137 percent over the past five years. Reactions to the specific case, but also the broader trend in this type of homicide—or femicide as it is legally and popularly known—have helped to galvanize large marches across Latin America as well as a recent massive strike in Mexico City. The rise of violence against women coincides with growing concern about high levels of violence in Mexico generally, including violence committed against transiting asylum seekersrisks to other foreigners, and recent incidents perpetrated by drug-trafficking organizations seeking to secure land. The level of violence is probably even worse than the figures reported by the government and covered by the media. Read the full article at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1270 0 0 0 <![CDATA[What’s the Role of the Academic in Times Like These?]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/whats-the-role-of-the-academic-in-times-like-these/ Mon, 08 Jun 2020 18:19:31 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1279 Tai Ming Cheung in Tiananmen Square in 1989, before the crackdown. But the fact that the White House actively considered such an option shows that the world is facing the very real danger of spreading authoritarian rule, and that the democratic forces that have so successfully resisted this trend have been seriously weakened. One victim that this authoritarian turn has claimed recently is Hong Kong, with the passage of a national security law by China that puts an end to the One Country, Two Systems framework that the territory had enjoyed. Is the world now going through rapid discontinuous change that will lead to even more turmoil and perhaps the threat of greater conflict and repression? The role for organizations like IGCC is to watch these events very closely and provide policy perspectives and solutions that can help reduce conflict and ensure peace and shared prosperity. Tai Ming Cheung is the Director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.]]> 1279 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Why Isn’t There More International Cooperation Around Migration?]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/why-isnt-there-more-international-cooperation-around-migration/ Fri, 06 Mar 2020 21:33:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1380 What makes this a particularly salient time for a book on international cooperation on migration? The picture of Alan Kurdi, a 3-year-old Syrian boy washed ashore in a failed attempt by his parents to reach Europe in the fall of 2015, presents a powerful message about the conditions of refugees and migrants globally. Despite the challenges, international cooperation on migration has been limited. Activists successfully pushed the United Nations to adopt the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016, and two Global Compacts—one for safe, orderly and regular migration, the second for a comprehensive refugee response framework—were negotiated and adopted in 2019. Yet these documents are not international treaties and signatories are not obligated under international law to abide by them. Moreover, three binding international treaties already exist to protect international migrants—ILO Convention No. 97, ILO Convention No. 143 and a core human rights convention, the United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Yet these treaties are poorly ratified. Migrants at Vienna West Railway Station, 2015 Our research seeks to understand why international cooperation on migration is not ubiquitous, especially since many other international flows—for example, trade and capital flows—are subject to intensive international cooperation. We focus on voluntary international migration, which covers individuals living in a country other than their country of origin for more than one year.

    What are the key takeaways of the book? Was there anything that you found surprising as you dug deeper?

    When many people think about migration, they tend to think about migrants moving from poor countries to the United States and Europe, but we’ve found that almost half of international migrants move among countries of the Global South, an acknowledgement that there is large variation in the wealth and stability of these countries. Although individual migrants move in every direction, unlike many other international flows, international migration is primarily a one-way flow, from poorer, less stable countries to wealthier, more stable countries. This reduces the prospects for international cooperation because there is little reciprocity, an acknowledged facilitator of international cooperation. We also find that the international legal status quo privileges “receiving states” (states that host migrants), and not “sending states” (countries of origin). Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protect the right of an individual to leave his or her country of origin and requires states to readmit their citizens, international law grants sovereignty to states to govern the admission of non-citizens. The international community also acknowledges that states have the right to prevent illegal entry into their territory. The absence of symmetry between the rules governing exit and entry allows receiving states to control the number of individuals admitted to their territory and to screen and sort potential migrants for desired characteristics. Sending states have few resources to bring receiving states to the bargaining table to modify the distribution of benefits arising from international migration, so little international cooperation exists.

    Are there any examples of successful international cooperation related to migration?

    Yes. We find that international cooperation arises under three conditions. The first is when receiving states experience increased costs associated with the status quo. One example of this is from the European migrant crisis. Many Syrian refugees in Turkey wanted to move from Turkey to Europe because of the better living conditions and opportunities. This onward movement was widely publicized and many other migrants followed the route exploited initially primarily by Syrians. The public backlash to this influx of migrants was significant politically for the parties in power in European countries. In response, the European Union (EU) negotiated an agreement with Turkey to halt the flow and, in exchange, provided €6 billion to help cover the costs of Syrian refugees housed in Turkey. Another example was the caravans of Central American migrants destined for the United States. In light of the public backlash, the U.S. negotiated agreements with Mexico and Guatemala to restrict migrant flows through their territories.

    So these examples of cooperation aim to restrict rather than promote migration?

    That’s right. In both cases, receiving states had bargaining leverage because of their wealth and power, but sending states had bargaining leverage through their ability to modify the size of migratory flows, even if this has meant non-adherence to international legal norms. And for the most part, this type of international cooperation has served to reduce rather than facilitate international migration and fails to protect migrant rights. This is why we recommend advocating for migrant rights at the national and/or local levels, rather than in the international arena. International cooperation may also take place when sending states leverage an international forum such as the ILO or U.N. where their numerical superiority allows them to adopt international conventions. The ILO treaties are poorly ratified in part because the nature of decision making in the ILO allows wealthy receiving states to incorporate their priorities, in addition to the priorities of the sending states. So, neither group of states is eager to sign on. The move to the U.N. General Assembly allowed sending states to craft a treaty that reflected their priorities but excluded those of receiving states. It is not surprising that all 54 signatories of the U.N. Convention are sending states. Likewise, the most recent negotiations on the Global Compacts have not even attempted treaty negotiations. An aspirational compact is the only mechanism that would be able to find support among a large group of states. The other instance where we see states cooperate is when states with similar levels of development, that are also experiencing labor market shortages, negotiate reciprocal migration rights. In practice, this is rare, with the most prominent example being the European Union. However, the fact that “old” EU member states like the United Kingdom still allowed reciprocal migration from newer member states, like those in central Europe, isn’t a result of similar levels of development. Rather, it’s a result of the “stickiness” of institutional structures that have forced the “old” EU member states to retain open labor markets despite large differences in wealth. This generated large flows of migrants from east to west that have provoked an anti-EU backlash and triggered, in part, the British exit from the European Union. Brexit protestors near the Houses of Parliament, London, 2018

    In the current international climate, we have grown accustomed to thinking about the cross-border movement of people as an antecedent to political tension and violence. Is that necessarily the case?

    A frequent response to the cross-border movement of people is increased political tension and, sometimes, violence, which may be aggravated by elite and media framing of immigration issues. But there are certainly conditions in which migration does not generate these negative externalities. The significant flows of migrants and guest workers to many European countries following World War II, for example, did not initially provoke an anti-immigrant backlash because unemployment rates were low, migrant workers filled jobs that the local population did not want and migrants, for the most part, were isolated from the local population. However, we should be more optimistic about the ability of societies to accommodate the newcomers over time. California, for example, passed Proposition 187 in 1994, anti-immigrant legislation that withdrew access to many social services from undocumented immigrants (although many of the proposition’s restrictions were ultimately voided by the courts). The initiative was also known as the “Save our State” initiative, echoing anti-immigrant rhetoric. As the local population and the immigrant population adjusted to each other, however, and as the children of immigrants who gained citizenship by birth in the U.S. became a significant voting bloc in California politics, the mood changed. In 2017, 23 years after the passage of Prop 187, California became a “sanctuary state,” extending protections to the undocumented migrant population.

    You have been associated with IGCC for a number of years. How does your work align with IGCC's mission?

    Research on global security often focuses on traditional areas such as nuclear nonproliferation, great power competition and political violence; however, IGCC also explores “non-traditional threats” to security including climate change, advanced technologies and global health threats. Migration is now often seen by states as a non-traditional threat to security—whether that means state security or “societal security”—including human rights and migrant rights. Our research illuminates why international cooperation on migration is so difficult to achieve even though policy entrepreneurs press for greater cooperation among states.

    What is your next project?

    We are working on a textbook on international migration in which all chapter contributions are from women scholars, to highlight women’s contributions to the discipline and to bring new perspectives to the research agenda. A second project explores the determinants of nationality legislation—why some states make it easier for migrants to become full-fledged citizens of their host state and why some states restrict access. There is a rich research agenda on wealthy western democracies, but citizenship is an issue central to all states in the international system. We have collected and coded the nationality laws of 193 member states of the United Nations and are in the process of evaluating our theoretical claims.]]>
    1380 0 0 0 Governments cooperate on trade and capital flows—so why not on migration? In this interview, IGCC-affiliated researcher Jeannette Money, a professor in the political science department at the University of California, Davis, discusses her new book, “Migration Crises and the Structure of International Cooperation” (with Sarah Lockhart). She explores the limitations of existing international agreements, where migrants travel from and to, and why the international cooperation that does exist tends to restrict rather than facilitate flows. She also talks about her next projects looking at why some countries make it easier for migrants to become citizens while others don’t.]]>
    <![CDATA[Q&A with IGCC Director Tai Ming Cheung]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/qa-with-igcc-director-tai-ming-cheung/ Thu, 05 Mar 2020 21:57:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1443 Since 2013, you have served as Director of the UC Institute of Global Cooperation and Conflict, where you lead work on science, technology, and innovation with a special emphasis on China. How did you get here? Academia is my third career. When I was finishing undergrad, I decided that I wanted to see the world, so I became a journalist. My first job was as a foreign correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review based in Hong Kong. One of my first assignments was in Beijing in the spring of 1989—I was in Tiananmen Square when the Chinese authorities sent in the troops in early June. After that, I was posted as a China correspondent, and a defense correspondent, which involved reporting on the end of the Cold War in East Asia. Next, I went into the business world as an analyst for political risk companies and stock brokerages. This provided me with another perspective of looking at how the world works from the vantage point of the relationship between power, finance, and development. But my long-term passion was always academia. I went back to school in my late 30s, and earned a doctorate in the UK in War Studies. From there I eventually ended up at IGCC and UC San Diego.

    There is a saying that “journalism is the first draft of history.” How do academics and journalists look at the world differently?

    Journalists are drawn by what is happening on a particular day, or week, or month, and conveying that to a general audience. In journalism, you don’t want to focus too much on the complexity, just on the most important details. You’re painting in black and white. As an academic, you’re much more focused on the underlining issues, the context, and many other details. You’re painting in a much more colorful hue, but you’re painting for a more specialized audience. The best journalists and academics try to balance these different perspectives.

    Your research at IGCC centers on innovation, defense, and technology, and in particular on China. In your chapter on China in a forthcoming volume on defense and innovation, you write that “China has transformed itself since the 1990s from a struggling military technological laggard to being part of the ranks of the global elite of innovation leaders,” and has done it on a scale and pace that is incredibly impressive. How has China done it?

    China is still in the midst of doing this, but it’s done so by getting the sequence right. The Chinese authorities focused on economic development first, which spilled over into human talent development, science, and technology development, which has also led to military development. The foundation for China was creating a vibrant economic system. The Chinese political system has also played a very important role. As a centralized, top-down authoritarian system, they decide what are the key priorities, and then they pour resources into those areas.

    China, in other words, has not only advanced in terms of its military might, but also in terms of other dimensions of power, like economics—is that right?

    The motto of the 21st century is integrated cooperation and competition, where there is considerable overlap between the economic, civil, and commercial sectors, and the strategic and military domains. This is very much the competition that China and the U.S. are engaged in right now.

    In the context of power competition between the U.S. and China, China is often viewed primarily as a threat. Is that framing appropriate?

    Before the mid-2010s, the U.S. and China had a very close relationship—economically, strategically, even militarily. Then the political and strategic consensus in the U.S. changed, and the narrative now is that the U.S. was hoodwinked, and that we must see this relationship mainly in terms of competition. Indeed, there are clear signs that, on the military and strategic technology side, the relationship between the U.S. and China is increasingly adversarial. But that accounts for a pretty small part of the overall economic, social, and strategic relationship between the U.S. and China—the two countries are a lot more interdependent than is commonly assumed. The key challenge now is: how can the U.S. and China protect the key crown jewels of their strategic, their military, and their economic competitiveness, and at the same time, allow the relationship to prosper? Both Washington and Beijing still recognize that it’s better to work together than to be walled off and fighting each other. But politically, there’s very strong nationalist and protectionist sentiments on both sides and not enough political will to be able to focus on that engagement. Tai Ming Cheung, Susan Shirk, and attendees at the 2019 NEACD meeting

    Is the moment we’re living in different than what has come before? Or do you think what we’re seeing now is part of patterns and that we can learn from history?

    When we look at it from an international relations perspective, the international system remains pretty much as it has been. Countries still have their own interests at heart, but there are rules of the game, even though those may be changing with technological, social and political changes. But despite fads, the structure of the system remains unchanged. The nation-state remains central. There is still no world government, so it’s still anarchic in that sense. But countries are still by and large reluctant to go to war. Although the statistics show that a lot more people have died through political violence, it’s been much more in terms of the civil war. As someone who’s studied the nature of war, actual warfighting between states has been much more limited. For example, although there is a lot of tension between the US and China, I don’t think that the actual chances of the two countries going to war are higher than it has always been. There are potential flashpoints, but there is a whole range of mechanisms to prevent war, like confidence-building mechanisms, dialogues, international organizations—all things that have helped make all-out conflict much less common.

    In this context, how does IGCC make a difference in the world?

    A key part of our contribution is the research we do, which provides academically rigorous and independent evidence on the global challenges we face. We also use this research as the foundation for our policy engagement. For example, since 1993, we’ve conducted the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), which was begun by my predecessor, Susan Shirk. A major focus of this dialogue has been engaging regularly with North Korea, and the five other major players in the region, on a Track 1.5, which is a mix of non-official and official representatives coming together in on an unofficial capacity. NEACD has been one of the very few mechanisms that has allowed the North Koreans to meet with their counterparts.

    What are the key things to watch in 2020 in Northeast Asia?

    One is what is going on in the Taiwan Strait, especially after the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan this past January. Taiwan is the biggest flashpoint between China and its external interests. How will the U.S. and Congress engage? Will they strengthen ties with Taiwan? The military forces of China, Taiwan, and the U.S. are increasingly operating in close proximity with each other, so the risks of accidents is rising. This makes the potential for political and strategic escalation between Beijing, Taipei, and the U.S. significant, if there are misunderstandings, miscalculations, or missteps. So far, everyone’s been fairly careful, but the underlying dynamics are worrisome. Also important is Xi Jinping’s planned visit to Japan this spring, which will be the first major summit between the two most important countries in the Asia Pacific for many years. They’ve had a very frosty relationship since the late 2000s, so looking at how they deal with things like territory issues in the East China Sea will be important. If Japan and China are able to get along and build upon these frosty but improving relations between them, that would be a very important help for the region. And then of course, the November presidential election in the U.S. is key, because the U.S. still plays a critical role in Asian security. Under the Trump administration, the status and reputation of the U.S. in the region has declined. If things continue in the same way over another four years, then the credibility and power of the U.S. may continue to be eroded, which will allow China to stake its leadership in the region.

    What would you like IGCC to be doing five years from now?

    I take it a year at a time. I hope that IGCC will be in a position to fund a significant number of graduate students, as well as faculty research programs and conferences. Funding for research has been under threat as foundations in the U.S. have cut back, so this is a very important role that IGCC plays. And then there’s the research—I’d like to be able to develop a lot of new areas of research. The international system is in the midst of major strategic, technological, and geo-economic transformations and there’s a need for new ways of things, new perspectives, and new ideas for meeting new challenges. Preparing the next generation will also continue to be at the heart of what we do at IGCC. A lot of students are interested in international relations, and now is a very, very exciting—as well as scary—time to be in the business. There’s a need for new skill sets that go beyond what a lot of the traditional training has been. Students need to have a much broader perspective, to bring in economics and domestic issues, and new methodological approaches. It’s daunting, but also very exciting.]]>
    1443 0 0 0 Since 1982, the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation has addressed global challenges to peace and prosperity through rigorous, policy-relevant research, training the next generation, and engagement on international security, economic development and the environment. In this interview, IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung shares his vision for the next chapter of IGCC’s history, his forecast for what to watch in Northeast Asia in the coming year, and his take on how journalists and academics see the world differently.]]>
    <![CDATA[What’s Economics Got to Do With It?]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/whats-economics-got-to-do-with-it/ Fri, 21 Feb 2020 22:05:34 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1453 The term “strategic competition” seems to be back in vogue in international relations circles—see here, here, here, and here for examples. What is “strategic competition” and why is everyone talking about it? “Strategic competition” is a word with a fairly specific meaning denoting a return to great power competition—and the existential consequences of this competition. Great power competition is itself an increasingly in-vogue term that harkens back to the United States’ rivalry with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today, great power competition centers on geostrategic competition between the U.S. and China, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. and Russia and emerging powers like India and Brazil. Key U.S. government documents—including the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy—have begun referring to strategic competition as being at the forefront of challenges we face as a country. The idea of an ideological struggle between Western democracies and Chinese and Russian autocracies is back as a framing narrative for U.S. foreign policy.

    You lead a research group on economic strategic rivalry, which is part of an IGCC research program on great power competition in the 21st century. Great power competition wasn’t on anyone’s radar three years ago and to the extent that it was, it usually focused on defense and the military. Why should economics be part of what we think about when we think about great power competition?

    Both academics and policymakers have been predominantly focused on terrorism and counter-insurgency over the past two decades—rather than great power competition. And both have tended to focus on the military aspects of state competition. Economic concerns have often been largely ignored in academic discourse concerning both national and international security (with the exception of some work examining the use of economic sanctions as a tool of coercion). Of course, this is driven to some extent by concerns about the security threats of today, rather than concerns about the security threats of tomorrow. Increasingly, though, we see states using economic policies, including the regulation of inward foreign investment, to pursue strategic sectors in the economy—with the military applications of new technologies (from artificial intelligence to cyber capabilities) central to state competition. What makes IGCC’s research program unique, then, is that we are reconceiving the notion of strategic competition and great power competition as something much broader than just the military or defense sector, but rather something involving economic dimensions of state competition, domestic politics and hard security.

    Insofar as strategic competition is about economics, there seems to be a narrative that the U.S. economic model is liberal and market-based, whereas China’s economy is protective and state-led (and that this gives the Chinese an unfair advantage in some cases). Is that accurate?

    It is perhaps less true than we think. As my work on industrial policy in high technology industries with Andrew Reddie at UC Berkeley points out, government support for strategic sectors of the economy comes in a variety of shapes and sizes. It is indeed the case that Beijing has more substantial state control over the research and development occurring within its borders than the United States or European countries, but governments around the world use a variety of levers, from industrial policies to export controls, to manipulate market behavior to their benefit. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency actively operates in Silicon Valley by providing venture capital to startups through In-Q-Tel.

    Is industrial policy and trading relations all about strategic competition or are countries simply trying to formulate smart economic policies for their own development?

    This is a hard question. Faster growth and success in emerging technology sectors have both economic and security externalities, even if the latter are generally ignored. That said, government intervention in strategic sectors of the economy—managing foreign investment in high technology companies, for example—can actually have deleterious consequences for “development” by constraining the free movements of capital, goods and people that might otherwise achieve growth more quickly. Industrial policy actually was viewed very negatively until recently and its use still has its doubters. Import substitution industrialization (ISI) that blocked imports, a policy that was pursued by most developing countries after WWII, tainted the use of industrial policy as ISI led to industrialization but many of the industries that were created were highly inefficient because they faced no foreign competition.

    Experts predicted that domestic forces would constrain President Trump’s aggressive economic (and other policies), but they haven’t. Is U.S. economic policy changing decisively under the current administration?

    Trump’s policies can be seen as “aggressive,” but it is worth pointing out that when it comes to trade, the United States’ position offers some continuity along with change. For example, NAFTA has been replaced by the USMCA (the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement), while the U.S. has pursued several bilateral trade arrangements. From my perspective, however, the bigger issue is the failure of the Trump administration to pursue both the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (a multilateral trade agreement between the European Union and the United States) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, both mega-free trade agreements with important security implications.

    One of the values of the kind of research you do is that it allows us to make sense of the world, and predict what might be ahead. But expert predictions can be wrong. When we look back in 10 years, what do you think we will have got wrong?

    Amid the hand-wringing surrounding the deteriorating relationship between Beijing and Washington, we might hope that both states find themselves cooperating more than current experts predict.

    What are the most important dynamics to watch vis a vis economic rivalry and great power competition in 2020?

    It will be important to watch how the first phase of the trade deal between China and the United States plays out, and how it might affect the dynamics of the competition between the two countries. In the context of COVID-19 coronavirus, it is unlikely Chinese will meet their targeted imports. Moreover, the first phase fails to deal with a central concern of U.S. policymakers concerning Beijing’s support of State Owned Enterprises and domestic firms with close ties to the Chinese Communist Party. And while the agreement addresses forced technology transfer, it does not address critical issues such as hacking and data storage regulations. Whether the second phase of a trade deal between the two countries manages to address these issues is something that we will be watching over the coming year.]]>
    1453 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[Defense Transparency is on the Decline Among Global Superpowers]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/defense-transparency-is-on-the-decline-among-global-superpowers/ Thu, 27 Feb 2020 22:29:16 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1457 “Scores on the 2018-19 Defense Transparency Index decreased on average by 8 percent compared to 2015-16, marking a significant decrease in transparency, a worrying trend in an era of intensifying regional security tensions, where the potential for miscalculation is growing.” Meanwhile, China, which continues to assert itself internationally in a context of rising trade tensions with the U.S., has also seen a decrease in its score. China has not issued a defense white paper since 2015, leaving neighboring defense establishments in the dark. Chinese reporting to U.N. has also gone down. However, China has been fairly transparent on cybersecurity and scores well on defense media even though China imposes significant restraints on the media in other areas. Japan regained its 1st place ranking in 2018-19, though its overall score decreased by 7.6 percent, driven by limited information on the English version of its Ministry of Defense website. Japan’s consistently high score on the index highlights Japan’s leadership in defense transparency, including its commitment to frequent publication of its defense posture. The Republic of Korea (ROK) largely maintained is a relatively good performance on defense transparency. It did well in media oversight and in the clear, public announcement and acknowledgment of its international military activity. But ROK scored poorly in reporting to the UN (it didn’t) and cybersecurity (it lacks a focused cybersecurity strategy document), putting it in third place overall. Russia is the only country in the 2018-19 Index that saw a marginal increase in its overall score (mainly driven by recent publications of several policy documents related to its cybersecurity strategy), but it has been and remains a poor performer overall. Although Russia publishes a defense white paper, the information provided is limited and vague, and the state asserts significant control over the press.  A more bellicose Russia, expelled from the G8 following its invasion and annexation of Crimea, has drawn far closer to China, publicly flaunted its obligations under the INF Treaty and heavily invested in modernizing its military capabilities in order to strengthen its position in confronting the West. A decade of DTI reports shows the leaders being Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea; followed by much less transparent Russia and China. North Korea remains at the bottom of the DTI. The 2019 results, which were presented at the 29th Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Hong Kong, are a worrying trend in an era of intensifying regional security tensions and increased geostrategic competition among great powers. The DTI was established in 2011, and has helped to inform dialogue in Northeast Asia among defense professionals looking to improve regional cooperation and confidence-building. Representatives of defense ministries that have attended NEACD have said that the lessons and findings from the DTI reports have been useful in helping the writing of defense white papers and other transparency mechanisms back home. To learn more about how the DTI is calculated and how countries are measured, read the 2019 DTI Policy Brief.]]> 1457 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/proxy-wars-suppressing-violence-through-local-agents/ Fri, 15 Mar 2019 19:20:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2241 Proxy Wars finds that: when principals use rewards and punishments tailored to the agent's domestic politics, proxies typically comply with their wishes; when the threat to the principal or the costs to the agent increase, the principal responds with higher-powered incentives and the proxy responds with greater effort; if interests diverge too much, the principal must either take direct action or admit that indirect control is unworkable. Covering events from Denmark under the Nazis to the Korean War to contemporary Afghanistan, and much in between, the chapters in Proxy Wars engage many disciplines and will suit classes taught in political science, economics, international relations, security studies, and much more.]]> 2241 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging US-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-gathering-pacific-storm-emerging-us-china-strategic-competition-in-defense-technological-and-industrial-development/ Thu, 28 Jun 2018 17:16:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2287 The Gathering Pacific Storm is a timely and valuable volume for students, scholars, security practitioners, and anyone involved in international relations, security studies, and political science.]]> 2287 0 0 0 The Gathering Pacific Storm is a timely and valuable volume for students, scholars, security practitioners, and anyone involved in international relations, security studies, and political science.]]> <![CDATA[Recommendations for the Next U.S. Administration]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/recommendations-for-the-next-u-s-administration/ Tue, 03 Nov 2020 15:16:03 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=186 186 0 0 0 Peter Cowhey is dean and Qualcomm endowed chair in Communications and Technology Policy in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego.]]> report earlier this year. Finally, while technology competition between the United States and China has become increasingly (and perhaps unavoidably) contentious, it is worth reflecting on the fact that clean energy technologies pose far fewer risks to national security than climate change itself. An understanding between the two countries on clean tech trade, difficult as it may be, could help to ensure that every country is able to aggressively deploy low-cost clean technologies in the timeframe required. Michael Davidson is an assistant professor in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego.]]> New START, is set to expire on February 5, 2021. Following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, this is the only remaining agreement that places any limits on the two countries’ nuclear arsenals. It also plays a significant role in supporting the existing nonproliferation regime. Negotiating an extension of New START is the most urgent nuclear issue for the next administration. Although we have the necessary technical tools to continue to verify New START—through cooperative monitoring measures, on-site inspections, and national technical means—the political barriers to extension are significant. Questions as to the appropriateness of China’s involvement given their growing nuclear arsenal, Russian critiques regarding the absence of limits on ballistic missile defense systems, and efforts to include nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the agreement represent just three of many points of contention that would need to be tackled when negotiating a new deal. Extending New START as soon as possible represents our best option for supporting U.S. national security and strategic stability. There are also three major proliferation concerns that the new administration will have to address: Iran, North Korea, and crisis instability in South Asia. Following the termination of the Iran Deal, we are going to need to find a means to reengage on the deal or come up with a new agreement to make progress there. North Korea has an active and increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons program and there is currently no framework or timetable for denuclearization. Meanwhile, tensions between India and Pakistan remain high and there is no forum for dialogue. In the face of the impending entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, frustrations with the pace of nuclear disarmament by parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be acknowledged—lest the existing NPT regime crumble under these significant differences in perspective. The new administration must prioritize the integrity of the NPT and work to ensure international cooperation in addressing proliferation challenges. Each of these issues deserves presidential attention. As a nuclear scientist, I take my policy obligations seriously. While much of my work is technical—applied nuclear physics and radiation detection—I also have the opportunity to collaborate with students and postdocs, to develop the workforce and build the expertise needed to support the nuclear enterprise and nonproliferation initiatives. As Bill Perry said in his book, “the key to taking constructive actions that can prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used again is education.” It is critical to keep early career scholars engaged. This is why educational initiatives, like the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, are so important. The Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp, a workshop at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation offers an exemplary model, giving scholars and practitioners the tools they need to address ongoing nuclear and national security challenges. Bethany Goldblum is a member of the research faculty in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at UC Berkeley, and the founder and director of the Nuclear Policy Working Group.]]> impacts of COVID-19 on poor people in developing countries and ensure rapid and equitable access to a vaccine once it becomes available. Health shocks affect the poor and vulnerable disproportionately, drive households into poverty, and can have lifetime impacts on children through inadequate nutrition and insufficient education. Collaboration will be essential—the United States will need to work with international partners such as the World Health Organization and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have been one of the most effective policies in the 21st century for reducing current and future poverty in developing countries. CCTs transfer cash to poor families subject to certain conditions normally related to the health and education of the children, such as vaccinations, visits to health clinics, and school attendance. These policies have been carried out by governments throughout the developing world, and there is strong evidence demonstrating their effectiveness. CCTs work better where the supply of educational and health services is sufficient, both in terms of quantity and quality. The next administration could have a big impact on poverty in the present and future by working with developing countries to improve children’s access to healthcare and education. A high proportion of the poor in developing countries live in rural areas and work in agriculture.  Increased agricultural productivity in developing countries—which contributes to higher incomes—should be an important component of the next administration’s strategy for attacking global poverty. The evidence is clear that education contributes to the adoption of new technologies and increased productivity. Improvements in rural education also provide children with the opportunity, later in life, to seek employment in other sectors of the economy if they so choose. Beyond education, increased productivity can be achieved via support for the adoption of higher yielding or drought resistant varieties, and through fertilizer subsidies and the provision of plot-specific information about how fertilizer should be used. Policy options also include institutional support for index-insurance schemes that protect farmers against droughts and floods and incentivize investments that contribute to higher productivity and income. Finally, one of the highest priorities for the next administration should be to focus its development efforts on the countries of Central America. There is a humanitarian crisis taking place in the region, and it spills over to the United States in the form of caravans of refugees, and thousands of people seeking asylum or crossing the border as undocumented immigrants. The underlying drivers of the crisis are complex, including drugs and violence, inequality, authoritarian governments, and climate change. While calls for a Marshall Plan for the region correctly focus attention on the gravity of the problem and the scale of the required response, what worked for Europe in 1948 is not what is likely to work in Central America in 2021. Central American countries require much more than a massive injection of foreign resources. They need assistance in strengthening democratic institutions and in combatting drugs and violence. In terms of poverty and development, the policies described above—with a focus on children, health and education, COVID-19, and agricultural productivity—provide a valuable point of departure. So too could enhanced remittances. In Guatemala and El Salvador, for example, remittances represented between 13 percent and 21 percent of GDP in 2019. This volume of resources was around ten times larger than foreign direct investment, twenty times larger than foreign aid, and 75 percent of the value of exports. The benefits of remittances also tend to be widely distributed, with a disproportionate share going to poor households. The next administration should seek to grow the flow of remittances to Central America. This could be achieved through a redesigned guest worker program with enhanced rights and protections. Policies that contribute to lowering the cost of sending money home could also play a role. Steven Helfand professor and chair of Economics at the University of California, Riverside.]]> UN report notes, the pandemic exacerbates the risks migrants face, creating a health crisis, a socio-economic crisis stemming from loss of employment, and a protection crisis for asylum seekers turned away at international borders. Although migration represents only 3.5 percent of the global population, migration pressures show no signs of slowing: the number of international migrants has increased significantly faster (78 percent) than the global population (45 percent) since 1990, according to the United Nations (United Nations 2019). U.S. policy towards migrants has shifted in several significant ways under the Trump administration. Rhetorically, Trump uses migration as a divisive tool—maligning migrants as criminals and rapists. Though the Obama administration deported more migrants than any previous administration, the Trump administration’s deportation policy is much more arbitrary. Previously, only those who were convicted of serious crimes faced deportation. Now, everyone is vulnerable. The result is a much more insecure migrant community. The Trump administration has also changed protections for asylum seekers and refugees. The ceiling for refugee resettlement for the 2020 was set at 18,000 and the US resettled only 11,814 refugees during the 2020 fiscal year, the lowest number of refugees since 1980, when Congress created the nation’s refugee resettlement program. Asylum seekers have also been affected. In early 2019, the Trump administration began limiting the number of asylum applications that could be filed each day and requiring asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their asylum claims were processed (the so-called Migrant Protection Protocols). With the advent of COVID-19, border controls restrict the acceptance of new asylum claims. Preventing asylum seekers from lodging their claims contravenes our international obligations under the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, and our own asylum laws and legal norms. The Trump administration also, notably, suspended DACA, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. Migrants are good for the United States—they strengthen our economy and support for them reflects our values and commitments as a responsible member of the global community. The next U.S. administration should prioritize four policies: First, during the pandemic, we need to treat migrants, even unauthorized migrants, the same as citizens.  People on the move are less able to protect themselves because they often face crowded, unsanitary living or working conditions, and have less access to health services. Amid the global pandemic, migrants in the United States are often front line workers, harvesting our crops, packaging our food, and caring for our sick, among other things. But increased exposure to the novel coronavirus in migrant communities puts everyone at risk. The U.S. federal and state governments need to ensure that migrant workplaces are safe, and that migrant communities have access to health care and to adequate resources while they stay at home if they are sick or need to quarantine. We must treat migrants like citizens because their well-being affects our well-being. In the words of the United Nations, “no one is safe unless everyone is safe.” The second priority is DACA. The Trump administration’s decision to rescind DACA was overruled by a recent Supreme Court decision but is likely to be contested if Trump is reelected. We are better off as a country if we allow the decision to stand and re-open enrollment to young people and grant them the documented status that permits them to be productive members of our community. Large majorities of Americans support giving legal status to immigrants who were brought into the country as children. Extending and expanding DACA clearly benefits the migrants themselves, but it also benefits the United States. They cannot make the contributions they otherwise would without coming out the shadows. Third, the United States should reverse current policies affecting refugees and asylum seekers. We need to ensure that our values are reflected in our policies. We have a moral, as well as a legal, obligation to welcome refugees and adjudicate asylum claims on our soil. We need to expand our refugee acceptance ceiling to higher levels and, to ensure that asylum claims are quickly and fairly adjudicated, we need to marshal the necessary resources. The Migrant Protection Protocols, which require asylum seekers to stay in Mexico, should be rescinded and asylum seekers allowed to enter and stay in the United States while their claims are processed. The fourth priority is to address the broader issue of the undocumented population in the United States.  Even though the “Dreamers”—young people eligible for DACA—may now gain assurances of their legal status, they are only a small portion of the more than 10 million unauthorized migrants in the United States. Deportation is not a viable solution. Two-thirds of these immigrants have lived in the United States for more than 10 years. They work, buy homes, send their children to school, and pay taxes; they are part of our communities. The next administration need to lead a reasoned debate about how to secure the lives of our immigrant neighbors. Smart migration policies and protection for the vulnerable are part of the fabric of U.S. history, support U.S. interests, and reflect U.S. values. The next administration has an opportunity to lead in this space—a task the COVID-19 pandemic has made all the more urgent. Jeannette Money is a professor in the Political Science Department at the University of California, Davis.]]> George Rutherford is Salvatore Pablo Lucia professor and the head of the Division of Infectious Disease and Global Epidemiology at the School of Medicine at UC San Francisco.]]> Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, is research professor in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego and chair of the 21st Century China Center.]]> <![CDATA[(Re)Evaluating the Politics of Global Supply Chains]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/reevaluating-the-politics-of-global-supply-chains/ Wed, 02 Sep 2020 23:44:08 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=686 You lead a research group focused on the role of global supply chains in the international relations of East Asia. The group is part of IGCC’s Great Power Competition in the 21st Century, a research initiative, which examines the technological, economic, and domestic dynamics of the new superpower rivalry. Why do global supply chains matter? Global supply chains (GSCs) accounted for about two-thirds of total (gross) trade until recently, and connect the world in unprecedented and complex ways. They spread over several countries the full range of tasks related to the design, production, and marketing of products and services. Each stage or task contributes some value-added to the final product, leading to “Made in the World” goods. Global supply chains have dramatically transformed global economic interdependence over the last three decades, but the effect of GSCs on interstate conflict and cooperation hasn’t received adequate attention until recently. I began wrestling with this topic in 2013, while writing an article that cautioned against simplistic comparisons between the onset of World War I—which ended the first wave of globalization—and 2014. The centenary of the outbreak of the Great War elicited frequent comparisons between 1914 and 2014, as if history was condemned to repeat itself. But the first and second waves of globalization were very different, and the density of GSCs was one important distinction between the two. GSCs captured little attention beyond economics and business schools at the time, but the Trump administration changed all that. A centerpiece of “America First” was the campaign to dismantle GSCs through reshoring (back to the U.S.), with special attention to decoupling GSCs linking the U.S. with China. And then came COVID-19, further catapulting GSCs into the headlines. On the one hand, the two exogenous shocks (geopolitical and pandemic) propelled GSCs to the center of attention. On the other, their combined interaction makes it difficult to disentangle their independent effects in recent months. Why is understanding the role of global supply chains especially important for East Asia? International relations in East Asia face the most complex bundle of geopolitical and geo-economic threats in decades: trade-and-technology wars, rising tariffs, export controls, sanctions, protectionism, nationalism, populism, the erosion of trade agreements and WTO rules, corrosion of alliance commitments, domestic political polarization, deterioration in regimes governing weapons of mass destruction, energy and environment-related rifts, and tensions from Northeast Asia to the South China Sea. The jury is out on whether the high density and maturity of GSCs connecting “Factory Asia” can play a role in preventing those tensions from deteriorating further. Your new book (forthcoming with Cambridge University Press) brings together UC faculty, graduate students, and international experts from different disciplines bear on the topic. What findings can you share? The political origins of GSCs were rooted in the grand strategies of outward-oriented political survival models adopted by most East Asian states. Those models underpinned decades of regional cooperation, as states were able to restrain persistent historical, ethnic, religious, and territorial cleavages. More recently, however, the rise of inward-oriented hyper-nationalist models in both China (under Xi Jinping) and the U.S. (under Donald Trump) altered the dynamics in the direction of heightened conflict. GSCs provide a core difference between U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, where mutually beneficial economic exchange was nil, and contemporary competition between the U.S. and China, where the two are deeply interlocked economically, financially, and technologically. It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Trump tariffs have not had their intended effects in terms of who paid for them (not China but U.S. firms and consumers). And China’s exports to the U.S. actually rose in the second quarter of 2020. How else has the U.S.-China trade war affected global supply chains? It’s hard to over-state the interconnectedness of the U.S. and Chinese economies. Trade conducted via GSCs (trade in parts and components, or intermediates) provides a fuller picture than gross or total trade. For example, over half of China’s total exports include intermediate inputs that the U.S. and the rest of the world exported to China in the first place, via GSCs. Nor has the trade war benefitted U.S. manufacturing or farmers, who lost jobs and businesses to China’s retaliation. Indeed, there is virtually no support for tariffs among most U.S. firms and peak industrial associations, most of which are highly connected to China via GSCs. China’s domestic politics are far less transparent, especially in recent years, but its own hyper-nationalism in economics and security doesn’t appear to have served it well either. The domestic balance of power, between outward-oriented and inward-looking political forces, is especially hard to assess under Xi Jinping. What is clear is that the Trump administration’s trade-and-tech war is a gift to China’s revitalized inward-looking camp. That camp can hardly deliver the “China Dream” through self-sufficiency and is more likely to make China’s “middle income trap” a reality. After all, China has derived impressive benefits from the presence of foreign GSCs: in economic growth, employment, an expanding middle-class, urbanization, and technological advancement. A potential global, not just U.S., backlash against China’s current domestic and international policies might also truncate its export capacity just as China faces high demand for jobs and an array of other bottlenecks. And yet, as of mid-2020, the purported vast reshoring of GSCs back to the U.S. advertised by the Trump administration hasn’t happened. Many firms are already close to the consumer: China’s domestic market. It’s true that rising labor costs in China in recent years resulted in some Japanese, South Korean, Taiwanese and even Chinese firms relocating production and assembly to Vietnam, Mexico and other destinations, from where they continued to export to the U.S. And the geopolitical and pandemic shocks accelerated that trend somewhat. But preliminary surveys estimate that no more than roughly 10 percent of firms have moved sourcing and manufacturing out of China. What effect have heightened tensions between Japan and South Korea, and on the Taiwan question, had on GSCs? There is little evidence that conflicts over Taiwan, Senkaku-Diaoyu, and the South China Sea have had more that marginal effects on GSCs thus far. Nor did the conflict that erupted between Japan and South Korea in 2019—the most severe in their bilateral relationship in decades—derail their GSCs significantly, for now. But all this is a moving target. To be sure, some GSCs are taking steps to reduce their vulnerability under the U.S.-China and pandemic shocks: diversification of production and sourcing, moving away from “just in time” production and toward more robust inventories, greater regionalization, shortening of supply chains, near-shoring, automation and other corrections aimed at reducing over-reliance on China, but only to a certain degree. Building more resilience is the name of the GSC game. If they succeed, they could buttress the view that GSCs might be, after all, a more central, nimble, and less vulnerable driver of contemporary globalization than were other forms of economic exchange prior to 1914. You’ve been a pioneer in the study of globalization since the publication of your Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn (Princeton UP 1998). Which insights have withstood the test of time and which have not? The vagaries of globalization and anti-globalization are nothing new. Indeed, that book charted in detail the age-old competition between outward-oriented and inward-looking nationalist-populist political survival models across space and time. While the epoch favored globalizing models at the time of writing, the book cautioned against ignoring their vulnerabilities to inward-looking counter-cycles, myopic nationalism and increasing inequality. So that basic insight survived the test of time. Brexit and the 2016 U.S. elections restored rather extreme forms of inward-looking populism, along with variants such as Erdogan, Putin and many others from Europe to the Middle East and Latin America. The study of underlying political forces has now returned to the fore, raising pressing questions: How, when, and why do these competing models diffuse within and across regions? What kinds of firewalls are strong enough to stem diffusion? Is East Asia—the most dynamic center of the global economy—resilient to inward-looking models? Have populist politicians worldwide poured political resources into an ephemeral bullish political boom that could soon turn into bust? Will one virus (i.e., COVID-19) end up killing another (i.e., populism)? Etel Solingen is Distinguished Professor and Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in Peace Studies at the University of California Irvine. She is past president of the International Studies Association (2012–2013) and a past chair of IGCC’s Steering Committee (2004–2008). Best known for her work on regional orders and the political economy of nuclear logics, in 2018 she received the William and Katherine Estes Award from the National Academy of Sciences, which recognizes basic research in cognitive or behavioral science that uses rigorous formal and empirical methods to advance our understanding of the risk of nuclear war. Solingen was the 2020 Susan Strange Professor at the London School of Economics.]]> 686 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Anxious America: Populist Nationalism, the “End” of Arms Control, and Security Priorities for the Next U.S. Administration]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/anxious-america/ Tue, 29 Sep 2020 21:35:52 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=802 You co-wrote What is Populist Nationalism and Why Does it Matter?, which was published in the Journal of Politics last year. What is populist nationalism, why does it matter, and is the Trump administration different from preceding administrations in this regard? Populist nationalism is a squishy term—it means different things to different people. But generally, all definitions of populism share a fundamental suspicion and hostility towards elites, mainstream politics, and established institutions. In one manifestation of this, Trump wrote in a Wall Street Journal piece in April 2016, that: “The only antidote to decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of elites is bold infusion of popular will. On every major issue affecting this country, the people are right and the governing elite are wrong.” Populism sees itself as speaking for the forgotten, ordinary person and often imagines itself as the voice of genuine patriotism. Historically populism has come in both left- and right-wing variances, but interestingly, right-wing populist parties are experiencing a new and striking rise today in countries across Europe and in the U.S. Why does it matter? These attitudes tend to lead to the abandonment of mainstream parties in support of emerging parties, often at fringes, and to policies that often depart from the mainstream. On this point, Fareed Zakaria recounts in a recent Foreign Affairs article that political scientist Justin Guest adapted the basic platform of the far-right British National Party and asked Americans whether they supported a party dedicated to “stopping mass immigration, providing American jobs to only American workers, preserving American Christian heritage, and stopping the threat of Islam, etc.” Sixty-five percent of those polled said they would support this platform. In this way, President Trump and Trumpism are the consequences, and not the cause, of changing political attitudes that may long-outlast a single administration. Is there anything about the Trump administration that has surprised you that doesn’t follow what you would anticipate? I am not surprised about the direction of most of the Trump administration’s policies. However, I am often surprised by the magnitude of the consequences that followed from some of the policies. For example, I am not surprised by the Trump Administration’s attempt to weaken trust in many social and political institutions, but I am surprised at how effective it has been in some cases. In particular, the loss of trust in the free press as an institution was far more pronounced than I anticipated, and I don’t know how long it will take to repair. The absoluteness with which it has occurred I find shocking. A few months ago, Vox published a piece titled The End of Arms Control As We Know It, and Jessica Matthews published The New Nuclear Threat, in which she writes that we are in greater danger today from nuclear threats than ever before. Is it the end of arms control as we know it, and are we entering a dangerous new phase? It’s a really important question. I don’t think we’re at the end of arms control. I’m more optimistic than most people on this. I think we are entering an important new phase of arms control, and because the decisions we make moving forward will be highly consequential, there's the latent danger of making mistakes. But I wouldn’t say that the future of arms control will necessarily leave us in a more dangerous place. The common narrative of arms control during the Cold War was: because nuclear weapons are so destructive, states—even hostile states—cooperated to reduce the number of arms because there was no way to win a nuclear war. Arms control stopped the arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and thus, in some ways, it stopped the Cold War. There are a lot of important correctives to this narrative. Arms control was seen as a competitive space as much as a cooperative one. For example, the U.S. sought to reach an arms control agreement that kept the total number of nuclear weapons constant with the Soviet Union, but we did this quite deceptively, because we made really significant qualitative improvements to the yield of our weapons such that we believed it would give us an advantage. Arms control thus served as this way to entrap the Soviet Union by forcing them to compete on the U.S. playing field. Competitive arms control has huge implications for emerging technology like cyber, artificial intelligence, drones, which will all present new challenges to strategic stability. Today, we’re only at the beginning of the difficult process to determine how we might govern the use of new and emerging technologies to everyone’s benefit. However, I take some reassurance in knowing that arms control has always been challenging, and as long as there is a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement that can be reached—even if only incremental—skilled negotiators may find it. There are probably lots of deals to govern the use of new and emerging technologies (whether they be related to nuclear weapons or not) that will leave all parties better off, at the same time that I expect actors to bargain very extra hard to secure the exact deal that most benefits them. What’s the most important thing the next administration can do to enhance global security? If the question is about the most important thing to enhance U.S. national security, some common answers among experts today include not losing the technological edge to rising powers like China, to limit vulnerabilities to information war and cyber-attack, and to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These would certainly be good places to start, but I might add another: doing the hard work of solving the important domestic problems that deeply divide the country. If the question is more about global security, some common answers among experts today include solving global climate change, solving control problems related to artificial intelligence, and mitigating risks from new biotechnology and global pandemics. As an international relations scholar, I would add another: reversing the rising sentiment of anti-globalism world-wide. The big global problems of the future will require international cooperation to produce big global solutions, but globalism and globalization appear to be under attack and backsliding. Reversing this trend will not be easy, since globalization always creates winners and losers at both the international and domestic level, so simply adopting new policies that increase globalization may not be a sustainable solution over time. The next administration will need to articulate a compelling case for globalization in principle, and, practically, it will need to construct a new grand bargain to allocate the gains from globalization in a way that makes it sustainable.]]> 802 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Between Conflict and Cooperation: The World in 2021]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/between-conflict-and-cooperation-the-world-in-2021-2/ Fri, 08 Jan 2021 22:21:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=865 865 0 0 0 <![CDATA[COVID-19 Outlook: An Interview with George Rutherford]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/covid-19-outlook-an-interview-with-george-rutherford/ Wed, 02 Sep 2020 22:20:42 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=914 Tell me about your role with COVID-19 responses—what do your days look like? It’s been non-stop 20-hour days since February. This is one of the great public health challenges of our time. I do everything from large research projects, to providing direct services—my group at UCSF is doing most of the contact tracing training for California—to providing hands-on technical assistance in Alameda, San Mateo, and Imperial counties. I also advise the San Francisco Department of Public Health on surveillance and testing strategies, and coordinate research activities between them and UCSF. I also do a lot of the press and Grand Rounds and town halls. And I have students.

    Sounds overwhelming.

    Yeah, talk to my wife about it. I deal with everyone from the city, to the state, to the federal government, to Congress and the Trump administration, to the World Health Organization. I also provide advice to other countries—New Zealand, Mexico, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Peru.

    When this hit around February, did you and your peers expect that it was going to be a world-changing event?

    We did not originally think that it would be life changing. By the first week of March, we understood that asymptomatic community transmission was occuring. That’s when everybody realized that this was going to be much bigger deal than SARS and MERS, which were mostly spread in hospitals.

    A piece in the New York Times cites a model that predicts that, under current policies, the U.S. is on track to have 150,000 new cases a day later this year. How worried should we be?

    We should be very worried. We're averaging 50,000 cases a day and 1,000 deaths a day [at the time of this interview], and it could get worse. We had a first wave, which was New York. It was initially suppressed in California, but then we got a much bigger second wave courtesy of the South and Southwest. The issue of school re-openings is very concerning. Leaving the state of the nation in the hands of 12 to 22 year olds is not good policy. You saw what happened with the schools in Georgia, or in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where they took no precautions and managed to stay open for five days. You should have seen the headlines. It's like the gang that can't shoot straight. It's really troubling. Governor Newsom is being appropriately prudent in keeping a lid on schools. We should also be worried about farm workers. That's where all the disease is now. And there are limits to what you can do. You need crops, and they all have to live together unless you put them in sleeping bags on the ground, or put them up in motels, and there aren’t enough motels in the whole Central Valley.

    How prepared was California for something like this?

    We were very prepared. There were a lot of contingency plans—for example, the six Bay Area Health County Health officers put plans into place on March 16—the day before Saint Patrick’s Day. That was no coincidence. The rest of the state went down on March 19. We did as good a job as we could early on. There's a lot of pressure to reopen—on the Governor, on the boards of education, on local health officers. One of the things that nobody talks about is the border with Mexico, which reopened and a lot of people came into Imperial County. A lot of them were Americans who were retired in Mexico. And that seeded Imperial County. We had Imperial Country patients here at UCSF, they were at Stanford, at San Francisco General Hospital. They had them at UC Davis. That's a big deal. That outbreak probably seeded the Coachella Valley, which seeded the Central Valley, and so on, all the way up into Redding. Then somebody who was not being particularly thoughtful sent 122 prisoners from Chino to San Quentin, the oldest prison in the state. Seventy percent of the prisoners are now infected. When those big institutional outbreaks happen they spread widely. Right now we’re seeing factory outbreaks in places like meat packing plants, fruit packing plants, and manufacturing plants.

    Some experts have suggested that if we have an aggressive lockdown for six weeks or so, we can get control of this thing. In your conversations with decision-makers, what prevents more aggressive measures? Or is it not that simple and wouldn't work anyway?

    It probably wouldn’t work. First of all, all the fruit and food would rot in the fields. That's a problem, right? And you’d have to enforce it and probably arrest a lot of people. The time for tight lockdown was early on. We did a half-assed job of it. But it's what society will tolerate. You don't want a rebellion, you don't want widespread lawlessness. You want to be able to pull it off as best you can, and I think we did that well early on. Then in mid-June people said, enough is enough. That's when the controls came off.

    You’ve worked extensively on HIV/AIDS. How similar or dissimilar is the government and the public response to COVID-19?

    It’s similar in that there was a lot of press attention, a lot of public attention, and a lot of local government attention focused on it. You see that with COVID-19, too. What’s also similar is that most of the federal government stayed completely out of it, except the National Institutes of Health. I don’t know if you remember this, but Reagan never said the word “AIDS.” What's different—the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) exhibited great leadership during the HIV/AIDS crisis, which they are not doing now. And during the early days of HIV/AIDS, there was a lot of altruism—the formation of social services, which became known as the San Francisco model, that provided support to communities, from health and education, to food and social services and housing. That felt coordinated compared to this.

    What about this pandemic has surprised you?

    What surprises me is the complete abrogation of federal responsibility.  Public health is admittedly not addressed in the Constitution—it’s not mentioned in the Bill of Rights. The 10th Amendment says that unless the issue is covered in the previous nine amendments, it belongs to the states. That's why the states have public health laws. But this is something that needs really clear central leadership. The states look to the CDC to lead with planning, policy, and recommendations, and to Congress and the administration to provide the funding and regulatory infranstructure to bring essential products (test kits, drugs, vaccines, etc.) to market.

    Do you think that the heightened nationalist global environment is impacting the global response to COVID-19?

    I don't see a lot of evidence of that outside the United States. The vaccine that’s farthest along is a Canadian-Chinese vaccine. There are a lot of joint ventures and a lot of transnational cooperation. But not in the U.S. The one international vaccine trial we cooperate with is the AstraZeneca vaccine being made in Britain, but nobody is thinking big picture. How are we going to distribute one hundred million doses? What about Canada or Mexico—our largest trading partners? What are we going to do to help them? The attitude of this administration is that it’s their problem. It's very xenophobic and narrow, and the administration is hugely at fault for that.

    What about the state of the country makes you feel encouraged, and what worries you?

    The least encouraging thing is that the Chinese gave the U.S. a two-month lead time to get our ducks in a row, and the U.S. didn't do it. The CDC thought this was going to be like other manageable infectious diseases, and wanted to control all the testing. So rather than having a million test kits available in two months’ time, we had hundreds available. The fact that the Food and Drug Administration wanted to close the CDC’s laboratory because they weren't following good laboratory standards is very telling. With testing highly restricted, we didn't know what was going on. I see that as one of the biggest failures. What’s encouraging was that the central Chinese CDC got to Wuhan on December 31, had the virus isolated on January 7, and fully sequenced on January 10, and had a diagnostic test for the virus by January 14. I find that speed for molecular biology totally remarkable. That's the most encouraging thing. And the lessons spread rapidly around the world thanks to international health regulations and their attendant treaty obligations, which were put into place by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the wake of the SARS epidemic of 2002-2003. This is probably the fifth time WHO has declared an outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (one of the core activities in the International Health Regulations). The others were for Ebola virus (twice), swine flu (2009) and Zika virus (2016).]]>
    914 0 0 0 The COVID-19 pandemic continues to threaten the health of communities, economies, and political systems. IGCC affiliated researcher George Rutherford, Salvatore Pablo Lucia professor and the head of the Division of Infectious Disease and Global Epidemiology at the School of Medicine at UC San Francisco, has been instrumental in the COVID-19 response at the local, national, and global level. Here, he weighs in on the most encouraging—and the most worryingdevelopments, and on what has surprised him about this pandemic.]]>
    <![CDATA[Global Cooperation in the Time of COVID-19]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/global-cooperation-in-the-time-of-covid19/ Mon, 05 Oct 2020 19:01:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=999 999 0 0 0 COVID-19 is pushing countries and communities to the brink. How is the pandemic playing out in different regions and countries, and will this collective global challenge facilitate a cooperative global response—or just the opposite? Experts from across the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation weigh in.]]> Alice D. Ba is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware.]]> press conference on March 11. At around the same time, on March 20, AMLO pointed to his fight against corruption as the answer to all of his country’s ills, including the pandemic, expressing his disagreement with the isolation measures stating that "we must not freeze.” He declared that he was “calm, there is governance, we have reserves, a lot of money, because we have managed well, because there are healthy public finances, because there is no corruption and because there are no superfluous, unnecessary expenses.” Trump and AMLO sharply diverge when it comes to their handling of the economy. President Trump and Congress injected a huge sum of money into the economy—almost a quarter of the country’s GDP or $5.4 trillion of goods and services. AMLO, on the other hand, has refused to increase public spending, push tax cuts, or take any substantial measures to boost failing businesses. So far, the virus has deepened the economic crisis generated by the "Republican Austerity" policies practiced by his administration. The Mexican leader’s response has been driven in part by ideology but also, according to Mexican analyst Viridiana Ríos, a fear of criticism from the right regarding the “inevitable” creation of debt by a leftist government. Like their neighbors to the North, Mexicans will likely suffer the consequences of an ideological paralysis. Experts estimate the economy could contract between 10 and 12 percent. Ángel Gurría, the Mexican director of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), wrote: “The pandemic overtook Mexico at a difficult time. The national economy had been suffering the effects of the 2019 contraction.” Mexico will likely undergo additional suffering. Its economic contraction could push more than 10 million Mexicans into poverty, according to estimates by the National Counsel for Social Development Policy (CONEVAL). Both Trump and AMLO could have done a better job to alleviate the worst effects of the pandemic on their people. They seemed to tackle the virus, at least initially, as an inconvenience and not the lethal enemy that it is. Rafael Fernández de Castro is a professor at the School and director of its Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (USMEX).]]> everybody. Second, we are all so interdependent; if major global players continue to suffer, it’s going to have implications for everybody. Aid flows and development assistance and development cooperation, done and coordinated in an efficient way, is going to be really crucial. Getting that to the places where it’s most needed is crucial. A dollar in the hand of developing country communities is more useful than a dollar in the hands of a richer community and a richer country. That is particularly true right now. The third thing is, there has been a knee-jerk reaction by donors to redirect a lot of investment toward COVID. That is short sighted. Now more than ever, continuing to invest in the recovery of institutions and investments we know have long-run payoffs—like basic health care, education—is essential. How do we get kids back in school as soon as possible? How do we make sure that women are not afraid to come to the clinic to give birth because of COVID? This is where the real risks arise—if those types of things stop working in developing countries, not if personal protective equipment is in the village. If I were a social planner, I would encourage development cooperation to keep priorities set on the big, fundamental development investments. So far, COVID-19 appears to be hindering, rather than facilitating, global cooperation. The British who have been an amazing source of support both directly and indirectly to global development have now embedded DFID with their foreign office, which is leading to an enormous contraction around the world. That is one very salient instance of this, but that’s going to be happening all over. There is a conversation happening right now that suggests that policy responses and cooperation around COVID-19 can inform thinking and action on climate change, a critical area in global development. While there are probably some things to learn, there are some things that are not particularly generalizable or suggest challenges. One is, as a private actor, the benefit to me of going outside without a mask is potentially large, and the cost are small. The private cost/benefit tradeoff with climate change is very different. For me to take public transportation instead of driving my car is quite inconvenient, and I get effectively none of the gain. Whereas with COVID-19, maybe the costs are still quite high in some cases, like staying home from work, but I recoup a lot more of the benefits, because the virus is a local externality. It’s increasing transmission in my immediate vicinity. Whereas carbon is a global public good, distributed around the world. The fact that it’s been so hard and so costly to do preventative policy in the case of COVID-19, where the behavior change is relatively easy to justify to the individual, highlights the challenge of climate. That said, it’s not above our capabilities to do preventative policy, which is a good thing. Kelsey Jack is an associate professor in the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management at the University of California, Santa Barbara; and director of the Poverty Alleviation Group at the Environmental Market Solutions Lab (emLab). ]]> Christina Schneider is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego and member of the IGCC Steering Committee.]]> Bulletin of Atomic Scientists now stands at “Within 100 Seconds Of Midnight” in 2020, citing the existential dangers of nuclear war and climate change, compounded by cyber-enabled information warfare. This is the closest to Doomsday we have been since the Bulletin’s proverbial clock was conceived in 1947. Where do these heightened concerns come from? In my view, building on previous work on Nuclear Logics, concerns emanate from the deterioration of the broader international context within which the nuclear proliferation regime is embedded. While some of those concerns predated COVID-19, pandemic time has reinforced them. First, an open global economy has been under threat, especially since 2016. Why does that matter for the non-proliferation regime you may ask? Because internationalizing models and regions thriving in an integrating global political economy had made the quest for nuclear weapons less likely in recent decades. Indeed, the impressive expansion of global markets and underlying international institutions in the 1990s undermined nationalist, populist, mercantilist, inward-looking models. That expansion also bolstered internationalizing models around the world, facilitating landslide Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ratifications and leading to nearly full NPT membership. More countries renounced nuclear weapons and programs than tried to acquire them during that promising era. Fast forward, and Brexit, the 2016 U.S. elections, and other processes turbo-charged the rise of inward-looking populist movements and politicians around the world. Historically, new nuclear aspirants have been more likely to emerge in domestic and regional contexts dominated by such models. The Trump administration’s trade and tech wars had already unleashed serious blows to the global economy and COVID-19 exacerbated concerns with supply chains, especially in medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. This one-two punch has deepened uncertainty about the future of the global economy as we knew it. Indeed, together they have engendered the most significant test for the resilience and durability of global supply networks, the underbelly of global integration. This tenuous conjuncture is the subject of a project I organized under IGCC sponsorship, bringing together UC faculty and students along with overseas experts (Geopolitics, Global Supply Chains, and International Relations in East Asia, forthcoming with Cambridge University Press). Second, the Trump administration’s inward-looking model has not only led to trade wars and protectionism but has also weakened U.S. alliances. Historically, those alliances lowered incentives to proliferate, especially as allies were also partners in advancing global economic integration. The signals from the Trump administration’s “America First” have been equivocal at best and hugely disruptive at worst. Trump himself prodded some allies to develop their own deterrent and to fend for themselves, from Asia to Europe, so as to allegedly lower the costs of protection for the U.S. This approach only deteriorated under COVID-19, as budgets now compete with unprecedented domestic needs. Third, while the Putin era had restored a rabid populist hyper-nationalism in Russia for decades, inward-looking populism resurged in China only more recently, under Xi Jinping. The superpower troika—Putin, Trump, Xi—has managed to undermine cooperation on nonproliferation; unravelling arms control agreements; eroding consensus on the NPT; modernizing their nuclear and missile arsenals; and glorifying nuclear weapons (each leader pursuing bigger nuclear “buttons” or, in Trump’s recent disclosure to Bob Woodward, “we have stuff that Putin and Xi have never heard about before”). Under the Trump administration, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review upgraded the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy; the U.S. withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; and it has signaled that it won’t renew the Obama-era New Start strategic nuclear weapons treaty when it expires in 2021. Such an ominous development, never seen in 50 years, would leave the world bereft of a single nuclear disarmament agreement between the U.S. and Russia, even as their nearly 13,000 warheads still stand. Failures to reduce their arsenals (known as “vertical nuclear proliferation”) violate nuclear-weapons-states’ commitments made in Article 6 of the NPT: to phase out their own massive arsenals in exchange for others’ renouncing nuclear weapons altogether. Trump also retreated from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and, in the process, strengthened the most inward-looking factions within Iran, yet another authoritarian regime emboldened by a particularly high incidence of COVID-19 deaths,  triple the number reported by the government, according to the BBC. Trump’s lovefest with Kim Jong Un has yielded only more North Korean tests. And finally, COVID-19 has forced the postponement of the 2020 NPT review conference, at a time of high frustration with the treaty. Internationalizing models have been an important firewall against the diffusion of nuclear weapons over the years. COVID-19 has generated further economic crisis, weakened economic openness, and revived inward-looking models, heightening existing strains in the NPT regime. But international relations are not pre-determined; it would be premature to conceive of our current world/time as prelude for the long run. The human and economic costs of this COVID-19 crisis could generate entirely new political dynamics, exhausting extremist politics and triggering efforts to restore cooperation and economic openness. It might, one hopes, help develop better tools to defeat common plagues that—like nuclear weapons—are entirely man-made. Etel Solingen is Distinguished Professor and Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in Peace Studies at the University of California Irvine. She leads IGCC’s Great Power research group on the role of design and production networks in East Asia’s international relations.]]> <![CDATA[IGCC Hosts Track 1.5 Dialogue on Northeast Asia]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/igcc-hosts-track-dialogue-on-northeast-asia/ Thu, 11 Feb 2021 21:59:53 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1026 2020-21 Defense Transparency Index were presented, several participants suggested that a framework for managing competition in new technological domains, such as space and artificial intelligence, is needed. Another major theme of the 2021 NEACD was the contentious Sino-American relationship. While many agreed that the relationship has worsened dramatically, others pointed to encouraging, if modest, signs of military-to-military cooperation. For instance, a new crisis communication working group reflects a commitment by leadership on both sides to avoid misunderstandings, one participant suggested. Nonetheless, the relationship remains tense overall. In contrast to worsening U.S.-China relations, many agreed that Russian-Chinese relations are better today than at any other time in the past half century. One participant suggested this is simply a “marriage of convenience,” but many pointed to deep structural factors that have facilitated the strategic relationship for decades. Russian NEACD participants expressed little hope for improvement in Russo-American relations in the near term, and most participants from other countries agreed with this sentiment. On the subject of arms control, many were cautiously optimistic about the recent extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)—the last remaining bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. The recent collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), however, suggests that arms control is not performing well overall. China has expressed unwillingness to join an arms control framework because of the small size of China’s nuclear arsenal, which would make any agreement “unequal”—one participant likened it to the Washington Naval Treaty of the 1920s. Russian participants expressed an unwillingness to pressure their Chinese partners to join any such agreement. On the subject of North Korea, participants agreed that the regime remains a potent nuclear and missile threat. “The North Koreans have been biding their time and keeping a low profile while,” one participant said, “and at the same time ramping up their nuclear missile capabilities.” A participant noted that the North Koreans have applied to COVAX, a consortium co-led by Gavi, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and WHO to accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines and guarantee equitable access among developing countries. COVAX requires ministries of health to submit detailed distribution plans, which the DPRK has so far failed to do, leading to questions over whether they will try to negotiate with China or Russia as an alternative to COVAX. Overall, the outlook for the region as a whole, and for great power relations specifically, was decidedly gloomy. The scope of challenges underline the importance of forums like NEACD for improving understanding and building confidence among countries. NEACD is an unusual and powerful forum for track 1.5 dialogue in the region. Having met nearly every year since 1993, some dialogue participants have known and worked together for decades. Their longstanding relationships enable frank and friendly discussions, even in the midst of heightened tensions. “Several NEACD participants noted that the current moment is similar to the dramatic shifts that occurred with the end of the Cold War in Asia, when we founded NEACD,” says Susan Shirk, IGCC director emeritus, who previously chaired NEACD. “We may need to get creative about ideas for confidence building measures again.” Since it was founded in 1982, IGCC has also facilitated track 1.5 and 2 dialogues in India-Pakistan and the Middle East. NEACD will meet again in the fall of 2021 either in person or virtually depending on the health circumstances. •••••• Read an interview with Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and chair of the 21st Century China Center, on 30 years of NEACD.]]> 1026 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Neil Narang Joins IGCC as Research Director]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/neil-narang-joins-igcc-as-research-director/ Wed, 02 Sep 2020 15:00:50 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1089 You are joining IGCC as a Research Director, after serving on the steering committee since 2016. What's your vision for the next phase of IGCC? In the short term, my vision for IGCC is to support Tai’s vision as Director. Tai has done a really masterful job of keeping IGCC’s mission alive through very tough financial times, including by maintaining the doctoral fellowship program and summer programing. IGCC has a big legacy to keep up, and Tai has not only managed to maintain the Institute, he has expanded the mission in important ways. So, in the short term, I want to see how I can help him keep IGCC thriving. In the longer term, I’d like to see IGCC become more like some of the other university based centers around the country, like CISAC at Stanford or Belfer at Harvard. IGCC is unique in that it represents a giant, vibrant UC system, and I can imagine a day where we have enough funding to run robust senior fellow, visiting fellow, postdoctoral fellow, pre-doctoral, and undergraduate fellow programs, and support more academic research programing. I would also like to see IGCC do more outreach within the state, acting as resource to help Californians understand the policy world around them.

    One of your current research projects is on the future of alliances. Tell me about it.

    Currently, the U.S. maintains dozens of military alliances that range from conventional assurances to nuclear umbrellas. There are important benefits that accrue from these alliances, but they also cost billions of dollars to maintain and expose the U.S. to the risk of entrapment. And yet, existing alliances have largely escaped critical reevaluation for decades. One of the more controversial examples is NATO. NATO’s overall budget has ballooned at the same time that the U.S.’s share of the financial burden has increased. Is NATO—as it is currently structured—the optimal allocation of defensive resources, or is it an inefficient legacy of the bygone Cold War? In collaboration with the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Director’s Office of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, we are asking foundational questions about the role of alliances, and what they mean for U.S. grand strategy. We are also asking if geopolitical and technological changes have reduced the need for alliances. There's a whole bunch of emerging technologies that will facilitate a lot of power projection, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance—without needing the same depth of alliances.

    One of IGCC’s central goals is to use rigorous research to engage the policy community. Why does that matter?

    A lot of people don’t appreciate just how important UC has been in national-level policy conversations. Historically, UC researchers have been at the forefront of national security issues beginning with pioneering contributions during the Manhattan Project and continuing through the Cold War. Scholars from across the UC system continue to generate a tremendous amount of important work on global conflict and cooperation that should help policymakers with their decision-making. And yet, there is no institutional mechanism through which cross-campus and cross-Laboratory coordination is facilitated and leveraged to the greatest benefit of the UC system, the state of California, and the nation. As the multi-campus research unit on global conflict and cooperation, I would like to see IGCC help solve this coordination problem, including by deepening relations with the UC-managed national laboratories, and by establishing more of a presence in Washington D.C.

    You yourself have straddled both policy and academic worlds throughout your career. What’s that like?

    Keeping one foot in academia and one foot in policy work keeps me motivated. I love how committed academics are to finding something true, and I love the way that they carefully guard the gates to knowledge. Academics can be absolutely brutal and ruthless to each other. I get rejected far more than my fragile ego can bear some days. But the rigor and transparency of the peer-review process is what makes it more effective, and why it can be as rewarding as it is frustrating. The policy world is a great counter-balance. Policymakers have to make a decision today with the best evidence available. They are obliged to move ahead while accepting large amounts of uncertainty. It’s much more action orientated, with time- and information-constrained people bouldering ahead the best they can. This can be rewarding in its own way, but it can also be frustrating for its own reasons, since so much of policymaking is based on little more than impulse and gut. After over a decade of government experience with the Department of Energy at nuclear weapons laboratories and the Department of Defense both inside and outside of the Pentagon, I’ve come to an appreciation for how the two worlds can relate. Because policymaking moves forward whether policymakers know what the best answer is or not, academic training and scholarship can help discipline thinking around issues, weigh the best available evidence, and help identify areas of uncertainty and risk.

    You were a PhD student at UC San Diego, and an IGCC dissertation fellow. Now, you’re back as a research director, a leader, a professor and a mentor. What’s it like being on the other side?

    I owe a large part of my career to IGCC. I was a graduate student in the Political Science Department at UCSD, just across the sidewalk. Before this, as a prospective Ph.D. applicant working in nuclear intelligence, I visited IGCC’s website and was seduced by the policy work they were doing under Susan Shirk, including the summer policy bootcamps for graduate students. I would eventually participate in three of these summer boot camps and ultimately serve as Director of the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats boot camp. Throughout graduate school, IGCC provided me with an intellectual home away from my department, where it was not only safe to ask about the more applied policy implications of my work, but actually encouraged. IGCC has always represented a place like that—a place grounded in real world policy problems and committed to introducing students to the world of foreign policy. This is not easy to accomplish in California, which can seem really remote from Washington D.C and foreign policy debates. I was also a recipient of two fellowships through IGCC. Both provided pivotal funding for me during the Great Recession, when research funding had dried up across the country and new academic jobs had disappeared. For many graduate students like me over the last three decades, these financial resources mean the difference between me finishing and not finishing. Being on the other side is a really surreal and wonderful experience. For the last three years I have been on the steering committee, and had the privilege of advising Tai and the staff, but have also been able to take part in reviewing graduate student proposals for the doctoral dissertation fellowship. To be part of the process of giving grants out to the next generation of scholars is probably the most professionally satisfying part of my year. Now, as research director I have an opportunity to direct programs and help facilitate the interest of future generations. Given my own experience with how profound the impact IGCC can be, I don’t take any of these responsibilities lightly. It's a huge privilege.]]>
    1089 0 0 0 Neil Narang, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at UC Santa Barbara, joins IGCC as Research Director, after having served IGCC in various roles since 2013. An expert in international relations, international security, and conflict management, here he shares his vision for IGCC, new research on the future of alliances, and why using research to engage in policy work is so vital. ]]>
    <![CDATA[North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/north-korea-nuclear-and-missile-programs/ Wed, 01 Jul 2020 23:32:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1102 1102 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Prospects for Cooperation in Northeast Asia—An Interview With Susan Shirk]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/prospects-for-cooperation-in-northeast-asia/ Tue, 07 Jul 2020 23:08:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1130 You founded the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in 1993, an unofficial track 1.5 forum for discussions about security among officials in the U.S., Japan, Russia, and North and South Korea. How did this come about? At the beginning of the Clinton administration, I was the director of IGCC, and we organized a small workshop on Asia-Pacific security together with the Council on Foreign Relations. We brought together the East Coast foreign policy elite, and some academics from California. Interestingly, the Californians promoted the idea that the U.S. couldn’t rely on a “hub and spokes” model of influence in the region—maintaining its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific on the basis of bilateral alliances. This should be supplemented with regional, multilateral arrangements. At the time, I was interested in the idea of a “concert of powers” for East Asia, the idea being that the United States would work together with the other major powers in Asia, especially China and Japan and Russia to keep the region peaceful. The idea was a way to diversify the U.S. position in the region to make it more resilient to an uncertain future. The Clinton administration was willing to experiment with our idea of a Northeast Asian multilateral arrangement including the four major powers and the two Koreas, especially Winston Lord who was the new Assistant Secretary for East Asia. Winston helped arranged meetings for me in Asia with foreign ministries to see if they would be interested in a track 2 security dialogue for Northeast Asia. The North Koreans were actually quite enthusiastic. The Chinese were worried that regional multilateral institutions meant that other countries would gang up and point fingers at them. We got U.S. government financial support from the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Bureau. And then we got the support of the State Department and from the Clinton administration. That’s how the whole thing started.

    When NEACD began, did you think it would be something that would last for almost 30 years?

    The long-term goal was that it would be a kind of testing ground for the idea of a Northeast Asia security arrangement, and that it would evolve from track 2 to track 1. It was an experiment to see if governments would want to turn it into a more permanent arrangement at the official level.

    What was it like the first time you all sat down together? Were there funny moments, or moments when you thought it wasn’t going to work?

    The initiative coincided with a growing awareness on the Chinese side that they could increase their influence in the region in a nonthreatening way by participating in these meetings. In the beginning, they were scared of it. They thought they were the big gorilla, and everybody would blame them for everything. But it didn’t work out that way. Because I’m a China scholar, I was able to work pretty well with the Chinese participants. The Chinese foreign ministry sent a woman about my age who was a mid-level official in the Asia department, and she and I would plan out what we were going to do each day. Maybe we worked well together because we were the only two women, but she had the creativity and the vision to see that this could be good for China. She introduced me to her boss, who is now the foreign minister, and he was very supportive. The Chinese really turned around to become big fans of regional multilateralism. The other thing that was interesting was the North and South Koreans had a wonderful time together. They got along very well.

    Isn’t that interesting.

    We had some amazing meetings. We tried to go to places outside the capitols to have a retreat-like atmosphere. One of the most amazing meetings was in ’96 at a retreat that the Russian central committee used to have outside of Moscow. Beautiful place. There was hardly any food in Russia in the 90s, and when we met in a hotel, you could see the truckloads of food going out from the kitchen to some black market. At that time, the Russians were very gung-ho on democracy. Every now and then they would needle the Chinese about being an old-fashioned authoritarian regime. I remember one dinner at my home in which the North Koreans, the Russians, and the Chinese were all needling one another. The Russians were needling the Chinese about having no democracy, and the Chinese were needling the Russians about how poor they were, and the Russians, who were feeling very liberated, said to the North Koreans, “And what about you? You only have one radio station.”

    The North Koreans dropped out in 1994. What happened?

    Relations got very tense with the nuclear crisis of 1993-94 [tensions increased when North Korea refused to allow international inspectors to inspect its nuclear sites]. Pyongyang basically dropped out for a decade. But then they came back. The first meeting with the North Koreans back again was in Moscow in 2002, and I remember being really worried about it. After the first session, during the break, I went up to the head of the North Korean group and asked how it was going. He said, “Oh I think this is really wonderful. People are very frank but friendly.” We had a few years with a lot of good North Korean participation, but it’s been increasingly difficult. That’s been disappointing, but NEACD has never been about just North Korea. If they don’t come, we can still make progress.

    Why do you think that this kind of model—track 1.5—is important for reducing conflict?

    Track 1.5 means that there are more officials in the room than there are private people. So even though the whole process is unofficial, there are a lot of political officials there. The people who participate really get to know one another. They’re able then to follow up informally afterwards. It became a kind of back channel that wasn’t as scripted with talking points, and you could develop a better understanding that could move the official process forward. We’d always have a lunch for the foreign ministry officials, and I would say: when we have an official Northeast Asia security dialogue, then NEACD can go out of business. And they would say: “Oh no this is so much better because the formal meetings are so constrained.” Even when we have a formal security arrangement, they’d always say they wanted to keep NEACD.

    What is the biggest impact of this over the years? What are you most proud of?

    I am proud of the fact that it was the template for the six party talks. I think it remains a foundation for a concert-like arrangement among the four major powers in the region, and I believe that eventually we could have a security arrangement for northeast Asia. But now it’s very hard to sustain the momentum, with U.S.-China relations being as strained as they are. South Korea and Japan have extremely strained relations. The Russians frankly have never really cared that much. Most of their focus is on Europe or in the Middle East. •••••• Due to the uncertainties surrounding travel, the 30th meeting of the NEACD will be held in 2021. Researchers from the six parties will meet virtually for a mini-session in July to discuss regional implications of the pandemic and bilateral relations. Susan Shirk is research professor and chair of the 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. She served as director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 1991-1997 and 2006-2010. Shirk first visited China in 1971, and has been teaching, researching and engaging China diplomatically ever since. From 1997-2000, Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, with responsibility for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. Shirk's publications include China: Fragile Superpower; The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China; Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China; and her edited book, Changing Media, Changing China. She co-chairs a task force of China experts that issued its second report Smart Competition: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy in February 2019. She also co-chairs the UC San Diego Forum on U.S.-China Relations.]]>
    1130 0 0 0 Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and leading U.S.-China relations expert, reflects on nearly 30 years of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which she founded, and the prospects for improved cooperation in the region. The interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Proxy Wars and Hotspots to Watch: A Conversation with Eli Berman]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/proxy-wars-and-hotspots-to-watch-a-conversation-with-eli-berman/ Tue, 02 Feb 2021 17:48:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1133 Powerful states have used proxies to pursue foreign policy objectives for probably as long as there have been nation-states. What is a “proxy” and why does working with or through proxies make sense? Our problem with ISIS in Syria is typical. We have interests—suppressing a terrorist threat—but are reluctant to deploy forces to do so. The solution that great powers and medium-sized powers have come up with is to deputize a local ally who we incentivize to do it for us. For instance, using Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish forces as a proxy to suppress ISIS—our common enemy.

    How does a country like the United States get a proxy to do what it wants?

    What the U.S. discovered in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Colombia, and in many of our other adventures and misadventures, is that the local allies who we choose to pursue our interests—well, they have their own interests. Even if you give them resources and training, they don't always use them to fight the Taliban or ISIS. Sometimes they use them to chase down their political opponents, and then return to barracks. In short, proxies cheat. When the incentives aren’t strong enough and monitoring isn’t tight, agents cheat. In six out of nine case studies in our book, the principals who observed cheating tightened up the incentives and monitoring and managed to achieve proxy compliance. So, the good news is that most of the time, proxy wars can work, but only when managed very, very carefully.

    So, you get a proxy to do what you want through a combination of incentives—carrots and sticks—and monitoring.

    Exactly. What's most surprising is not that incentives work, but how often the principals initially overestimate how misaligned their own objectives are with those of their proxies. You have a character like Maliki in Iraq who says “Oh, yes. We definitely want a liberal democracy and we're going to have an inclusive government and it's going to include the Sunni.” And we tend to buy that line. We tend not to be as skeptical as we should. As a result, the United States tends to naively provide unconditional aid, rather than conditioning military and civilian aid on performance.

    The United States is in the process of reducing its force presence in Afghanistan in line with the 2020 agreement with the Taliban. How might our ability to influence local partners in Afghanistan change in the absence of these forces on the ground? What do you predict for the Biden administration?

    When you withdraw American forces, you lose the ability to monitor. Not totally, because the satellites are still there, and you can still listen to phone calls if you are inclined to do such a thing. But without actual personnel on the ground, monitoring gets worse and leverage declines very, very rapidly. That means our allies and our own personnel are less safe, which means they can do less things. And as we lose leverage, somebody else gets more leverage—Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia. It's a little early to predict what the Biden administration will do. But I would expect to see a slow ramping up of forces—if domestic politics allows —so they can succeed at counterterrorism and make sure there's a rapid response force if security deteriorates and our local allies are endangered. The Ghani government is probably the best government a principal could ever expect in Afghanistan, and it's certainly a strong American interest that it succeeds. But without knowing how the Senate would respond, and how the House would respond, and how isolationism will express itself in the Biden era, it's difficult to predict. Amazingly, Afghanistan is more predictable right now than domestic politics here in the United States.

    The Afghanistan papers seem to demonstrate the failure of the United States to address the corrupt practices of its local partners in Afghanistan, which, some argue, damaged U.S. military operations over the long term. Is this an example of the difficulty of a principal monitoring an agent, or is it a case where the U.S. was constrained and didn't have effective means to address corrupt practices?

    I have mixed feelings about the anti-corruption effort in Afghanistan. When the United States launched its anti-corruption activities, they said the same thing you did: “corruption is getting in the way of our counterinsurgency effort.” Well, maybe. Or maybe the counterinsurgency effort needed better governance. The ABC of counterinsurgency is secure the space, then build. Building means you need a local government that provides services to local people so that when the rebels come back, the local population prefers the local government over the rebels. If they prefer the rebels, it's over. Of course, we would prefer that the government be inclusive and honest and reflect our values. But if we initially chose as our proxy a patronage-dependent politician, then we might want to let them build their way, rather than undermine the build.

    Yemen is the site of a complex web of proxy wars—with the United States, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Iran, all supporting various factions. The previous U.S. administration designated the Houthis, a Shia militia supported by Iran that controls much of North Yemen, a foreign terrorist organization. How significant is that designation?

    Yemen is in an absolutely catastrophic situation. It's stuck between Iran and the Sunni Gulf States, who want to conduct proxy wars in lots of places, including Yemen and Syria, with callous disregard for human life. They're allowed to do it because the United States has removed itself from diplomacy that addresses this kind of human suffering in the way we used to. That retreat started under the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” but became a vacuum under Trump. From the point of view of American interests, the pivot is understandable. We need the oil less, it's an expensive deployment, and, if anything, we're protecting oil that's for the most part flowing to Asia; China might do that job better. But as we pull out, China moves in, Russia moves in, and the regional powers—Iran and Saudi Arabia—increase their influence. No champions of human rights among them. Yemen and Syria are in a bad place and until we work out a deal with China and Russia and the local powers to shut down these conflicts, the population will continue to suffer.

    That’s a grim prognosis.

    It didn't have to be that way. We had an ally in Yemen who was behaving, and the situation was mismanaged. There’s a very clear chapter in the book on exactly that by Ben Brewer. We had an ally who was trying to comply with what we were asking and got confused by our mixed signals under the Bush administration, and gave it all up. Our ally fell and ever since, there’s been chaos in Yemen. It was a solvable problem, but we abandoned an ally.

    In a review in the London Review of Books, Tom Stevenson suggests that proxies are neither effective nor necessarily cheap, and he cited Abigail Vaughn's chapter on Columbia and Ryan Baker's chapter on El Salvador to suggest that the use of proxies may be morally dubious and stimulate violence rather than suppress it. What's your reaction to Stevenson’s question about the efficacy, cost, and legitimacy of using proxies?

    Managing other humans through proxies is, yes, dubious—especially if those proxies don't have the same regard for human rights that we do. In that situation, as Stevenson points out, the principal absorbs some legal and ethical responsibility for what the proxy is doing, especially if it arms and otherwise increases the coercive power of a local government. There's also a related line of criticism that powerful nations are repeating the sins of the colonial era in disregarding human life, not to mention the environment and other things we hold dear, which we wouldn't allow to happen at home. These are ethical arguments. I think the main counterargument is: what's the alternative? The United States remains the necessary superpower. I think it’s our responsibility—the U.S. and Western powers—to manage these situations as well as possible. For instance, when the Taliban ran Afghanistan, it was worse in every dimension. It wasn't just that girls weren’t going to school. The punishment for homosexuality was they would drop a wall on you. That's not to say that we always choose proxies as carefully as we should—but I think you have to start by recognizing that in many parts of the world, the options are very limited.

    Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian general who is considered by some to be the master of proxy warfare, was assassinated in January 2020. What does his assassination portend for conflict in the Middle East and beyond?

    Soleimani was a terrorist and organizer of terrorism; from an ethical point of view, I have no problem with his assassination. But the event highlights something important about deterrence. The people who applauded the move said, “The Iranians will be deterred.” The people who criticized it said “That was reckless. We don't know how the Iranians might respond.” It turned out that the Iranians were not in the mood to start a new war or attack Saudi Arabia, because they had bigger problems. So, they satisfied themselves with a relatively minor attack on bases in Iraq. The general lesson about deterrence is that usually what we see in these confrontations with medium-sized powers, and even with the great powers, is that if neither side wants to escalate they will find an excuse not to, even in the face of provocation. Usually it's the case that both sides want to de-escalate. And so we don't see individual attacks sparking regional wars. Both sides usually understand the deterrent capability of the other, and there are lots of ways that the medium-sized powers can make each other quite miserable, including pulling out of trade agreements and applying sanctions—things that are not violent but are in a sense coercive.

    You’re working on a project with IGCC on cyber security, and I’m wondering if the same point about deterrence applies in cyberspace.

    Absolutely. Many of us were really, really surprised that the Obama administration, and certainly the Trump administration, were very, very slow to react to cyberattacks, including election interference and the assassination of spies and diplomats on foreign soil. There are two possible reasons that cyber attacks aren’t being adequately deterred: one is that we've been asleep at the wheel, and the other is that the other side has some capability which is so great that we're afraid of what the counter-attack would look like. The last attack was the worst hack ever of government and industry here in the United States, and the fact that we didn't see a response leads you to wonder: am I protected as an individual? This is a little far from Soleimani, but I see a strong analogy to our government not having a methodical approach to deterrence, which our enemies and allies recognized.

    What are some of the key hotspots to watch in 2021?

    The hot spots in our great power confrontations are clearly the most important. If we want to have fewer troops in the Middle East, but at the same time want the Middle East to be stable, then we need to watch Iran, Syria, and Yemen. Depending on how the Biden administration chooses to confront Russia, certainly Ukraine, other parts of the Eastern European periphery, and maybe the Central Asian republics, are key. In the confrontation with China, the hotspots include the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. But China, through the Belt and Road initiative, also has aspirations to compete in Africa and South America. And so there are lots of places where great power competition with China will unfold. There are also some medium-sized powers that are stepping in to fill voids and vacuums, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. It's hard to point to individual places—the world is changing, especially in the Pacific Rim, in dramatic ways. And the Biden administration is coming into a world which is worse in many ways than what those same folks left four years ago. The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.]]>
    1133 0 0 0 , IGCC research director for international security studies and professor of economics at UC San Diego, revisits his book Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence Through Local Agents. The interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Tai Ming Cheung on the New Era of Chinese Technology and Innovation]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/tai-ming-cheung-on-the-new-era-of-chinese-technology-and-innovation/ Thu, 07 Jan 2021 19:25:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1167 As we see increasing references to “national security” in U.S. political lingo—including the attempts to ban Chinese apps such as Tiktok and Wechat, and U.S. pressure on EU allies like the U.K. to ban Huawei 5G—can you help us understand what is behind these U.S. policies?
    So, what we see today and in the last few months with TikTok or 5G, is this sense of the U.S. identifying China as a comprehensive technological, informational, influence threat.
    What you have described has been taking place even before the Trump administration. In fact, you can trace such policies back to Obama’s second term when the U.S. began to pay increasing attention to China as a strategic competitor, or a potential threat. Many of such policy moves were in the security domain, but there were also some in what we call the broader geo-economic domain, particular technology and innovation. Some of the policy changes were in reference to Chinese investments coming into sensitive parts of the U.S. economy. These “business” issues became linked to the role of the communist party, information disclosure, and influence. So, what we see today and in the last few months with TikTok or 5G, is this sense of the U.S. identifying China as a comprehensive technological, informational, influence threat. China’s threat has become increasingly crystallized in the minds of Trump administration officials. There are various parts to this policy shift: first, the intention is to curb the Chinese footprint in critical parts of the U.S. economy and society. Second, the U.S. is looking to slow China’s acceleration to become a science and technology power. When the U.S. talks about China, it specifically means the Chinese Communist Party. The Trump administration has tried to differentiate the party from the state, but in the overall analysis, it is still China as a whole that we have to deal with. You see this effort to decouple, or further, to contain and push back against China’s rise in the areas of technology and information. The U.S. also realizes that it cannot accomplish this alone. It must be a comprehensive international effort, which is why the U.S. is relying heavily on its allies like the U.K., and other Five Eyes countries. I see this as the next phase going forward. Given that the U.S. is very much a bottom-up decentralized state, it cannot do what the Chinese state is doing. Now a key question is: What is the U.S. doing to significantly improve its own ability to innovate and develop technology? Given that the U.S. is very much a bottom-up decentralized state, it cannot do what the Chinese state is doing. The Chinese model of technological development is very much a state-led approach, for instance, Made in China 2025 or the Five-Year Plans. The Chinese state’s ability to mobilize allows it to concentrate and push forward. Therefore, it is more difficult for the U.S. to leverage its model in a great power competition, especially at the onset of mobilizing for innovation.

    If Chinese telecoms giants’ 5G services and networks are excluded from western markets, would this prove a bigger disadvantage to China or to western countries?

    That is a good question, but there is no black and white answer. Right now, in terms of 5G, the U.S. has had mixed success in trying to block Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE. They had success in Australia and New Zealand, and the U.K. has come back on the U.S. side. However, there are a few countries who have hedged their bets. Germany, in particular, stands out. Germans want to take a balanced approach when dealing with the U.S. or China. The U.S. has found it challenging to get all of its allies on board. This stems from the fact that 5G is both a national security and economic issue. As we have seen, the U.S. is emphasizing the national security aspect. A number of other countries like Japan and Australia have emphasized national security as well because of their geographical proximity to China. Preventing China from doing 5G means that European countries will have to rip up a lot of embedded investment, which is very costly. Let’s look at Europe. Europe is much more divided when it comes to Chinese 5G. This is because Europe invested heavily and opened up to 4G, allowing Chinese companies, especially Huawei, to invest in the legacy 5G systems. The Chinese presence in these countries has been quite significant. Preventing China from doing 5G means that European countries will have to rip up a lot of embedded investment, which is very costly. Chinese 5G, from an economic point of view, is very appealing because it is an early starter, advanced, and low-cost. Non-Chinese competition in this area is very limited. If the 5G technology race is a marathon rather than a 100-meter sprint, the U.S. and the western countries would have greater competitive advantage. The ultimate question is: do the U.S. and its allies view 5G as a near-term or long-term issue? If it is the former, allowing Huawei and China to enter the market makes more sense because of the legacy investment, and because the Chinese are much more advanced and cost-effective in 5G infrastructure. However, if they look at 5G with a long-term and comprehensive view, considering that 5G is critical to next-generation information and technology development, then this will show a very different picture. While Chinese companies are good at developing 5G hardware, they are not that advanced when you consider the entire 5G ecosystem. A lot of the more fundamental innovations, such as 5G connectivity, are more advanced in the U.S. and other countries. If the 5G technology race is a marathon rather than a 100-meter sprint, the U.S. and the western countries would have greater competitive advantage. Further on that point, 5G is one of the clearest areas where significant decoupling can take place. This would entail two groups: a western 5G and a Chinese 5G. We see that a number of developing countries and Russia have decided that they can only afford what the Chinese can offer. Meanwhile the western 5G will most likely include the more industrialized countries of the world. Then there is the messy middle. We will find many countries in the middle, where they have partly Chinese 5G, partly U.S. 5G due to the geo-economic and geopolitical issues at play. At the end of the day, you get technologically divided ecosystems in the global economy, which will raise the cost and lower efficiency. But in a “cold war” environment this is the messy architecture that we are going to have.

    As the U.S. increasingly suspends the export of sensitive technologies and defense equipment to China, do you think this move will further impede China’s innovation, or actually spur tech innovation and military development?

    This is not the first time the Chinese encountered international sanctions and technological containment. It is part of their history. China has historically had this issue on how dependent they can be on international sources of technology for their development, especially on the national security side. This goes back to the 1950s and 1960s when the Chinese were very dependent upon the Soviet Union for a large portion of their technology imports. When the Chinese wanted the critical and strategic technology that the Soviets had, they were cut off and had to develop their own indigenous capabilities in what has become known as the liang dan yi xing “two bombs, one satellite” experience. This is not the first time the Chinese encountered international sanctions and technological containment. It is part of their history. If you fast-forward to today’s speeches by Xi Jinping and military leaders, they refer regularly to the “two bombs and one satellite” spirit. How to react after being cut off from the international arena was a critical decision in the Maoist days, as it is now with areas such as semiconductors. China’s focus on indigenous innovation, a step up from a late catch-up technology power to an original innovation power, is front and center of China’s global technology ambition, both in terms of existing technology and in emerging areas such as 5G, quantum, AI, nuclear fusion, etc.  Xi Jinping regularly states that China is going to step up, and that the efforts to shut China off from the global innovation network are only spurring China on. The shifting landscape is a good opportunity for China to wean itself off from what I call an “absorption-based model of technology development.” Some concrete areas to analyze for changes are China’s research and development flow, and the training of next-generation talent in science and technology. We see that China is doubling down in these areas. When you try to develop new generations of technology like AI or Quantum, it does not happen overnight: it takes 10-15 years and it requires a whole ecosystem. The problem for China though is that such a technological leap takes time. When you try to develop new generations of technology like AI or Quantum, it does not happen overnight: it takes 10-15 years and it requires a whole ecosystem. You need human capital, financial capabilities, and enterprises. China under Xi Jinping has been building this ecosystem, what I call a national innovation system, but it will take a long time. The Chinese leadership has set the goals that, by 2035, they will move into the top tier of S&T countries in the world, and by 2050, they will begin to challenge the U.S. for the “most advanced country” title. It looks like they are trying to reach that goal and are putting in the resources and political capital to make it happen.

    How successful do you perceive the “Made in China 2025” strategy to be, and has COVID-19 compromised Chinese capabilities in reaching the ambitious science & tech goals?

    There is a much more important strategy that Xi Jinping passed back in 2016, which was the innovation-driven development strategy (IDDS). Made in China 2025 is a buzzword, but it is just one plan that pertains mostly to manufacturing. I like to tell people to look at it more broadly. There is a much more important strategy that Xi Jinping passed back in 2016, which was the innovation-driven development strategy (IDDS). It replaced the Open Door and Reform policy established by Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s strategy was very successful, focusing on exports and encouraging foreign companies to enter the Chinese market. This helped to redefine China as a manufacturing powerhouse. However, as China’s GDP growth has slowed, Chinese leaders have noted the dangers of a potential middle-income trap. The next step is for China to become a high-tech economy with a strong innovation focus, resembling the stage that characterizes many industrialized powers. Xi Jinping’s focus is now on the innovation part of the economy. This area provides a much more efficient use of resources, which can help China compete in the global marketplace.  Made in China 2025 is part of that, but the strategy is broader. There are numerous other plans that are associated with future innovation, such as the Standards 2035. The Chinese have a new science and technology 2030 innovation plan as well, so a whole range of innovation-driven development strategies are being rolled out under the innovation umbrella. A key mistake for China was the marketing and names of some of these plans. For example, not only did “Made in China” attract bad press, but “China 2025” also began to attract negative attention especially from the U.S. due to its lack of clarity. Made in China 2025 is really about industrial policy and how China is using subsidies to help industrial companies focus on critical areas. This allowed China to gain advantage at the expense of the U.S. and international players. Two years ago, due to all this international criticism, the Chinese no longer talk about Made in China 2025: they use other terms. Due to COVID-19, we will see a much more focused interest on development in the biotech sector in the 14th Five-Year Plan. China is starting to lay the foundations for the ecosystem that these plans will need moving forward. Currently, they are pouring money and resources into cultivating a lot of these technological programs and projects. Due to COVID-19, we will see a much more focused interest on development in the biotech sector in the 14th Five-Year Plan. There is no doubt that we are entering a new phase in Chinese technology development. The Chinese are going to have to make some adjustments as they push the bar higher. However, the general direction is very clear since Xi Jinping has taken power, and COVID-19 has not caused much strategic deviation.]]>
    1167 0 0 0 In this interview, conducted by the 21st Century China Center, Tai Ming Cheung, a leading expert on China and East Asia and director of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, analyzes China's efforts to boost its innovation capabilities, as well as the response by Western countries in key sectors such as 5G, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, and biotech.]]>
    <![CDATA[The Future of NATO: A Conversation with Heidi Hardt]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/the-future-of-nato-a-conversation-with-heidi-hardt/ Tue, 09 Feb 2021 19:51:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1181 You are the author of NATO's Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory and International Organizations. At his inauguration, President Biden said that his administration would rebuild international alliances after what has obviously been a period of withdrawal under the Trump administration. How might the U.S. relationship with NATO change with Joe Biden in the White House? Despite what many might think, my research showed that there was already quite a degree of skepticism among European allies about the United States’ interests and intentions within NATO—well before Trump entered the White House. When Trump came to power with his focus on an “America First” agenda, that trust disintegrated even more, to the point where we've heard Angela Merkel clarify that trust is an issue. Now that Trump has left, I think it's important to recognize that things aren’t likely to go back to “normal.” Certainly, there's going to be a big sigh of relief at NATO headquarters, but that diminished trust needs to be rebuilt. Many EU countries are considering ways to reduce their reliance on the U.S. for security. That said, Europe fundamentally needs the U.S.—they need the nuclear umbrella, they need our defense capabilities. So, I don’t foresee the relationship returning to what it once was; the strength of the relationship has changed.

    The U.S. maintains dozens of alliances that range from conventional assurances to nuclear umbrellas, and there are important benefits and also costs to maintaining them. And yet, as Neil Narang noted in a recent interview, existing alliances have largely escaped critical reevaluation for decades. NATO is one of the more controversial examples. The linchpin in Trump’s anti-NATO rhetoric was the failure of some NATO member countries to raise their defense spending to the 2 percent of GDP target. Can you weigh in on the 2 percent target—is it meaningful, is it the right number, is it the right measure?

    It’s important to recognize that simply having the presence of an alliance as strong and successful as NATO is really important for maintaining stability in the transatlantic region. There has been all sorts of research done on alliances and their pacifying effects. We know that just being a member of NATO, whether you're Romania or the U.S., reduces the likelihood of conflict among those states. In terms of the burden-sharing debates—are other states paying their “fair share”?—there’s a lot of confusion about what is meant by paying a fair share. Yes, there is a common pot that states put money into to keep the lights on and pay personnel expenses, but in terms of actual operations—when troops are sent out—the states bear those costs. Ultimately, it's up to the individual countries to determine how much they want to spend on Afghanistan, on Libya and how many troops they want to send. There is some utility to the two percent goal because it is a way of gauging defense commitments without penalizing small countries for being small. Right now, ten countries are meeting that target. That said, it is just one of many metrics that we need to look at. It doesn’t account for capabilities, military equipment, number of personnel, number of women. Another qualitative measure I’d like to see is: what's the record on civilian casualties? If you look at the numbers, civilian casualties actually increased over the course of NATO's presence in Afghanistan. I'm not blaming NATO entirely for that because individual member states are responsible for their troops, but there continue to be interoperability problems. There are instances where the rules of engagement don't match up.

    One of the defining dynamics in global politics is the rise of China and the return of great power competition. How do you think NATO will or should address the rise of China?

    NATO has been intentionally vague on China—officials will frequently cite “challenges and opportunities”—and that's because its member states have very different perspectives on their relationships to China. But it's also because NATO has to strike a delicate balance. On one hand, member states have huge economic interests in China. On the other, China isn’t a democracy. It doesn’t comport with the values entrenched in the NATO treaty—values supporting human rights, for example. That's where that tension lies. In terms of dialogue, there are shared interests in non-proliferation, China, of course, being another nuclear power. There are shared interests in maritime security along the Gulf of Aden. There are shared interests in stability in post-conflict countries. China has been getting increasingly involved in peacekeeping. NATO has three goals: cooperative security, crisis management, and collective defense. Collective defense is the core Article 5; if one country gets attacked then, we all have their back. NATO has said that China is not an adversary. But is China a partner? Probably not. Because they don't align with NATO values and, in some cases, they pose threats, whether in cyber security or weapon sales.

    Why isn’t there a NATO for Asia? Do you think the rise of China will see the emergence of some kind of an analogous alliance?

    NATO's establishment was a clear product of a Cold War arms race between two superpowers. It emerged as a direct response to the Soviet Union. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is the closest equivalent to NATO, but it's not a formal alliance. It's an international organization. ASEAN’s culture is very different from NATO’s. Member states have a strong commitment to sovereignty, to non-intervention; and culturally the organization works through very informal processes that are built around consensus. I’m skeptical that we will see a more formalized alliance in the near future. China emerging as a rising power isn’t a new thing. If an alliance to counter China’s rise were going to happen, it would have happened 10 years ago.

    In your book, you talk about how formal learning processes aimed at developing institutional memory within NATO haven't been sufficient to ensure that learning actually occurs. What are some of the key lessons that NATO needs to learn going forward?

    NATO has an institutional memory problem. It's an issue of high turnover—among members of the military and among NATO’s civilian staff. The result is that a lot of projects and ideas get reinvented, and there’s a lot of forgetting. After interviewing 120 NATO military and political elites, the big takeaway was that the informal forms of learning work really well, but they can be improved. I recommend a number of things, like requiring exit documents, and requiring newcomers to have a conversation with their predecessors. Extending job contracts to at least five years is important, too, and thinking about how to recruit and retain great people. NATO has a big problem with retaining smart women, and there are very few women in leadership. But another big lesson is planning for the day after. There was plenty of planning for going into Afghanistan and Libya. But planning for the day after was minimal. There were assumptions that the U.N. would come in and pick up the mess. International partners should have been part of the conversation from the beginning. You have to make sure that there are commitments from organizations to provide follow-on missions—not to mention ensuring there’s political will from the Libyans! Civilian casualties is another big lesson. This was not a priority in the beginning of the ISAF Afghanistan mission, then it became more of a priority, then it became a zero-tolerance policy. There's still a lot of confusion among allies about how to avoid civilian casualties. NATO also needs to take a gender perspective on their operations. They need to think about what are the implications for men versus women when they’re operating in an environment like Afghanistan where there are really strong cultural gender norms. Those can have explicit lethal, medical, all sorts of really dangerous consequences when you don't think about the gender perspective.

    What does the future of NATO look like?

    I think the future of NATO is going to be in addressing the elephant who has come back in the room— Russia—and emerging challenges like cyber security and disinformation threats from Russia and China, terrorism, and threats from non-state actors. NATO is going to have to figure out how it wants to engage with China. NATO is also trying to help support multilateral intelligence-sharing, and the Women Peace and Security Agenda. NATO is very good at adapting. It remains the most successful international organization, in terms of the diversity of challenges and threats it has faced. It's not an organization that necessarily adapts easily; things move slowly there, just like in any other international bureaucracy, but there's no reason to expect that NATO is going away anytime soon. The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.]]>
    1181 0 0 0 NATO’s Lessons in Crisis, and the emerging challenges facing the alliance. The interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue Convenes for the 28th Year]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/the-northeast-asia-cooperation-dialogue-convenes-for-the-28th-year/ Mon, 13 Jul 2020 19:06:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1192 "The experience and expertise of the participants and guests at this year's Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue contributed to a robust discussion on a wide range of policy issues in the region,” says Vice Admiral (ret.) Robert Thomas, Senior Research Fellow with the UC Institute on Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and new Chair of NEACD. “It is clear that the dialogue is more important than ever at this critical juncture.” NEACD was founded by IGCC in 1993, with the aim of reducing the risk of military conflict in the region and to lay the groundwork for an official multilateral process in Northeast Asia. Previously chaired by IGCC director emeritus Susan Shirk, NEACD has proven its value over the past three decades, as the only ongoing regular channel of informal communication among the six countries. It was the precedent for the Six Party Talks on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear program, which met between 2003-09. One of the major topics of discussion at the 2020 dialogue was the current state and trajectory of Sino-American relations. It was widely acknowledged that bilateral relations between the two countries are at their lowest point in the past thirty years. Said one participant: “No moment in the past is comparable to now. COVID-19 is pushing both sides further apart. How far will decoupling go? Financial markets? High tech markets? Flow of students? The question is how to avoid the worst-case scenario in bilateral relations.” Most were pessimistic about the current trajectory of the relationship, with consensus that things seem likely to get worse in the near term. Both states were seen as culpable for this development, as the U.S. government has taken a much more aggressive stand toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while simultaneously backing away from taking the lead in organizing an international response to the novel coronavirus crisis. China, on the other hand, is widely seen—not only in the United States, but in Europe and Asia—as attempting to take advantage of the instability wrought by the pandemic. Countries across the world—including those previously disinclined to follow U.S. warnings about China—have reacted negatively to China’s increasingly aggressive “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy and have imposed investment restrictions on PRC entities. It was widely thought that both the United States and China have damaged their international reputations in their response to the pandemic.
    "COVID-19 was a test of the [U.S.-China] relationship. They completely failed the test. This is a real tragedy for the global commons. People will die because the U.S. and China couldn’t pull in the same direction. Neither country has enhanced its reputation for leadership. No one has won and both countries and the world have lost.”
    Said another participant: “We’re always worried about U.S.-China relations but we always also see some off ramps—ways out of the dilemma. But it’s hard to see them now. COVID-19 was a test of the relationship. They completely failed the test. Previously the countries have been able to carve out cooperation on health issues. The pandemic has made the relationship more adversarial. This is a real tragedy for the global commons. People will die because the U.S. and China couldn’t pull in the same direction. It will inhibit the world from coming together in a joint effort to help developing countries, to fairly distribute therapies and vaccines. Neither country has enhanced its reputation for leadership. No one has won and both countries and the world have lost.” Relations between Japan and South Korea have remained poor over the past year due to a South Korean court ruling that Japanese companies could be held liable for certain human rights violations occurring before 1945. Boycotts and other measures of economic statecraft have been employed in the confrontation and there seems to be little immediate prospect for solving the issue between these two democracies, which are among America’s most important allies. Relations between Russia and China, on the other hand, have been steady and have continued to improve during the pandemic. The two states have increased cooperation in multiple areas, and Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin seem to have a genuinely close relationship. Participants discussed events on the Korean peninsula, which have continued to cycle from aggression, to rapprochement, and then disaffection (and back again). On the subject of whether there will be further provocations from North Korea, there was agreement that the DPRK has been seriously weakened by COVID-19, but mixed opinion on what will happen next, with some suggesting that more low-level provocations should be expected while Pyongyang presses the U.S. to accept a deal more favorable to North Korea, and others suggesting that they will instead look to pacify their external relations. Offers to the DPRK of humanitarian assistance for the pandemic have been rebuffed except help from Russia. It was suggested that the DPRK may be experimenting with trying to reduce its dependence on China. What about the prospect of new arms control agreements? The recent breakdown of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty between the United States and Russia has led to growing concerns of the prospects of an international arms race. But a coordinated international agreement to replace the old, Cold War-era arms control framework will prove challenging. Any new agreement, for example, would likely need to include China and potentially other states such as India and North Korea. Furthermore, the disparity in the quantity of warheads possessed by states will make any mutual agreement difficult as any arrangement could be viewed as an “unequal treaty” by domestic audiences. The financial strain of the pandemic, however, may spur countries to reconsider the benefits of arms control as states now have stronger incentives to reduce military spending as overall government budgets come under stress. The COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be a “black swan” in international relations—an event few anticipated but that has had an enormous impact. Six months after Chinese scientists notified the World Health Organization of the new virus, COVID-19 has spread to almost every country around the world and killed more than 500,000 people. Asia has fared relatively well in terms of stemming the tide of infections, but there is no regional multilateral response. A main impact of the crisis has been to seemingly accelerate the prior trend of “decoupling” between China and the United States and some other countries as they seek to diversify their supply chains. It remains to be seen whether U.S.-China relations will improve after the U.S. November election, or whether the increasingly negative opinions of the two publics toward one another will continue to exert strong pressure on the relations. NEACD will meet again in 2021 and may meet again virtually later this year. •••••• Read an interview with Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and chair of the 21st Century China Center, on 30 years of NEACD. Learn more about past NEACD meetings here. Read the 2019 Defense Transparency Policy Brief. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), presented each year at NEACD, ranks six countries on their dedication to policies that ensure transparency in defense and national security: China, Japan, North Korea, and the Republic of Korea, along with the superpowers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia.]]>
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    <![CDATA[The Political Economy of Great Power Competition: An Interview with James Lee]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/the-political-economy-of-great-power-competition/ Thu, 30 Jul 2020 19:43:50 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1216 One of your colleagues described you as one-part historian, one-part scholar of international relations. How’d you get here? I’m interested in applying history to contemporary issues and public policy. I wrote my dissertation on how the U.S. responded to the challenges of great power competition in the first 20 years of the Cold War, with a focus on how U.S.-China rivalry led the United States to support the creation of developmental states in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. There is a lot of debate today about great power competition and the U.S.-China relationship. I’m interested in looking at how the history of the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War can shed light on current issues facing the United States and China.

    In a recent interview with Susan Shirk, who is emeritus director of IGCC and a leading China expert, she said that U.S.-China relations are the worst they have ever been. Do you agree?

    I wouldn’t say that this is the worst period of U.S.-China relations. Susan was probably referring to U.S.-China relations since normalization. During the Cold War, you had the Korean War and U.S. soldiers and Chinese soldiers actually fighting each other. But if we start the clock in 1979, then yes, what we are experiencing now is the worst period in U.S.-China relations.

    Tai Ming Cheung, the director of IGCC, said in an interview in March, that Taiwan is the biggest flashpoint between China and its external interests. What do you think?

    I think we are entering into a potentially dangerous period in the management of the Taiwan question because this is the first time since the founding of the PRC that we’ve had a combination of three factors: the rise of China, U.S.-China great power competition, and Taiwan’s aversion to the One-China principle. With the One China principle having such little appeal among Taiwan’s people, and the U.S.-China relationship deteriorating so quickly, the United States faces a formidable challenge in trying to support Taiwan’s security without seeming to support Taiwan’s independence. Of all the important issues in Northeast Asia—North Korea and the territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea—Taiwan is the one most likely to lead to military confrontation.

    Has COVID-19 affected Taiwan’s position?

    It’s raised the question of Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations much more prominently. Taiwan has been effectively excluded from the WHO because Beijing makes Taiwan’s ability to participate, even as an observer, conditional on Taiwan accepting the One China principle, which Taiwan is not willing to do. COVID-19 has raised the question of whether (or not) it’s legitimate to continue excluding Taiwan from international organizations.

    In June, China enacted an extraordinary new security law that effectively guts Hong Kong’s legal system, in addition to impacting the media and education. What are the implications for residents and for U.S. foreign policy?

    The U.S. used to pursue a different trade and export-control policy toward Hong Kong from what it pursued toward mainland China because the U.S. recognized the “one country, two systems” framework. Now the U.S. is treating Hong Kong the same way that it treats the mainland, which is significant. Another concerning aspect of the Hong Kong security law, in addition to all these vague assertions of extraterritoriality, is the question of what it means for Taiwan. For a long time, the conventional wisdom was that Beijing wouldn’t adopt extreme measures towards Hong Kong or seriously undermine “one country, two systems” because Hong Kong was supposed to be an example of what reunification with China would look like for Taiwan. The fact that the PRC has decided to impose these laws on Hong Kong raises the question: has the PRC given up on the notion that Taiwan will reunify peacefully, and if so, has the PRC’s long-term strategy toward Taiwan fundamentally changed?

    Your work on the Marshall Plan shows how economic power was used to the geostrategic advantage of the U.S. after World War II. How do you think this is playing out today as the U.S. and China compete in the same areas? Is the U.S. engaging and capable, as it was in that earlier era, or is the U.S. weakened and withdrawing from the world?

    The U.S. is still engaged in Europe and in East Asia and recently there has been more of an attempt by U.S. officials to encourage European allies to think about China as a common great power competitor of the United States and Europe. They’ve actually raised the example of the Marshall Plan quite a lot to point to the history of European and American cooperation. The challenge the U.S. faces in Europe and in East Asia now is actually less complex than what it faced in the Marshall Plan era and the Cold War generally. During the Cold War, the United States had to not only think about military issues but also engage in the reconstruction and development of entire regions. There were monumental challenges in terms of state-building. We have a lot of stable, healthy, strong democracies in Europe and East Asia today, and so the U.S. strategy is resting on a much more stable foundation than it did during the Cold War. When people talk about the “new Cold War,” I like to look back in history and say that the previous Cold War was much more challenging.

    Do heightened tensions between the U.S. and China motivate you—or just make you worry?

    It makes me worried. But it’s also an area where an understanding of history can help address some of these issues and potentially shed light on ways that the U.S. and China can manage the tensions between them. I think history offers some warning signs for how relations between great powers can deteriorate.

    What are some of those lessons?

    One important lesson from Thucydides is that the deterioration of relations between Athens and Sparta resulted from the belief that conflict was inevitable and that they had to prepare for the coming war instead of taking measures to preserve the peace. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. On a related point, there were certainly many problems with U.S. strategy in East Asia during the Cold War, but one of the positive aspects of U.S. strategy was that American officials never assumed that conflict with the PRC was inevitable. Even at the height of Cold War tensions, they never ruled out the possibility that relations might someday improve. That left the window open for the PRC to realign with the United States against the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Looking at U.S.-China relations today, even though the two countries don’t face a common great power adversary, they do face common challenges that underscore the need to keep the door open for cooperation. For example, climate change is a threat to national security, and the United States and China need to work together and with other countries to meet this challenge. If they don’t leave the door open to eventual cooperation, they may well fall into the tragic situation that Thucydides described in his account of the war between Athens and Sparta: “they damaged their own interests competing in the heat of the moment.”]]>
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    <![CDATA[The Role of International Actors in Domestic Politics and Institutions: An Interview with Aila Matanock]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/the-role-of-international-actors-in-domestic-politics-and-institutions/ Wed, 02 Sep 2020 20:35:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1233 Your latest work looks at how international actors can help enforce domestic bargains after conflict. When does this happen and how does it work? In some contexts, after conflict, a government will want to strike a deal with members of the opposition. But incumbent governments often renege on their promises and violate the terms, reverting to something closer to the status quo than what was agreed. One of the ways deals like this are enforced is through international actors. Sometimes they send in troops to enforce a peace agreement. But, in many cases, enforcement is done through monitoring—of electoral processes, of trade agreements—to make sure both sides respect the deal they agreed to. Those “systematized spotlights” can be really important in highlighting when one side or the other is going off the rails. And then conditioning incentives on compliance—aid, preferential trade terms, or something else that makes it beneficial for the government to stay committed to these bargains.

    Can you give an example of where this has worked?

    In El Salvador, as part of the peace process, the government agreed to allow the rebels to participate in the elections in the early 1990s. But the government didn’t proceed with voter registration at the appropriate pace, a move that would have disenfranchised mostly rebel supporters. The rebels brought the issue to the UN, and the UN sent personnel into every district in El Salvador to check that what they were reporting about voter registration was accurate. They agreed with the rebels about the problem, and the U.S. was one of the countries that suspended its aid to El Salvador until the government started registering voters at a much quicker rate. International involvement has been a really good mechanism for some domestic actors, helping them forge deals that are really productive for their societies in terms of securing peace and growth and development.

    When might this mechanism not work?

    International actors have to be willing to use these tools in ways that support the agreement the domestic actors actually want. If the international actor is seen as partisan towards the government, for example, they’re not going to be a credible guarantor.

    Another of your projects looks at why weak states delegate security to stronger states. More than three-fourths of all African states invite intervention in their security institutions, including police and judiciary. Why would states ever do this?

    In some cases, the external actor—often a former colonial power, or a neighboring country—is just coming in to back the state. Those make up about half of these interventions, in this initial data, and are a little easier to explain. In another set of cases, though, the missions include reforming institutions. They’re not just state-backing, they are state-building, in that the host state is committing to allowing external actors to operate directly in their security forces and change them from the inside out. To explain statebuilding, I argue that, for whatever reason, the government wants to commit to a set of reforms, and it is willing to invite the external actor in for that reason. In most of these cases, it’s an outgoing leader who’s concerned about their successor, so they want to tie the hands of the government to make it harder for them to use the security apparatus of the state; or they want to strike some sort of deal with their own opposition.

    Are there examples where it’s gone terribly wrong?

    Sometimes these deals just can’t be reached. But the cases I know the best are the ones that worked, at least on some dimensions. One example is a 2003 mission in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands had had a coup and was bankrupt. The government invited an Australia-led mission through the Pacific Islands Forum to take over the police and reform institutions. The top commander of the police force was Australian. Crime dropped off immediately. The country is still grappling with the longer-term reforms, though, after the mission left. Guatemala is another example, but in the judicial sphere. A UN mission brought foreign prosecutors and investigators into Guatemala to run their own investigations and then jointly prosecute, together with Guatemalan prosecutors, cases that involved state corruption. They operated in the country for over a decade and had major successes. For instance, they brought a huge case against then-sitting president Otto Pérez Molina and some of his top officials. He resigned and faced charges. They also managed to reform some institutions within Guatemala, introducing practices like better witness protection, for example. Their mandate was not renewed, though, in 2019, so there, too, we will see how well the changes stick.

    Your work centers on fragile and failed states. Recently, George Packer in The Atlantic called the United States a failed state. Do you agree?

    Since I don’t study U.S. politics, I can’t say much about our institutions—at least not more than others who pay attention to the news. There are a lot of very smart scholars right now thinking about this, though. I can offer a couple of thoughts on fragile or failed states. One of the things we think about when we think about fragile states is institutions, and specifically how objective they are in terms of the policy put into place. There is a big debate, though, about what exactly “rule of law” versus “good governance” means. The rule of law threshold would be much higher in terms of democracy and openness rather than just a good governance threshold where, for example, there is consistent security. There are definitely differences between the U.S. and most states designated as fragile or failed by one of the existing definitions. The level of development is often lower in fragile states, and that has huge implications in terms of what the state can do. In most fragile states, there’s an important constraint on capacity in addition to a potential constraint on will.

    What about research resonates with you?

    I am a very puzzle-driven person. If I don’t have an answer for something, it bothers me. Until I know the answer—or at least a satisfying explanation—I want to keep reading about it and measuring it and trying to understand it better. And that is what research allows me to spend time doing.

    I thought that in research there are no definitive answers.

    Any piece of a problem that you feel satisfied that you know something about just raises other research questions for you to work on. Curiosity brings up a puzzle, and then that same curiosity brings up a whole new set of puzzles even as you’re answering the first one. That makes it really fun to be an academic.

    Can research make a difference in the world?

    I hope so. Before I fell in love with research, I thought about working in policy. Research should inform good policy, and that is part of what motivates me to do research. We’re still searching as academics to find the best ways to do that—how to best communicate our long-term systematic research on big problems so that it can help inform important day-to-day policy decisions.]]>
    1233 0 0 0 In this interview, Aila Matanock, an associate professor of political science at UC Berkeley and member of the IGCC steering committee, talks about her latest research on why (and how) international actors can help enforce domestic bargains, and why states sometimes delegate management and reform of security institutions to external governments.]]>
    <![CDATA[Understanding the New Great Power Competition]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/understanding-the-new-great-power-competition/ Thu, 07 Jan 2021 18:22:21 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1258 Listen to the lectures: The Nature and Dynamics of Great Power Competition: The Security Dimension With Brad Roberts, director, Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California.
    GPS · Great Powers - Brad Roberts
    --- Economic State Craft & Great Power Competition With Vinod Aggarwal, Travers Family Senior Faculty Fellow and Professor in the Department of Political Science, Affiliated Professor in the Business and Public Policy group in the Haas School of Business, and Director of the Berkeley Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center at UC at Berkeley.
    GPS · Great Powers - Vinod Aggarwal
    --- The Chinese National Security and Techno-Security State With Tai Ming Cheung, Director, IGCC and Professor, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego.
    GPS · Great Powers - Tai Ming Cheung
    --- U.S. Grand Strategy: Is There One? With Thomas Mahnken, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
    GPS · Great Powers - Tom Mahnken
      The Great Power Competition series is part of a multi-year project, funded by a grant from the University of California Office of the President Laboratory Fees Research Program, that brings together scholars from political science, international relations, security studies, political economy, and area studies from four UC campuses and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to look closely at the intersection of economics, strategy, security, technology, and politics in this dynamic scenario. The University of California has managed the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories since 1943. IGCC was established in 1982, to study questions of peace and security, and promote nuclear arms control and curb proliferation, in addition to the work being done in the laboratories. A significant portion of IGCC research since 1980s has focused on understanding these security issues.]]>
    1258 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[What’s the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy?]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/whats-the-future-of-us-nuclear-weapons-policy/ Mon, 08 Mar 2021 19:10:49 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1274 As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, you served as Policy Director of the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). What can we expect from a Biden Nuclear Posture Review? Every new administration conducts a review of national security strategy. An NPR looks at the security environment; it looks at declaratory policy, which are the things the president says about when he or she might or wouldn't ever use nuclear weapons; it looks at forces and capabilities and their long-term modernization; and it looks at strategies to reduce nuclear dangers—arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament. It's important for every incoming administration to do its homework on this stuff, because you're not compelled to on the campaign trail, and if you're the out-of-power party, you're in a position to criticize but not really to make policy. It's also valuable for the American public because the review results in a report that can help us all to understand what policymakers are thinking and why. It's also good for informed civilian oversight of the military. Each administration has approached this review task differently. Sometimes Congress has given a lot of direction about what it expects to see; sometimes none. Sometimes the incoming president has given a big speech, as President Obama did in Prague in April 2009, laying out his nuclear ambitions. This time around there’s no congressional guidance, and there is no clear indication from the president of the direction he intends to go.

    How should the U.S. address the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs? Is it too late to contain their nuclear weapons programs, particularly in the case of North Korea?

    It is too late to prevent. It's not too late to contain. Containment is a loaded term—it has a particular meaning from our Cold War history—but it's the right concept for dealing with North Korea today. We need to ensure that North Korea doesn't believe it can commit aggression now that it can threaten nuclear attack on anyone who might resist. Toward that end, we must continue to adapt and strengthen our deterrence posture in East Asia. Our allies—Japan and South Korea—are clamoring for more from the United States in this regard. On Iran, I hope that diplomatic re-engagement will work. I'm skeptical, but then everybody's skeptical and you still need to try and work the problem as best you can.

    What about China? How should the U.S. deal with China's nuclear weapons development program and its refusal to take part in arms control discussions?

    The first Nuclear Posture Review (1994) didn't mention Asia at all. Over time, Asia has become more and more significant to our nuclear thinking. We have multiple objectives for our nuclear strategy in Asia. We want to deter aggression by nuclear-armed states like North Korea; we want to assure our nuclear-capable allies that they’ll be safe without nuclear weapons of their own, and that we’re credible as a guarantor of their security despite the nuclear threat to us; and we want to dissuade China from trying to compete with us for nuclear advantage, while also trying to deter it from acts of aggression. Since the Nuclear Posture Review I ran 11 years ago, there's been a rapid buildup by China. And nobody knows—or if they know they're not saying—how or when China will reach a point where it says “we have enough.” What do we do about this Chinese build up? There's not a great deal to do. We're not going to build more nuclear weapons because China is building a few more. But we do need to hold China to the right standards of transparency and restraint. The best way to do that is to tackle it as a problem of the five permanent members of the Security Council—all of which are recognized as nuclear weapon states—and ask that China meet the standards of the other nuclear weapon states. That does not mean China will join arms control, but it could bring improved Chinese transparency and things that lend predictability to the thinking about China's nuclear future.

    Last year, you published Taking Stock: U.S.-China Track 1.5 Nuclear Dialogue. What impact did these dialogues, which occurred between 2004 and 2019, have on U.S.-China engagement?

    The unofficial dialogues with China, which included current and recently retired officials and military people, made a huge difference to our mutual understanding of the way the two expert communities think about the world, understand nuclear weapons, and understand nuclear strategy. When we started those dialogues roughly 15 years ago, we didn't have a common vocabulary. We didn't have common concepts. We didn't have a shared history of thinking about our nuclear relationship. Moreover, the number of people engaged on China-U.S. nuclear questions was tiny. Our first meeting counted seven participants on the American side. Fifteen years later, there are 80 to 100 people at the table, and many of them younger experts who have found their voices in recent years and are trusted by their government to speak. That said, it's difficult to see many ways in which what happened unofficially affected what happened officially. Three U.S. presidents—George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump—all wanted high-level government dialogues with the Chinese on strategic stability, and China rebuffed all three. One possible explanation is that they were relying on the unofficial side to do the job of communicating to and from the United States. Another is that the unofficial dialogue was just a front to keep us busy while they went about their business. And frankly the U.S. side wasn't all that effective either at adapting its official policies based on lessons from the dialogue.

    What are the prospects for maintaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex? If the Biden administration decides it can't afford the huge price tag to modernize the nuclear weapons enterprise, what are the long-term prospects for the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

    I would distinguish modernization of the complex (the physical infrastructure, including facilities and people) from the modernization of the arsenal (the collection of warheads and bombs). Let's talk about the stockpile first. The stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons has come down from approximately 30,000 in the mid-1980s to less than 5,000 today, and of those, a relatively small proportion are actually deployed. They were all designed on the understanding that they would be replaced in 10 or 20 years. The newest nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal dates to 1991. We've retired many of the different types, so that we have only very few types left. And the delivery systems are even older. The newest intercontinental ballistic missile went into service in 1971.  The newest B-52 bomber still assigned the nuclear mission went into service in 1962. Russia, in contrast, has replaced 80 percent of its delivery systems and every single warhead over the last decade. Now, we're not in an arms race with Russia. But we can't produce anything on that scale.  China is also building up and at an accelerating rate. Both are growing the size of their forces and fielding new types of weapons. The U.S. is headed in the other direction. Unless the current arsenal is extended and replaced, what we have is going to become unserviceable over the coming decade or two. The best illustration of this is the ballistic missile submarines. They were all built in the 1980s. They came into service 15 months apart. They're going to go out of service 15 months apart. That process of de-commissioning will start in about five years. And about a decade later, we’ll be out of the submarine business unless they're replaced. Same thing with the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Modernize or disarm. There’s no third option. If we're going to disarm, we should do it because we've made the choice to do so and not simply by default. During the Cold War, we had the ability to produce thousands of weapons the way the Soviets did. But the main production plant was closed in the 1990s. The U.S. nuclear enterprise, as it is called, is constrained by heavy oversight and a set of rules that oblige the complex to refurbish warheads with exactly the same materials, technologies, and techniques that were used to produce them in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Some of those materials don't exist anymore. Refurbishing warheads could be done more cheaply and much more quickly if there were some relief from those constraints. But what elected official is going to say “Let's loosen the constraints on America's nuclear weapons complex?”

    I don’t think most Americans realize that the United States faces such a stark choice between modernization and unilateral disarmament. In fact, I don’t think Americans are particularly worried about nuclear weapons and nuclear war anymore.

    We no longer face the Cold War problem of being toe-to-toe with an enemy who has the ability to annihilate us in 30 minutes. When the Soviet Union collapsed, and Russia and the United States agreed to accelerate the elimination of nuclear weapons, the problem simply went away for most Americans. And if it hadn't gone away by 9/11, it went away on 9/11. Our focus shifted to a new problem. What we didn't appreciate was that for Russia and China and North Korea and Iran, 9/11 didn't have the same effect. They worried about our assertiveness, our power, our values, our willingness to use force to advance our interests. So they put increased emphasis on nuclear weapons. Not until Russia's military move against Crimea did anyone in the U.S. defense community think there was a possibility of war with Russia again. Few took seriously the prospect of war with China until it built up its military so substantially and began to be assertive in the maritime environment. North Korea’s defiance of the international community and steady progress in developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles also drew attention back to the nuclear problem. Now, it is creeping back into our consciousness.

    What are the implications of the recent entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons for the Biden administration?

    The Ban Treaty, as it's called, declares the possession of nuclear weapons illegal. It is the result of a combination of forces between a particular group of states and a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who joined in an effort to “leapfrog” reluctant states and proceed to criminalize the possession of nuclear weapons. The states are non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that are impatient with the progress shown by the nuclear-armed states in moving towards disarmament. The NGOs are led by ICAN, the group that won the Nobel Prize a couple of years ago for its anti-nuclear advocacy. ICAN’s basic philosophy is that you can work around reluctant states to create norms and laws and then pressure the outliers to join in. It's not a bad strategy, but I question its advisability for an issue like this. The Ban Treaty says the nuclear weapon states will disarm according to rules that they'll figure out later, and that they'll be accountable to an international organization whose authorities we haven't figured out. No nuclear-armed state is going to sign up to that. I think it's counterproductive. By demonstrating that international law is weak and ineffective against this problem, it's going to further weaken the law.

    What is the most urgent nuclear weapons policy issue that the Biden administration will need to address? And what's the most important issue, whether it's urgent or long-term?

    Probably the most important issue for the president is declaratory policy. Every president has declared that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States or our allies. But no president has been willing to say that this is their sole purpose. This is because we can imagine a range of scenarios in which non-nuclear means could be used to present a threat to the United States that would jeopardize their vital interests, their integrity, and sovereignty—or to our allies. Thus, no president has completely ruled out the possible employment of nuclear weapons when those extreme circumstances exist. As vice president and then presidential candidate, Mr. Biden has said he wants to take that step. Will he do so as President Biden? This will be a very important issue, particularly for our allies, and for adversaries who carefully watch where America draws red lines and then walks right up to them. I would also rate the preservation of some measure of bipartisanship as highly important. Nuclear policy on modernization and arms control has been mostly bipartisan for most of its history, but that's eroding. The nuclear modernization project to replace the delivery systems and the warheads and modernize the infrastructure, is a 30-year project that has gone through 15 different congresses, four, five, or six different administrations. You can't accomplish these long-term objectives in the absence of bipartisanship. President Biden might want to declare sole purpose, but it would run directly counter to the tradition of bipartisanship, and would very likely be reversed by the next president. Bipartisanship is worth purchasing, with some narrowing of the ambitions for change in policy.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    Learn more about U.S. nuclear weapons policy: visit the Center for Global Security Research.]]>
    1274 0 0 0 Nuclear war may at times seem the stuff of a bygone era. But with Iran and North Korea growing their nuclear weapons programs, a rapid acceleration in China, and a flagging U.S. arsenal—nuclear weapons are back on policymakers’ radars. Here, Brad Roberts, director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and an affiliated researcher at IGCC, analyzes the challenges ahead for the Biden administration—both to contain growing threats and modernize the U.S. enterprise.]]>
    <![CDATA[Why is Democratic Backsliding on the Rise?]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/why-is-democratic-backsliding-on-the-rise/ Thu, 11 Mar 2021 19:27:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1286 Your new book with Robert Kaufman looks at democratic backsliding in 16 countries, from Zambia, Venezuela, and Brazil, to Hungary, Turkey, and the United States. What is democratic  backsliding and why is it happening in so many different places at roughly the same time? Backsliding captures a new way in which democracies regress. If we look at the long history of the 20th century, most episodes of regression to authoritarian rule were driven by coups until quite recently. We've seen this in Thailand, and more recently in Myanmar. What makes backsliding peculiar is the fact that it's driven by duly elected incumbents. Once the autocrat is in power, he or she undertakes actions that then weaken democratic rule: removal of horizontal checks on the executive; diminution of rights that citizens typically enjoy; and, in extremis, going after the integrity of the electoral system itself.

    Do these elected autocrats and their supporters believe they are damaging democracy?

    The conception of liberal democracy that most of us have is one in which democratically elected governments are checked in a variety of ways. That's very much the Madisonian tradition: people—including politicians--are basically self-interested, and the way you check those tendencies is by building institutions that limit what executives can do. Hence the concept of the separation of powers and checks and balances. But there is a completely different conception of democracy, which is sometimes associated with the Republican tradition or what I call a majoritarian tradition, in which the majority should have the power to do what they want, and shouldn't be checked by the “deep state,” by the courts, by rights, by other restraints. Part of what we're seeing in backsliding is the rise of a different conception of democracy in which the majority should more or less be completely unrestrained.

    What conditions allow backsliding to take place?

    A common feature of all our cases was polarization. Polarization was a kind of seedbed for backsliding because of the way it divides electorates and leads them to permit certain actions on the part of their leaders. Societies can polarize in a variety of different ways, but what really counts is the devolution in thinking about the opposition, from being a group that is essentially loyal but different, to one that is an enemy, that's traitorous, that's opposed to the interests of the nation.

    In several of the cases covered in your book, polarization was preceded by economic crises or corruption scandals. To what extent does economic vulnerability create populations that are more susceptible to polarization?

    In some cases, polarization was a result of deep economic cleavages. For example, in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez drove his path to power by focusing on economic grievances. In the United States, the 2008-2009 financial crisis had a big role in the emergence of a new wave of far-right thinking, reflected in the Tea Party Movement. But it also triggered anxieties that were racial and ethnic in nature. In other words, inequality is a piece of this, economic anxiety is a piece of this, racial anxieties and immigration are a piece of this, maybe even technological change is a piece of this. It's extraordinarily difficult to isolate the effects of economic crises and economic inequality from other points of division. What's most important is the way in which you view your political adversaries. Once you define an adversary as an enemy of the people or a traitor, you'll accept a lot of behavior that you otherwise wouldn't, because the other side is so much worse and poses so much risk. That’s what opens the door for autocrats to say we are in an emergency. We're in a crisis. We can't trust the opposition. We've got to do things that are extreme. That was the American Carnage speech. In various ways, it was repeated in virtually all of our cases—from Bolsonaro in Brazil to Erdogan in Turkey.

    Your book says that autocrats “Test the normative limits one initiative of time, with each derogation making subsequent steps easier to pursue” in a process that is incremental in nature. How do leaders get away with this?—And how do they keep getting away with it?

    Incrementalism is a feature of virtually all the cases we examined, and appears to matter for two reasons. One is that the components of liberal democracy are mutually constitutive—the integrity of the electoral system depends on the courts; the courts rely on people having rights to bring cases without being being locked up; and those rights in turn depend on the courts. Democratic rule is a bundle of mutually reinforcing features. Incrementalism affects democracy by picking that bundle apart. Incremental changes are also normalizing and disorienting—they have the social psychological effect of getting people used to behavior, to language, to portrayals of the opposition which, five years ago in the United States we would have thought were virtually impossible.

    We’ve talked about two of the three facilitating factors you discuss in your book—polarization and incrementalism. The third involves the role that the legislature plays.

    Legislators, certainly in presidential systems, but to some extent in parliamentary ones as well, are crucial checks on what the executive can do. So the question of how acquiescent and pliant legislators are and the extent to which they're willing to delegate powers is really crucial. A curious feature of backsliding is that legislators, which are duly elected, also play a crucial role in delegating power to the executive, which then ironically ends up reducing their capacity to check the executive. The American example is one we see replicated in other cases, but the U.S. is interesting because, in some ways, the institutions in the United States held to a surprising extent. The Republicans, when they enjoyed majorities, were unwilling to hold Trump to account for certain obvious derogations of his constitutional responsibilities, like making a phone call to the president of Ukraine inviting him to interfere in the election. But the United States Congress was never going to delegate the kind of powers weak legislators in Russia or Venezuela delegated to Putin and Chavez.

    You write that the political systems of the advanced industrial states are under greater threat today than at any time since the 1930s. That's a big statement. What can be done about it?

    Our analysis of backsliding suggests a few things. Number one is that, if polarization is really so central to this process, and if polarization is increasingly playing out, not on the street, but in social media and the virtual realm, then clearly cleaning up social media is a crucial piece of trying to check democratic regress. That work has to involve actions on the part of governments in terms of protecting the system from outright illicit hacks; it has to involve the cooperation of social media companies to police content in ways that don't damage the vibrancy of these communities; and it has to involve a new kind of nongovernmental organization (NGO) focused on tracking these kinds of derogations, and revealing them.

    What surprised you and your co-author Rob Kaufman as you got deeper into this topic?

    The fact that this is going on across such a diverse set of countries is surprising. And we're talking about countries that had already achieved a modicum of electoral and even liberal democracy. People forget that Venezuela was considered one of the most democratic countries in Latin America for decades before it fell apart. Everyone thought Hungary and Poland were nestled in the bosom of the European Union. Russia—we forget the hopefulness; Yeltsin was a character, but there was this outpouring of desire for greater freedom and overcoming the shackles of authoritarian communist rule in the Soviet Union, and boom, within a decade of that transition it was reversed.

    It’s tempting to think about political progress as linear—that things just keep getting better and freer and more inclusive. It's unnerving to remember that oftentimes, they don't.

    The Enlightenment belief was that things are on the upward march. Particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a sense of hopefulness, as if there weren't any alternatives. What we're learning is that there are alternatives. They're just very protean and hard to define. They’re in the space of what we call “populism,” which combines this anti-cosmopolitan, anti-enlightenment view that’s majoritarian, that's tribal, that’s strongly nationalist, that's anti-liberal, and takes a lot of different guises. But the alternative is emerging as a new political type that's deeply anti-liberal.

    What do you and your co-author still not know about this topic that you wish we understood?

    One of the things we found surprisingly difficult was how to measure the decline of democracy when you're not moving towards an obviously autocratic system. How do we take the temperature of democracy when the changes we've seen are extraordinarily subtle? Take just one dimension—a common feature of all of the backsliding cases is that autocrats move very quickly to try to do something about the media. They either try to control it directly or they try to discredit it. The media fights back and in some cases is quite successful. You can't say that Donald Trump wasn't covered over the last four years. But at the same time, he delegitimized the media. He wasn’t capable of silencing the media or taking it over, yet something went wrong—and that something was crippling. But how do measure it? The fact that we don't know how to think or talk about these derogations intelligently is part of what makes them so threatening.

    If there was one thing that you could tell American leaders or the new administration about protecting democracy, what would you tell them? And what would you tell the American people?

    It's hard to avoid cliches, but one quite central thing is the significance of the truth—of being able to share facts. Once you introduce the capacity to claim anything and allow that to stand, everything else follows. We need to be able to check outright falsehood and recraft the political discourse. This isn't a one-sided game. When power shifts hands, it's also important for those who come back in as Democrats to understand that there are large numbers of people in the country and in the countries that we study who believe what they believe. We need to figure out how to bring them into a competitive fold where we can compete and still go out at the end of the day and drink a beer. Those fundamental issues of truth and a willingness to accept an opponent, and not see him or her as an enemy, are really key. Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, is available at Cambridge University Press.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1286 0 0 0 Recent analysis suggests that democracy is on the decline globally. Why and where is this happening—and what can be done about it? Here, Stephan Haggard, the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific studies at UC San Diego, talks about his new book with Robert Kaufman Backsliding: Democratic Regress in The Contemporary World, and the role that polarization, acquiescent legislatures, and incrementalism play in democracy’s decline. ]]>
    <![CDATA[Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/2250/ Tue, 19 Jan 2021 20:40:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2250 2250 0 0 0 <![CDATA[A Crucial Link: Using Intellectual Property to Inform Global Supply Chain Policy]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/using-intellectual-property-to-inform-global-supply-chain-policy/ Tue, 17 Aug 2021 17:48:54 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=129 129 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and International Relations in East Asia]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/geopolitics-supply-chains-and-international-relations-in-east-asia/ Wed, 05 May 2021 13:32:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=133 Part I - Global Supply Chains, Geopolitics, and Trade Wars 2. Global Value Chains and the U.S.-China Trade War 3. The U.S.-China Trade War: Implications for Japan’s Global Value Chains 4. Constructing a Chinese AI Global Supply Chain in the Shadow of “Great Power Competition” 5. Competition and Collaboration among East Asian Firms in the Smartphone Supply Chains 6. Hidden Economic Costs of Geopolitical Disputes for Supply Chains in East Asia 7. Global Supply Chains and Great Power Competition in Africa

    Part II: Domestic Political, Economic, and Social Dimensions of Global Supply Chains

    8. Are Global Supply Chains Vital to China’s Leaders? 9. Firms Fight Back: Production Networks and Corporate Opposition to the China Trade War 10. Understanding and Contesting Global Supply Chains in an Era of Inequality 11. Why Escalate? Cognitive Theory and Global Supply Chains in Northeast Asia 12. The Role of Chinese Workers in Supply Chain Campaigns

    Part III: Postscript On COVID-19

    8. Are Global Supply Chains Vital to China’s Leaders? 9. Firms Fight Back: Production Networks and Corporate Opposition to the China Trade War 10. Understanding and Contesting Global Supply Chains in an Era of Inequality 11. Why Escalate? Cognitive Theory and Global Supply Chains in Northeast Asia 12. The Role of Chinese Workers in Supply Chain Campaigns]]>
    133 0 0 0 Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and International Relations in East Asia, an edited volume supported in part by IGCC through the University of California Office of the President Laboratory Fees Research Program, dissects the sources and effects of contemporary disruptions of these networks.]]> Cambridge University Press]]>
    <![CDATA[The Rise of Authoritarian Regional International Organizations]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-rise-of-authoritarian-regional-international-organizations/ Thu, 12 Aug 2021 19:18:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=152 152 0 0 0 <![CDATA[A Disinformation Research Agenda]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-disinformation-research-agenda/ Thu, 03 Jun 2021 18:05:27 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=714 Defining mis/disinformation Although there is no one accepted definition, misinformation can be thought of as false information that is spread, regardless of whether there is intent to mislead. Disinformation on the other hand refers to the spread of deliberately misleading information. Damon McCoy of New York University described a market for fake social media accounts—or sockpuppets—at prices of $75-$900 per thousand. Sockpuppets can manipulate platform algorithms to direct traffic to fake political news ads, which are sometimes allowed by platform policies. Platforms are incentivized to reduce spam from fake accounts, but only if it diverts attention from paid ads. Emotionally charged narratives are especially likely to gain attention on social media and are often favored by attention-maximizing algorithms. Danny Rogers of the Global Disinformation Index (GDI) reported on how this enables actors—like Cyrus Massoumi who specializes in outraging liberals—to profit from disinformation. GDI estimates that disinformation generated $235 million in ad revenue in 2019. Separately, Rogers noted that 73 U.S. hate groups raise funds online, mostly in violation of existing platform policies. Platforms have a number of ways to limit mis/disinformation: fact-checking, reducing the rank of noncredible information, banning political misinformation in paid ads, limiting user-targeting options for political ads, banning all political ads, requiring transparency in funding of political ads, or using the extreme measure of deplatforming accounts. These policies are inconsistent across platforms, however, nontransparent, and can be gamed in various ways, such as the “news source” exemption from fact-checking. Importantly, each platform has a strong disincentives to unilaterally limit mis/disinformation if the only effect is to divert traffic (and ad revenue) to a competing platform. In the Philippines, users have much less recourse. Jonathan Ong of the University of Massachusetts Amherst described online misinformation in Philippine elections. Disinformation is generated and disseminated by both state and commercial actors, including “public relations” firms hired by politicians to peddle false or misleading narratives online. Civil society actors lack the power to regulate platforms, with only weak tools at their disposal, such as celebrating firms, journalists, and influencers who behave responsibly, while blacklisting those who do not. Invoking nationalism is an amplifier of misinformation, at least in China. Kaiping Chen of the University of Wisconsin discussed how nationalism is used to facilitate misinformation on social media about health and science. She finds that not all aspects of nationalism lead users to endorse misperceptions, such as COVID-19 conspiracies. But rhetoric that downgrades out-groups does lead to endorsements of misinformation. Algorithms that downrank nationalist appeals, particularly those based on blaming out-groups, would reduce amplification of conspiracy theories. The role of research is to help platforms and policymakers develop a coordinated, strategic response. Platforms can also draw on the expertise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that counter misinformation such as First Draft, and on industry-academic collaborations such as Social Science One, a partnership between Facebook and Harvard's Institute for Quantitative Social Science. Platform responses such as redirecting hate and violence-related search terms towards resources, education, and outreach groups that can help (e.g., the ISIS-focused tool The Redirect Method), are also beginning to be evaluated by academic-practitioner partnerships. Topics for future research include better understanding: variation across jurisdictions in rules and norms; the role of, and how best to work with, civil society actors in states that limit expression on platforms; the impacts of restricting payment channels; mis/disinformation in the Global South; and the “swag”-ification of disinformation. Cross-platform research opportunities include exploring spillover effects, integrating information on payment methods and off-platform behavior, and creating a consistent definition of mis/disinformation. Also valuable to research would be archiving data on removed content; data sharing on the targeting of ads; using a Census data center model to protect privacy; access to aggregated data for context; a data inventory so researchers know what’s possible; and transparency about keywords that trigger content removal. Serious obstacles to research on digital mis/disinformation remain. Platforms often change their policies with lead times too short to allow evaluation; algorithms detecting disinformation may violate terms of service; enforced rules cost attention and profit; and transparent rules are easier to game. But if industry-research-NGO collaboration can be ramped up, a rich agenda of policy relevant research topics is waiting eagerly to be populated with projects. Learn more about IGCC’s Disinformation Initiative. Listen to the Talking Policy episode about The Disinformation Threat—and What to do About It.]]> 714 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Huban A. Gowadia]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-huban-a-gowadia/ Wed, 12 May 2021 19:06:21 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=746 You have had an expansive career spanning two decades. Where did it all begin? I grew up in India. I remember my dad brought me to an airfield and I watched MiG jets land. I thought: oh my God, I have to fly one of those one day. Unfortunately, I’m not tall enough to fly fighter aircraft. I’m only 5’1”. If I wasn’t gonna fly them, I was going to try to design and build them. That’s what brought me to the U.S.—I came to the University of Alabama in 1989 to study aerospace engineering.

    You grew up in a family of engineers, right?

    My dad is and my mom's dad was an engineer. And there wasn't a mechanical thing my grandmother couldn't fix either, to be honest. We're all mechanically bent.

    Did you ever consider other careers?

    I was pretty serious about piano and voice. The question was: do I go to music school or aerospace school? Everybody said: you can always keep music going, but it's hard to come back once you leave the technical world. And they were right.

    You did your dissertation on detecting explosives concealed on the human body and received your PhD in 2000. Your first job was with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Within months of starting, 9/11 happened.

    On 9/11, I was a checkpoint program manager in aviation security at the FAA. My responsibility was to get new metal detectors deployed. For years, every time the FAA tried to change the standards, the aviation lobby would push back, and say: no, the lines will get too long, it will be too onerous. So, we had developed a five-year plan to slowly phase things in. After 9/11, we were asked to implement that plan in nine months.

    I can’t imagine what it must have felt like. You couldn’t have had a more relevant job.

    It left a huge psychological and emotional mark. Many of us that day re-dedicated our lives to serving the nation. “Not on my watch” became our credo. Every one of us was going to do our best to keep the nation safe. Figure 1 Gowadia at a House Committee, Hearing on Counterterrorism

    Sounds more like a vocation than a job.

    Civil service, for me—it's not a job. It's a vocation. It's a calling. It's the condition of your existence. That's how I've always felt. Patriots from across the country came to serve almost immediately after.

    How does patriotism for one country develop when you are born somewhere else?

    Growing up, America was a shining city on a hill, the streets were paved with gold. It was the aspiration for anybody who wanted to do something in life—you went to America. For those of us who choose another citizenship, especially when you come to it with such big hopes, when that country accepts you, when you are given the chance to join and start building your dream, you appreciate the nation more. You don’t take anything for granted. It never struck me as strange that I would want to serve this country.

    You are the Global Security principal associate director at Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL). How is working at LLNL different from your prior roles, other than being located in the ideal human habitat of northern California?

    Insofar as service to the nation has always been very important to me, there is no change. Everybody across the Lab serves with passion and distinction and honor, just as my colleagues in the civil service did. We’re just finding different ways to do so. This job is more technical; my prior roles were more operational.

    The global security directorate has an incredibly diverse portfolio, including intelligence analysis, energy security, nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, and chemical, biological, and explosive threats.

    As the world gets more interconnected, and threats become more complex, our ability to see past our immediate work, to adjacent missions, and to contribute on multi-disciplinary teams becomes more and more impactful and necessary. And at our Lab in general, and the Global Security directorate in particular, we have a great venue for bringing innovation to full impact because of our diversity of thought and experience. Figure 2 Dr. Huban Gowadia delivers remarks at the University of Tennessee.

    When your job is built around thinking about threats, how does that impact your life?

    Threats are always in the back of my mind. But it doesn’t weigh too heavily because I have and still do work with the most incredible people. I would fight alongside these people every day of the week and twice on Sunday, and I know we would win. When you work around accomplished dedicated people, who know the mission and are devoted to it, it gives you great hope that good will prevail. There have been moments when threats have been imminent, and it gets very, very stressful. The TSA acting administrator job was probably the most stressful because you put two and a half million people up into the sky every day. If you only thought about the potential for catastrophe you’d be paralyzed. So you can’t. You have to think about the things that are in your control, do your best to train and equip your teams, and then rely on the system.

    Most of your work prior to joining LLNL was working on the nuclear portfolio at DHS. What do you view as the most important nuclear security challenges today, and the role of both the U.S. government and international bodies in addressing them?

    The nuclear threat is a very large question and depending on which slice you look at, there are different challenges. I don’t think we have the luxury of saying: this is the most important, especially since they are all interconnected and reliant on each other.

    In 2007, you attended one of IGCC’s flagship programs: the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats boot camp in La Jolla. Why did you end up there?

    I was sent by my boss at DNDO to evaluate the course. The course was run by Linton Brooks, so what was I going to say? Are you kidding? Linton is my hero. It was a tremendous learning experience for me and I was convinced it would be so for others. I’m glad we started supporting the program.

    IGCC’s goal, like many think tanks, is to use rigorous research and evidence to influence policymaking. What does policymaking actually look like on the inside?

    When you're in government, in a decision-making role, everybody at the table brings their piece of the puzzle. Let’s pretend we're dealing with aviation security at the national security council. There will be an economic angle. There will be a safety piece—will the aircraft be able to fly safely. There is a security angle. There will be an intelligence piece. There will be the State Department's position on what will it do to our treaties and relationships. There will be the DOD piece, and on and on. And then there’s politics. It shouldn't play a role, but you can't pretend it doesn't matter. Policymaking on the inside is about negotiating all these frontiers for the national good.

    If there’s one way organizations like IGCC contribute to the fate of our country, what is it?

    Preparing the next generation of thinkers and leaders. Our nation needs people who can think critically and objectively, who can think through three, four, or five positions at a time. We can’t assume the enemy will do exactly what we do. IGCC is important because it brings together diverse minds and diverse experiences, and helps smart people get beyond their individually limited experiences.

    What is one of the most important challenges ahead for the U.S.?

    National security requires a fine balance between liberties and security. How does one bring about the right national security policies and postures in a world where facts and truth are not agreed upon? I think this is something an institution like IGCC should take on.

    National security is a traditionally male-dominated space. Have you faced any special challenges as a woman?

    There have been times when it hasn’t been an issue at all, and there have been times when it has been an issue. Once in my career I struggled with what I would today understand was a bona fide case of sexual harassment. And I had tremendous colleagues at work who helped see me through it. Sometimes my name has worked to my advantage. I get a lot of letters addressed to Mr. Gowadia or “sir.” If they don’t know better, they just assume, “PhD, strange name: must be a man!” I’ve used that to my advantage because you have a moment of surprise when they realize that they’ve been calling you a man and a tiny little woman shows up. The one other thing that still happens, and we have to find a way to change, is, I’ve been in situations where I will offer up an idea; no response. Ten minutes later, an older gentleman will offer the same idea and all of the sudden it’s a great idea.

    Since 9/11, have you achieved your goal of protecting the U.S. from another attack?

    During the laptop threat in 2018, I was acting administrator of the TSA. We worked with a tremendous set of civil servants, people from industry, international partners—everybody came together. And we staved off an imminent attack. It was more real than people know. These are the things that make being a civil servant—and continuing in national service—worthwhile. Every now and then, you can actually trace what you did to national impact. But there is no “achieving this goal.” It is work we must do every day for as long as we have the privilege of contributing.]]>
    746 0 0 0 Huban A. Gowadia is the principal associate director for Global Security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Before joining the Lab, she served as deputy administrator for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations for the $7.6 billion agency and its 60,000 employees, in addition to advancing its security mission of protecting the 2 million+ travelers who pass daily through U.S. airports. Gowadia also spent many years working on countering nuclear terrorism at the Department of Homeland Security, including as director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. In 2007, she participated in IGCC’s Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp and has remained connected to IGCC ever since. This interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Lawrence Rubin]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-lawrence-rubin/ Fri, 09 Jul 2021 19:44:19 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=767 You work on a whole host of extremely interesting and important issues—from religion and politics to nuclear proliferation and emerging technologies. You’ve conducted research all over the world, including in Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the UAE, and Yemen. What set you on the path that led to this career? My career and interests have not followed a straight path. I had always been interested in big policy questions, but at the same time, I was intellectually fascinated by what goes on at the local level. My first trip to the Arab world was to Morocco while I was studying for my Master's degree at LSE [London School of Economics]. I thought I’d do a PhD in post-war European integration, but things started to shift for me, particularly after that first trip. After another graduate degree at Oxford, I spent time in Israel from 1998 to 2000. At the time things were looking very promising, with the peace process moving forward. I was interested in both the Palestinian and Jewish diasporas, particularly in the United States, and the role they play in influencing the peace process. My interests have grown quite a lot since then, but I continue to be attracted to things that are complex and nuanced—that aren't clear or linear.

    What does a typical day look like for you these days?

    COVID time was entirely different, with considerable childcare responsibilities, but in normal times, my focus is on research, teaching, and service. I had the opportunity to serve for a year in government as a senior advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy through a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship (2017/18). It was exciting to see what the needs are, and how applied research can contribute in a tangible way. I think my career is heading more in the direction of policy-relevant research and government service again.

    You have a long history with IGCC, both as a dissertation fellow and a participant in our first Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp. What role did IGCC play in your professional formation?

    It was tremendous. I don't think I appreciated the full value until much later. If you do a PhD program on the west coast, you don't always have opportunities to engage with other policy interested academics. And frankly, at research universities, we were socialized to think that policy or public engagement was beneath us as a career path. PPNT provided an opportunity to do more than just read articles about the latest “ism” or theory, and think more about how theory would apply in practice. We spent almost a month in the bootcamp, reading, discussing, and exchanging ideas. We got to hear policymakers tell us about the issues they dealt with. It whet our appetite for policy engagement, and got people from totally different disciplines to talk together.

    The D.C. policy world can be tough to break into. It’s not always obvious how to participate in that world from California.

    People need to know that if you don't get a job in academia and you're interested in international affairs, then your next step is going to be in policy in some capacity. Networking for those jobs has to begin well ahead of finishing a degree. IGCC has a huge network of people who have gone through IGCC programs and are now serving in government, in the national labs, and in industry. IGCC can play a big role through its network to connect people.

    You served from 2017–18, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy. It was your first time fully immersed in government. What was it like?

    I worked in one of the regional offices and landed initially on the Egypt desk. It was a total and complete eye-opener, a shock, even. It takes months and months to figure out what you’re doing. If somebody doesn't say that, they're not being honest. I also had the opportunity to serve in a regional office, the Countering WMD Office which provided a much broader perspective on what the DoD does.

    What about it was jarring?

    One of the big shockers was to see the discrepancy between the importance I’d assigned to certain issues and countries, and their importance (or not) in the U.S. policy ecosystem. I also think outside experts vastly overestimate how much they understand. Within my first 10 days, a decision was made to condition aid to Egypt. There was all this talk on the outside about how it was going to play out, and what the reasons were for doing it. Then the decision came out, and many people, even on the inside, were surprised about the decision. Academics might attribute the outcome to a theory, but that's not how and why it happened. Sometimes not even people on the inside know how or why these things occur. Another interesting part was to see the labor costs involved in creating doctrines and strategies—and then, of course, thinking about what happens to all those hours spent when a strategy is abandoned. When a senior official says, “We need to look into this,” it can cause hours and hours of work.

    So academic explanations for why things happen in the world don't always match the reality—is that what you’re saying?

    Yeah. I came away from government with an entirely different perspective of how things do or don't work.

    How is the culture of academia different from work culture in government? I think if you'd asked me that question 15 years ago, I would have assumed that the government is super cut-throat and that academia is warm and fuzzy. I would probably revise that today.

    I think most people probably have that impression and it's totally misguided. What I really appreciated about government is that, for the most part, people are on a collective mission to make the country and the world a better place. And it takes everyone to do it. I appreciated the fact that people saw the work as a team effort. I don't think people from the outside fully get that. And I didn't either until I was there. In academia, we succeed when our idea is better than the others. You have to stand out above others.

    What's the best way that institutions like IGCC contribute to that world?

    If you want to have policy relevance, you have to get your idea in front of the right people at the right time, and you do that through networks. While the timing part is largely luck, IGCC can help strengthen the networks that can be activated at the right time.

    It’s been a tumultuous decade for the United States. What are some of the most pressing issues for the Biden administration to tackle?

    One of the biggest challenges is going to be pulling ourselves away from the Middle East. As much as people keep talking about it, it's time to do it. We need to be able to allocate resources away from the Middle East and towards other priorities, like a rising China. U.S. resources are finite and relative U.S. power is diminishing. We can't do everything. You can't have a maximum pressure campaign against North Korea and against Iran and push against China and be mired down in the Middle East. We just don't have those resources.]]>
    767 0 0 0 Lawrence Rubin is an associate professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, a fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and a Templeton fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. Based in Washington, D.C., Rubin specializes in Middle East politics and international security, and served as a senior advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy in 2017-18. Rubin attended IGCC’s first Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp in 2003, and was an IGCC dissertation fellow while a doctoral candidate at UCLA. This interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Matthew Kroenig]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-matthew-kroenig/ Fri, 04 Jun 2021 21:01:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=780 You’ve been teaching for 13 years. How is teaching different from when you started out? When I started teaching in 2008, we thought our biggest problems were insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, we think our biggest problems could be war with China over Taiwan, or war with Russia over Ukraine. Great power competition and the deterioration of the security environment are the big new things. I remember lecturing students about World Wars I and II. To them, it was ancient history—something that could never happen today. Now it feels real to students.

    What sparked your interest in political science and international affairs?

    I was a very good high school basketball player, and a little bit delusional. I was convinced I was going to be the next Michael Jordan and was well into college until I realized that wasn't going to happen. My junior year of college, I did a program called Semester at Sea. I went to Cuba, Brazil, South Africa, Kenya, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, China, and Japan within three months. It was an incredible experience and literally changed my life. I applied to a bunch of political science PhD programs, and was accepted at UC Berkeley. From there I got an offer at Georgetown University, just down the street from the State Department and Defense Department.

    Nuclear weapons issues have been a major focus of your career. To what extent did participating in IGCC’s first-ever Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp matter for your career?

    The PPNT fellowship was really transformational. I arrived at Berkeley interested in nuclear weapons issues in 2001. Many of my advisors were saying: nuclear weapons were a Cold War problem; today it's all about globalization and the Internet. If you want to be relevant, you can't do nuclear weapons. Susan Shirk brought in some of the leading scholars and policy experts for PNNT. Through that program, I realized that nuclear weapons still mattered, and that this was a viable career path. Without that, there's a pretty good chance I wouldn't be working on nuclear issues today.

    You've argued for a robust nuclear posture to modernize and increase the arsenal. Why do you think that’s important?

    The nuclear arsenal does need to be modernized. There is a bipartisan consensus for that, which I think Biden will maintain. Nuclear weapons have an understandably negative connotation. But I think U.S. nuclear weapons are special. We use them, not just to defend ourselves, but to protect the entire free world. Ensuring peace and prosperity depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and our deterrence policies.

    What have been some of your most gratifying roles as an academic-cum-policy advisor?

    Government work is most gratifying when you want to change something about the world, and you actually see the policy change at the end of the day. That's rare. But I've been lucky to have experienced that a couple of times. The first was in 2005. I was still a PhD student and was doing an internship in the Strategy Office at the Pentagon. It was shortly after 9/11. My boss asked me to prepare a brief on deterring terrorism. At the time, U.S. government strategy documents said that terrorists can't be deterred, so we've got to just track them down and kill them. I put together a briefing, based partly on what I learned from PPNT about deterrence theory, and married it with what I was reading about terrorism, and Secretary Rumsfeld really liked it. He took it to President Bush and all the subsequent U.S. strategy documents say that we’ll deter terrorists as well as try to defeat them. And then I worked from 2017 to 2021 as a senior policy adviser in the nuclear and missile defense office. One of the challenges we face from Russia is their so-called escalate to de-escalate nuclear strategy. The idea is, if they get into a war with NATO, they would pop off a nuke or two to try to frighten everybody in the west to back down. They have a lot of low-yield nuclear weapons to make that threat credible, whereas we don't really have any. So I began arguing that the United States needs to develop low-yield nuclear weapons in response. I was able to help make sure that that was in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. There's a good chance that wouldn't be part of U.S. nuclear strategy today if it hadn't been for my work.

    To what extent did your academic training prepare you for working in government?

    The academic training helped in two ways. It gave me a rigorous and comprehensive way of thinking about problems. In Washington, a lot of people are kind of reactive: Here's the problem; here's what we're gonna do about it. My academic training helped me take a step back and say, is this really the problem? What are all the possible options or answers to this problem? How do we weigh those against each other? The second way is writing. Not all academics are great writers. But if you're writing every day on a dissertation, you tend to be better and faster than the average government bureaucrat. It's a helpful skill in Washington.

    You recently wrote The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China (Oxford University Press 2020). Great power competition is getting a lot of attention—what’s going on?

    Russia and especially China pose threats to a broad range of U.S. and allied interests. They're stealing our intellectual property, they're cheating on the global trading system, they're helping dictators. And there is a real military risk as well. It's possible China could try to attack Taiwan or another country in Asia, and the United States would be in a major war with China. The stakes are high. What we want to do is change the mind of China's leaders. Maybe that’s impossible with President Xi. But it might be possible to convince the next generation that competing with the United States and its allies is too hard and Beijing is better off with a cooperative approach.

    Your argument is that democracies tend to excel in great power rivalries. Why are you so confident in democracy?

    In writing this book, I looked at seven autocratic versus democratic great power rivalries starting with the Greeks and the Persians 2,500 years ago. Democracies tend to do pretty well. Autocracies put up a challenge for a while, but like Hitler, Napoleon, and Xerxes, they tend to run out of steam. So I think we're well positioned for this competition. But, as we've seen in some of these historical competitions, things got worse before they got better. And unfortunately that might be what we're looking towards in the next several years.

    Things can change pretty quickly in international affairs. How do you think things will change in the next 10 years? What will we not have seen coming?

    Predicting the future is hard. But I think the biggest change coming is new technology—artificial intelligence, quantum computing, directed energy. Nuclear weapons were the last major military technology that fundamentally changed international politics. I wonder if there's another one coming now. Which country is going to figure out how to combine robots and drones and artificial intelligence and lasers and space sensors, in a way that gives them a dominant advantage? I hope it's the United States and our allies.]]>
    780 0 0 0 Matthew Kroenig is a professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington DC and director of the Global Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, including in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA’s Strategic Assessments Group. He co-writes the "It’s Debatable" column at Foreign Policy, and his most recent book, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the US and China, was Amazon's #1 new release in international relations. Matt attended IGCC’s inaugural Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp in 2003, and was an IGCC dissertation fellow as a doctoral student at UC Berkeley. In this interview, Matt makes a case for modernizing and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal; talks about why he thinks democracies do better than autocracies in great power rivalries; and recalls how he once hoped to be the next Michael Jordan. The interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Philipp Bleek]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-philipp-bleek/ Fri, 04 Jun 2021 21:08:13 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=786 You're an associate professor in the nonproliferation and terrorism studies program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, and coordinator of the Cyber Collaborative. How’d you get here? As an undergrad, I was interested in market incentives in environmental policy, but burned out on it by my senior year. I took a class on nuclear, chemical, and biological threats and got really excited about it. My professor nominated me for a Scoville fellowship, which took me to work in the think tank community in DC. From there it became path dependent.

    I remember the first time I went to Washington DC. I flew in at night and saw the monuments lit up. I was in awe of the place. What was it like when you first touched down?

    I love DC. It’s a very polarizing place—people either love it or hate it. I loved it. I loved that it was full of people like me who were policy wonks, really motivated to make a difference. That might sound a little cheesy, but I think it's right. And there was an energy to the place. I loved mixing the social and professional—going to a think tank event and then chatting about it over drinks afterwards.

    You work at the intersection of teaching, research, and policy engagement. Others dig the well squarely in one of those zones and not the others. What drove your decision to be in the muddled in-between?

    I'm definitely in the muddled-in-between. I worked on the foreign policy team for then-Senator Obama—alongside several hundred colleagues—for his 2008 presidential campaign, and decided not to go into government with the first wave [after he was elected] because I wasn't done with my PhD, and figured that if I didn't finish, I might not come back to it. Then I applied for a couple academic jobs and got one I felt was a really good fit. So I thought I’d go live in California for a couple years. I'm a big outdoors person and life out here is pretty good. Then I got a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship that lets young faculty members spend a year in government, the idea being that they bring that experience back to their teaching and research.

    Right—you worked at the Pentagon from 2012 to 2013. It was your first real experience in government. Were you prepared for it?

    The transition was challenging. When you first get a government job, you're in this weird limbo where you kind of have nothing to do, and at least in my case, my role was somewhat undefined. And then all of a sudden the switch flips and you're drowning in work.

    You helped staff the Syria Chemical Weapons Senior Integration Group, which was a then-secret group that worked on understanding and preparing for ways in which chemical weapons might come into play in the Syrian conflict, right?

    I was the point person for international partner engagement. It was an incredibly exciting portfolio. I took part in a lot of international partner engagement meetings with the Brits, the Turks, the Jordanians. I flew to Rome to negotiate with the Russians. I thought I was in a staff support role. On the plane ride over, they were like, “No, you're a negotiator.”

    What was the situation at the time with Syria?

    The Syrian civil war had started in 2011 and gradually escalated from protests to a full-blown civil war. From the beginning, the U.S government was concerned about the potential use of chemical weapons—either the Syrian regime using them against regional states, or losing control of them to non-state actors. I think we were least concerned that the regime would use them internally against their own people, but that is what ended up happening. We had a robust intelligence program that tracked, or tried to track as best we could, what Syria was doing in terms of their chemical weapons.

    After the fellowship, you decided to go back to Middlebury. Why’s that?

    Working in government was a phenomenal experience. But it also got the West Wing TV show fantasy of government service out of my system. I still miss the teamwork. But I didn’t love the culture of always being at your desk, the lack of flexibility, the long hours. I love my work, but I also love cooking. I like exercising. I decided that the work-life balance felt off.

    You ended up in one of the most ideal human habitats on the planet—Monterey—to work on some of the most horrific issues on the planet: the causes and consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons threats.

    We joke about the fact that we work on such terrible issues in such an extraordinarily idyllic setting.

    Chemical weapons in the morning. Biking and swimming in the afternoon.

    Pretty much. Though I prefer regular triathlons.

    Tell me about your job.

    I'm a professor in a security studies Masters program that focuses on two particularly important domains within security studies: so-called weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

    You’re currently working on a number of emerging technologies, including “proliferating swarms of drones.” I almost don’t want to ask.

    Drone swarming technology—which is where drones coordinate their actions with each other—has a lot of potential implications, both for state and non-state actors. It’s easy to write the Tom Clancy novel version and tell some very melodramatic story about the horrific future of drone swarm threats. It's great to be imaginative about the potentials, but then also to be thoughtful about the limitations—the ways in which defensive capabilities might keep up with it, or even leapfrog emerging, offensive challenges.

    You’ve also done work on acid terrorism.

    We're seeing that tactic spread and we're seeing it spread to places that might be surprising. The highest per capita rate of acid attacks for the most recent year for which we have data is in the UK.

    You’re kidding.

    India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh probably have higher per capita acid attack rates, they just under report. But the highest reported levels at this point are in the UK. And they're not primarily from people coming from South Asia to the UK. It's a form of violence that emerges when there's a scarcity of other forms of violence, and we're seeing it from criminals and from individuals who are personally motivated. It's a tactic that has the potential to catch on in terrorism circles. It’s extremely accessible. It's not a very good way to kill or even hurt a lot of people, but it's a very good way to terrorize people.

    You're an alumni of one of IGCC’s most long standing programs—the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp. Why did the bootcamp matter?

    It was huge for building and deepening my professional network. I remember having coffee with one of the other participants, who is now a colleague and good friend. She sat me down and told me that her boss was following my professional trajectory and hoped I would work for him in some capacity someday. That planted a seed that ended up germinating later into the faculty position I have now.

    Professional relationships are so important.

    They are. And what PPNT enabled is what you might call deep, rather than superficial, networking. Networking has a bad reputation in DC. There's this idea that you're in a bar and some guy—and it's usually a guy—is thrusting a business card in your face. But deeper networking where you form real relationships is very meaningful.

    What is the best role institutions like IGCC play in terms of participating in the important work happening in government?

    There is a real need for bridging the gap between researchers and policy people. IGCC and others try and sometimes succeed in doing that, but I think it's also important to recognize the limitations. Not all academic research translates, or is necessarily helpful to policymakers, even if you can put it in a memo. But I also think that there are habits of intellectual rigor and ways of thinking systematically on the academic side that are helpful to policymakers.

    We’ve been in various levels of pandemic lockdown for more than a year. When was your last work trip?

    Just before the pandemic I was in Europe for a set of engagements and got stranded in Istanbul as the pandemic ramped up and couldn't get a flight home to the United States. That was a bit stressful. But I did get to hang out with John Malkovich.

    Say more about that.

    He was there collaborating with a friend of mine to start a business that lets people rent out their musical instruments. He did some experimental theater that I got to watch. It was the last live performance I went to before the pandemic really hit.

    “Stranded in Istanbul with John Malkovich.” If I had a nickel for every time I heard that.

    ]]>
    786 0 0 0 Philipp Bleek is an associate professor in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies, and coordinator of the Cyber Collaborative at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Philipp works on the causes, consequences, and amelioration of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons threats. He served as a senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs in 2012-13, and has advised political campaigns, and the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations. Philipp participated in IGCC’s Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp in 2008. In this interview, he talks about his experience as a fellow with the Pentagon’s Syria Chemical Weapons Senior Integration Group—including a surprise role negotiating with the Russians in Rome; why he choose academia over a life in government; and about the time he got stranded in Istanbul with John Malkovich. This interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence and National Security]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/artificial-intelligence-and-national-security/ Fri, 16 Apr 2021 21:01:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=854 How might AI be used to strengthen national security, and are the United States and its allies well-positioned relative to competitors in developing and using AI? On March 17, nearly 200 global experts gathered virtually at the National Security Innovation Forum to discuss the impact of AI on national security. A collaboration between the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), the Silicon Valley Defense Group, the National Security Innovation Catalyst, and partners from the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, the Forum brought together specialists from government, academia, and industry (including the investment and start-up communities) to address key national security issues raised by AI and identify practical solutions. AI has become one of our key focus areas,” said Scott Tait, executive director of Catalyst, “because it appears that it will have disruptive impacts across all areas of human endeavor: information, politics, policy, economy, sociology, and national security. For the Forum, we brought together practitioners who are all wrestling with how this transformative technology is going to influence their worlds, and to explore how those influences are going to cascade across the traditional divisions of labor.” Among its defense applications, AI can be used for decision making, intelligence, logistics, cyber (both offense and defense), autonomous systems control and coordination, weapons systems and a host of other areas.
    “AI will be one of the most disruptive technologies of our generation, and will change how we do business today, especially in the security sector,” said one Forum presenter.
    Contrary to concerns that AI will replace human decision-making, speakers stressed that human thinking, judgment, and leadership will continue to be critical—certainly in the near term—underscoring the need for leaders who are trained in how to use AI for strategy and decision-making. But there are growing questions about the ethical, technical, and policy challenges to adopting AI technologies. Key competitors to the United States in China and Russia may be less constrained by legal and ethical considerations, and thus gain advantages that the United States is un-willing to consider and ill prepared to counter. One of the major themes of the Forum was the need for greater cooperation between the United States and like-minded countries in the adoption of AI. Given ethical questions, such as AI’s use in surveillance and its potential for exploitation and manipulation, participants said that a coordinated strategy was essential. With the "Five Eyes" (the long-standing alliance between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as a starting point, participants suggested that the United States should work with its allies and partners in developing and adopting AI according to democratic principles and standards, while also anticipating how others might employ it. Unlike the era of the space race, today the vast majority of AI advances are made in the private sector and driven by consumer demand and potential for profit. Several speakers and participants stressed the need for governments to provide greater incentives for developing AI for national security goals, and addressing the roadblocks to innovation within government systems. The U.S. defense acquisition process, some noted, may need to be adapted for emerging technologies like AI, where current processes designed to minimize risk could prevent the United States from advancing the technologies it needs to compete. If stronger incentives are needed to spur innovation, so too are approaches to protect technologies against manipulation or theft, without building new barriers to public sector aquisition. Said Tait: “This is a two-fold challenge: the companies that develop effective AI algorithms must be allowed to protect them for commercial benefit despite government dual use, and the data sets used to train defense applications of AI must be protected in order to prevent competitors from reverse engineering the capabilities. Our current system of security clearance and information classification is insufficient to address these challenges, and a new system that protects commercial IP and provides government security is needed.” While the challenges are many, AI, which is emerging alongside a range of other groundbreaking technologies—from 5G to quantum computing—promises to transform the national security and defense landscape for decades to come. Learn more about IGCC’s Technology and International Security research, and about its partner organization, Catalyst, and the Silicon Valley Defense Group.]]>
    854 0 0 0 described as “more profound than fire or electricity.” Experts predict it will add as much as $16 trillion to the global economy by 2030 and fundamentally change the workforce, transportation, medicine, energy, and more.]]>
    <![CDATA[Catalyst Year-In-Review]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/catalyst-year-in-review/ Tue, 25 May 2021 21:32:18 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=871 When we spoke a year ago, Catalyst had just been launched, with ambitious goals—not only to improve connections between the defense establishment and technology innovators, but to get meaningful solutions deployed. How’s it going? It’s been a little crazy with the pandemic. But any crisis is also an opportunity, and the pandemic has knocked down some of the barriers to innovation inside the national security community. We've built some really good linkages. And we now have validation of the model and how you do it. I’ll give you an example. At the beginning of the pandemic, there was great concern that the illness would overwhelm the supply of ventilators, both in the U.S. and in developing countries. DOD [Department of Defense] put out a challenge for innovative ventilator designs, and one of the criteria was that they be made from readily available materials, so that they'd be simple enough to be useful to people who were only marginally trained in healthcare, and cheap enough to mass produce. We joined up with UC San Diego’s Medically Advanced Devices (MAD) Lab (a joint venture between the Jacobs School of Engineering and the UC San Diego medical school) and put together a team within about a day. Within another day, Kratos Defense—one of our founding sponsors—had contributed $100,000 to get them moving. And then within about seven days, working through one of the Navy’s local Science Advisors, the Office of Naval Research had contributed an additional $140,000. The ventilator they developed is now in production and use.

    Has Catalyst’s focus changed since the initiative launched?

    Like any good startup, we’ve pivoted a bit from our original business model. We've shifted our focus to the operational side of national security where requirements are written rather than the acquisition side. The way DOD develops technology works like this: operators who have missions submit their “requirements” (a description of the capabilities they need) to the service staffs; then the staffs get them into their budget requests. Once money is provided by Congress, the acquisition system works with industry to provide solutions that meet the requirement. Thus, there’s not much room left for innovative approaches on the acquisition side. There’s much more room for change when you start on the requirements side and expose the operators to what's available in the commercial market, then help them explore how they’d use it. As long as you can show that the innovation provides immediate operational value, the customer (i.e., DOD operational force) can help fund it out of their operations and maintenance budget, which gives smaller companies a path to survival across the proverbial valley of death, while that requirement is being put into the budget request. We've worked closely with Xcite here in San Diego, to try to get a couple young companies into this process, where they're actually getting real revenue, and providing real services or products while they work their way through the requirements process.

    What are some of the policy and research achievements of year-one?

    Simply by virtue of figuring out what's working and what isn't, we’ve started to identify areas where, if policies were changed, it would be very beneficial. Most of those policies involve areas where the actors involved are extremely risk averse. Their incentives aren’t so much to succeed as to not fail. We’re looking at ways to partner with and empower change agents in the national security ecosystem. What are the ways they can be given the authority to make operational decisions without needing 20 or 30 different approvals?  We partnered with IGCC and the Silicon Valley Defense Group to make sure we have an effective way to get policy recommendations to the right audience.

    The pandemic heightened concern in many countries about the vulnerability of global supply chains in world of renewed great power competition, and the need for resilience. In this sense, did the pandemic make people more aware of the problem Catalyst was created to solve?

    Absolutely. People have been forced to realize that the system is a lot more fragile than they thought.  The recent Colonial Pipeline cyber attack is a case in point. It's forcing people inside national security to start to take a more holistic view of what national security means. We used to think of defense as an “away game” outside the U.S., and of homeland security as a purely domestic effort. But today, there's no major crisis that doesn't quickly cascade across both those areas. Better cooperation and information sharing between government agencies, academia, and industry is going to be key going forward, whether it's to address threats emanating from great power competition or natural disasters or pandemics. This reality has led IGCC to start its nascent National Security Professional Education initiative.

    Will new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and 5G revolutionize defense the way nuclear weapons did? How do government and industry view the challenges ahead—are they on the same page?

    In general, national security practitioners are a little bit behind in their understanding of the potential of these emerging technologies. The commercial sector is very much leading. AI is a potential game changer on the level of nuclear weapons. When you pair it with other capabilities, like cyber and AI-driven edge computing for autonomous systems, I think you come to a period that looks a lot like the dawn of long-range intercontinental nuclear weapons—where a new technology forces a significant change in how we approach command and control. Because of the speed at which AI is going to develop, folks working in our security apparatus are going to have to start delegating decisions to technology that have previously been made only by humans at fairly high levels. The faster we come to grips with that and start building new operational models and debate the ethics and legal framework within which this is going to happen, the better off we'll be. Catalyst hosted a conference on AI in April, in partnership with the Silicon Valley Defense Group, and with the Five Eyes partners, to start to look at this. IGCC will also lead a policy discussion on things like the ethical and legal and policy frameworks that are needed.

    What do you worry about most in terms of the future?

    I'm still incredibly positive about the U.S. system. The energy in the United States—especially among young people who are out there doing incredible new things—is a reason to be hopeful. We've got a generation now that has been shaped by three really significant seismic changes: 9/11, the crash in 2008, and now the pandemic. The last generation that was formed by a series of shocks like that grew up during the Depression and World War Two. I think we're going see the same thing with this generation, which is an unwillingness to accept small changes when big ones are needed, and a fearlessness when it comes to making big changes. I am also worried that we don't fully understand the nature of the great power competition that we're in. We're still too focused on traditional definitions of roles when it comes to national security. We need a more holistic view of what competition looks like. Today it’s about who can best harness their cumulative national power, not necessarily in a military way, but in an economic way, and at the same time protect and defend our institutions.

    What lessons have you learned about how to overcome the institutional barriers to accelerating innovation in the national security realm?

    You have to look at incentive structures. That's why we shifted to focus on the operational side. The operational side has a strong incentive to solve problems and get missions done. They also bring a lot of advocacy to the table. On the acquisition side, the incentives are different. They're not necessarily incentivized to take risks or try anything new. Quite the opposite. I think the strongest lesson learned is: understand the incentive environment of the people you’re trying to help, and help those that most need it and are actually open to it. For a lot of new organizations, the first thing they want to do is draw an organization chart and hire a bunch of people and build an organization. And then they go after the objective. We intentionally did it the other way around. We said, let's figure out what the right function is first, and then we'll build the form that makes sense around the function. It’s been chaotic at times, but I think it was the right approach. Going into our second year, I think we have a good idea now of what the most useful functions are.

    What are some of the new things Catalyst will be working on over the next year?

    We're working with the Office of Innovation and Commercialization here at UC San Diego on a project called Civic Resilience and national security is one part of it. The idea is to build innovative networks in a time of non-crisis so that you can leverage them when there is a crisis. The project also looks at health care, manufacturing and logistics, and infrastructure. We’re also excited to be working with IGCC to support the development of a National Security Professional Education system that will bring the power of academia and industry together to help advance and expand what’s now called Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Defense officials need a deeper understanding of how innovation is taking place, in particular in technology, but also in terms of financing models. I can give you an example. Silicon Valley has shifted away from patents and almost entirely to trade secrets. They see the patent system as too slow and fear that they have to divulge so much information that competitors who don't follow trade laws—like the Chinese—will copy their technology. So, trade secrets sort of makes sense from the near-term competitive advantage perspective. The downside is that for almost all the international organizations that set standards for emerging technologies, national representation and national influence is based on the number of patents you have. So, the United States is actually eroding and undermining our position with the standards bodies over the long term, which will diminish our competitive position. These are the types of things that our national security practitioners really need to understand coming out of a program like this. Learn more about Catalyst. Visit: Catalyst.ucsd.edu]]>
    871 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[How Will the U.S. Meet the Rising Challenge of Artificial Intelligence?]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/how-will-the-u-s-meet-the-rising-challenge-of-artificial-intelligence/ Fri, 09 Jul 2021 19:21:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1019 1019 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Interview with PPNT director Bethany Goldblum]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/interview-with-ppnt-director-bethany-goldblum/ Fri, 09 Jul 2021 21:41:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1048 Dr. Bethany Goldblum stands behind her neutron detector array at the 88-Inch Cyclotron at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

    You are a nuclear scientist in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. How did you first get interested in the technical sciences?

    I’m from a very small town in Louisiana. None of the women in my family worked; it wasn't really expected that we were going to get an advanced education. So, I had no plans. I ended up going to a small liberal arts college in Colorado, and started out majoring in math, because I liked the exactness of it. About a year or two in, I started taking chemistry classes, and ended up double majoring in math and chemistry.

    You were initially planning on law school after college. Why did plans change?

    The summer after graduating, I participated in a six-week nuclear chemistry summer school with the American Chemical Society at San Jose State. It was all day long: it started at eight o'clock in the morning ended at five. There were lectures and labs. It was really intense and really, really cool. I came out of that with a lot of questions. I was having a lot of joy doing those experiments. Did I really want to go to law school? I reached out to some of the professors I’d worked with and one of them, Alice Gast, said I could come work with her, but I needed to start the next day. I canceled the enrollment in law school, jumped on a plane, flew out to Delaware, and started making magnetorheological fluids—liquids that harden or change shape when exposed to a magnetic field. Then I flew up to MIT, characterized them, and they flew on a shuttle to the International Space Station. It was crazy.

    You went on to pursue your Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, and it was during that time that you attended IGCC’s first PPNT.

    I was interested in weapons design because the physics is really neat. I went through a huge evolution during the PPNT program—it exposed me, not only to all of these different aspects of nuclear science, but also to the policy aspects that I really had not thought about. It was eye-opening. Just because we work on the technical aspects of a project, it doesn't mean that's where our duty ends. We have the responsibility to ensure that the fruits of our technological labor are being used for peaceful purposes. We’re the creators of this work. We can’t expect that some other group of people is going to take the responsibility. Understanding the policy and ethical aspects of the science was something that PPNT gave me.

    You've served as director of PPNT since 2014. How has the world of nuclear security policy changed over the time that you've been involved with the program? And how has the program evolved to reflect changes in the world?

    The core PPNT curriculum has not changed. We continue to cover the historical, legal, technical and policy aspects of nuclear weapons issues. But since the program started in 2003, the world has definitely changed, and our program has adapted to continue to cover the most pressing nuclear weapons policy issues of our time. I was a student in the shadow of 9/11. George W. Bush was the president. We were talking about bunker busters, for example, a program at the time to design Earth penetrating nuclear warheads capable of striking targets buried deeply underground. North Korea had just withdrawn from the nonproliferation treaty, so there was a discussion about the potential implications for the sustainability of the nonproliferation treaty. When I returned to lead the program in 2014, the global nuclear landscape had shifted significantly. Obama was president. Following the 2009 Prague speech, the emphasis was on decreasing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. There was serious dialogue about how can we reduce the size of the nuclear arsenal while maintaining our national security objectives? And given that we're decreasing our reliance on nuclear weapons, how can we continue to transfer knowledge to the next generation as those weapons designers age out? How do you maintain a knowledge base when you're not allowed to work on these things? Today, we've continued to see a shift. We have a return to great power politics, and we continue to have an increased emphasis on the multipolar nuclear order. We also talk about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. There have been some structural changes to PPNT as well. We've significantly increased the fraction of female speakers in the program, which isn't hard to do because there are so many excellent women in this field. We have also added a simulation exercise at the end of the program, which is the brainchild of Ambassador Linton Brooks.

    What are some of the program highlights that you're most excited about for this year?

    The program is going to be held over a week virtually, and it's very intensive. Last year, we opened PPNT to the public, which was really great, because we were able to reach a broad cross section of technical and policy scholars from around the world. The disadvantage was that the participants weren’t able to deeply engage with the speakers, or each other. This year, we're going back to having a select cohort of participants. We’re going to try to bring as much of the traditional aspects of the PPNT program into the online environment. We've crafted sessions where the balance of time is similar to what we would do in the traditional setting to allow participants the chance to generate dialogue and have professional development opportunities with the speakers. In terms of content, we have so many excellent speakers. John Scott will be back again—he’s a weapons designer from Los Alamos. Rose Gottemoeller, who was the former undersecretary of state for arms control, is joining as well. She was the former deputy secretary general of NATO and the lead negotiator of the New START treaty. You can't introduce her without talking for five minutes because she's just that fantastic. Laura Rockwood, who was head legal counsel at the International Atomic Energy Agency for decades, will be here. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who was former CIA and went on to be the head of intelligence and counterintelligence at the Department of Energy, is also joining. He's at Harvard now. Last time we were in person, someone leaned over and said, “This guy is straight out of a Tom Clancy novel.”

    It's really extraordinary for students to get to be exposed to folks like this.

    It is. It's not like learning about the issues from reading a textbook. What you're hearing is the on-the-ground experience of policymakers, lead negotiators, and scientists.

    You said earlier that scientists have a responsibility to participate in ensuring that the technologies they help develop are used for peaceful purposes. What have you learned about how to do that? How easy or hard is it to strike that balance?

    It can feel insurmountable for technical scientists, especially. Policy folks and scientists speak different languages. Literally, the words that scientists use sometimes mean different things to policy people. We also think about things differently. In science, we try to conclude. We draw boundaries around a problem, and then we make assumptions so that we can try to reach a conclusion. In the policy realm, the focus isn’t on concluding, because there isn’t necessarily a right answer. What they're going to do is make the best possible decision that they can with the information they have, and the limited amount of time that they have. Understanding the differences between these communities, which comes from interacting—having shared experiences with people across disciplines—is a good first step. Scientists often feel like—“Hey, I'm not a policy scholar. That's not for me.” But I think it’s important to realize that this really is a part of your work scope. Policy people want a technical voice in the room. It's by working together that we can really help make advances.

    Do you think the world is getting more or less dangerous in terms of nuclear weapons?

    I think the threats are evolving. We need to ensure that our ability to respond to the threats or our conception of the threats continues to evolve as the threat space changes. The total global number of nuclear warheads has significantly decreased since its peak in the mid-1980s, when there were about 60,000 warheads. Now there are around 10,000, globally. From that perspective, if you're just counting warheads, the risk has decreased. But the total number of nuclear armed countries has continued to increase and the nuclear terrorist threat has become more salient. Our ability to understand and respond to national security threats needs to change as the nuclear order changes.]]>
    1048 0 0 0 This month, IGCC will host its 17th annual Public Policy and Nuclear Threats (PPNT) boot camp, our training program on the historical, legal, technical and policy aspects of nuclear weapons. In this interview, PPNT director Bethany Goldblum talks about how the program has evolved over the past two decades, and highlights for this year, including speakers like John Scott, Rose Gottemoeller, Laura Rockwood, and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. Bethany also reflects on whether the world is getting more or less dangerous, and how scientists can participate in ensuring that the technologies they help develop are used for peaceful purposes.]]>
    <![CDATA[Is Arms Control Over?]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/is-arms-control-over/ Sat, 24 Apr 2021 21:47:56 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1054 1054 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Not Free or Credible: Why Regional Election Observers Failed Chad and Benin]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/not-free-or-credible-why-regional-election-observers-failed-chad-and-benin/ Thu, 22 Apr 2021 23:03:19 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1124 local and international perceptions of an election’s legitimacy. Political scientists and policy experts are increasingly raising concerns, however, about whether and when election observers are actually free to write fair reports. A significant number of regional organizations’ post-election reports do not reflect the reality described by citizens and media coverage. Instead, they gloss over repressive tactics that incumbents use months or years ahead of elections to predetermine their outcomes. Read full analysis on Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1124 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Christina Cottiero, Postdoctoral Fellow at IGCC, analyzes election observation missions and their potential bias.]]> <![CDATA[Psychopolitical Implications of Forced Migration and Violence on Human Behavior]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/psychopolitical-implications-of-forced-migration-and-violence-on-human-behavior/ Tue, 01 Jun 2021 17:01:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1140 Yuval Neria (Columbia University), Adam Brown (The New School), and Richard Tedeschi (Boulder Crest Institute for Posttraumatic Growth) explored the cognitive neuroscience of trauma exposure and the psychosocial aspects of posttraumatic growth. Assessing the mass recovery rates of war prisoners and ex-militants, the panelists examined how pre-existing trauma sensitivity influences the development of psychopathologies or the efficacy of peer-led recovery programs. Several panelists addressed the need for cultural competency and collaborative ownership when studying populations affected by trauma. "There’s a disconnect within the majority of refugee studies coming from the Eastern Hemisphere, as Western research practices are being used,” noted Rana Dajani, Associate Professor of Biology and Biotechnology at Hashemite University in Jordan. “As a Western scientist, I need to find a local Eastern scientist, whether they are in the country or the diaspora, because they know better. Why? To design better science.” Dr. Dajani was joined by Mohammad Al-Rajabi (Questscope), and Melanie Greenberg (Humanity United) on the panel, which underscored how trauma research can be better-translated to community-based applications when local people are engaged. Specifically, Al-Rajabi questioned the role of studies with traumatized individuals who are unable to access or benefit from the results. To develop collaborative ownership, the panelists asserted the value of scientific transparency and the synthesis of localized models, as well as the value of returning to trauma-affected communities to disseminate and seek feedback on research findings. Rebecca Wolfe (University of Chicago) and Rebecca Littman (University of Illinois Chicago) led a working group on the methodological challenges of conducting investigations in active conflict regions. They elaborated on the ethical difficulties inherent in randomization in vulnerable communities, in addition to the need to protect interviewers and implementers who may be traumatized from collecting data on trauma. Working group participants recommended thinking beyond the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and establishing a common ethical framework for researchers of trauma to follow. In reviewing the political outcomes of exposure to trauma, Justine Davis (University of Michigan), Biz Herman (University of California, Berkeley), Phoung Pham (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative), and Lauren Young (University of California, Davis) emphasized the need for clear definitions of trauma exposure and response in order to build an accurate conceptual model linking violence to political participation. On the second day of the conference, Patrick Vinck (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health), Brian P. Marx (National Center for PTSD), and Andrew Rasmussen (Fordham University) opened discussion by reflecting on shifts in definitions of trauma and the heterogeneity of trauma response. Rasmussen called for incorporating local understandings and definitions of trauma-related experience into cross-cultural frameworks. Vinck further encouraged the application of an intergenerational, qualitative approach to characterizing trauma-related events, highlighting the under-explored influence of information transmission within a community. In their panel entitled “Mental Health Realities and Treatments in the Field,” Adeyinka M. Akinsulure-Smith (City College of New York), Mohamed Elshazly (Consultant psychiatrist), and Mike Niconchuk (Beyond Conflict) reflected on their own experiences working with trauma-affected communities across the globe. They underlined the importance of considering the impact of past and daily trauma events by being prepared to shift treatment and research priorities to accommodate populations’ evolving needs. Although a significant amount of research focuses on individual experiences with trauma, several panelists stressed how trauma affects groups and communities, requiring structural interventions in addition to individual-level evaluations. Heidi Ellis (Harvard Medical School) described her work with Somali refugees, focusing on community strengths and community ownership over programming. Rose McDermott (Brown University) and Besty Levy Paluck (Princeton) suggested an alternative model to individualized psychological interventions by creating ethical interventions to simultaneously enact individual and societal change. In her keynote address, Wendy D’Andrea (The New School) described psychobiological measures that are frequently used during violence-based investigations, including skin conductance, pupillometry, and eye tracking tools. She detailed the ways in which measuring physiological responses to trauma can enhance self-reporting. D’Andrea proposed bidirectional learning, where researchers and community members determine the best strategies to collect biophysical measures that are the least invasive to trauma-affected participants. In a final working group, Aila Matanock (University of California, Berkeley) and Tim Phillips (Beyond Conflict) asked how trauma affects the likelihood of building lasting peace in communities affected by violence. Matanock underscored the importance of thinking through conflict dynamics and different facets of violence before creating peacebuilding programs. Phillips encouraged more thinking on how trauma can serve as a driver of conflict and how its legacy can thwart or help transitional justice initiatives in the post-conflict setting. Justine Davis (University of Michigan) and Biz Herman (University of California, Berkeley) closed the conference with a summation of the conference proceedings. Drawing from panelist and participant contributions, Davis noted a need to focus on relational and evidence-based approaches to assist individuals in healing from their lived experiences. “The sheer number of participants and amount of interest in the conference,” Justine said, “show that conversations—between practitioners and academics from diverse disciplines—are needed as we further the development of practices to treat and collaborate with trauma-affected communities.” The conference on Human Security, Violence, and Trauma in the 21st Century: Psychological Response and Political Impacts of Civil War & Forced Migration, was organized by Cecilia Mo (UC Berkeley), Biz Herman (UC Berkeley), and Justine Davis (University of Michigan), as part of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation annual Academic Conference Competition. Learn more about the Human Security, Violence, and Trauma (HSVT) conference.]]> 1140 0 0 0 Human Security, Violence, and Trauma Conference on May 26 and May 27, 2021. Hosted by the University of California, Berkeley and funded by the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), panelists highlighted the importance of understanding and integrating community definitions of trauma into research and treatments; innovations in methodologies to study the effects of trauma exposure; and ethical considerations when conducting research on trauma-affected populations.]]> <![CDATA[The Disinformation Threat—and What to Do About It]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/the-disinformation-threat-and-what-to-do-about-it/ Wed, 12 May 2021 18:43:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1176 Disinformation got much of the blame for Brexit and Trump’s election and has been cited as an essential contributor to the January 6 insurrection in Washington DC and the conspiracy known as QAnon. What is disinformation? One trait that people often associate with the phenomenon is the veracity—or not—of the factual claims being made. The second thing centers on whether the information is being conveyed in a manner that is honest about who you are. In my research group, the thing we worry about is not people saying things that aren't true—we worry about people creating false impressions of who they are. As a society, we put a lot of weight on giving people who have heterodox views the opportunity to have a voice. A big part of what is happening now is people are realizing that they can make money off heterodox views, and can gain political power off of it. And so they are spreading, to use the Harry Frankfurt definition of the term: bullshit.

    So disinformation is a combination of a lack of transparency about who the messenger is, and mal-intent, right? It’s not just a lie. It’s a lie with some kind of nefarious intention behind it?

    The distinction between mis and disinformation is really valuable. For a while, people understood misinformation as things that are factually wrong, and disinformation as things that are intentionally made up. So, misinformation would be me sharing incorrect information about the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccine, or incorrect information about how severe COVID is. Disinformation would be me promulgating—intentionally—a lie about those things.

    You are a part of a research group led by Princeton University that has developed a way to track online foreign disinformation campaigns—specifically state-backed campaigns. What have you found?

    Going back to 2013, there have been at least 80 different times when one country has tried to influence a political issue in another through covert action on social media. What's fascinating about that is it's almost all done by three countries—China, Russia, Iran—and they're targeting a relatively small number of other countries, mainly western democracies. That sounds really bad, but it's not in the following sense. There are at least 30 countries that have employed this technology against their own citizens, none of whom, with the exception of the ones I mentioned, are projecting it outwards. In other words, the skills needed to engage in online disinformation are very widespread. The use is not.

    Eighty campaigns is much less than I would have assumed give how inexpensive and effective it is. Is it less effective than is generally assumed?

    The people who argue that disinformation campaigns are effective fall into three categories: the marketers who sell them to politicians; the bureaucrats in dictatorships who stand to lose their fortunes and potentially their lives if they go to their boss and say, “Hey, you know that thing you had us do with great risk against America. It didn't work.” And then you have people who work on this stuff for a living and are motivated to say that “the social ill that I study is really scary and we should be worried about it.” There are a lot of reasons to be cautious about how worried we are. One is that the volume of activity by foreign countries is quite low. If you look at American Twitter, the volume of content that has been credibly attributed to foreign actors is tiny—hundreds of thousands to millions of tweets in a sea of hundreds of millions a day. There's a wonderful study that was in Science a few months back where they actually tracked the entire media consumption of a large sample of Americans. They weren't looking at disinformation—they were looking at certain fake news channels, like common purveyors. Relative to people's total media consumption, fake news was a fraction of 1 percent. So, if we believe that is really moving people, then they are the best damn political advertisers in the history of the world.

    But don’t we know that disinformation can shape behavior—isn’t that something we should worry about?

    It is very clear that exposure over multiple years to ideas purveyed through mass media, can shape very consequential actions—things like fertility decisions, risk-taking during war time, economic investments, where to live, participation in genocide. That is very well-documented. If misinformation is shaping the larger media environment in consequential ways, then that might be a mechanism for real behavioral effects. Looking at the response to COVID-19, there's definitely reason to be worried about that.

    You wrote a piece last year for Political Violence At A Glance about the proliferation of misinformation about COVID-19, from its origins to people peddling false cures. What’s happening and what are some of the consequences?

    There's pretty good evidence that consumption of and belief in misinformation about COVID-19 is correlated with higher transmission rates, lower compliance with health measures, and lower vaccination rates. The more interesting, and I think important, thing about COVID-related misinformation is that some unknown, but possibly massive share of the medical misinformation is not about authentic belief in expression, but about grift and profit. It is people trying to drive traffic to websites, increase their follower counts, and get people to pay them for saying things that play into people's interests in conspiracy theories.

    How lucrative is it?

    Estimates vary. Some of the best work has been done by News Guard and the Global Disinformation Index. The estimates from News Guard are that ad revenue associated with fake news is somewhere around $185 to $200 million a year. GDI puts a similar value on ad sales by sites that are promoting misinformation.

    That sounds really low, actually.

    It does, depending on how many people you think are engaged in this. One way to think about what's happened, is that we have created this wonderful ecosystem on the Internet from monetizing all kinds of creative activity, and that's given us some wonderful things like a direct relationship between artists and people. But it has also enabled people to monetize conspiracy theories and political and health misinformation. People have always found ways to make money off BS; the challenge today is, because of the scalability of these online platforms, it's possible for the for-profit actors to ramp up the volume of their activity in ways not possible before.

    Is there a way to rein in people who profit off misinformation?

    We have very different standards in the United States and in many countries for protecting political speech versus commercial speech. If misinformation around politics and health and other issues is understood as political speech and authentic expression, then the ability to regulate it is roughly zero. If it is commercial expression, the ability to regulate it is massive, and the set of institutions that have at least technically the ability to do so is quite large. A critical task for researchers is to understand how much of the misinformation that's out there is authentic expression versus for-profit activity.

    You direct a project called Empirical Studies of Conflict, which is co-directed by IGCC’s Eli Berman, and you both, together with Molly Roberts recently launched a project with IGCC on the political economy of disinformation. What will you be doing?

    The purpose of the project is to better understand the economics behind the misinformation. There's a body of knowledge in economics and political economy, and to some extent in political science, that can be applied to understanding for-profit misinformation that isn’t currently being applied to it. People who work on misinformation mostly come from communications and computer science backgrounds. It struck us as a place where the kind of interdisciplinary work that both ESOC and IGCC do, could have real value.

    To what extent will you be collaborating with the major platforms like Twitter, Google, and Facebook?

    We will certainly maintain ties with the people who are on the front lines dealing with the policy problem, which means people in the policy groups at Facebook and Twitter and Google. With disinformation, a large portion of the public policy problem is being managed by for-profit companies instead of by government. They're thinking about policy, but unlike the U.S. government or the World Bank, they lack mature policy bureaucracies.

    How concerned are people from Google and other companies about this problem?

    There are absolutely people in these organizations whose mission is to maximize revenue. There have been moments in the last couple of years where people have looked at it and said: This is an existential threat to our business model. If we don't get our heads around this problem and wrestle it under control, we're going to be regulated out of business. Then there are other people in these organizations who have a rational, well-argued position for why this is a really small problem in the scope of the things that they do, and commands way too much senior leadership attention. And there are people who view it as a fundamental threat to democracy and want to try and get the companies to do things to address it. The way to think about the companies is as complex organizations—what are the coalitions in them that are pushing the organization in the direction of goodness, and how can we help those coalitions?

    What kinds of approaches are being used right now to identify and reduce peoples’ exposure to online disinformation?

    There are strong arguments for things like getting rid of CDA 230 protections so that the platforms are liable for the content they host; or for breaking up the platforms. But I'm not sure those arguments are right. Right now, the policy bureaucracies, such as they exist inside the companies, are operating on a very thin evidentiary base. They have very little ability to analyze anything beyond their own platform, and so they're not making decisions in the ways that mature organizations that govern large commons should. We need to figure out ways to get them, and the government regulators who would like to regulate them, more reliable information on what's going on in the information environment, and what would the likely impact of different kinds of policies be? The barriers to doing that are largely institutional. We don't have the right organizations to handle the sharing of data between platforms in ways that protect anonymity and enable peer review and high reliability science, but don't go all the way to becoming academic research. And we don't have people who are incentivized to do the boring but necessary work of monitoring the space. We need to find a way to support institutions that solve those two problems.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1176 0 0 0 Manipulation and deception have always been a part of politics. But misinformation and disinformation are flourishing in the digital age, with social media, and new technologies like artificial intelligence, making fake content easier to create and disseminate. In this interview, IGCC expert Jacob Shapiro, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University and co-director of IGCC’s new research initiative on disinformation, talks about what disinformation is, who’s doing it and why, and what can be done about it.]]>
    <![CDATA[The Psychological Consequences of Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/the-psychological-consequences-of-conflict/ Fri, 04 Jun 2021 19:51:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1219 For each conflict we read about in the news—whether in Afghanistan, Gaza, or Yemen—there are hundreds, if not thousands, of people experiencing hardship, loss, and trauma. Unlike a lot of the global policy issues we talk about on this podcast, trauma is something we can all get our heads around to a certain degree. As someone who has worked extensively on this topic, can you give us a fuller sense of what we're talking about when we talk about trauma? Sure, and thanks again for having me. I’m really glad that conversations about psychology and mental health are being incorporated into security studies, because when we talk about peace and security, we're talking about human beings. So you have to think about mental health and wellbeing. It affects most everything we do and is at the root of a lot of behaviors and attitudes we are interested in as social scientists. In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), trauma exposure is defined as a direct personal experience of an event that involves actual death or serious injury or other threat to one's physical integrity; or witnessing an event that involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning about an unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of injury or death experienced by a family member or other close associate. So, it can be something you experience personally. It can be something you see happen. Or it can be something you learn about that happens to someone you love.

    How common is trauma?

    The vast majority of people will have at least one traumatic experience in their lifetime, but not everyone responds the same way. That variation is where a lot of research is being done—to understand why certain people who live through the same potentially traumatic experience respond in different ways.

    On the first day of the HSVT conference, Richard Tedeschi said that trauma is something that calls our assumptions and beliefs into question. And the challenge then is whether you can reconstruct those beliefs, which gets at the question of why some people are more resilient than others.

    I came to this work from working as a journalist on a project that focused on women who had been involved in conflict around the world. The conflicts varied widely; the time periods varied widely; the experiences varied widely. But for all the women I interviewed, the experiences had been formative, and continued to inform their lives, in really different ways. Some had a new sense of purpose and went on to pursue careers in public service or in politics, or dedicated themselves to raising their kids in a really different way from how they had been raised. Some of them had ongoing stress and clearly presented with what would be described as PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder]. And some were able to incorporate the experience into their life narrative, and it was something they viewed as firmly in their past. There are a range of responses, in other words, and though we have ideas about why certain factors might predispose people to have better or more adverse responses to trauma, the causes of that variation are largely unknown.

    How is trauma from political violence similar or different from trauma caused by other sources?

    That's an open question in research. There's been a lot of good research on the differences between acute trauma and chronic trauma. So, living through a single traumatic experience that starts and stops versus living through either chronic traumatic experiences or the constant possibility of traumatic experiences. Our bodies respond differently to a singular trauma than they do to chronic trauma—things like living in a war zone or being forcibly displaced and having to resettle and having ongoing environmental stressors. PTSD from acute trauma presents as being hyper aroused, having high threat reactivity, or having nightmares or flashbacks. Your body can't stay in that elevated state all the time, though, so when you’re exposed to chronic trauma, as a survival mechanism, your body will often downregulate, and instead of hyper arousal, you might present as shutdown and disconnected.

    A lot of your work looks at the ways in which trauma impacts intergroup relations and political participation and the prospects for reconciliation and peace building. How does trauma affect societal relations?

    In the Za’atari Refugee Camp—which is the world’s largest camp for Syrian refugees—we evaluated a novel psychoeducational program called the Field Guide for Barefoot Psychology, which was developed with Beyond Conflict in partnership with Questscope. We collected a wide array of both psychological indicators and outcomes that political scientists are interested in—things like intergroup dynamics and trust and prosociality. One thing that came out of that was a relationship we hadn't really thought of before, which was the relationship between emotion regulation and intergroup dynamics. People who reported being better able to emotionally regulate themselves—being able to identify the emotions they were feeling and calm themselves down—reported better intergroup dynamics than those who reported worse emotional regulation. Intuitively, that makes sense. If you feel grounded within your own brain and body, your interpersonal relations are going to be better. Although we can’t say anything causal about this, one of the trainers shared that, when he first got to Za’atari camp, there were a lot of small skirmishes happening, especially between young people in the camp.  As there was gradually more space provided to deal with some of the traumas they had experienced and to address some of the adverse mental health implications that had arisen as a result, those interpersonal dynamics improved.

    In refugee camps, I assume there’s a strong emphasis on meeting people’s basic physical needs first. Does mental health get short shrift?

    There is this idea that you can deal with mental health stuff once you get everything else taken care of—that physical needs come first, and mental health is secondary. But that dichotomy doesn't exist. When you think about the way mental health impacts interpersonal dynamics and the importance it has in people's being able to integrate into their communities, it's vital and it's indispensable. And it needs to be prioritized in that way.

    Wars might end, but that doesn’t mean the trauma is necessarily over. Yet peacebuilding begins in that context. How does collective trauma impact the potential for peacebuilding? Especially since, the stakeholders involved in peace building don’t necessarily have mental health expertise.

    The last point you made is really important. It’s critical to bring in people who have expertise in different areas, so that ideas from mental health are incorporated in ways that are accurate and make sense. I can give a few examples. In peacebuilding, programs will often frame healing from trauma as this end point. You go through a certain number of sessions, you get a certificate, and you’re healed. There can definitely be something cathartic about that, but it can create a sense of false hope. One thing that came up in the HSVT conference was the idea that healing from trauma is a journey. It's not an end point that you're trying to hit. It's often a lifelong process. A lot of peace building and reconciliation also starts at the point of: let's share our traumatic pasts. But asking people to share their traumatic experiences right off the bat can be counterproductive, especially if you're not going to provide follow-up care and you're not going to build trust.

    What interventions exist to help people in populations who are dealing with trauma, particularly trauma emanating again from political violence, war, and forced displacement?

    The Field Guide uses storytelling and science to help people engage with common issues that arise as the result of living through and beyond forced displacement. Each chapter opens with a narrative. You follow the story of a brother and a sister—their lives before, through, and after forced displacement. The narrative allows people to engage in the issues without having to share their own traumatic experiences. Then the Field Guide goes into some of the scientific concepts touched upon in the narrative. It helps people understand why certain things might be happening in their brains and bodies—why your heart might be racing, why you might have trouble sleeping. One of the goals of the Field Guide is to make the science of trauma accessible to the people going through it. And then it's paired with self-care exercises that were adapted to make sure that they were contextually relevant and could be done in whatever context they'd be administered.

    What have you been learning that you wish donor agencies and policymakers understood?

    That there is a lot of resilience within communities, and the goal of assistance should be to figure out how to provide resources to build upon that resilience, as opposed to seeing these communities as fundamentally broken. And at the same time, we should acknowledge that if left unaddressed, adverse responses to mental health challenges can have really, really important societal effects.

    Do we have any examples that show the consequences of neglecting mental health after conflict?

    If you speak with people who have lived through conflict, especially in places where there is intergenerational conflict or cycles of violence, people will point to the fact that their parents experienced violence and that it was passed down to them. There's a lot of good epigenetic research on the effects of living through trauma and passing it down to future generations.

    One of the things it would seem, intuitively, would help in recovery from trauma is bringing perpetrators to justice. But my guess is that in most conflicts, justice is not the norm. What happens when justice is unattainable?

    The fundamental question is what do we mean by justice? An important way to get at that is to ask communities and individuals themselves. What does justice mean to them? What does peace building mean to them? There has been a push to “serve justice” by developing things like the International Criminal Court. But the process of testifying in court can actually be retraumatizing. I remember talking to someone who was involved in collecting evidence in Cambodia about atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge. People had to provide their stories in detail—it was a very specific process—and were questioned about whether or not they were telling the truth. And it might deliver justice to only a few people; or it might deliver a symbolic justice to many people; or it might backfire entirely if the perpetrator is found not guilty, and people went through the process of testifying in court for nothing. On the other hand, in Bosnia, I interviewed people who felt a lot of pride about the fact that, in the court cases there, it was the first time that rape was tried as a crime against humanity. People were proud that the country had been able to set that as an international norm. I don't think there's a formula about whether specific approaches to justice lead to a feeling of justice.

    Have you had the experience of asking a community or an individual what justice meant to them and their answer surprised you?

    I spoke with women in Bangladesh who had been actively involved in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. When thinking about how they might want to have their experiences memorialized, I expected that they would say: I want to be seen as a hero, or I don't want to be seen as a victim. What I heard instead was that they wanted the room to have the complexity of their lives be held up in public. Not necessarily a finite recognition of oneself as one or the other, hero or victim, but wanting their own experience to be held in the public narrative in all its complexity. It's easier to think about wanting a statue or some sort of glorification of your experience. But just having the ability to talk openly in public about what you experienced is very, very simple and often not on the roster of things that we consider to be justice.

    What are some of the challenges of doing research about trauma?

    One of the things that really shone through during the conference were conversations about positionality, ethical research, and participatory research. All three of those issues came up on nearly every panel. Dr. Rana Dajani opened her remarks on the second panel asking everyone to think about why they were engaged in this work—what identities were they bringing to it and why did they want to do it? No matter what your identity is, whether you're an outsider or an insider, everyone needs to ask themselves a set of questions to make sure that you’re not producing unethical extractive research. In terms of thinking about what does it mean to do ethical research, we have IRB approval, but is that really ensuring that we're doing ethical work? Something that came up again and again, was that the most important thing is having community partners who can help you assess ethics questions. Things that often don't get flagged by the IRB are sometimes some of the most ethically challenging things. Another thing that came up, is how do you share your work? How can you bring results back to whomever you're working with? How can you make sure that you're doing that responsibly and accessibly and making sure that that's budgeted for? Ethical, participatory research has to be incentivized. The conference on Human Security, Violence, and Trauma in the 21st Century: Psychological Response and Political Impacts of Civil War & Forced Migration, was organized by Cecilia Mo (UC Berkeley), Biz Herman (UC Berkeley), and Justine Davis (University of Michigan), as part of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation annual Academic Conference Competition. Learn more about the Human Security, Violence, and Trauma (HSVT) conference.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1219 0 0 0 For people impacted by war and displacement, what are the long-term mental and social consequences of trauma—and what can be done to help them? In the latest episode of Talking Policy, Lindsay Morgan interviews Biz Herman, a UC Berkeley doctoral student and IGCC alumna, who studies the psychological consequences of conflict. Biz shares insights from the recent Human Security, Violence, and Trauma (HSVT) conference; and reflects on the relationship between trauma and justice, how trauma from political violence is similar and different from other kinds of trauma, and the societal impacts of collective trauma—and what that means for peacebuilding.]]>
    <![CDATA[U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/us-security-ties-with-korea-and-japan-getting-beyond-deterrence/ Sat, 10 Apr 2021 21:11:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1248 1248 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Why Statebuilding Didn’t Work in Afghanistan]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/why-statebuilding-didnt-work-in-afghanistan/ Tue, 17 Aug 2021 18:35:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1291 dilemma in all statebuilding attempts. The statebuilder wants to build a government strong enough to stand on its own. To do this, the new state must win the support of the people it hopes to rule. This need not be the entire population of a country—no government wins universal praise—but it must be a sufficiently large share of the population that it has room to maneuver, favoring some groups with a policy, and other groups with another policy, but not always sitting on the knife’s edge between repression and rebellion. In short, the statebuilder wants to build a state that is legitimate. At the same time, the statebuilder wants to build a state that shares its interests and adopts policies that it favors. In a country like Afghanistan or Iraq, statebuilding has proven enormously costly. Any statebuilder will bear that cost only if it has interests in the future political choices of the country. Humanitarian interventions are possible, but as the US mission in Somalia demonstrated, only if the costs are minimal. To pour enormous numbers of lives and dollars, and massive effort into building a state, the statebuilder expects to get something in return, and that something is a government that supports its foreign policy agenda. In other words, the statebuilder wants to build a state that is a loyal client. In countries like Afghanistan, this dilemma is acute. As a highly factionalized, Muslim, and traditional society, the interests of average Afghans are quite different from those of the United States. Indeed, the average Afghan is likely closer politically and culturally to the Taliban than to the Western statebuilders trying to steer the country onto a new course. Efforts by the United State, its allies, and associated non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to “Westernize” Afghanistan, in turn, fell on deaf ears. Democracy, women’s rights, free and open markets were and remain quite literally foreign concepts outside an internationalized elite. In Afghanistan, the United States could have a state that was legitimate in the eyes of Afghans, or one that was loyal to American interests, but not both. Read the full blog post on Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1291 0 0 0 post for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported online magazine, IGCC expert David Lake, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, explains why the US statebuilding effort failed in Afghanistan, and what the United States can do now.]]> <![CDATA[Why the U.S. Should Prioritize Security in Its 5G Roll Out]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/why-the-u-s-should-prioritize-security-in-its-5g-roll-out/ Wed, 12 May 2021 18:46:48 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1305 1305 0 0 0 <![CDATA[New Research Program Analyzes Public Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/new-research-program-analyzes-public-perceptions-of-nuclear-weapons/ Wed, 10 Nov 2021 14:58:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=141 Neil Narang—a UC Santa Barbara associate professor and IGCC research director for U.S. and Global Security Initiatives—and sponsored by the University of Virginia and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Nuclear Weapons and Public Perceptions project aims to tackle three questions related to public attitudes about nuclear weapons in the United States. Here, Narang shares his plans for the project. What does the public know about nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy? This is a really good question, and the short answer is: we don’t really know, but probably less than would be ideal. Our aim is to fill several major gaps in our understanding of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons. In many ways, public fascination and knowledge of nuclear weapons peaked during the Cold War. After Fat Man and Little Boy were dropped on Japan at the end of World War II, public revulsion towards the horrific effects of the atomic bombings fueled a widespread belief that nuclear weapons were not merely larger bombs; they constituted a new and entirely different class of weapon. Indeed, American leaders famously lamented this perception in the early 1950s, when Dwight Eisenhower complained that a “public taboo” in the United States and Europe prevented him from using nuclear weapons against Chinese forces in the Korean War. Some scholars have argued that this distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons is a key reason why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. However, several trends are converging to weaken this distinction, including technological advances to make nuclear weapons more useable and increasingly hawkish rhetoric from leaders in Russia, North Korea, and also the United States. Meanwhile, we are now many decades from the days when students would perform civilian defense drills like hiding under their desk, so there is also less collective memory of nuclear risks. Recent survey research suggests that the U.S. public may be growing increasingly indifferent to the idea of nuclear war. For example, one study showed that the U.S. public is quite willing to support the use of nuclear weapons, especially if doing so might save American lives. If the public comes to believe that nuclear weapons can be used “just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else,” as Eisenhower once suggested, then the use of these weapons may become dramatically more likely. I know many foundations and policymakers that are very worried about public indifference to nuclear weapons growing at a dangerous time. To this end, several foundations—like the Carnegie Coporation of New York, the Stanton Foundation, the McArthur Foundation, and others—are funding educational initiatives on this topic, and I know a recent Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security that toured college campuses just to raise interest in nuclear security among future generations. How strong are the public’s views about the use of nuclear issues, and under what conditions can they change? This is a good question, and it is one we’re hoping to help answer. What perceptions—and misperceptions—about nuclear weapons exist in the public mind? Although recent survey research suggests that the public can be quite willing to support the use of nuclear weapons, especially if doing so might save American lives, it is not clear that this trend yet extends to military or civilian officials who most immediately control the use of nuclear weapons. It’s also unclear how strong and stable these preferences are. A recent study by Sechser and Post 2018 suggested that the public’s support of nuclear weapons is driven largely by its ignorance of nuclear issues, and that they were easily swayed by small amounts of new information. Understanding the factors that shape public opinion on nuclear weapons may help to identify and combat public indifference. If we think the public can play an important role in nuclear restraint during crises and in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is critical to understand the kinds of information and arguments that shape and sway public opinion in this area. How do views in the United States compare to attitudes in other nuclear countries and among U.S. allies? This is also a good question, and it is an important long-term ambition for us to explore this. Strategic stability depends not only on U.S. nuclear attitudes, but also attitudes in other nuclear states and U.S. allies—countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Previous survey research has shown that public attitudes towards nuclear weapons acquisition and use vary considerably across these societies, but also over time within them. South Korea is a particularly well-documented example of this, where public support for nuclear weapons acquisition has risen and fallen dramatically over time in public opinion polls. We’re interested in what kinds of information and messaging is most likely to shape nuclear attitudes in these countries. Messages that reshape nuclear attitudes among American voters may not necessarily succeed abroad.]]> 141 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Will the U.S. Go to War Over Taiwan?]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/will-the-us-go-to-war-over-taiwan/ Fri, 29 Oct 2021 17:40:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=162 Tensions have been rising in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei, and the Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, whose party platform favors independence, has rebuked Beijing’s efforts to undermine democracy. Can you bring us up to speed on what’s happening in Taiwan—how did we get to where we are today? I'll answer the second question first, because it provides context for what's happening today. The Taiwan question originated from the inconclusive resolution of the Chinese civil war, where the former government of China, and the party and military loyal to it, the Republic of China, moved to Taiwan in 1949. Throughout the Cold War, the Republic of China insisted that it was still the legitimate and sole legal government of China. The People's Republic of China also insisted that it was the sole legal government of China. So, during the Cold War you had these two rival Chinese governments, one in Beijing and one in Taipei, both insisting that they had the sole legal right to represent China. That's how the Taiwan question originated. The United States was on the side of the Republic of China and interposed the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait after the outbreak of the Korean War to ensure that Taiwan would not be invaded by communist forces from mainland China. Fast forward to the present day. Taiwan is still governed separately from mainland China, and though Taiwan has never declared independence formally, over time there has been a gradual and persistent shift in the consensus in Taiwan, away from the idea that Taiwan still represents the sole legal government of China. Right now there is a debate in Taiwan about whether or not Taiwan should adhere to what is known as the One-China Principle, which is the idea that Taiwan and mainland China are both part of one China. The current government in Taiwan does not accept that view. And it's been because of that refusal to accept the One-China Principle that Beijing has been ratcheting up its maneuvers around Taiwan. The intention is to send very aggressive signals warning Taiwan not to declare formal independence. You talked about ratcheting up tensions. Can you give some examples of what's been happening? Beijing has been sending warplanes into Taiwan's ADIZ [air defense identification zone] and they've been crossing over in record numbers. Chinese warplanes have been crossing into the southwest of Taiwan's ADIZ, crossing over the de facto median line between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. Many US observers are increasingly concerned about China's growing assertiveness broadly, but specifically with the Taiwan issue. The U.S. Department of Defense said in a 2020 report that China's military is “likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force.” A top U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific warned that China could try to invade Taiwan within the next decade. Other experts believe that is such an invasion as farther off, but just yesterday, President Biden reiterated that the US will come to Taiwan's defense if it's attacked. Do you think the US is going to go to war over Taiwan? I don't think war is likely. China will go to war if it feels it's backed into a corner and has no choice, but China won't go to war unless it's absolutely certain it will win. There's still an element of uncertainty about whether or not the PRC [People’s Republic of China] can actually succeed in an invasion of Taiwan, so I think they're likely to be cautious. The government in Taiwan has been very moderate and cautious in how it's approached cross strait relations, so I'm optimistic about the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait. As for the US role, it's partly because of uncertainty about whether or not the United States will intervene in the cross-strait conflict that doubt arises about the likelihood of Chinese success in an invasion of Taiwan. The United States does not have a commitment to come to Taiwan's defense if Taiwan is attacked. The U.S. maintains what's known as a posture of “strategic ambiguity.” The U.S. has never said if it would intervene and that’s meant to be a way of keeping the peace in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan is an island, slightly smaller than Maryland and Delaware combined, and a little over a hundred miles from mainland China. Why is Taiwan so important to the United States and to the rest of the world? Traditionally the importance of Taiwan was defined in terms of its geography. Going back to the Cold War era, General Douglas MacArthur called Taiwan an “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender.” If China were to take control of Taiwan, China’s ability to project power in the Western Pacific would be greatly magnified. So that's always been a part of the importance of Taiwan for the United States. Over the last ten years or so, Taiwan has invested very heavily in developing its capacity to manufacture computer chips. In particular, one Taiwanese company, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, is believed to hold 50 percent of global revenue in manufacturing computer chips. They have a 90 percent market share for the really high-end chips—the ones that are needed to power the fourth industrial revolution that go into Apple smartphones and 5G networks. So, the world economy is dependent on Taiwan. According to an essay by Steve Blank, if the PRC were to take control of Taiwan and cut off the supply of chips in the United States from TSMC, that would set back the United States civilian and military electronics industry by about five years. And that is a lifetime when you look at how rapidly technological changes are occurring. Taiwan is also a democracy, a relatively young democracy, but it has so far seemed to buck the trend of democratic backsliding that we're seeing in some other parts of the world. And this is despite Chinese attempts at interfering in Taiwan elections, including spreading disinformation on social media. How threatened does China feel by Taiwan's democracy? And is Beijing finding some success in its attempt to undermine democracy? So far Beijing has not been successful at undermining Taiwan's democracy. Taiwan is highly sensitive to misinformation and it has been trying to limit the spread of misinformation. And I don't think Beijing feels threatened by Taiwan in that it doesn't seem like Taiwan's democracy is affecting developments in mainland China. The Republic of China was founded with the vision that China's future was to be a democratic nation, and after a century of revolution, warfare, and struggle it finally triumphed in the culmination of democracy in Taiwan. That was a remarkable success story. A former authoritarian regime has now become a vibrant, robust, competitive two-party system. If Taiwan were to be taken over and its democracy extinguished, that would be a disaster for the global spread of democratic values. Are there parallels between China's crackdown in Hong Kong and what people fear might happen in Taiwan? I don't think it's likely that Taiwan will follow the path of Hong Kong. Hong Kong was already part of the PRC and China's ability to enforce its political order in Hong Kong was always taken as a given. It’s much more difficult for China to project power into Taiwan. For a long time China held out Hong Kong as the model for what Taiwan would look like if Taiwan were unified with mainland China. The people of Taiwan were always skeptical about that formula and they didn't think the PRC would govern Taiwan with a light touch approach. The recent crackdown on Hong Kong has turned people in Taiwan against the idea of One Country, Two Systems pretty definitively. How have recent US administrations approached Taiwan? Trump seemed to push the envelope early on. Just after he was elected, he accepted a phone call from Taiwan's president, which was unprecedented, and there was speculation that maybe the United States would abandon the One-China Policy. Trump publicly questioned the One-China Policy, but then eventually he said he would abide by it. The question that is being asked under the Biden administration is, how much can the U.S. do to support Taiwan under the One-China Policy, Because the One-China Policy isn't fixed, necessarily. There are a lot of day-to-day diplomatic practices that are the result of interpreting the policy. So, for example, there's actually nothing written down [in an agreement] that says the United States will never take a phone call from the president of Taiwan. There's nothing [in an agreement] that says the United States will never show the Taiwanese flag, nothing that says that United States officials will not be able to go to Taiwan. That’s always been an act of interpretation [of “unofficial relations”]. The question right now is, “How much freedom does the United States have to maneuver under the One-China Policy to bolster its support for Taiwan?" What are the most salient components of the One-China Policy that are most important to what's happening right now? The most important part of the One-China Policy is that the United States does not recognize Taiwan. The One-China Policy allows for the United States to have unofficial economic and cultural relations between the people of Taiwan and the people of United States, but official government-to-government relations are prohibited and the United States historically has gone to great lengths to try to show that its relations with Taiwan are strictly unofficial in nature. But recently there has been skepticism about how strictly the US is adhering to the policy as it attempts to show U.S. support for Taiwan. Do you think the United States will change the One-China Policy? It's unlikely. Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence said that the United States would not change strategic ambiguity because, “the Chinese would find this deeply destabilizing.” So, there's an acceptance that the United States is going to maintain strategic ambiguity. The question is, if those elements are fixed, how much of the rest of U.S.-Taiwan relations is variable? How much can the US actually change with regard to the details of how these unofficial day-to-day relations are conducted? If you think little is going to change, and Chinese invasion of Taiwan is unlikely, then what's all this heightened rhetoric then about? I think it's partly an effort by Xi Jinping to convince the Chinese people that he's created an effective deterrent against Taiwan declaring independence and an attempt to cement his legacy. In terms of President Biden talking about deepening relations with Taiwan, there are ways of approaching that so that it doesn't become destabilized. One possibility would be a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement. As long as they finesse the issue of how to convey the fact that the U.S. does not consider Taiwan a country and that relations are still unofficial, there’s a possibility for the U.S. to move forward on economic cooperation, technical assistance programs, and encouraging Taiwan's participation in international organizations, in a way that maintains the unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations. It's where cooperation crosses over into the military and strategic realm that it becomes much more sensitive. What do the Taiwanese people want? They want to be treated with dignity and respect, and they are practical and pragmatic and there isn’t widespread support for a declaration of independence. The public opinion surveys show that most Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo. They may differ on what the status quo means, but there isn't much support for either immediate unification or immediate independence. One helpful reference point is 1995-1996, when there was a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC was warning the people of Taiwan not to elect a president [Lee Teng-hui] that the PRC considered to favor independence. The PRC attempted to intimidate Taiwan and it backfired because the Taiwanese people reacted strongly against it and elected the president the PRC did not want. So, the Taiwanese are not interested in pushing the envelope, but they do not react well to intimidation either. Are the Taiwanese right to worry about whether their so-called allies are going to show up? Ever since the United States abrogated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1979, there's always been this question of, “Will the United States show up?” Taiwan has lived with this question for decades. Because of the ambiguity, Taiwan has invested in other ways to try to raise the likelihood of the United States showing up. One is the semiconductor industry. When Taiwan lost recognition from the United States, Taiwan’s government started investing in the earliest stages of what would become the semiconductor industry. They tried to emphasize Taiwan’s democracy and economic and technological strengths to try to raise public support in the United States for Taiwan and provide a strategic reason for the United States to support Taiwan. Today Taiwan has what it calls the “Silicon Shield,” which is TSMC. Taiwan has worked hard to make itself too valuable to attack—or abandon.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    162 0 0 0 James Lee, a postdoctoral research associate at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, weighs in on Taiwan’s future.]]>
    <![CDATA[A Tribute to John Ruggie]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/a-tribute-to-john-ruggie/ Wed, 10 Nov 2021 19:11:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=723 1989 to 1991, following Herb York, IGCC’s founding director, died on September 16, 2021. A deeply engaged scholar-practitioner, Ruggie served in many roles spanning the research-policy space. Born in Austria, he and his family immigrated to Canada, where he received a bachelor’s degree from McMaster University. After earning his Ph.D. in political science from UC Berkeley, he taught at UC Berkeley, UC San Diego, and Columbia University. He was the dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University from 1991 to 1996 before joining Harvard's Kennedy School of Government as the Berthold Beitz Research Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs. John Ruggie made many pivotal contributions to the field of international relations. From 1997 to 2001, Ruggie served as United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, a post created specifically for him by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He was one of the architects of the United Nations Global Compact as well as of the Millennium Development Goals. One of his most significant achievements in this space was establishing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights—known as the “Ruggie Principles”—which were highly influential to lawmakers and the businesses community alike.
    Peter Gourevitch, an IGCC affiliated political scientist and founding dean of GPS says, “John Ruggie had deep ideals, strong conviction, and a capacity for hard work. He devoted himself to improving the world he lived in. He worked hard to strengthen IGCC in its very early young uncertain years.”
    Peter Cowhey, who directed IGCC from 1999-2006 and served formerly as the dean and Qualcomm chair emeritus at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy (GPS), says of Ruggie: “He left a permanent imprint on the intellectual agenda of the Institute and the field of international relations scholarship. John combined a creative sharp intellect with self-effacing humor as he redefined how scholars thought about the fundamental forces shaping global affairs.” Cowhey also recalls how Ruggie added climate change and environmental policy to IGCC’s agenda, long before it was de rigeur among policy think tanks: “While at IGCC, he led a path breaking collaboration among scholars exploring  how the concept and practice of multilateralism as an organizing principle for security and economics made the world after 1945 distinctively different from prior centuries. While maintaining the focus on issues of nuclear weapons policy he also put global climate change and environmental policy on IGCC’s long-term agenda.”]]>
    723 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Brenda Seaver]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-brenda-seaver/ Fri, 03 Sep 2021 18:33:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=733 How did you initially become interested in democratization and international relations—subjects you studied in graduate school—which eventually led to your career as a CIA intelligence analyst? My journey was hardly linear. As an undergraduate, I was a first-generation, low-income student, and my family in Oregon did not have the money to travel. It wasn’t until I dated a Lebanese Portlandian that I was exposed to the human consequences of war—in his case, the Lebanese civil war that began in the mid-1970s and forced his Maronite Christian family to flee Lebanon. It is no coincidence that years later I published a journal article on Lebanon’s democratic collapse. That was my attempt to understand the complexities of sectarian strife in the country that had so deeply affected his family. I experienced a more significant political awakening as a college junior in 1986. I jumped at the chance to study abroad in Greece, but the program was nearly cancelled following the U.S. military’s bombing of Libya that spring. Once it was given the green light, I lived in Athens and traveled throughout Greece. My friends and I witnessed anti-U.S. and anti-NATO protests first-hand (we pretended to be Canadian in the surprisingly rowdy crowds). After the Iran-Contra scandal broke, Greek friends, merchants, and students bombarded us with questions about “Contra-gate” and NATO, raising our awareness about issues we had blithely ignored. Meanwhile, our coursework focused on the history of democracy and dictatorship in Greece, Greek enmity toward Turkey, and Byzantine history. The latter was a riveting evening course taught by a Greek master storyteller who lectured with a cigarette in his mouth. After I returned to Pomona College, it was too late to change my major from psychology to political science, my new passion. So I enrolled in courses in international affairs, including a seminar on Middle East politics. My formal training in international affairs continued after I graduated in 1988 and landed a job at the NBC affiliate in Seattle, which paid for courses at the University of Washington. I studied democratization, Soviet politics and history, and the history of modern China under a brilliant professor who supported my research on what was then called “informal groups” in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, several of which would evolve into new democratic political parties once the Berlin Wall fell. More than a decade later, my Ph.D. dissertation fieldwork on the nexus between democratization and interstate war, funded by IGCC, took me to Ethiopia and Washington, D.C., where I met with Ethiopian government officials and political party leaders and U.S. officials, academic experts, and journalists. Fieldwork made me rethink my longtime career aspirations. After I started the process of applying for faculty positions at liberal arts colleges, I had a nagging feeling that I was heading in the wrong direction. I wanted a career that had the same excitement and policy relevance I experienced during my fieldwork. Around this time, I accepted invitations to lunches with foreign service officers who whispered to me over appetizers that “the spooks are hiring.” It was 1999—a time when the Agency’s analytic directorate started to hire again after downsizing at the end of the Cold War. I gave their suggestion little thought until my husband found a position on the CIA website for an analyst with my somewhat unusual background that blended international security, democratization, and psychology. I figured nothing would come of applying. I joined the CIA about nine months later.

    You have been an analyst at the CIA for more than two decades. What is an ordinary week for you?

    For many analysts, an ordinary week resembles the tempo and structure of working for a newspaper. Analysts get into work early to scan large amounts of raw intelligence on their countries or functional areas (like counterterrorism or global health) that came in overnight before their morning team meetings. Those meetings typically cover who is writing what and for which U.S. officials; who will give briefings and on which questions from U.S. officials or senior CIA managers; and what raw intelligence reports need to be passed to managers. Analysts who are writing current production—an article for the highly restricted President’s Daily Briefing (PDB) or for the World Intelligence Review (WIRe), for example—may have to work under very tight deadlines, or they might have days or weeks to draft their articles, coordinate them with other analysts and intelligence agencies, and receive edits from several layers of management and editors. Other analysts might focus on writing longer assessments, contributing to intelligence community-wide National Intelligence Estimates, or collaborating on operations led by the Directorate of Operations. Having published journal articles in the past, I can say that the academic peer-review and editing process is a cakewalk compared to getting articles through the Byzantine editing process at CIA. Earlier in my career, I would receive calls in the wee hours of the morning from PDB editors who had questions on my articles before they “closed the book.” Those late-night phone calls happen less often now. However, our Operations Center will call analysts to come in—at any time on any day—if major events break on our accounts that require immediate analysis. International travel is also a big part, and perhaps the best part, of an analyst’s career. That’s when analysts get to compare our raw intelligence reporting and analytic judgments to “ground-truth” to assess the accuracy of our analysis. Part of what I have enjoyed most about my career is the unpredictability of daily life in the Directorate of Analysis. Breaking developments overseas, new intelligence reports that drop, or quick turnaround tasks from U.S. officials can upend our daily schedules in a matter of minutes. Most analysts keep a suit or jacket at their disposal in case they get called downtown or into our executive suites to give unplanned briefings.

    In what ways did your academic training prepare you for a non-academic, government-focused career? In what ways did it not?

    The best CIA analysts have spent years developing expertise in specific areas, which began with courses they took as undergraduates and, usually, as graduate students. Time spent living overseas and learning foreign languages in high school and college is also invaluable for intelligence or diplomatic careers. Giving presentations in graduate courses, teaching undergraduate courses, and presenting research at academic conferences prepared me for the briefings and presentations I would give as a CIA analyst. After I interviewed for my first position at the Agency, my manager told me that my ability to scrutinize sources and write clearly helped get me the job. Today, with the explosion of disinformation in social and other media, evaluating the veracity of information, biased reports, and propaganda—often from foreign actors—is more important than ever. As for differences, I had to learn a new writing formula as a CIA analyst. Whereas academic papers build toward their conclusions and are often long and replete with methodological details, intelligence products present judgments up front and often have short, bulleted sentences that corroborate those conclusions. Our products are much shorter. Writing is crisp, jargon-free, devoid of most adjectives and adverbs, and gets to the point fast. We assume that senior U.S. officials will devote seconds—maybe a minute, if we are lucky—to skimming an article. A major gap in my academic training, which reflected conventional international relations and political training at the time, involves data science—a deep understanding of algorithms and big data—and cybersecurity. Today's undergraduate and graduate students can declare majors in these areas, preparing them for analytic positions in data science and cyber analysis/operations.

    How has working as a CIA analyst changed since you joined the Agency?

    I love this question, which I catch myself thinking about as I enter the final chapter of my career. In terms of organization, the CIA Director since the post-9/11 intelligence reforms is no longer dual-hatted as the head of the CIA and of the intelligence community. When the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the DNI’s staff were established, the CIA Director’s job became limited to overseeing the Agency. That was a major shift. Then came “modernization” of our bureaucratic structure under CIA Director John Brennan around 2015. That shook up the Agency. It replaced the earlier structure of four directorates with regional and functional "mission centers," which better integrate analysis, operations, science and technology, digital, and support functions. Modernization’s impact was much greater than the creation of new organization charts. I’m still trying to figure out what exactly changed and if the new structure favored operations over analysis, as many feared it would. One thing is clear, though: Modernization enabled analysts to work more closely with operations officers and assume operation-centric positions. Looking at the big picture, I have watched the Agency’s focus shift from an emphasis on the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War/nuclear era to supporting warfighters and countering Islamist extremism after 9/11 to countering China’s global expansion. Following the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in late August, the Agency will be challenged to achieve a balance between the increased importance of counterterrorism and China. As for collection and analysis, I think the biggest change has been in the direction of balancing quantitative/big data analysis with qualitative analysis (the latter being the traditional area-studies approach to analysis). The Agency established a new directorate—the Directorate of Digital Innovation—to promote and centralize data-centric positions. Quantitative methodologies, which used to be viewed as alternative or secondary by many, are now much more prominent in driving our analytic judgments than they were 20 years ago. This is a substantial cultural and occupational shift in the way we do analysis. As a result, the Agency has broadened the academic and professional credentials it seeks in analysts to include data scientists, mid-career professionals from the private sector, and cyber experts.

    You were a dissertation fellow with IGCC (1997-98; 1998-99), which meant that IGCC funded your research as a Ph.D. candidate at UC Irvine. Can you tell me about what IGCC has meant to you?

    IGCC funding was critical to my ability to conduct fieldwork and complete my dissertation in a timely fashion. Without those funds, I would not have had access to Ethiopian government officials, aggregate and qualitative data I gathered in Ethiopia, and the general familiarization that comes from fieldwork that can’t be replicated by reading books. I also would not have had the funds to travel to Washington, D.C. multiple times to conduct vital interviews. Before I advanced to candidacy, IGCC helped me to develop a professional network that would prove useful during my dissertation. I was able to establish relationships with other academic experts at IGCC conferences, sitting in on book-planning meetings, and poring through IGCC publications on topics of interest. Some of the contacts I made during those early years proved helpful when I was researching my dissertation.

    In an article you published in 2015 while working as a national security fellow at the Wilson Center, you wrote about global democratic regression and that the potential threat to democracy of the growing global middle class. Since then, scholars and journalists have documented widespread democratic backsliding— in Latin America, the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S. What do you think are some of the drivers of this trend, and how can the US shore up democracy at home and abroad?

    Although I could go on and on about this topic, I am not permitted to as a current CIA analyst. (Talk to me in a few years after I retire!) That said, I have been kicking myself for not including pandemics as a potential global threat to democracy, particularly nascent democracies with limited resources and institutional capacity, in the articles I wrote while at the Wilson Center. I also stand by my analysis from that period, which argued that expanding middle classes are not the panacea that some democratic theorists and pundits have championed; they can be a double-edged sword that can be wooed, as we have seen, by dangerous populist or extremist leaders whose actions undercut democratic institutions and norms. Like many Americans, January 6 hit me very hard. I had never cried at work—even on 9/11 (when I was in crisis mode and too stunned to feel anything)—until January 6. I told my colleagues that day that I wished I hadn't spent so many years researching democracy and democratization and learning about the fragility of even the most institutionalized democracies. Understanding the significance of the January 6 insurrection was emotionally overwhelming. As the last one in my office working late that evening, I broke out a personal-sized bottle of Brut that a colleague had given me months before for my birthday. With tears streaming down my face and my eyes glued to CNN, I finally drank it, thinking that no democracy anywhere in the world is immune from collapse. History teaches us that.]]>
    733 0 0 0 In our latest Alumni Confidential, CIA analyst and former IGCC dissertation fellow (1997-99), Brenda Seaver, who received her PhD in political science from UC Irvine, talks about the ways her academic training prepared her to be a CIA analyst (and the ways it didn’t), and organizational and cultural shifts at the Agency during her tenure, including increased reliance on quantitative analysis. An expert in international security, democracy, and democratization, Seaver remembers back to January 6, and the only time she’s ever cried at work.]]>
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: David Palkki]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-david-palkki/ Mon, 11 Oct 2021 18:44:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=739 How did you become interested in political science and international relations? I'm a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. I went on my mission to Germany and ended up living there for two years. While I was there, I became fascinated with people's stories about their experiences during World War II. You look at the old pictures from the war—we basically bombed out the whole city of Freiburg, Germany, the first city I lived in, except for the beautiful cathedral. All that beauty and destruction got me thinking about violence against civilians. There were also many refugees from Bosnia in Germany, so I thought a lot about their plight. It got me interested in issues of ethics and war. I came back from my mission, went to Brigham Young University, and took a class on international relations taught by Valerie Hudson. That got me hooked. I actually thought I’d study ethics and war but I ended up going in a very different direction, from normative theory to positive theory.

    Normative theory looks at questions of ethics, while positive theory is about testing things that are objective and verifiable. Social scientists are typically loathe to engage in the normative side of things, at least in my experience. Do you agree, and why is that the case?

    I certainly think it's the case that there are fewer rewards for social scientists to publish on ethics than something else. There's no question about that. Good luck getting a normative piece on international affairs published in one of the major journals. It'll happen occasionally, but it's not very common. Most academic jobs want an almost formulaic approach. In political science, your book, if you have a book, should have an intro chapter, a theory chapter, a case study, a quantitative chapter, and a chapter where you turn the arguments into math and present your formal model. And then you have a concluding chapter. The sad thing is that the case study can be complete garbage, and often is, but no one cares. Political scientists care far too little about history, which they view as squishy and unsophisticated. For similar reasons, there are few rewards for writing about ethics.

    You participated in IGCC’s Public Policy and Nuclear Threats bootcamp, which is one of our longstanding signature educational activities. What was that like and what role did it play in your early career?

    It was fantastic. It forced me into an interdisciplinary environment. There were engineers and scientists; it shattered any kind of disciplinary boundary, which was so important.

    You started graduate school at UCLA shortly after 9/11. Did the attack affect the trajectory of your career?

    Between undergrad and grad school, I spent two years in Washington, D.C. working as a very lowly staffer on the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee. When 9/11 happened, I was on the phone discussing graduate school with a former professor when the call got cut off. We had to run out the back door, and you could see the smoke from the Pentagon. I started graduate school later that month. It certainly focused my attention on security issues, as did the invasion of Iraq a few years later.

    You now work in the world of professional military education (PME). What is PME?

    A lot of people are familiar with the military’s undergrad schools: West Point, the Air Force Academy, the Naval Academy. That's called professional military education (PME). Then there are the more advanced schools for senior officers. I work mostly with lieutenant colonels and colonels—these are people who are fairly senior officers, and after they leave, many of them will advise generals. About 40 percent of my students are Air Force officers, and about 20 percent are foreign officers from allied countries. And then we have Naval officers, Army officers, Marines, and some civilians—usually people who work with DOD [Department of Defense], the State Department, the intelligence community, or USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development].

    Did you plan to go into PME?

    No, I absolutely assumed I'd work in a traditional civilian university or maybe a think tank. I came to PME unexpectedly. But there are a lot of beautiful things in the PME system that have kept me here.

    What are some of the advantages of being in PME?

    The interdisciplinary nature of the work here is something that I love. It’s a huge selling point for people who enjoy dabbling in other fields. My students are all practitioners, which is a boatload of fun. I teach an elective on nuclear weapons, and to sit in a room where half of the students have spent their entire career working on these issues is a ton of fun. There's immediate policy input, and you're helping to influence and shape people's thinking who will then, some of them, have a seat at the table.

    Do you feel separate from the civilian academy?

    Yes and no. I'm a political scientist, but I'm in a strategy department and virtually everyone else in my department is a historian. That's not a common dynamic in traditional academia. If I were in traditional academia, they'd also be much more concerned about traditional metrics of ranked journals and things like that. Being in an interdisciplinary department, as long as I’m publishing and people think it's good stuff, especially if it's policy-relevant, everyone's happy. If I were at an R1 school, the incentive structure would be very different.

    Do you find intellectual curiosity among your students or does it feel more like it's serving a rigid curriculum?

    With the students, you get a wide variety just like you do anywhere. Some are here to punch their ticket. Coming here satisfies a requirement for promotion. Others are very intellectually engaged, and voracious readers. It just depends on the individual. By and large, I've been really happy and pleased with my students. It’s not uncommon to have students who come here from multiple tours of duty, away from their families, in Afghanistan or elsewhere. They often see this as the year to save their marriage and spend time with their kids, which is entirely understandable. As faculty, we get annoyed when at the beginning of each year, generals come and tell all the students: this is your year to recharge your batteries and spend time with your family. As professors, we feel they’re here to work. The truth is it needs to be both.

    Your colleague, Larry Rubin, who is also an IGCC alum, mentioned that when you guys were in grad school, PME as a career option was thought of as a lesser kind of path. Yet, Larry says, these institutions epitomize the policy-academic bridge. Do you think that the link to policy influence is more direct in PME?

    I see my primary product, and I think the vast majority of my colleagues see their primary product, as our students. We're given opportunities and funding for research, which are actually pretty generous, but the priority is our students, as opposed to our research. But yes, I think we’re able to influence people who in some cases have direct influence. I had a student who’d spent his whole career flying a B-1. He'd never done anything with nukes, but figured that sooner or later he might be asked to do something along nuclear lines. So, he took my elective on nuclear weapons and wrote a master's thesis for me as well. And his next position was at Strategic Command, which oversees all kinds of responsibilities for nuclear weapons. That was exciting. I was able to teach someone and help him prepare to be a better analyst, advisor, and decision-maker. And I have opportunities like this every year. I think if people understood better what happens in the PME system, then we would get a whole lot more applications. The views expressed in this interview are of David Palkki and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government entity.]]>
    739 0 0 0 In our latest Alumni Confidential, David Palkki, an associate professor at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College and IGCC alum (PPNT 2003) talks about how a trip to Germany altered the trajectory of his professional life, and how he moved from an interest in normative theory and ethics to a focus on positive theory. He also reflects on the advantages of working in professional military education, including the interdisciplinary environment and ability to influence student-practitioners who go on to positions of policy influence.]]>
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Kathleen Hancock]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-kathleen-hancock/ Wed, 10 Nov 2021 20:19:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=757 You are an associate professor of political science at the Colorado School of Mines, an expert on energy and politics, and worked for ten years in the fray in Washington, D.C. What’s your origin story—where did this all start? When I was in high school, I was the student liaison between the city council and the police department. I got into politics at an early age, even though my family was mostly apolitical. When I went to UC Santa Barbara for my undergraduate degree, I thought I was going to be an economist, but it was too abstract for me. I quickly ditched it and took sociology instead. My first class in sociology was very political; I remember a particular lecture on worker alienation that was so interesting. It opened my eyes to things I had been thinking and feeling but didn't have words for. And as a woman, I connected with the coursework that focused on how women are portrayed in society. That just rang so true. In my final semester, I went to D.C. and worked for the National Women's Political Caucus. That launched my career in political issues.

    How did you get interested in energy and politics?

    I’ve had energy in my life for a very long time. There used to be a Hancock Oil company. That was my family. I used to go to Long Beach and there would be Hancock Oil gas stations. My grandfather sold out a little too early and we didn't get to be super wealthy like some Hancocks.

    Darn it.

    When I was getting my master's degree, ExxonMobil paid for my education. And then when I was doing research for my Ph.D., I was looking at the former Soviet Union, and particularly the relationships between Russia and the other former Soviet states. As it turned out, one of the big factors in their relationships was energy—oil and gas pipelines and electricity grids. So I was back into energy, but I still didn't think of it that way. When I came to Colorado, I was hoping to get early tenure. When I didn't, I had to reassess. I decided that if I didn’t ever get tenure, I wanted to set myself up for a career that would be important to me, and that could become something non-academic. I went to the mountains, to a yoga meditation retreat and had no contact with anyone outside the retreat for 48 hours. I did a lot of writing and thinking about who I am, and I emerged deciding I was going to take my interest in energy and make it about the politics of renewable energy and how we can help move that needle in the United States particularly but also globally.

    I had a similar career juncture where I was trying to make a big decision. And I did a similar thing—stepped away from life for a couple of days to think about who I am and what I value. It's important to do that every now and then.

    We really don't do it enough. Now you're making me think I need to go back to that retreat!

    The Colorado School of Mines is a leading global educational institution for science and engineering. You work in the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences Department. Why is social science important for understanding and participating in engineering?

    Great question. It's one a lot of our students ask, but more like: “why do I have to take your class?” My job is to teach engineers about why people matter and that they live in a global economy. You can't do engineering in a vacuum. Engineering is for people. It's about people. If you don't understand that you're not going to succeed.

    Would you say that the political challenges associated with climate change are more challenging than the technical ones?

    They definitely need to work together and too often they don't. To the extent that the social sciences get involved in energy issues, it's usually the economists that dominate. Very little attention is given to the political scientists, the sociologists, the anthropologists. So you might get a technical breakthrough and wonder why nobody uses it. Our role is in part to help students begin to see how money and power play this huge role in what we do. It's not strictly that the best technology wins.

    Before getting your Ph.D., you worked in Washington, D.C. as a lobbyist for the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and then as an analyst at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). What were those roles like?

    I loved being a lobbyist. We were not a wealthy organization—it wasn’t about fancy dinners. As I tell my students, it was all about the different ways you can influence people. The FAS doesn’t have grassroots, so you can't threaten politicians with the specter of losing votes. The FAS doesn’t have money to throw at them either. We had to win on arguments. We had to bring facts to bear. Sometimes we aligned with grassroots groups, so we would bring the facts and the arguments, and they would bring the people power. I loved that. Eventually, though, I began to feel like I needed more information. I was pushing the position that my organization wanted me to push, but I began to think, I'm not sure arms control is always the right answer. Getting my master's was an attempt to better understand security policy. After that, I went to the GAO. Unlike lobbying where you're moving really fast, at the GAO, you have time to really investigate an issue. I was working in the international section, so there was a lot of great travel. I was there for five years and left for personal reasons. I didn’t know what I would do in California but thinking about how much I loved learning, I decided on a life in academia. I decided to come to UC San Diego for my Ph.D. My fellow students who mostly were 10 years younger than me, would say: oh, did you take time off? And I said no, I had a career. It was not time off!

    What did you learn about how to influence people during your decade in D.C.?

    We tend to think that lobbying is about pressuring people to do things they weren't going to do, but a huge percentage of lobbying is actually working with people who agree with you. It’s building coalitions with like-minded lobbyists and other organizations, and forming relationships with the members of Congress who already agree with you. You're sitting down and writing legislation with them, you're talking about strategy with them. A lot of that means working with allies. As an academic who's trying to take your academic work and move it forward into actual policy, you want to work with organizations that are going to be open to your research.

    Your forthcoming book explores the politics of renewable energy. What’s the goal of the book?

    The main question I want to answer is what factors are behind U.S. states making real progress in renewable energy, and what can we learn from them to help speed up this transition? I've been focused on Republican states that are making progress or purple states to understand what coalitions are playing a role there. I just finished a case study on Nevada. Most theories in political science that look at energy intensity are thinking about steel mills and big industrial organizations that use a lot of electricity. But casinos use electricity 24/7. In Nevada, you have casinos saying they want solar because it's cheaper. They wanted to get out of NV Energy, which was not making progress in renewables. So the casinos pushed renewables really hard. I think they spent about $30 million on one referendum in Nevada. The casinos lost that particular referendum and ended up paying millions of dollars to get out of the monopoly. Now they're doing their own solar power and they have their own solar arrays. Cases like this show that you need to rethink who your allies are. Who would have thought that casinos would be your allies? Well, now you should.

    You are looking at Republican states, but you also look at states that have been successful. Is the assumption that Republican states are more regressive and Democrat-led states more progressive, wrong?

    That is the understanding we're trying to unravel a bit. It’s true that the big leaders tend to be Democratic states. There are so many factors saying that California, for example, will be a leader in renewable energy: it's got the resources, it's got the ethos, it's got the environmental organizations. What's more interesting to me is a place like Nevada, which, by the way, is blue right now. But it was red. I want to get rid of the idea: don’t bother working with Republicans. It turns out not to be that simple. In Nevada, we called it the battle of the billionaires because Nevada Energy is owned by Warren Buffett's company—the rare billionaire Democrat. But his company was against this solar push because he wanted that monopoly. On the flip side, you had Sheldon Adelson who was the kingmaker for Republicans, pushing for solar.

    That is cognitive dissonance on a massive scale.

    Right. But Adelson wasn’t doing it for political reasons. He was doing it for business reasons. He wanted cheaper electricity. There's other research that shows that if you want progress on renewable energy, in places not like California, you need to disconnect it from climate change. Because our country has politicized climate change. If you disconnect renewable energy and focus instead on jobs and lower prices, you pick up a whole lot of people you wouldn't otherwise expect to support you.

    The United States is generally behind our peers in Europe in terms of renewable energy. In the U.S., coal-fired electricity generation has halved since 2007, but a lot of that was replaced with natural gas. In Europe, which also halved coal-fired electricity, they replaced it with renewables, which led to greater emissions reductions. What are the political explanations for this kind of difference?

    One of the big factors is that the oil and gas industry is very, very powerful. The renewable energy industry is increasingly powerful and employs a lot of people so that they now have more political and economic power than they used to. But still. You're pushing against big oil and gas companies that have a lot of money. And then the United States became awash in natural gas, in large part because of fracking. That reduced dependence on other countries, which is often seen as a positive, and it was cheap. It was considered a “bridge” resource: let's use it as a bridge until we can get solar and wind to a level where it's relatively inexpensive. Also, in our country, people are sympathetic to the idea that government shouldn't intervene in the market. Whereas in Europe, having the government intervene in your economy is normal. Of course, this is often mischaracterized, because the oil and gas sector has had enormous subsidies in the U.S. But people sort of brush past that.

    How do you know that you've been successful in your career?

    Helping younger scholars move forward with their research feels really good to me. Seeing citations of my work means people respect the work and want to use it. Now I want to impact policy. I'm teaching a course on energy equity next semester. It's going to be overtly a normative class—we want energy equity. If you don't believe this, if you're not interested in this, this is probably not a good class for you. I was one of those people who early in my career resisted the idea that you could be an academic and an activist. That was a big debate. If you're a renewable energy policy advocate, will that change how you do your analysis? That’s the concern. But I think what it changes is the kind of analysis you want to do—your beliefs influence what questions you ask.

    What do you tell young scholars who are just starting out?

    I worked with a research group, where Ph.D. students would present all this fabulous research and say: “because nobody's looked at x, I'm going to.” I'd always ask—why is this important from a real-world perspective? The fact that somebody hasn't done something isn't enough of a reason to care about it. Why is it important to you, and why will asking this question make an impact in the real world? That's a question we should always be asking.]]>
    757 0 0 0 In our latest Alumni Confidential, Kathleen Hancock, an associate professor of political science at the Colorado School of Mines and expert in the politics of renewable energy, talks about the unexpected allies leading efforts to transition to renewable energy in the U.S., gives advice to young scholars, and explains why she thinks it’s possible to be both a scholar and an activist. Kathleen was a dissertation fellow with IGCC in 1996–97.]]>
    <![CDATA[Alumni Confidential: Steven Lobell]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/alumni-confidential-steven-lobell-2/ Wed, 01 Sep 2021 21:18:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=793 You’re an expert on U.S. foreign policy, the rise and decline of great powers, international relations, and international security. How did you initially become interested in global issues of peace and conflict? Some of my early interest in international affairs came out of seeing the Vietnam War on TV—seeing the end of that play out. It made me aware of the bigger world. I was also pretty involved as a kid. I participated in the Democratic Farmer Labor Party in Minnesota and worked at Common Cause in high school on voting issues. I also lobbied against the Reagan administration's proposal to sell AWACS surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia, and took a six-week trip to Israel. This was when Israel was withdrawing from the Sinai Peninsula and there were all sorts of fights going on within Israel about the withdrawal—whether they should or shouldn't do it. It was also the month after Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor. I witnessed firsthand the effects of government decisions.

    You started your career at the University of Northern Iowa (1997-2004). What were the early years in an academic career like?

    Getting tenure is tough. I worked at a teaching university and was competing with people at research universities. It was a lot of working nights, weekends, and early mornings. But we didn’t have financial stress, which a lot of people have, and it was a small town—I had a two-minute commute; we had a nice network of friends; we had good public schools. We were lucky. It was a heavy load, though. I showed up and I had no courses prepared. I thought I was prepared because I’d TA’d. I didn't know the difference between TA-ing a course and teaching your own course. It was brutal. We were in a two-bedroom rental house, and then my son, my second child, was born. He slept in the dining room, and I prepared courses at the dining room table.

    What took you to the University of Utah?

    Oddly enough, I lived in Salt Lake City for the first two years of my life. I love the mountains. I love the West. And when this opportunity opened up, thankfully they hired me.

    You are the PI on a Minerva Research Initiative grant, funded through the U.S. Department of Defense and the Office of Naval Research, that looks at why some near-crises escalate into full-blown crises and wars. This is a huge area. Give me a real-life example of why this research is important.

    So on the evening of May 31, 2010, I was supposed to fly through Turkey, from Israel to the Persian Gulf. And on that day, there was the Gaza flotilla raid. Six civilian ships had come from Turkey and were trying to break through the naval blockade that Israel had around Gaza. That’s what we would call a near crisis. There was the perception of a threat to basic values and a short time to respond. But it didn't tip into a full-blown crisis. Take a different example: on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah crossed into Israel and attacked an Israeli Border Patrol. Again, there was a near crisis: there was perception of a threat to basic values, and a finite time for the Olmert government to make a decision. In this case, Israel chose to escalate into a full-blown war. The question is: why? That's what we are studying, what we call near crises, almost crises, and why some of them escalate, and some of them don’t. The FAA studies near collisions. In the healthcare industry, they look at near medical misses, instances where somebody gets the wrong medication, but they don't die. We're looking at “almost” crises.

    What “almost wars” are you studying?

    We have four in-depth qualitative cases—Russia-Georgia (2008); The Second Lebanon War (2006); the U.S. in Iran, and the ballistic missile test in 2015; and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96)—and a whole host of quantitative cases. So far, we’ve identified 31 cases of near crisis that escalated and 40 cases that did not between 1995 and 2015.

    What variables seem to matter most in terms of whether conflicts escalate or not?

    We’ve identified five “baskets” of variables. Whether states are rising or declining is one, and whether that makes them more or less willing to escalate. We're looking at countries that are almost peers with the U.S.—the Chinas and the Russias of the world; rogue states like North Korea and Iran; and violent non-state actors including Hezbollah and Hamas. The second variable is regime entrenchment. This is about the stability of the regime, the leadership, and its institutional capacity. We find that sometimes when there's lots of instability at home, leaders are aggressive overseas. They escalate a near crisis to distract attention from problems at home. The third variable is stateness: the domestic centrality of the state, and whether it’s able to resist domestic opposition (or not). The fourth variable is the capabilities of violent non-state actors. And the fifth is the risk propensity of leaders.

    What are some of the key emerging lessons?

    Unfortunately, most of our work so far has been on cases where near crises did escalate. Again, the case in 2006 of the Second Lebanon War is illuminating. There was pressure to make a quick decision, concern that Israel's deterrent capability would be challenged if they backed down, a leader who lacked both military command experience and public support and was in the shadow of the previous prime minister, and a sense that Israel's capability was in decline. All of these things played a role in Israel escalating—and some of these can be better managed next time to avoid a full-blown conflict.

    You are a leader in neoclassical realist theory, and your co-authored book with Oxford University Press, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, makes a case for why neoclassical realist theory is the best lens for explaining foreign policy. So why is it?

    When I was working on my dissertation at UCLA, structural arguments were everything. It was all about the distribution of power and explaining why broad recurring patterns happened over time, such as alliances or wars. But nobody could explain why a specific war or a specific alliance happened. Neoclassical realism brings in what we call intervening variables—the role of domestic politics and the role of leader’s beliefs, for example—to help explain why states do specific things at specific times. So, it's a theory of foreign policy, but it’s also a theory of grand strategy and international outcomes.

    Those intervening variables strike me as really important for making the research practical for policymakers.

    Absolutely. Take the example of China. Structural realists talk about China's aggregate power, right? They say, well, if you look at China's aggregate power, they're catching up to the United States. And structural realism would say that as a state catches up with another, there's a tendency for war. My take on it is that what matters is not China's aggregate power, but its domains of power. Its air power, its naval power, its land power, its cyber capability. If China builds up its land power, it doesn't pose much of a threat to the United States because we're a naval power. If you go back to pre-World War II, when Germany was building up its land power, Britain was much less concerned. It's when Germany started building up its naval and its air power that it could pose a threat. Aggregate power doesn't tell us anything. Domains of power do. So, when the U.S. looks at China, the questions our leaders ask are: what elements of power are rising? How quickly? Can they easily convert latent power to an element that poses a threat? We still agree that structure matters. The fact that China is a powerful country matters. But the way China rises could be very different from the way the U.S. rose. They rise differently because of those intervening variables.

    How has the academic-research business changed since you were starting out?

    When I started graduate school and in my early career, there was a huge divide between the academic world and the policy world. I knew academics who did policy work, and they were looked down upon by other academics. They weren't taken seriously. Okay, that doesn't happen as much anymore, right? You can do serious policy work and be seen as a serious academic. The field has also moved toward explaining foreign policy, and grand strategic and adjustment questions. And Minerva is part of this movement. Our work on neoclassical realism also helped moved the field away from just pure structural explanations.

    You were a dissertation fellow with IGCC when you were a doctoral candidate at UCLA. What was that experience like and why did it matter?

    Obviously it funded me to finish my dissertation, but it also gave me the time to develop a research agenda. When I moved to the University of Northern Iowa, I was far enough along that I was able to generate the articles and a book to get tenure early. I didn't get there with a half-baked project; my project was cooked and ready to be published. People who come out and don't have that are in a spot where they're preparing new courses, moving to a new city, and doing some major heavy lifting, which I had already done as a graduate student. That was really important. I also met a lot of UC faculty up and down the coast who influenced my research. I remember sitting next to Peter Gourevitch at an IGCC lunch, and him asking me, “What are you working on?” I told him, and he said, you should include “Second Image Reversed,” an article he wrote about the effect of the international system on domestic coalitions. And all the sudden the light bulb went on. I ended up incorporating it into my work. So, because of an IGCC luncheon, I had a conversation that changed the direction of my research.]]>
    793 0 0 0 In our latest Alumni Confidential, IGCC dissertation fellow (1996-97) Steven Lobell, a professor of political science at the University of Utah and expert in U.S. grand strategy, international security, and great power competition talks about what the early years of academic life are (really) like, and why being an IGCC fellow helped him get a head start. He also shares emerging findings from his new research on why some near crises escalate into full-blown conflict—and why others don’t—and how escalation can be avoided.]]>
    <![CDATA[Culture, Personality, Gender and War]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/culture-personality-gender-and-war/ Tue, 12 Oct 2021 22:39:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=921 I think we often assume that decisions to go to war are made by well-informed groups of people after long periods of careful deliberation. In your recent work, you look at individual leaders—their experiences, personalities, beliefs. What role do individual leaders play in steering countries towards or away from war? Even when there are really well-informed groups of people, and they think really hard, the biases of individuals and the pathologies of groups come into play. But the question about individuals is a perennial one, and it’s hard to get at a clear answer. You might find a correlation between, say, older leaders and war. But it may not be that older leaders are more likely to go to war. Maybe it’s that, when things look uncertain, the voting public feels they can trust an older person more than a younger one. If you think about Winston Churchill—he wasn't in office, but then England went to war and it's pretty clear that people thought he was the best person to lead them through the war. At the end of the war, they vote in a much younger person. The point is: it's really hard to figure out what the effect of an individual is because you don't know if the driving factor is the individual or the circumstances that brought them there. And on age, it turns out that the younger leaders in our sample are twice as likely to engage in some form of international conflict compared to the older leaders. It's actually a really big effect.

    Many have assumed that former President Donald Trump was (and maybe still is) more prone to violence and to instigating international conflict. Conversely, I think the general assumption is that President Biden is much less inclined towards international conflict. Do you think those assumptions are true?

    That's a really interesting question. We've looked at a few different factors that lead individuals to be more or less aggressive as leaders internationally. One of the things we look at is age. President Biden is a little bit older than President Trump, but not much, right? So, the age factor is probably not that important. We also find that right-wing parties are more war prone than parties on the left. When you look at polling data in the United States, Republicans are much more hawkish than Democrats. On the other hand, when a leader is in office, there are things that constrain them. In other research, we show that if there's a Republican in office who decides to go to war, the Republican has to do more to prove the worth of the conflict to the American people than a Democrat who does the same thing. But a democratic president has the opposite problem. People are suspicious of a Democratic president in office who stays out of a conflict. So, the parties have these opposite branding problems, and the result is that they're not as different once they get into office as you might expect them to be.

    A paper you published in 2019 lists some traits that might make leaders more or less likely to engage in conflict. This includes things like: how much risk they tolerate, how ambitious they are, how delusional they are, if they had a troubled childhood, if they served in the military, their perception of danger posed by the other country. Do some traits matter more than others?

    They surely do. But it's really hard to figure out what is really driving things.

    How do leaders form beliefs about what to expect in the international system? And in an age of relentless social media, to what extent is that influencing how these beliefs are formed?

    That's the million-dollar question: what are the effects of social media, how do foreign actors intervene and shape perceptions, and where's the line between messaging and propaganda? I guess I take a longer-term view. People have never had tons of information when they make decisions about who to vote for or what policies they think are right. They don't go out and seek tons of information. They don't know that much. But they do know what newspapers to turn to that reflect their view of the world. Studies have shown that when you educate people in the specifics of an issue and then ask them: “What do you think now that you know so much more than you used to know?”—their views don't change. Even when they have more information, they don't change their beliefs all that much. Now, in the world of social media, the information environment is changing. People are getting information about politics in a different way. And I think that because it's so new, they don't yet know how to weigh it. If they see a post on Facebook, they aren’t sure how that compares to an editorial from the New York Times. Right now people are at sea in terms of trying to construct a reality.

    I did an interview recently with Matt Kroenig, an IGCC alum who teaches at Georgetown. He said that Russia and China, especially China, pose threats to a broad range of U.S. and that what we need to do is to change the mind of China's leaders. Can leaders' minds be changed?

    It's very hard to change anybody's mind. You wouldn't want to place a big bet on your ability to do so. Now, I think Matthew Kroenig probably has in mind the ways that we can structure incentives to change minds. And I do think that people respond to incentives. But I'm not sure that counts as changing minds. If you're the United States, you may be able to deter China from behaving aggressively towards Taiwan for a time. But that doesn't mean that China is giving up on Taiwan. That doesn’t mean its mind has changed. If what we're asking is: can China be convinced that full reunification with Taiwan is not important to China? I have very strong doubts about that.

    Right—deeply held values aren’t particularly amenable to change. That’s true for individuals and it’s true for countries.

    That reminds me of a good friend of mine who was a classic Oxford history don, who used to say: “where there is death, there is hope.” Sometimes, that's what it takes for change.

    Whether countries go to war also depends on the public mood. Democracies are often thought to go to war less than non-democracies, but you have argued that democratic institutions themselves don't ensure peace—who votes in democracies matters. Whose vote matters?

    Everyone's vote matters. But if we want peace, it's not just about the institutions of democracy, it's about the culture of the place, and who's voting. This work I and others have been doing suggests that a really, really big deal, when we talk about the democratic peace, is the enfranchisement of women. When half of the world's population suddenly started to have a say in political life about 100 years ago, that made a really, really big difference. Around the time when there were democratic revolutions in the United States and France, and subsequent democratizing revolutions through the 19th century, you get intellectuals like Kant and Montesquieu talking about the potential of a democratic peace. That is the great hope. And then you get the 19th century. And in the 19th century, guess what democracies are not? They're not peaceful. Not only are they not peaceful, when you look at these conflicts—the Crimean War, colonial conflicts, Spanish-American War—it looks like these male voting publics are not just acquiescing to war, they're actually pushing their leaders into these conflicts. Democracies seem to get more peaceful when women are brought into the electorate. It's not that all women are pacifists. All women are different, just like all men are different. But there are on average differences between men and women in terms of their support for the use of force internationally. It's probably the most consistent gender difference that we find in polling. And it is true across time and place.

    So, when you look at the U.S. and other countries, can you literally do a before and after and see that there’s less violence when women get the vote?

    Well, it's less violent in some places and between some countries. But it's not all a rosy story. There's a book by a British historian called Guilty Women, which follows on a famous book called Guilty Men about the Chamberlain peace policy of appeasement of Hitler. The argument of Guilty Women is probably right: women in Britain had a lot to do with enabling Chamberlain's peace policy. You can go back to the very earliest polls and see in Britain that there was a big gap in support for Chamberlain between men and women. And this leads to a question. Can a country that isn’t a suffrage democracy take advantage of a peace-inclined suffrage democracy? That arguably is what happened with Chamberlain's policy. So, in order to get peace more broadly, it's not enough to have a smattering of suffrage democracies. You really need suffrage democracies on both sides of any potential conflict to see a real reduction in the amount of conflict.

    Why do women voters reduce the likelihood of war? Are women just better people?

    It’s a fascinating question, and this is a contentious area. We don't know, is the main thing I want to say. I think the fact that this difference is so prevalent means that we should take seriously the idea that there is some element of nature difference that might be involved. Those are fighting words to some, but I don't think they should be fighting words. Maybe there's a different baseline in terms of acceptability of violence. That doesn't mean that you couldn't have cultural factors that override that baseline.

    You mentioned that culture can also shape whether countries go to war. Is U.S. culture more war prone than others?

    It's funny you asked that because I had always thought that the answer was yes. American culture is obviously very attached to firearms and is militaristic. Not that those don't exist in many other cultures, too. But I tend to think of American culture as tending towards militarism. But in some of these experiments, we found the opposite. For example, in one study, we asked people in a bunch of countries about an international negotiation. They were dividing up shares of a resource with a rival. And we asked them: would you be happy if your country got 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 90%, 100%? Would you be happy about that? And we found these really striking cultural differences, and gender differences too. In the United States, people wanted a 50/50 outcome. They had a strong norm of fairness. They were really unhappy with getting 40 or 60 percent. Getting 50 was better even than getting 100 percent on average. In other places, in Egypt, for instance, they don't feel that way. Getting 100 percent is way better than getting 50 percent. We did problem experiments to try to account for this. And we found that there appear to be some groups of individuals, both in the United States and in Egypt, who don't like to compromise, and they tend to have a more traditional mindset if you will. So there seem to be similar sorts of folks, at least to a degree, in both places. It's just that the proportion of those folks in the overall population seem to be a bit different.

    You've also written about blind spots in the United States where we assume that the rest of the world thinks or acts like we do. What do you think are our biggest blind spots right now?

    The one that has probably persisted the longest is: Americans think that America is perceived in the world as a force for good. In many places, that isn't true. A decade or so ago there was a poll done in Morocco. The poll asked: do you think the United States is going to invade Morocco? I used to like to ask my students: what percentage of Moroccans do you think thought that the United States was going to invade? I would get answers like 2 or 1 percent. The true answer was something like 70 percent. And the students would say: why would they have this crazy idea? Well, there's a reason why they had that crazy idea. And the reason was that at the time there was a lot of press coverage about so-called foreign Islamist fighters who had left their country and gone to fight in Iraq and other places against Americans. Many of these foreign fighters were coming from Morocco. And the Moroccan people, thought: the United States invades places where there are Islamists, so they're probably going to invade our country. Thank God we didn't invade Morocco. But it just shows the gulf between perception of America around the world and the way Americans see themselves.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
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    921 0 0 0 What makes some countries more or less prone to war (or peace)? What leadership traits are war prone—and what cultural traits are? In the latest Talking Policy episode, Lindsay Morgan interviews Robert Trager, an associate professor in the political science department at UCLA and affiliated researcher with IGCC. The author of the forthcoming book, The Suffragist Peace with Joslyn Barnhart, and a researcher on IGCC’s Great Powers project, Robert talks about the importance of women voters in maintaining peace, weighs in on whether the U.S. is more or less war prone than other countries, and discusses Americans’ key blind spots. ]]>
    <![CDATA[Do Israeli Policies Deter Violence?]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/do-israeli-policies-deter-violence/ Mon, 11 Oct 2021 23:21:58 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=943 Wars today are fought most often, not directly between adversaries, but through proxies. Think the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, the French in the Sahel, or Iran in the Middle East—powerful countries pursuing their objectives through local intermediaries on the ground.

    Deterrence with Proxies, an IGCC project funded by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Minerva Research Initiative, studies these relationships. Tell me more about the project—what question are you trying to answer?

    We present an alternative to the practice of countries putting boots on the ground in other countries and trying to buy hearts and minds to stabilize countries. When we started this project in 2014, we understood that in order to achieve peace and prosperity, in order to deter insurgents, you need to take into account that insurgents and the local government have different incentives. The idea is to align those incentives with the goals of, in this case, the U.S. or Israel or other power, by providing a contract, if you will, to local rulers that, through punishments and rewards, will achieve peace and prosperity.

    Why would a powerful country like the United States work through a proxy to achieve a goal, and not just do it directly?

    There are several advantages. The first advantage is that if you do the opposite—if you do it directly— that means that you will have to do it forever. The idea is not to stay in a given country for an unlimited time period. You train local people to help you out, then give them the power to rule in the way that they're supposed to rule. The second advantage is that, usually, local agents have better information. And they receive better cooperation from the local population.

    Is it cheaper?

    Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn’t. Afghanistan was obviously very expensive.

    As part of your work on this project, you've done a paper with IGCC research director Eli Berman on whether retaliation by Israel for Palestinian attacks can reduce future violence. What did you find?

    The paper tries to understand the relationship between Israel, Hamas, and local militants who shoot rockets and missiles against Israel. We look at what type of incentives or punishments given by Israel to Hamas stop Hamas and other militant groups from attacking Israel. What we found is that no matter how hard Israel tries to discipline Hamas, given Hamas’ grievances, they will never be completely deterred. There is no incentive for Hamas to stop shooting completely given that their requests are not being met by Israel. So, what we see is what economists call a game, where Israel is setting rules to the interaction, defining what it can tolerate and what it won’t tolerate. And that actually, in a way, constrains Hamas attacks. Hamas knows that Israel will tolerate small attacks. But bigger attacks will lead to retaliation. So, Israel is able to achieve what is called “narrow deterrence.” That is, Israel is able to set some rules to the violent confrontations, but is unable to completely stop violent interactions with Hamas and other Gazan militant groups.

    You have also studied Israel’s use of house demolitions—which is when the Israeli Army destroys the homes of Palestinians.

    The issue of house demolitions is a hot topic in Israel. The legality of this policy is constantly being challenged in front of the Supreme Court. The logic is: the Israeli government claims that it's very difficult to deter a suicide terrorist. Let's forget about the normative implications. But from a positive standpoint, I say, well, there are costs and benefits. If I commit a crime, if I'm successful, that's the benefit. But if I'm not successful, and I'm caught, I will go to jail. That's the cost. Now, if I'm willing to commit suicide, these cost and benefit calculations don't make sense—unless I'm afflicting a cost on the people I care about. So maybe we can deter a suicide terrorist if that person knows his kids are going to be homeless. House demolition has been used even before the creation of the State of Israel. It was enacted by the British Mandate before 1948. When Israel occupied those territories in 1967, that was the law of the land. And because those territories were never annexed formally to the State of Israel, the Israeli military says that it's legal to use it, because that's the law in those places. And they keep going in front of the Supreme Court saying that it’s an effective way to deter potential suicide terrorists. Palestinian organizations and human rights organizations claim that this policy is illegal and against the Geneva Convention. Because you're punishing innocent civilians, usually the wife and kids of a suicide bomber, while the perpetrator is already dead. These organizations also say that the policy backfires—it’s not effective. It actually creates a backlash and leads to an increase in suicide terrorism.

    Are house demolitions only used in response to suicide attacks?

    There are three different kinds of house demolitions. So far, we've been talking about punitive house demolitions. Punitive demolitions started as a tool against suicide terrorists, but then it expanded to most terror operatives. There’s also what we call precautionary house demolitions or demolitions for military purposes. The third type is called administrative demolitions, which is the demolition of houses that were built without permits. Those demolitions usually occur in East Jerusalem. It's very difficult for the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem to obtain permits to build houses or to extend their houses. And so they do it anyhow, and every once in a while, the ruler of the area gets them demolished.

    How frequently are Palestinian houses demolished?

    Right now, it's infrequent. It was very frequent during the Second Intifada.

    You also mentioned precautionary demolition. Can you say more about that, just to clarify the difference?

    The Israeli army calls them demolitions for military purposes, and basically, it’s when there's no claim of any wrongdoing by the owner of the house. It's all about the house location. So, for example, before the disengagement of 2005, the Israeli Army felt it was important to clear the Gaza border with Egypt, because there were tunnels being used to bring in military equipment and it would be easier to patrol the border without those houses there. Close to 700 houses were demolished. The owners of the houses do receive some compensation, but it's still a very difficult experience to go through. Usually, it’s houses by the border or houses that overlook roads that are used by Israeli settlers. Again, there is no claim that the owner of the house is going to the roof and shooting. But the fact that somebody could do that makes the house a problem. And so those houses are demolished.

    When a house is demolished, are people ever hurt or killed? What happens to the infrastructure itself?

    The house is completely demolished. Sometimes it’s an apartment in a building and they fill the apartment with cement. They give a prior warning—it’s required by law—but there are questions about how many days are sufficient. But no people are injured or killed or hurt in any way. But sometimes tenants will appeal to the Supreme Court. When they rule allowing the demolition, the army will come and say, okay, you have five hours, take whatever you need. It’s usually in the middle of the night, to avoid bystanders.

    You were looking at whether the use of this tactic would help reduce the likelihood of future attacks—does it?

    In the first study from 2015 (with Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi), we were trying to see whether precautionary and punitive house demolitions are an effective tool to combat terrorism. And we found that punitive house demolitions do bring about a decrease in the probability that a suicide attacker will come from a given locality during the month of the demolition. The problem is that the actual impact, while statistically significant, is not that substantial. The deterrence effect disappears after one month. And the effect doesn't spread to localities surrounding the affected locality. So while we say that it is effective, it may not be efficient, because we only look at the benefits. We don't do a cost-benefit analysis. If there is any cost associated with using this policy, then it's possible that these costs will outweigh the benefits. For precautionary house demolitions which is an indiscriminate policy of counterterrorism, we conduct the same exercise, and find that this policy leads to a significant and substantial increase in the willingness of individuals to commit suicide terror attacks. Again, we can’t say whether this is inefficient or ineffective, because the actual outcome that the Israeli Army looks at when deciding to conduct precautionary house demolitions is not the number of suicides terror attacks. But it’s still important to know that, whatever the goal is, this policy has an additional cost in terms of leading to a high number of suicide terror attacks.

    In these studies, you look at very specific slices of activity between Israel and Palestinians. But of course, there's all this other stuff happening that might be driving violence—like the occupation itself, Israeli policies that hurt the Palestinian economy, collective punishment. How do you take into account all of those different variables?

    We are very careful to try to isolate the effect of house demolitions from all the other things that are going on. We control for the pre-existing levels of violence, and for other forms of counterterrorism, like curfews, targeted killings, closures, etc. Second, and this is crucial, we rely on what we call panel data. Panel data has temporal and geographical variation. This allows us to estimate deviations from the mean for every locality and to control also for national trends.

    What’s the goal of these research projects?

    My first goal is to understand what is going on. In Israel you see rockets falling every day. Once in a while you see a plane or a drone and you think: why have we been doing this for 20 years and nothing seems to change? With this project, I learned that this back and forth between Israel and the Palestinians is an equilibrium. The next question is: does it work? Is this the best policy for Israel? Is this the best contract available for the principal? I think, given the political constraints, it’s a pretty good contract. Even though at first view it looks crazy: we keep shooting at each other and every five years there’s a major military operation. But maybe there’s no way out. It’s sad to realize but I understand something that I didn’t know before. Regarding the project on house demolitions, the goal is straightforward: is this a good or bad policy to deter terrorism?

    In your 2015 paper, you say that the main factors in bringing about the beginning or the end of terror campaigns belong to the political rather than the military realm. If the determinants are political and not tactical, then what’s the purpose of the research?

    The beginning or the end of the Intifada, whether or not we are going to have a ceasefire with the Gaza Strip, whether the U.S. military is going to stay in Afghanistan or not—those are political issues. We are looking at the micro level. So long as we need to continue to manage a conflict, what’s the best way to do it? The big political decisions have a great effect on the evolution of a conflict. However, between those big political decisions there is an army and there is a civilian population. The army is trying to achieve some goal and the civilians and militants are trying to achieve a different goal. What’s the best way to micromanage the daily fluctuation of violence while we wait for the next major political decision that will transform this conflict in some other way? This is the focus of my research projects.

    As a researcher, do you separate whatever you might think politically from the stuff that you’re studying?

    It’s not a conflict for me at all. I guess that’s the beauty of being an empirical economist. I generally start a research project when I have an interesting question and I don’t know the answer. For example, regardless of my political views, I didn’t know whether house demolitions worked or didn’t. From a normative standpoint, of course I have my own ideas about whether this is the right policy or not, but from a positive standpoint, I was curious. Do they work? How is it possible that Israel is using this policy for this many years and it’s so controversial and we don’t know the answer? Give me the data and I’m going to do the best analysis I can, and whatever I learn I’m going to write it down and show it to the public. First and foremost, I’m a social scientist, and then I am a citizen of the State of Israel. I would never let my views affect my research, but sometimes the outcome of my research affects the way I look at the world.

    In the best-case scenario, what contribution do you hope this research makes?

    I’m going to give you an actual example that happened in front of the Supreme Court. The army argued that punitive house demolitions were an effective way to deter suicide attacks. The Supreme Court said, well, we read a paper that found that it’s actually not so clear cut. For me, that’s the kind of impact I want my work to have. I want policymakers to have better information when they make decisions that affect the lives of a lot of people. I don’t know that I can affect Israel’s decision to use house demolitions or drones to attack the Gaza Strip. But at least they can choose to learn from my research and use a policy in sensible ways. That’s a good outcome for me. I did my job. I contributed something to society that goes beyond publishing a paper.]]>
    943 0 0 0 With fighting between Israel and Hamas ongoing, Esteban Klor, the Rosita Herczeg professor of economics at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, weighs in on whether Israeli defense policies deter violence. Part of an IGCC research project called Deterrence with Proxies, Klor analyzes Israel’s controversial use of house demolitions and retaliatory attacks, and finds that the evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. He also discusses how he balances his views about the normative implications of Israeli policies with his job as an empirical researcher. Says Klor: “I would never let my views affect my research, but sometimes the outcome of my research affects the way I look at the world.”]]>
    <![CDATA[Elections Are Under Threat–How Can We Protect Them?]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/elections-are-under-threat-how-can-we-protect-them/ Tue, 28 Sep 2021 23:32:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=949 election monitoring globally (1:12), poll watching in the U.S. (19:43), meddling in the U.S. elections (29:48), and threats to democracy in the U.S.—and what can be done about it (37:06).

    Foreign interference in elections is generally regarded as a bad thing. But in some cases, foreign engagement can be helpful, like when monitors help countries track the integrity of their elections. Tell me more about this kind of foreign interference—what do election monitors do?

    Election monitors are typically individuals who are sent by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or intergovernmental organizations to other countries at the invitation of those countries’ governments to monitor the execution of the election. They'll come before the election to monitor the media environment and how the campaigns are going. They set up local offices, visit campaigns and party organizations, and observe the voter registration effort. And then on election day, larger groups will circulate throughout the country to visit polling stations to observe how the vote is carried out. Afterwards they frequently observe the counting of votes. Election observers are supposed to be neutral and they're supposed to evaluate the election according to international standards. In many new democracies, election monitoring is quite pervasive, but election monitors also monitor elections in established democracies, including the U.S.

    How do election monitors strengthen the legitimacy of elections?

    The academic research on whether the presence of monitors deters fraud is mixed. Some folks have found that it does deter some fraud, while others have found that it merely displaces where fraud occurs. In my research with Sarah Bush, we came at this question from a different angle, which was: what do election monitors do to the perceived integrity of an election? When voters go into polling stations and see international monitors, does that reassure them or does that make them even more suspicious?

    In your 2018 paper with Sarah, you talk about there being a proliferation of election monitoring—how big of a proliferation?

    The statistics suggest that 80 to 90 percent of elections around the world are being observed by some sort of international presence.

    Wow. Why do so many governments invite monitors?

    Partly because the signal of governments allowing their elections to be observed has been rewarded by the international community. It can be a way for governments to attract more foreign aid and international press. The more these governments have become aware that inviting election monitors could be in their self-interest, the more demand there is for election monitors. And that demand has been met with supply. But there's a second component to the proliferation, which is the phenomenon of governments that intend to cheat, that actually don't have a strong interest in holding elections with integrity, inviting monitors in order to sell an election as legitimate to the domestic populace. In this case, we're seeing authoritarian organizations mimicking the democracy promoting activity of election monitoring. They send very small teams. They don't go to many places around the country. And then they issue a positive evaluation of the election.

    You conducted research following the 2014 presidential election in Tunisia, looking at the degree to which different monitors were more or less trusted by the local population. You found that the Arab League, which is not perceived internationally as being particularly effective at monitoring, was more trusted by the local population than the U.S. election monitors, who are highly professionalized and experienced. What's driving that discrepancy?

    Peoples’ trust in monitors depends on two key characteristics: their ability to detect and deter fraud, and their will to do so. We call that the capabilities and biases of the monitors. So, if the government invites monitors that have no ability to actually detect and deter fraud in my country, then I'm not going to update my views on the integrity of an election. Conversely, even if I think they are able to detect fraud, but I think they're biased—that they support one side in the election over the other—then I might be skeptical about the integrity of the election, because I don't trust that they are observing the election in a neutral way. What was interesting in Tunisia was that some of the monitoring groups—the United States, the EU—were perceived as capable. But they were also perceived to be biased. In Tunisia, the elections were competitions between Islamists, who want to see Islam reflected in the laws of the country, and secularists who want a bigger separation between mosque and state. Tunisians are very aware that the United States and EU have taken sides in that debate, so it makes perfect sense that they were perceived to be biased.

    You’re working on a project with IGCC, looking at circumstances in which election monitors come to a country, ostensibly monitor the election, and then essentially rubber stamp fraudulent elections, which is what you call “zombie” monitoring. First off: why call it zombie monitoring?

    It's not my term, but it has kind of become a term of endearment. The idea essentially is that you have organizations that have the bones of a reputable international organization, that mimic the structures of other organizations that have good reputations, but that are in reality, vacant on the inside.

    Why’s it happening?

    Again, it's these competing priorities. In order to get international aid from Western countries, you have to hold elections—you have to show that you have a commitment to democracy. But, as a leader, you don't want to be removed from power. So how do you balance those two things? Well, you have an election, you cheat at that election, and then you get an official body to say it was legitimate.

    Your colleague on the project, Christina Cottiero, wrote a post for Political Violence At A Glance about zombie election monitoring in Chad and Benin. She said: “When the U.S. allows biased regional election observation reports to go unchallenged, it implicitly accepts the compromise these organizations have made between full democracy and managed stability.”

    Yes. I fully agree with that. In some sense, zombie monitors give the international community cover for continuing to give countries aid because they hold elections, even though those elections aren't really that risky to the leader because they can cheat.

    Another kind of perversion of election monitoring, and something we're seeing increasingly in the U.S., is poll watchers. These are people who purport to monitor the integrity of the polls, but are actually there to harass, intimidate, and discourage people from turning out. Trump encouraged thousands of people to show up at the polls to observe the elections and Texas recently passed new voting restrictions that allow partisan poll watchers to have free movement in polling places.

     Is this something you're worried about here in the U.S.?

    One of the challenges for U.S. democracy is how decentralized it is. States make a lot of their own rules about how to execute elections within their states. It's different from other countries, which usually organize elections at the national level, and are very professionalized, with permanent election authorities and institutions that make rules for the entire country. Now, with the way the United States is going, you could say that our decentralized system is a good or bad thing. If we had national governance of elections, and we didn't have politicians who were committed to democracy, then they could do a lot of damage to U.S. democracy very quickly. One of the rationales for federalism was that states would be laboratories of democracy. They could make their own rules, and we could see how they play out before they actually become big national laws. Jake Grumbach, who's a professor at the University of Washington, has a really fabulous new paper on this called Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding, which is essentially flipping the idea of the decentralization of American democracy as something good for democracy and showing that it is now being used to test different ways to limit democracy. Some of the research we've published actually suggests that monitors have pretty limited effects on people's perceptions of the credibility of elections. Poll watching is happening in places that are already pretty skeptical of elections, places dominated by the Republican Party, which has now shown themselves to be skeptical of American democracy and tried to limit democracy in various ways around the United States. But there's a well-known phenomenon that winners of elections have much more trust in election results than losers. If you support a losing candidate, you're more skeptical that the election was free and fair.

    Right—in your research on the 2016 election, you show that prior to the election, Clinton and Trump voters had almost the same amount of distrust, and then after the election, the Trump voters were like: actually, we trust this election.

    Exactly. Trump voters were even a little bit less trusting than Clinton voters. And then the pattern flipped once Trump won. We saw the same thing going on in the 2020 presidential election: Biden voters were pretty skeptical about the integrity of the presidential election until Biden won. All of this is to say: we're not really worried about winners and their beliefs about the election. We're worried about losers. A hallmark of democracy is that the losers of elections believe it was a fair process and wait for the next election to try to promote their ideas and candidates. Peaceful turnover, peaceful transfer of power—that's a hallmark of democracy. We've seen that really challenged in the United States.

    Could international monitors strengthen perceptions about the integrity of elections in the United States?

    To be effective it would have to be more widely publicized. But the issue is almost beyond that because elections themselves have become so polarized. If international monitors were allowed to come in, if they had full access to places and the ability to issue reports that were publicized, that could help. But I don't see that happening. Both sides would have to have a commitment to allow that to happen. And I'm pessimistic about that.

    Meddling is another form of foreign inference in elections, and many Americans were concerned about Russian meddling in 2016 and 2020. Why do countries meddle?

    With Russia, you could say that the immediate goal was potentially to get Donald Trump elected so that there was a friendly U.S. politician in government that Putin could work with or who wouldn't sanction him. I would be remiss if I didn't mention that the United States is one of the biggest election meddlers in the world, and has done so for exactly this reason. A lot of election meddling occurred during the Cold War and involved helping candidates who were aligned with the U.S. to come to power. But I think a secondary goal was: even if Trump isn’t elected, we can still cause chaos, which is useful domestically for Putin, who can go to his domestic constituency and say: our elections may not be perfect, but look what's going on in the United States, the paragon of democracy.

    What do we know about the impact of foreign meddling in 2016 and 2020?

    Researchers are still trying to get a handle on it. It’s pretty clear that there was no actual tampering with the ballot box. The Russian intervention was more about persuasion and information, which is harder to assess. Certain information was given to the Trump campaign, potentially, by foreign actors that was then used in the campaign to help persuade voters to vote for Trump, or at least not to vote for Clinton. There were also social media disinformation campaigns happening at the same time. Both of those things are really hard to quantify in terms of impact. But it's clear that it probably had some effect.

    Is meddling a substitute for political violence?

    If we think about international political violence as being a part of the bargaining relationship between two countries that have a dispute, whether or not they actually end up in conflict depends on whether they can solve that bargaining issue. Cyber warfare and meddling are tools in the toolkit, just like any other method of political violence, to achieve your goals in a dispute. Russia and the United States have obviously had many years of international conflict and disputes. Russia could threaten us, but their threats are kind of empty, because the U.S. has a large advantage in terms of military power. You could try diplomacy to get the U.S. closer to Russian preferences. But that might be ineffective as well. But one thing that can be really effective is if you just change the leader of the country and install a leader whose preferences are closer to yours.

    Should we expect more election meddling going forward? What are some appropriate countermeasures?

    This is the next project for Sarah Bush and I—the politics of anti-meddling policy. We're trying to understand what states are doing to counter the threat of meddling. State sovereignty is a well-established norm—the idea that states have the right to govern their own domestic affairs—although it's broken in all sorts of ways. But there doesn't seem to be as much international attention to anti-meddling laws or norms. I think part of the reason is because the United States and other countries do some meddling themselves. They don't want to be victims of meddling, but they might want to leave that policy option open. The Library of Congress did a really great study looking at the anti-meddling policies of eight countries. A lot of this is done through election laws in countries, so for example you're not allowed to accept foreign donations, things like that.

    I was struck recently reading research from Pew that trust in government in the U.S. is at a historic low:

    “When Pew’s National Election Study began asking about trust in government in 1958, about three-quarters of Americans trusted the federal government to do the right thing almost always or most of the time. Today only about one-quarter do.” And the problem is worse among Republicans: “36% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say they can trust government, compared with 9% of Republicans and Republican-leaners.”

    It's sobering to think about, because it suggests problems with the fundamental structure and nature of the society we live in—the idea that we have representative government, that there's a social contract. The idea that these foundations are dissolving, is extremely concerning. And it's not clear what we're supposed to do about it.

    You've devoted your professional life to these questions. What worries you most, and how do you grapple with this stuff in your own life?

    Well, I think I finally understand how my colleagues who study climate change feel. We're living in an age where we've documented several challenges to the human species. Scientists have pointed to what would mitigate potential climate disasters, and political scientists and historians have pointed to the ways to build healthy democracies. But we're bumping up against collective action problems. For me, that's where the real despair comes in. Many of us who study climate change, or who study democracy—we can see what's happening. And it feels like you're screaming into the void. We know ways to mitigate climate change, we know ways to build healthy democratic institutions, and people are refusing to take those steps. Some for reasons of ignorance, some for reasons of self-interest. I didn't use to understand how much being a citizen of a democracy was integral to my identity. There's been many questions about whether we ever did live in a democracy. But growing up in Kansas City, I was brought up to believe that the United States has always been a leader of democracies. It's really kind of amazing just how much that has crumbled. On an ever so slightly hopeful note, despite meddling in 2016, and despite the obstacles to voting created by the pandemic, Americans have been turning out to vote in really high numbers. Scholars had, pre-2016, thought that when people lose confidence that their vote is not really going to be counted, they're going to turn out to vote less. But we haven't got there yet. That is a potentially hopeful sign—that Americans who feel like their vote is threatened will fight back.

    That's reminds me of a quote from Sasha Frere Jones, in a piece he wrote after the Trayvon Martin verdict. He wrote:

    “However thick the darkness, we drag ourselves into arguments, up to lecterns, because we have not let go of each other yet.”

    We're still going to elections. We're still casting votes. We're not there yet. So, if we're in this space, where we haven't let go, this feels like a really important moment.

    Yeah, I think it is. I don't see Americans letting democracy go without a fight.

    What is the one thing you want every American to know, if you could tell them anything? And what is the one thing you would want policymakers to know?

    Supporting the Voting Rights Act is key. The right of every citizen to vote, protecting that right should be up there with other protected rights. It's shocking that it's not. Now that the right to vote is under attack, it's important to institutionalize it at the highest levels. The Biden administration has talked very recently, about how to grapple with the filibuster, as it pertains to voting rights. Whatever you can do to get that passed, and to protect the right to vote at the highest levels, is the highest priority. To citizens in the United States, finding ways to execute your voice and make your voice heard is the most important thing. Hopefully we can take this moment and use it to strengthen political participation in the U.S. Just as an example, I was a campaign volunteer in the last election—I called people for the first time and went door to door. Even as someone who's as interested in politics and political science, I've never gotten actively involved in a campaign. This last election got me off the couch. Learn more about The Rise of Authoritarian Regional International Organizations.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
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    949 0 0 0 Elections are a core component of democracy, but the integrity of elections is under threat—globally and in the United States. In the latest episode of Talking Policy, Lauren Prather discusses U.S. efforts to promote democracy globally through election monitoring; considers whether international election monitors could strengthen U.S. elections; and answers questions on the threat of meddling. Lauren is an assistant professor of political science at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy and author of the forthcoming book Monitors and Meddlers. She is also part of an IGCC project looking at the rise of authoritarian international organizations.]]>
    <![CDATA[Global Value Chains, Risk Perception, and Economic Statecraft]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/global-value-chains-risk-perception-and-economic-statecraft/ Thu, 06 Jan 2022 20:14:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1011 1011 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Is the U.S. Headed Toward Civil War?]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/is-the-u-s-headed-toward-civil-war/ Mon, 03 Jan 2022 22:56:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1059

    The release of your book, How Civil Wars Start, coincides with the grim anniversary of the January 6 Capitol insurrection. Do you think America is headed toward a civil war?

    It's showing signs of greater political instability and political violence. The U.S. government’s Political Instability Task Force, which I joined 2017, has identified two factors that best predict where political instability and civil war is likely to break out around the world. The first and most important is whether a country is what we call an anocracy—neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. Countries most at risk of civil wars are those that are transitioning rapidly from one end of the political spectrum to the other. Think about Iraq in 2003, when the United States went in, toppled Saddam Hussein, and wanted to set up a democracy. It didn't take long for Iraq to spiral into civil war. But it can also happen in the other direction, when a country is rapidly moving from democracy to something less democratic. Think about Ukraine just a few years ago. The second thing is whether “ethnic entrepreneurs” emerge in these countries who mobilize citizens around ethnic, religious, or racial lines. Those countries are most at risk of civil war. So I'm sitting on this task force and we're studying countries around the world. And I start to realize that these two factors are emerging in the United States at a surprisingly rapid rate. The United States, for most of its history, has been considered fully democratic. Starting in 2016, one of the datasets that measures the level of democracy began to downgrade the United States. And in January of this year, for the very first time since the late 1700s, the United States was classified as an anocracy. We are now in that middle zone where the risk of political instability and violence increases. Then, in 2020, the United States was classified as factionalized, because our political system is increasingly polarized around identity.

    In your book, you note that, today, Black, Latino, and Asian Americans more likely to vote Democrat, while roughly 60 percent of white voters vote Republican. In contrast, in the middle of the last century, the ethnic minority vote was split between the two parties and most white working class voted Democrat. Even in 2007, a year before Obama was elected, whites were just as likely (51 percent) to be democrats as republicans. Today 90 percent of the Republican Party is white. How did the U.S. get so divided?

    I think it started when Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act. At that time, the Democratic Party had to make a choice about who they were going to embrace. The white population was starting to shrink, and the African American community was demanding more rights. If the Democrats embraced full voting rights for African Americans, they were going to become a fairly large block. So, the Democratic Party had to decide whether to double down on its Southern strategy, which was to maintain the support of Southern whites—a very important constituency for the Democratic Party—or support civil rights. Johnson correctly assessed that the future of American politics was going to have to be more inclusive. When he signed the Civil Rights Act, he turned to his aid and said, “I think we've just delivered the south to the Republican Party for generations.”[i] And that's exactly what happened. Republicans started making real political gains. Playing on racial identity is a strategy that has worked for them and continues to work for them. But we're starting to see that break down because a majority of Americans are now Democrats. If you look at how America is going to change demographically, the Democratic Party is likely to capture new voters and the Republican Party is not.

    Although many countries have cleavages along religious, ethnic, or other lines, civil wars are still relatively rare. What are the things that tip groups into violence?

    Most people think that civil wars are started by the poorest groups in society, the most discriminated groups, the immigrants, the people who are abused. That's generally not the case. Civil wars are often started by groups that political scientists call “sons of the soil.” These are groups who have historically been dominant politically and economically, but have either lost power or believe they will lose power. These are the groups that feel they're the rightful heirs to a country. So in Northern Ireland, for example, the Catholics were heavily discriminated against by the Protestants and were angry because they felt it was their country, their land. They didn't understand why they were second class citizens in their historic home. What triggers them to shift to violence? Catholics in Northern Ireland were peaceful protesters for decades. The shift to violence happened when they realized there was no way to regain power by working within the system. There are certain indicators that measure when these shifts happen. One is a loss in elections, or a series of losses, where it becomes clear that in a democracy, this group no longer has the numbers to win elections. The 2020 elections in the U.S., for example, were devastating to many, many whites. The Republican Party had unbelievably great turnout—they brought out millions of additional Republican voters. It was a Herculean effort, and yet they still didn't have the numbers to win the presidency. That's going to happen again, because the numbers are against them. The second condition that tends to create a loss of hope are failed protests. Protests are an act of hope—people go out into the streets to express dissatisfaction because they hope the government will reform as a result.

    So if people protest, it indicates that there's still some belief that the system can work.

    Right. I think the Charlottesville march ended up being evidence for white Republicans that working within the system wasn't going to work for them. In Charlottesville, far-right groups came together, they coordinated, they marched, they chanted, “we will not be replaced.” These were people who thought they were doing the right thing and that there would be no consequences because this is “their” America. But not only did Charlottesville have no effect—for example, it did not cause radical change in U.S. immigration policy—it led to the arrest and deplatforming [from social media] of many of the participants. The same thing is happening to the insurrectionists. What feeds loss of hope is a sense that working within the system doesn’t work and in fact makes life worse and harder. That's when you begin to see extremists turn to violence to work outside the system.

    You describe in your book the moment of lost hope in Northern Ireland, where the Catholic community, faced with Protestant provocation and the brutality of British troops, stopped believing that nonviolent means could achieve their goals. And that was the beginning of the violent era of the IRA.

    But when I think about the Republican base in the U.S., which I know is diverse in its own right, and includes people of different income and education levels, I find myself wondering whether this community’s grievance is being manipulated or manufactured by politicians who have an interest in stoking that resentment? What do you think?

    It’s not manufactured at all. One of the interesting things about sons of the soil across the world, is that they don't see their privilege. To them, the fact that the country's official language is their language is the way it should be. The fact that they celebrate their holidays is the way it should be. They don't see their privilege, but they do see their own social decline. They see other groups in society who are doing better than them, and that creates a lot of resentment. In the United States, the lives of the white working class have not improved in terms of income, in terms of the outcomes for their children, in terms of employment levels, in terms of home ownership. They've been suffering disproportionately from the opioid crisis. Their grievances are real. And they look at the rich coastal cities, and they see people who don't look like them who are benefiting enormously from the new economy and they are resentful. Ethnic entrepreneurs take advantage of this situation. They realize there's a disaffected group, and they know that if they play on ethnicity, they can get support that will catapult them into political power. The classic example of this is Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. He was a member of the Communist Party when Yugoslavia disintegrated, and went from being in political power to facing competitive elections. And the Yugoslav citizens who were now independent of the Soviet Union didn't love the communists. He was really very savvy. He realized that demographically, there were more Serbs in Yugoslavia than any other ethnic group, so by fearmongering, he convinced them to vote as a bloc against the Croats, who he said would slaughter the Serbs if they gained power. If the grievances weren’t real on some level, then mouthpieces like Milosevic wouldn’t gain any traction. But people like Milosevic are playing on something that does exist. They just amplify it and exaggerate it and manipulate it. That's exactly what Trump did. He was in a very crowded group of Republican politicians in 2016. Nobody thought he had a chance. Then he started talking about immigrants taking American jobs. That catapulted him to the forefront of Republican candidates—it was a message that resonated. Once he figured out that it worked, he was very entrepreneurial about exploiting it.

    You write about social media as being an accelerant to polarization. What's the problem with social media, and what role is it playing in the U.S.?

    The 20th century was the century of democratization. It reached a peak in 2006 and reversed after that. V-Dem called 2020 the year of autocratization, because every year since 2006, more democracies have declined than have become more democratic. So we are in a period of democratic backsliding. And it's not even the new, fragile democracies that are withering away. It's the most liberal democracies. The United States, the UK, Belgium. Why are these once powerful liberal democracies declining? I think a lot of it has to do with the amount of misinformation and disinformation that is being spread and amplified on social media. People can put whatever they want on social media for the most part, and I actually don't think we should censor content. What we shouldn't be doing is creating algorithms that take the most incendiary, most hateful messages and put them in front of the biggest possible audience. On social media, if you “like” a kitten being pet by a police officer, you will be fed something about the Police Benevolent associations. And if you look at that, you will be directed into far-right content related to the police. It happens very quickly. And social media companies—and Facebook is the worst of them—know this is happening. And they're not changing their algorithms, because this is the business model that makes them the most money.

    You write that James Madison and Alexander Hamilton feared that factionalism would undermine American democracy. But they thought it would take the form of property owners protecting their wealth. What you show is factionalism that’s identity-based, not class-based. At the same time, people don't have a primordial instinct to kill each other. Grievance must be stoked, and look the person doing the stoking—watch their bank accounts. Are they motivated by identity stuff? Or is it about protecting their wealth? Were Madison and Hamilton right?

    I think they were right. It's either about protecting their property or their power, which often go hand in hand. I'm sure there are individuals who are stoking racial division here in the United States who are true believers. They believe that white Americans have a right to this country. They believe the ideals that white people hold are better. But I think those people are the exceptions.

    I was really moved when I read the story of Berina and Daris—Bosnians living in Sarajevo, who were educated, had great jobs, a diverse group of fun friends, and then watched as their world disintegrated around them. And they didn’t really realize what was happening until it was already well underway. I could see myself in that story. It was disquieting and sobering. We are living in fraught, uncertain times. What can ordinary Americans do, and are there any reasons to be hopeful?

    I do think there is hope. There's hope on many levels. The single most important thing that we as a country can do is to regulate social media. Don't make it easy for people to place incendiary information in the hands of your citizens who are increasingly getting all of their news online. What can we as individual citizens do? Listen, the power of voting is really important. In a good year, maybe half of Americans vote. Voting matters a lot, turnout matters a lot. If you could increase turnout across the board—Republicans, Democrats—if you had 90 percent of Americans voting, we would have a very, very different Congress. Individuals can knock on doors; the local ground game is really, really important. Turn out to vote yourself and convince others to go out to vote, especially young people, who are going to have to live with these policies for a long time. Learn more about IGCC’s Future of Democracy initiative. [i] Specifically, Lyndon Johnson said: “We [the democrats] have lost the South for a generation.” https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/10/remarks-president-lbj-presidential-library-civil-rights-summit
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1059 0 0 0 On the anniversary of the January 6 U.S. Capitol insurrection, many are asking whether increased political violence is in the United States’ future. In a new episode of the Talking Policy podcast, we talk with Barbara Walter about her new book, How Civil Wars Start, and about the factors that increase the likelihood that countries will turn to violence, and their growing presence in American life. Walter, a leading authority on international security and civil wars who helps run the award-winning blog Political Violence At a Glance, is a professor of political science at UC San Diego and a research affiliate at IGCC.]]>
    <![CDATA[Remembering Herb York]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/remembering-herb-york/ Mon, 01 Nov 2021 17:23:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1148 Making Weapons, Talking Peace, encapsulates the seemingly contradictory nature of York’s professional contributions. Despite playing a key role in the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb, York’s most famous quote emphasized their destructive potential: “There is no such thing as a good nuclear weapons system. There is no way to achieve, in the sound sense, national security through nuclear weapons.” York was instrumental in the creation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, working on the electromagnetic separation of uranium-235 for the Manhattan Project, overseeing programs that included work developing the hydrogen bomb as the first director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and acting as the first chief scientist for the Advanced Research Projects Agency at the Pentagon, where he directed space and anti-missile research. Later in his career, York became an influential voice for disarmament and nonproliferation. Throughout the 1960s, he acted as an adviser to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, simultaneously serving as UC San Diego’s first chancellor from 1961–1964 (and later from 1970–1972). Under the Carter administration, he was the United States ambassador to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty talks in Geneva, where he led an attempt to establish a comprehensive nuclear test ban with the USSR. And in 1983, through a determination by California Governor Jerry Brown and University of California (UC) President David Saxon that the UCs should not help to create weapons through their management of two national labs unless they simultaneously did more to prevent these weapons from being used, IGCC was created, with York at the helm. According to his daughter Rachel, York came to a three-point conclusion about maintaining security in a world with bombs that could level entire cities: 1) defense of the population is impossible in the nuclear era, 2) our national security dilemma has no technical solution, and 3) our only real hope for the long run lies in working out a political solution. Photo courtesy of Life Magazine. That insight shaped the mold in which IGCC was cast, as an institute committed to anticipating and addressing global threats to peace and prosperity that can benefit from global cooperation to solve. As director of IGCC, York helped to establish a model for influencing policy through rigorous research, seminars, informal diplomatic dialogues, training programs, and a strong presence in Washington, D.C., bringing together experts from government, academia, and the private sector to generate fresh thinking on the most pressing challenges of the day. Since its inception, IGCC has awarded over 600 fellowships to doctoral students, held dozens of track 1.5 dialogues, and become a recognized leader in international security, the Asia-Pacific, and nuclear nonproliferation. IGCC’s success can be traced back to York’s multidisciplinary approach and passion for real-world relevance. “Herb York had the ideal mix of skill-sets and experience to build IGCC,” says IGCC director Tai Ming Cheung. “He was a cutting-edge scientist who embraced politics and international relations. He was a seasoned high-level government administrator who also fit seamlessly into academic life. He was passionate about ensuring the national security of the United States through the most advanced and destructive technological capabilities that the world had ever seen, but was equally driven to mitigate their use and to reduce their proliferation through dialogue and engagement with adversaries. Herb’s genius in bridging these different worlds is what makes IGCC an engine of original research and insights.” York’s desire to direct knowledge towards real-world change is still alive at IGCC. Today, IGCC conducts research, engages policymakers, and trains the next generation of peacemakers across a range of social science disciplines—including in fields outside traditional international security domains, such as economic development, climate change, geoeconomics, great power competition, democracy, and disinformation. Despite his extensive resume of executive positions and prestigious roles in research, government, and academia, York was well-known by his colleagues as a witty jokester, passionate storyteller, and down-to-earth colleague and friend. Perhaps thanks in part to his humble upbringing in Rochester, New York, his amiable demeanor set him apart from the technocratic, ego-driven personalities of D.C. But his charisma and charm are perhaps explained best in a quote from his colleague at UC San Diego, quoted in the Los Angeles Times, who once said about people working on research for nuclear weapons: “There are the Strangeloves, there are the dour, existential thinkers, there are the efficient, white-shirted Rand Corp. automatons, and then there are the human beings. Herb is a human being.” (Los Angeles Times obituary by Tony Perry)

    Herb York: A Life in Pictures

    IGCC thanks Rachel York for providing photos and stories for this tribute, and the York family, for their ongoing support of the Herb York Dissertation Fellowship.]]>
    1148 0 0 0 Photo courtesy of Life Magazine.]]>
    <![CDATA[Six Questions on North Korea Answered]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/six-questions-on-north-korea-answered/ Thu, 21 Oct 2021 18:15:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1160 North Korea successfully launched a ballistic missile earlier this week. How has a poor, isolated country been able to develop a robust nuclear and ballistic weapons program? North Korea initially borrowed and reverse-engineered technologies from abroad; it is possible that the recent missile that was tested has a lineage to Russian designs. But those days are largely past as the country has invested heavily in the program and mastered sanctions evasion to get needed inputs from abroad. The main point is not the particular test, which appears to have been a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Rather, the striking development is the commitment made at the Eighth Party Congress in January to a host of technological improvements, from cruise and hypersonic missiles to new conventional capabilities.

    What is the significance of the launch for the US and its allies?

    North Korea naturally worries about the survivability of its nuclear and missile forces: whether they can be taken out in a crisis or whether they will be able to retain a so-called second-strike capability. If the force is not survivable, then it doesn’t serve the purpose of deterring the US. Virtually all of the recent tests appear to have this objective in mind: launching from trains, employing fueling techniques that permit more rapid launch, and of course the SLBM launch.

    Do the US and its allies need to be worried about an attack from North Korea? What would be the warning signs that we should worry?

    The chance of either a nuclear “bolt from the blue” or large-scale conventional attack is slim. Despite cycles of provocation, deterrence on the peninsula has generally worked well since the armistice was signed in 1953, with the alliance playing a critical role. All of the worry centers on what might happen during a crisis, such as the “fire and fury” period in late 2017. Could we find ourselves in a situation amidst rising tensions where one or both sides felt they needed to escalate, or even launch? And of course if a wider war did come to the peninsula—even if an extremely unlikely event—would American and South Korean capability to fight it be affected by North Korean capabilities? These now include an increasing array of options, such as striking American bases in the region or even attacking Japan. Again, such scenarios appear unlikely but it is the job of military planners to worry about them.

    How does the Kim family hold onto power? Would Kim Jong-un’s government ever be overturned?

    A number of pundits have made the wager of predicting imminent collapse, but needless to say that bet has been a losing one. The sources of regime stability in the North are both ideational and rooted in coercion and violence. On the one hand, the regime has proven surprisingly successful in building a nationalist narrative of survival in the face of adversity; the propaganda machine is relentless. Yet the regime has also figured out how to mitigate risk through a variety of well-known political strategies,  such as paying off elites in the capital city, largely keeping the military happy and developing complex systems of surveillance and monitoring, not only in society as a whole but in the party and  army as well. Could an unexpected crisis—such as COVID-19—put the regime at risk? We cannot rule it out, but to date we see few visible signs of either major challenges from within the elite or from the mass public. Another source of support is of course external. China shifted to a much tougher sanctions posture in 2016–7, signing on to UNSC resolutions. But since that time, sanctions evasion has gone up and China appears to have shifted course following the Xi-Kim summits of 2018–19. Quite obviously, China remains a major player on this issue and its intentions at the moment remain somewhat opaque.

    Why does North Korea have such a fraught relationship with its neighbors, and the US specifically?

    The sources of the tensions on the peninsula go all the way back to its division in the aftermath of the war in the Pacific and the American and Soviet occupations, each of which sought to influence developments in their zones to their liking. Needless to say given the coming of the Cold War, those visions were antithetical. The Korean War was a defining moment in the broader Cold War, leading directly to the US-ROK alliance. Kim Il-sung quickly outgrew Soviet tutelage, going his own way as early as the late 1950s and consistently shunning the reformist experiments in the Soviet Union. A key part of the North Korean national narrative has centered on its grit in standing up to Japanese and American imperialism, and to the “puppet” regime in the South. And of course as the country’s nuclear and missile capabilities have expanded under Kim Jong-un, a path toward reconciliation seems harder and harder to achieve.

    How can the Biden administration ease tensions?

    The Biden administration has said the right things and has very capable diplomats on this brief. The US is willing to talk to the North Koreans without preconditions, any time any place. But the Biden administration has been less than clear about what it is willing to offer to move those negotiations along. The current team has recognized that any diplomatic process will need to accept interim steps in which concessions are made on both sides; we will not jump directly into an Iran-style deal with all commitments made more or less at once. But what interim trades would the United States and South Korea accept? Would they trade some initial moves, for example in shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear complex, for partial sanctions relief? And as noted above, China’s voice on these questions will be important too, as diplomacy is likely to involve North-South initiatives, US-North Korea talks, and a possible return to wider talks that include China and even other actors around the peninsula. This post was originally published in Political Violence at a Glance. To learn more, read North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, an IGCC policy brief by Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung.]]>
    1160 0 0 0 This week, North Korea fired a suspected submarine-launched ballistic missile into waters off the coast of Japan. The move comes amidst rising geopolitical tensions in the region. Here, Stephan Haggard, a research affiliate with the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies, director of the Korea-Pacific Program, and distinguished professor of political science at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy, answers six key questions about what the missile launch means.]]>
    <![CDATA[The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-one-china-policy-adapting-to-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait/ Fri, 29 Oct 2021 19:12:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1199 1199 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Uncertain Future of Global Supply Chains]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/the-uncertain-future-of-global-supply-chains/ Wed, 08 Sep 2021 20:45:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1240 We depend on global supply chains for everything from phones to medicine to clothes and cars. Yet supply chains aren’t something most of us know much about. Can you give us a sense of the breadth and complexity of global supply chains? Global supply chains are not a new phenomenon. The big growth spurt took place from about 1998 to 2008 in a period of hyper-globalization, at which point supply chains accounted for two-thirds of total gross trade. So, what are global supply chains? In economics they're known as global value chains (GVCs), where the “value” part comes from value added in the production of a final good. GVCs spread a range of tasks—design, production, marketing—over several countries. Inputs crisscross borders often several times to be assembled into a final product somewhere. Each stage, or task, contributes some value to the final product. Samsung for instance relies on something like 2,500 suppliers across the globe to produce a mobile phone. The iPhone 12 has more than 1,600 parts. The camera and display come from Japan, the ram from South Korea, and so on. An electronic commuter bike that is sold in the United States is another example. The tires come from Indonesia, and Indonesia contributes 1.7 percent of the total value added. The motor is from Germany, which contributes 27 percent of value added. The brakes are from China—1.8 percent. The gears are from Japan, the seat is from Italy, and so on.

    There have been several big shocks to global supply chains over the last couple of years. What are they and how have they affected supply chains?

    GVCs captured little public attention until the Trump administration made them a centerpiece of his “America First,” inward-looking anti-globalization campaign. Trump targeted GVCs in an effort to dismantle them and presumably bring them back to the U.S. That's the concept of reshoring. His policy was to basically to decouple—separate—the U.S. economy from China's. Then came COVID-19. Demand for things skyrocketed, supplies of medical equipment and other basic items became scarce, and the trade war aggravated these bottlenecks.

    Many commentators predicted severe damage to global supply chains—were those fears overblown?

    Economists and many others were concerned that trade tensions would inflict high costs on the global economy as a whole. And that decoupling would mean lower exports, fewer jobs, and the erosion of U.S. global technological leadership. Here's the thing: we're at an inflection point. There are few signs so far of reshoring. And there are very few signs of U.S.-China decoupling. The IMF’s [International Monetary Fund] latest economic outlook of the Asia Pacific actually finds little evidence of this bifurcation. And amazingly China's global share of exports—which in large proportion is parts and components—actually grew over the last year. But of course, that could change as concern with China’s behavior in many areas rises around the world. And if it does, it will be slow change because it's very costly—and some say impossible—to find replacements for China's inputs in such a wide range of goods.

    So there's a disconnect between the hyper-nationalist rhetoric and what's actually happening.

    I think the gap between the policy concerns and what's actually happening is narrowing. There is some resilience on the part of these global value chains. But some people think that resilience requires that your entire supply chain remain at home. That's not only unrealistic—it actually undermines resilience. The name of the game in resilience is diversification—diversification within and across countries, not absolute self-reliance.

    Can you give an example of what diversification looks like in the real world?

    Absolutely. Resilient firms should and are diversifying their suppliers. So, if a supplier cannot provide a particular component, alternative suppliers should be online that are able to fill that vacuum quickly. The firms also build resilience by expanding the inventory stocks of raw materials or intermediate inputs and finished goods. Previously, inventories were not part of the toolkit. It was “just in time” production. Now, the idea that you have to encourage redundancies to avoid bottlenecks is sinking in. Another component is automation and digitalization, which help firms map their suppliers’ networks more effectively to prevent bottlenecks and to maximize timely substitution. In a recent survey about 87 percent of 1,346 firms reported that they are investing in resilience over the next two years and a big proportion of U.S. leaders expect a fully digital ecosystem by 2025. But—and here's the caveat—firms are still at the mercy of government. If you look at the surveys, firms also confirm that the U.S.-China trade and technology war heightens uncertainty and almost 90 percent of members in the U.S.-China Business Council report that bilateral trade tensions have impacted their business with China. Yet, only about 30 percent of firms in one important survey reported that they slowed or delayed or canceled investment in the U.S. or China because of geopolitical tensions. Are firms leaving China? Not really. Most still build on China's comparative advantage and huge domestic market.

    How is the tug between hyper-nationalism and global interconnectedness playing out in China?

    Techno-nationalism in China is nothing new. But it was somewhat subdued under hyper-globalization. Then around 2013, China began breaking more sharply from earlier goals of just maximizing economic growth, and it has continued to break more and more sharply from that view. For instance, in 2015, China launched its “China 2025” industrial policy plan that was supposed to achieve self-reliance in a number of sectors. In 2016 and 2017 China launched other programs to enhance self-sufficiency in a wide range of high-tech sectors. In 2018, the Trump administration, reacting to all this, unleashed tariffs to counter a number of things that China was engaged in, like forced technology transfers and subsidies to state-owned firms, and failures to enforce intellectual property. Then China doubled down. You see the ping pong here. Then the Biden administration came in and responded with proposals for building resilience. In response, China issued new procurement guidelines imposing very high levels of local content, meaning items that have to be produced at home, on something like 315 items. And on top of it, they haven't made those rules transparent, which violates China's commitments to the WTO. You can see the spiral, which could leave everybody worse off.

    So we’re seeing conflict between the U.S. and China play out in the economic domain. Does this counter the idea that being economically interconnected reduces the risk of conflict?

    There's a theory known as neo-realism that holds that economic interdependence does not and cannot prevent major armed conflict. And they offer as evidence the presumed failure of the first wave of interdependence, which was before World War I, to prevent World War I. But interdependence back then was radically different from interdependence today. And GVCs have everything to do with it. A second theory in the field of international relations assumes that greater economic interdependence raises the costs of major armed conflict, and in so doing, lowers the probability of conflict and enhances the likelihood of cooperation. In this view, the gains from trade are substantial enough that they take primacy, even though other ambitions are never completely eliminated. Following this logic, GVCs tighten economic interdependence, which in this theory is a positive thing because it reduces the likelihood of conflict.

    From the vantage point of populist groups, it's taken for granted that bringing manufacturing home would be helpful to them—would be helpful to workers. From the point of view of business, it's taken for granted that it won't help. Who is the system of global supply chains good for?

    GVCs are predicated on a division of labor that maximizes efficiency. Increasing returns, diminishing costs, economies of scale—all of these terms describe the advantages of large-scale global production. And all GVC participant firms are presumed to gain in this division of labor. Many studies by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank document the huge gains, especially for developing countries. So, for instance, East Asian countries, which have the highest levels of GVC participation in the industrialized world, have very high levels of economic growth, employment, income, technological development, and export diversification. But developed countries also benefit through lower consumer prices, a wide range of goods, and huge proceeds from selling intellectual property and other knowledge-intensive goods, including services. There's a lot of literature on the role of economic anxiety, inequality, the loss of manufacturing jobs to China, and the rise of populism. Other experts think technological change including automation was a far more significant shock to workers than trade or globalization. Paul Krugman, for instance, finds only modest detrimental economic effects on U.S. manufacturing labor. Others find the rise of populism to have less to do with the presumed evils of globalization and more to do with social and psychological considerations, especially hyper-nationalism, tribal biases, and prejudice against immigrants and minorities. Diana Mutz found that there is growing support for trade in the U.S.—it just depends on who you trade with. The more like the U.S. the country is in terms of language, religion, form of government, or cultural values, the more positive some people are towards that trading partner.

    When you look out over the next five years, what worries you most?

    There are a number of things related to GVCs that are concerning. Let me start with the fact that trade wars are not as effective tools as people make them out to be. They can lead to decreased investment, declining exports, rising unemployment, and costly victories that sometimes hurt the senders more, or as much as, the target. Trade wars also have a nasty tendency to escalate the antagonism among states and cause it to spill over from economics into other areas, especially security. In addition, the fact that many firms are going digital to build resilience increases the potential for cyber-attacks, already a huge problem reaching new heights. Another concern is climate change. GVCs increase energy consumption and CO2 emissions, precisely because they're spread all over the world, they overuse resources, and are less subject to environmental and labor regulations. But a rising number of firms not only support, but also lobby in favor of enhanced regulations, lower carbon emissions, sustainable reusable packaging, zero waste—both because it's of growing importance to consumers and because it's in GVC’s interest to help prevent future shocks. All these concerns go back to what I would call the original sin: hyper-nationalist populism. They all stem from extreme inward-looking politics within countries that fuel trade wars, cold wars, cyber wars, real wars, and impair international cooperation on climate change.

    How can governments and policymakers address these challenges—what sorts of policies can ensure the benefits of globalization are shared and the efficiencies of global value chains are preserved?

    I think those would be policies, number one, that are more sensitive to domestic distributional considerations—who gains and who doesn't gain as much from GVC participation. We need policies that can enhance equity, improve labor standards, and educate and train well-remunerated workers, as well as foster environmental protections. We also need to understand that global interdependence via global supply chains entails complex compromises, and international institutions like the WTO must once again become central to making those compromises possible, especially by bolstering compliance and transparency. And, by the way, we are still in COVID times. We need to scale up pandemic preparedness through, for instance, geographically diversified GVCs for diagnostic tools, therapeutics, and vaccines. Over the last year, dozens of companies and a hundred-plus facilities around the world have created the global supply chains that now underpin COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution. You started the interview off by saying that supply chains are very complex. They are complex, which is why we shouldn't fall into simplistic understandings of what it takes to advance international cooperation.

    What do you think the Biden administration should do?

    Biden is dramatically different from Trump. He has surrounded himself with very respected economists, academics, and practitioners that share the goals of addressing social change, income inequality, inclusion, and environmental sustainability. Trump had a very aggressive, inward looking, self-reliant public policy, not just against China, but against Canada, Europe, and other allies. He was equal opportunity about “America First,” where that meant something like: to hell with the rest. Biden, by contrast, highlights cooperation with allies and sensible partners in bolstering GVC resilience. The big debate is whether we're headed to an even more intensive trade war or just more competition in a broader context, where GVC policies cater neither to the extreme right-wing chauvinism nor to far-left protectionist fantasies. In fact, I don't think Biden's policies reflect either of these extremes. His team reflects a genuine effort to carve the right balance that benefits Americans without extricating the U.S. from the world.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1240 0 0 0 From U.S.-China trade wars and the COVID-19 pandemic, to the mounting effects of climate change, global supply chains are under severe strain. In this episode of Talking Policy, Etel Solingen, a distinguished professor and the Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at UC Irvine, weighs in on what’s at stake, and shares lessons from her new volume, Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and International Relations in East Asia. You can also read the edited transcript below.]]>
    <![CDATA[Turning the Tools of the Liberal International Order Upside Down]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/turning-the-tools-of-the-liberal-international-order-upside-down/ Tue, 07 Sep 2021 21:08:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1244 In recent years, scholars and journalists have documented declines in democracy worldwide—from Latin America, to Europe, the Middle East, and even the United States. You are part of a new IGCC initiative that looks at one piece of that puzzle, which is the rise of authoritarian international organizations.

    What are authoritarian and international organizations?

    We focus on inter-governmental organizations where most of the member states are non-democracies. We’re particularly interested in regional international organizations, where membership is limited to countries in a particular region. Some relatively well-known examples are the League of Arab States the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

    In a new working paper with Steph Haggard, you note that these organizations have proliferated in recent years. How prevalent are they?

    We focus on organizations that are involved in issues like political security and financial cooperation. We’ve found that since World War II there have been 92 regional organizations like this, where the majority of members or all of the members are non-democratic. Around 70 are currently active. It's a pretty significant number of organizations. Every region where you find non democracies, you'll find these organizations, but they're most common in Africa.

    In your paper, you note that the majority of the regional international organizations formed after the mid-1950s have been dominated by non-democratic countries. Why is that?

    The organizations that are made up of democracies were created earlier; in more recent years, the authoritarian states have been catching up. In Africa, post decolonization, states came together and formed these organizations initially to push back against the international order dominated by former colonizing states and the global north in general, which was keeping African states in a position of dependency and disadvantage. As time has gone on, these regional organizations have become a fixture of what we think about as the international order.

    Part of the premise of your research is that the rise of authoritarian regional organizations, is bad—bad for citizens, bad for democracy, bad for U.S. interests. Why is that the case—what do these organizations do?

    We've categorized different “buckets” of activities that these organizations engage in. Some have to do with legitimation—think of it as reputation laundering for member states. That can take the form of sending election monitors to take the heat off member states who have held rigged elections. Another bucket is material support. Particularly in organizations where at least one member state is a lot wealthier than the others, you'll see lending and aid—financial transfers from one member state to another, managed through the regional organization. In organizations that China has been involved in, for example, you'll see the organization helping to finance infrastructure projects. The Arab League might finance development projects through affiliated banks. And sometimes, with organizations whose members aren’t as wealthy, like in sub-Saharan Africa, the organizations act as a go between for member state governments and donor countries like the United State and European countries. Another aspect of cooperation is in security. Some authoritarian regional organizations have mutual defense arrangements and cooperatively manage peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is normally a definitive good for the United States, but in some of these cases, peacekeepers are misused. They might be used to protect member state leaders and elites, or they might not have the highest standards of human rights protections for civilians in conflict zones. In Central Asia and East Asia, especially, these organizations cooperate against political dissidents. A Freedom House report from earlier this year talked about how, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization coordinates a black list of names of activists and individuals from persecuted communities like Uyghurs, and if a person flees, the receiving state will be able to identify that person and extradite them back to the authoritarian state that they're fleeing.

    In some cases the U.S. supports and even funds authoritarian regional organizations. Can you give of some examples of where this is happening and why?

    The organizations that have funding from the U.S. or European states often have, in their charters, language that indicates some sort of baseline respect for the transfer of power through elections and respect for the rights of their citizens. And, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the U.S. has chosen to partner with these organizations in the hope that they will become watchdogs that are able to help member states stay the path of democracy. But what we're seeing in recent years is that these regional organizations are ultimately dominated by the member states. And if member state governments have decided that they don't want to keep up their pretense of fair election monitoring, then there's very little that the U.S. can realistically do. One organization that people were pretty hopeful about was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). But what we've seen in recent years is an inability or lack of interest on the part of ECOWAS to stand up to leaders for violating democratic norms or for interfering in their states’ elections. This last year, for example, in Benin, a country that used to be considered a democratizing success story, ECOWAS failed to condemn the rigged election that involved violence against civilians and disqualifying opponents before the election.

    Are some of these organizations better than others?

    Definitely. No one would argue that ECOWAS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are equally harmful. On lending, we don't have enough research yet to know if lending from authoritarian regional organizations is more likely to be misused or whether it leads to more or worse perverse outcomes than lending from other institutions. There is a lot of research looking at the effects of lending from China that shows that they have lower standards of conditionality tied to member states politics—so for example, China is much less likely that the U.S. to condition aid on transparency or upholding human rights protection. In Central Africa, there have been a number of instances where the Economic Community of Central African States has been reprimanded. And some Central African banks have been reprimanded for fraudulent invoicing and diverting money for development projects towards cronies.

    As you've dug into this topic, what has surprised you?

    I was surprised by the sheer number of organizations and the extent to which there are still more authoritarian regional organizations popping up in recent years. You’d think there’d be a saturation point, but there are certain regions like south and east Asia where we're still seeing new organizations continue to pop up.

    Is the growth in the number of authoritarian international organizations something that's happening because of the democratic erosion? Or is it the vanguard of that erosion?

    It’s a two-way street. Some of the more powerful organizations are helping countries try to slow down or prevent democratization. But the proliferation of these organizations is also a symptom of the problem. Countries are becoming more authoritarian and are increasingly cooperating in a way that we previously associated with the behavior of democratic states.

    Last month, representatives from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), at a meeting in Tajikistan, said SCO would play a key role in Afghanistan now that the U.S. is officially withdrawing. Do policy decisions like the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, or a reduction in development assistance from the UK, leave a vacuum for some of these organizations to then come in and fill?

    Absolutely. Whenever China engages, it tries to fill in these gaps. When it engages bilaterally, it’s more likely to get immediate pushback. When it goes through multilateral institutions, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it’s seen as a more legitimate way of engaging—as part of a coalition. China also uses the SCO for its own propaganda purposes. Earlier this year, SCO officials were shooting propaganda videos in Xinjiang about how great conditions are there. It’s an example of how countries like China are using these organizations to improve their own image and turn the tools of liberal international order back around.

    What options does the United States have for influencing the activities and behavior of authoritarian regional organizations?

    An obvious option would be to pull back U.S. funding for these organizations. But the U.S. has become very dependent on some of these organizations and their non-democratic members to do things that the U.S. wants to get done but doesn't want to do for itself—like peacekeeping operations. It's difficult to push too hard on these organizations, or condemn them when they engage in self-serving behaviors, when they provide a security service that the U.S. values and has invested in.

    Are there any examples of effective cooperation between the U.S. and one of these organizations?

    To the extent that they've helped to train peacekeepers who've then gone on to successfully manage conflict situations, that's been successful. The U.S. also cooperated with ECOWAS and the West African Health Organization during the Ebola crisis, which was more positive and productive. In certain areas like election monitoring the U.S. would be better off working with civil society organizations that are more credible within respective member states or consorts of civil society organizations, rather than trying to go through organizations that are essentially controlled by the member states.

    What are the things that you still don’t know about this research area that you’d like to know?

    We’d like to know the full scope of the amount of lending that’s going on in each region by these organizations. We currently don’t have a picture overall of the scope of financial flows across each region, or what sorts of projects the regional organizations are mostly focusing on in these countries. With respect to election monitoring, one thing I want to better understand is why some non-democracies only invite authoritarian organization monitors and some invite both democratic monitors and authoritarian organization monitors. From what we can see so far, having dual monitors can create confusion—they can make people less certain about who to believe. And this is obviously advantageous for the incumbent government holding the election.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
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    <![CDATA[Why Summit Optics May Help De-escalate Public Appetite for Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/why-summit-optics-may-help-de-escalate-public-appetite-for-conflict/ Tue, 17 Aug 2021 18:43:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1299 1299 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The World in 2022]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/the-world-in-2022/ Thu, 06 Jan 2022 16:30:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1310 1310 0 0 0 The world continues to be rocked by multiple, overlapping crises—environmental disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic, strident nationalism, nuclear brinkmanship, and an eroding liberal order that threatens democracy everywhere. As 2022 begins, IGCC experts from across the University of California share their candid—and at times sobering—reflections on the most important global trends to watch in 2022.]]> Nobel Prize lecture. Insulting as my demotion is personally, I mention it because my colleagues and I are in the truth business, and we're being demoted in general. We're not under out-and-out attack, as are the investigative journalists. But the foundation of data we rely on is being eroded, and our ability to compete in public discourse—as it migrates to social media, and even into our classrooms—is also eroding. Facts, collected, curated, and validated, are the foundation that our research builds on here at IGCC. Whether we're studying climate degradation, political violence, great power competition, backsliding into authoritarianism, global health, or any other major topic, our carefully vetted and argued inferences and policy advice now compete with the toxic sludge of untruths—salient but false. The platforms competing for my students' attention are willing accomplices in spreading that sludge, creating a competing imagined reality for them, untethered to facts. For that reason, understanding disinformation and informing the regulation of platforms should become a necessary part of our future research activity. Those platforms are mostly based here in California, but the threats they amplify are truly global concerns. Eli Berman is IGCC’s research director for International Security. He leads IGCC research on Disinformation and is a professor of economics at UC San Diego.]]> Joshua Graff Zivin is IGCC research director for environmental and health studies. He is the Pacific Economic Cooperation chair in International Economic Relations at UC San Diego. ]]> Emilie Hafner-Burton is an IGCC research director and leads The Future of Democracy initiative. She is a professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego.]]> Courtenay Conrad is a member of the IGCC steering committee and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at UC Merced.]]> Tsourapas recently noted, cooperation on transnational repression now involves regional and global intergovernmental organizations. Regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Gulf Cooperation Council gained notoriety for maintaining “blacklists” of wanted activists and opponents, as well as legitimating members’ attempts to relabel non-violent political oppositions as terrorists. Autocrats have also manipulated international organizations with democratic members by, for example, abusing Interpol’s “red notices” to seek the arrests of dissidents. Recently, a UAE official accused of torture was elected as Interpol’s next president with more than 70 percent of votes from the Interpol General Assembly. This could be emblematic of a lack of willpower on the part of democratic states to adequately fund multilateral institutions and defend their original purposes against authoritarian influence. I am most hopeful when I observe the determination of civilians leading protest movements to demand democratic governance and respect despite repression by state security forces and militias. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, for example, successfully organized to demand democratic reforms, with the latter receiving the Nobel Prize in recognition of their efforts to democratize Tunisia. In the wake of Sudan’s most recent coup, the SPA has sustained street protests and shamed the United Nations for not taking a harsher stance against the military junta and complicit civilian leaders. Some still believe in the willpower of international organizations and powerful democracies to support pro-democracy activists, but resilient coalitions of national civil society organizations give me more cause for hope. Christina Cottiero is a postdoctoral fellow at IGCC. She will join the University of Utah’s Department of Political Science in summer 2022. ]]> Peter Cowhey served as director of IGCC from 1999-2006. He is dean and Qualcomm chair emeritus of the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego where he served as dean from 2002 to 2021.]]> masks today, none tomorrow—people may also pick up on the inevitable fluidity of incomplete scientific knowledge. This is not a problem in itself. But it becomes a vicious—and frightening—cycle when skepticism towards expertise is used to justify experts’ doubling down on their own (uncertain) certainties. We are often told that public “distrust” of scientific evidence comes from misinformation that emanates from individual leaders or circulates in certain social spaces. This is no doubt true in some cases. But it is also a convenient explanation for the social, behavioral, and political complexities we have faced through the pandemic, and puts the onus for this distrust on specific bad actors or ordinary people and their supposedly spontaneously arising untruths. But when trust in public health authority seems fragile, experts’ denying evident contradictions in their own messages, or the lived experiences of people making sense of the situation on their own terms, may be the worst strategy for health communication. (Similar dynamics unfolded during the 2014-2016 Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa, which I wrote about in The Atlantic.) Given the challenges we face in the coming decades—especially climate change—it’s more important than ever that scientific knowledge—even imperfect scientific knowledge—be mobilized to direct collective action. My hope is that technical experts—virologists, modelers, epidemiologists, meteorologists—and policymakers who find themselves in the limelight begin to articulate scientific uncertainty with more transparency. This could be a matter of shifting the tenor from “everyone wear a mask now” to “people who are working very hard to understand this situation have learned new information, and here is why masking would help.” No great anthropological insight here, other than a maxim of ethnographic engagement, which is that it is always best to assume that your audience—in this case, Americans from extraordinarily diverse backgrounds and historical experiences grappling with the effects of the pandemic—is capable of complex thought and inclined towards critical thinking. Raphael Frankfurter is an IGCC dissertation fellow and medical anthropologist at UC San Francisco.]]> Stephan Haggard leads IGCC research on the Rise of Authoritarian International Organizations and is a distinguished professor of political science at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. He is the author with Robert Kaufman, of Backsliding: Democratic Regress in The Contemporary World.]]> Esteban Klor is an IGCC affiliate researcher and is the Rosita Herczeg professor of economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.]]> racism, with individuals holding anti-Asian prejudice supporting more aggressive policies toward China. The real turning point for the United States, however, was “losing” the U.S. international business community as an advocate for cooperative relations with China. Wooed by the attractions of a billion increasingly prosperous consumers, but then repelled by China’s mercantilist practices, by 2010, many U.S. firms concluded that the economic opportunities in China were less beneficial than anticipated. President Trump’s trade war would not have been possible if the international business community had not been disillusioned by China’s restrictions on trade and investment. This alienation of its biggest supporters in the United States is on China. In seeking to pursue its own economic nationalist aims, it estranged the one forceful advocate of cooperation that counter-balanced the natural fears of a rising China. As a result, there is no constituency within the United States today for better relations with China. Perhaps the one thing both Republicans and Democrats agree on in this highly polarized era is the need to “get tough” on China. For its part, China is justifiably proud of its accomplishments but remains somewhat contradictory in its foreign policy. It wants to be recognized as a global power co-equal to the United States. At the same time, it wants to continue to benefit from rules on trade and allowances for small developing countries written into existing international institutions. “We’re big and powerful,” China claims, “but we’re still poor and should not be expected to compete on equal terms with Western firms.” The world’s largest economy by some reckonings, China continues to act in some ways like a small country constrained by international market forces, whose actions have no impact on others, when in fact its actions have broad, systemic effects. Backed by its own nationalists, whether sincere or manufactured, China’s leaders demand both recognition and respect for its privileged position within the international order. While analysts focus on strategic and military competition between the United States and China, and access to China’s market, my biggest worry is the presently embryonic but worrisome competition for third-country markets that will—unless managed carefully—turn into exclusive zones of economic domination. Historically, great power competitions have typically revolved around the pursuit of spheres of influence and ended in conflict and war. This was true of the imperial competitions carried out by Europeans prior to 1914, Imperial Japan’s attempt to build an Asian empire, Nazi Germany’s pursuit of lebensraum and a de facto empire in Eastern Europe, and of course the United States and Soviet Union’s division of Europe in the Cold War. In each of these cases, one state aimed to carve out an exclusive economic zone in which it would dominate trade and investment at the expense of its great power rivals. And in each case, war—hot or cold—was the result. The United States and China today are on the same or at least a parallel course. The United States has already taken important steps towards greater conflict, most notably by seeking to ban its allies and friends from importing communications technology and equipment developed by Huawei. This is defended as protecting national security and intelligence, a claim some experts and allies dispute, but is and was intended as a shot-across-the-bow for Chinese industry. Other U.S. restrictions on trade and investment have been more narrowly targeted at China itself, but one can easily imagine U.S. rules being extended to third countries if relations deteriorate, creating an American-centric sphere while alienating those less inclined to join with Washington. China is moving in the same direction even if it has not yet attempted to close off third-country markets to the United States. Through the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), China is investing enormous sums abroad. As of February 2021, China has signed memorandums of understanding with 140 countries and invested roughly $4 trillion through the initiative. Most of the funding comes from China’s three government policy banks, large state-owned banks, and sovereign wealth funds, with 59 percent of the plan’s projects owned by government entities, 26 percent by private firms, and the remainder in public-private ventures. The largest recipients of BRI investments between 2005 and 2017 are Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Iran, Kenya, Vietnam, and Egypt. Many BRI investments are in politically or financially unstable countries with poor credit ratings. At present, approximately $369.5 billion in Chinese BRI investments are described as “troubled,” meaning either that the collateral value of the investment is below its liabilities or loans are not performing. To date, China has offset the risk inherent in site-specific investments in unstable countries by providing state-backed financing in one form or another; that is, the Chinese government is essentially ensuring investments against foreign risk. If the investments fail, the government will—or is expected to—cover the loss. The Chinese government, however, cannot be indifferent to the actions of host governments that affect these investments. Even if Beijing covers the loss, expropriation or default still transfers wealth from China to the host country. While China’s workers have been willing to forgo present consumption for greater growth in the future, how long they will be willing to wait to cover investments that have turned bad in foreign lands is unknown. Eventually, the government will have to act to protect these investments and ensure the loans are repaid. This will draw Beijing into the domestic politics of host countries to ensure that friendly regimes remain or come to power that will prioritize Chinese interests, especially the repayment of the huge outstanding debts. Again, one can easily imagine China insisting as a condition for new funds that its outstanding loans get priority over loans to Western institutions. To date, China has refused to participate in any of the international creditor “clubs” that aim to prevent such bilateral deals. As its interests and influence expand in these third countries, there will be an almost inevitable tendency to manipulate relations to Beijing’s advantage at the expense of the West, creating a Chinese sphere of influence similar to that being developed by the United States. This tendency will be reinforced by the nature of high-tech competition between the United States and China. At present, China’s technological capabilities are behind those in the United States. To catch up, China is investing heavily in what it perceives as industries of the future. There are large economies of scale in many high-tech industries, and to compete effectively firms must expand production to move down their cost curves. As China’s fledgling industries attempt to compete with U.S. firms, in the early stages at least they will require government subsidies (already underway) or privileged access to third-country markets (where consumers will end up paying more than they should). It is, once again, a short step to imagine China using its economic leverage over other countries to negotiate deals that ensure preferential market access for Chinese firms and raise barriers to Western firms. These are early trends by both Washington and Beijing but nonetheless worrisome. Washington and Beijing need to open a dialogue and keep third-country markets open to the products and investments of both. A superpower competition for exclusive economic zones abroad will almost certainly result in a cold or hot war. Economic competition on free and open markets should be encouraged, but political competition that seeks to close markets to the other power is extremely dangerous. Nothing would be more reassuring to Americans than a credible commitment by China to keep the world open to free and fair trade and investment. A similar commitment by the United States would reassure China that it does not seek to prevent its rise but welcomes free and fair economic competition. David Lake is an IGCC affiliate researcher and author most recently of Why Statebuilding Didn’t Work in Afghanistan. He is the Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs professor of social sciences and distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego.]]> Mark Green noted, repeated efforts to cut aid in the past U.S. administration could have real consequences: “Less resources mean we can do less…the investments that we make, particularly health infrastructure investments, may not have immediate tangible payoffs, but they are an essential part of a long-term strategy.” While the COVID-19 pandemic may turn the tide on health spending, there are many forms of U.S. and foreign assistance that have been on the cutting block. Reduced support for international involvement is worrisome. Domestic actors in countries facing conflict and fragile security institutions have often invited international involvement. In these settings, where citizens face daily hardship, and the international community worries about refugee crises, the spread of violence, and other transnational threats, governments at times make voluntary requests to the U.S. and others for assistance. In many of these instances, these governments want to sign mutually beneficial agreements with opposing groups, allowing them to end conflict and share power. International involvement can help to enforce these agreements and avoid situations where the government reneges on the terms and prevents the deal from being implemented. International actors use different tools to incentivize governments to comply with these deals. For example, peacekeepers often help secure peace settlements, but even unarmed monitors working together with donors can do so. Relatively efficient and cheap, mechanisms like monitoring post-conflict elections with rebel parties, for example, can be useful. Going forward, if the U.S., other countries, and global intergovernmental organizations cut their international involvement, these domestic actors could be left without this tool for striking deals that can improve stability, openness, and protections for civilians. There are certainly justifiable critiques to be made of some international involvement, especially when enacted under pressure or force. Moving toward more cooperative relationships—as well as perhaps more regional rather than North-South missions—can help overcome some of the problems. But international involvement has been valuable in many contexts and continuing to discount this outside assistance, even though its payoffs may not be immediate, can be dangerous. Aila Matanock is a member of the IGCC steering committee and an associate professor of political science at UC Berkeley.]]> Jeannette Money is a member of the IGCC steering committee and professor of political science at UC Davis.]]> T.J. Pempel is chair of the IGCC Steering Committee and Jack M. Forcey professor of political science at UC Berkeley.]]> Sevin Gulfer Sagnic is an IGCC dissertation fellow and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at UC San Diego.]]> Third Global Value Chain Development Report 2021, published by a consortium of international economic institutions. We find that, although the sources of each of those risks are varied, GSCs can exacerbate them. At the same time, GSCs can also help mitigate those risks through various means. But that requires dependable outward-oriented political-economy strategies that are more environmentally sustainable, sensitive to distributional considerations and labor protections, committed to stronger multilateral institutions and peaceful exchange, and compliant with nondiscrimination, reciprocity, transparency, and market-oriented policies. Unfortunately, that’s not where we are in the world now. Lingering inward-oriented protectionist populism in many countries continues to fuel environmental, pandemic, and geopolitical risks. Etel Solingen is an IGCC affiliate researcher and distinguished professor and the Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney chair in Peace and Conflict Studies at UC Irvine.]]> firm support for Abiy Ahmed’s government in its war against Tigrayan separatists, while the U.S. has condemned the regime’s human rights abuses and imposed sanctions. Similarly, even as the U.S. has imposed severe sanctions against Myanmar’s military government, China has provided tacit support to the junta by blocking UN resolutions condemning the recent coup. While their actions so far fall short of the Cold War modus operandi, it is not difficult to imagine that the U.S. and China’s opposing positions on these wars could lead to more direct confrontation in the future. Yet the return of Cold War style proxy wars is not inevitable. Despite their political and economic rivalry, the U.S. and China can prevent rising tensions from spilling over into these civil conflicts. In the U.S. in particular, there are some promising signs that the appetite for involvement in foreign wars has waned. In the case of Yemen, the Biden administration announced in February that the U.S. would no longer support Saudi Arabia’s offensive operations, and in November, a bipartisan group of legislators attempted (unsuccessfully) to block a $650 million arms deal with Saudi Arabia over its continued involvement in the war. So far, the U.S. has emphasized diplomatic and economic pressure in its approach to the conflicts in Ethiopia and Myanmar. Perhaps norms of non-intervention have grown stronger in the aftermath of the Cold War’s devastation. Or perhaps the U.S. has learned practical lessons about the unintended consequences of intervention after members of the Mujahideen it armed against the Soviets formed the Taliban and became its most formidable enemy in Afghanistan. Whether they are guided by norms or pragmatism, policymakers in the U.S. should continue to support diplomatic solutions to civil wars and resist the impulse to view them as opportunities to confront competitors like China. Frank Wyer is an IGCC dissertation fellow and postdoctoral candidate in political science at UC Los Angeles.]]> <![CDATA[Defense Transparency Improves Modestly in the 2020-21 Defense Transparency Index]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/defense-transparency-improves-modestly-in-the-2020-21-defense-transparency-index/ Fri, 31 Dec 2021 16:00:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1634
  • Read the 2020-21 Policy Note
  • View the Defense Transparency Index Data (.xlsx)
  • ]]>
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    <![CDATA[American Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories Is Smaller Than You Think]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/american-endorsement-of-conspiracy-theories-is-smaller-than-you-think/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 20:56:40 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=773

    Headlines seem to suggest that disinformation and belief in conspiracies are big problems in the U.S. (see here, here, and here). In your new paper, you suggest that these conclusions might be overstated. Why

    (Molly) When Seth and I were working on this project, we noticed that most of those headlines are generated from surveys where researchers ask the American public something like: do you believe in this conspiracy? And the respondent answers yes or no. Or they might state a conspiracy and then ask if it is true or false. So, for example, True or False: Barack Obama was not born in the United States. Or, True or False: Donald Trump won the 2020 presidential election. The problem with this setup is that in most surveys, answering “true” means agreeing with the conspiracy, whereas answering false is disagreement with the conspiracy. And a long-understood challenge with survey research is a phenomenon called acquiescence bias, where people who respond to surveys are more likely to respond true than false, agree rather than disagree—no matter what the question is. This inflates the proportion of people who seem to believe in the conspiracy. This doesn't mean that disinformation and belief in conspiracies isn’t a problem in the United States. Certainly, there are still quite a few people who believe in conspiracies. It just means that we're not accurately measuring their prevalence.

    Why are people more likely to answer in the affirmative than not?

    (Molly) There are a lot of different theories about this. Some people think it's just inattention to a survey. As you might imagine, it’s really hard to get people to respond to surveys. Right now, most are either answered over the phone or online. There's not a lot of incentive for people to pay attention to the survey or spend a lot of time on it. So, people's default response might be to click “agree.” There's also some evidence that if they feel uncomfortable with a particular question, “yes” or “agree” is their default answer. We don't know exactly what the cause of acquiescence bias is, but it's probably some combination of those things.

    How did you attempt to overcome this problem in your research?

    (Seth) The problem that Molly identified is that most of the questions we saw in surveys about conspiracies ask respondents whether they agree with a conspiracy. And there's this general prevalence to default to agreement. When people are uncertain, they’ll say they agree, or people will agree just to be agreeable to the person who's on the other end of the phone. The alternative we came up with is: what happens if we ask people if they agree with the opposite of the conspiracy or if they disagree with the conspiracy? We asked some people a version of the question where agreement meant you were endorsing the conspiracy, and others a version where agreement meant they were disagreeing with the conspiracy or saying the conspiracy was false. An example is: do you agree that Barack Obama was born in the United States? In this case, agreeing is counter to the conspiracy. In contrast, we asked other people: do you agree that Barack Obama was not born in the United States? If acquiescence bias was absent, then we should get the same percentage of people on average endorsing the conspiracy in the two different conditions. We implemented this method across dozens of questions, which we collected from published research on political conspiracies and political facts, including one study on coronavirus. And for each question that had been fielded by other scholars, we constructed an alternate version of the question where it was the opposite of the original question. We fielded four surveys in the United States and three surveys in China.[1]

    It sounds so simple: to just flip a question on its head and you get a different answer. What did you find?

    (Molly) We found consistently, across all of these questions, that there were really large differences in our measure of belief when we asked what we call the “positively key” where agree meant agreement with the conspiracy, and the negative key version where agree was disagreement with the conspiracy. The actual magnitude of this bias varied a lot between questions. But it could be up to 50 percent larger in the positively keyword wording as compared to the negatively key wording. So, the wording of the question was very consequential in determining the proportion of people that we estimated to believe in the conspiracy. Findings were similar for both China and the U.S.

    You found particularly large acquiescence bias on questions about democratic norms and the transition of power following the 2020 American presidential election. What do you make of that?

    (Seth) Those questions were fielded in December of 2020, which was obviously a very salient time for those questions. My suspicion is that if we fielded them at a less salient time, it might not have been as large. On the other hand, it does suggest that some of the findings out there showing the extent of endorsement of violence to put the “correct” person in office might be overstated. One of the things we found that we don’t fully understand is that ideologues exhibited more acquiescence bias than independents and the less political. This is surprising, because you might have thought that ideologues—a strong conservative or a strong liberal—would have the most consistent, strongly held beliefs. Whereas someone who doesn't pay attention to politics might be more likely to say, I don't know, I'll just agree with this. We actually find the opposite.

    You found not just that ideologues are more likely to have acquiescence bias, but that people who identify as very conservative exhibit larger acquiescence bias than those who identify as very liberal, or those with less ideological identification. What’s your hunch about what might be driving that?

    (Seth) I think there are a couple of possibilities. There's some research out there on what's called “expressive responding,” which says that people don't answer survey questions with the response they think is factually correct, but rather with the response that makes them feel good. If that’s the case, then it might be a reason to believe that ideologues would be more likely to agree with conspiracies that made them feel good. Most of the questions we asked were about right-wing conspiracies. So, it could be the case that ideologues like to express their political views by agreeing with things that are kind of fun or make their side look good. That could be an explanation for why very conservative seem to exhibit the most acquiescence bias, if most of our questions agreeing with a conspiracy means supporting the conservative side of the issue. It could also be that there is actual belief in these conspiracies, but when the negative keyed version asks them to disagree with a non-conspiracy, it's a little more confusing. Molly and I have talked about looking more carefully at the set of questions and trying to see if the complexity of the negative key version is somehow driving some of this.

    Despite your results, the conventional wisdom remains that belief in conspiracy is a significant and widespread problem in the United States. What effect does this perception have on politics in the U.S., and on politicians’ behavior?

    (Molly) It's a really interesting question: what’s the impact of belief about beliefs on American politics? What happens when I have the impression that 50 percent of the American public believes in a conspiracy, when in fact, it’s closer to 25 percent? If I believe that conspiracy, then maybe that means I think that more people are on my side than actually are. If I don't believe in that conspiracy, it might mean that I think that more people think differently than I do. One of the things that is really important from a policy perspective is, if we want to target information, about the pandemic, for example, or about politics, to people who we think have the wrong information, we need to be able to target that really accurately. Our research shows that some people are more likely to display acquiescence bias, which can help policymakers better understand what types of people believe in conspiracies.

    How do you think this perception about the magnitude of conspiracy belief affects the behavior of politicians in the U.S.?

    (Seth) I'm not aware of any direct evidence on that question. But I think it's really important and something we have to think carefully about. We tend to assume that politicians are very carefully attuned to what the public wants, and what the public thinks, and a lot of that information comes from polls like these. And so, to the extent that the political class believes that, say, 50 percent of Americans believe in a conspiracy rather than 20 percent, the consequences could be quite large. I'm speculating here, but you could imagine that Democrats say: look, 50 percent of conservatives are totally unhinged, we have no reason to pay attention to them, there's no point in talking to them. That could undermine political compromise and opportunities for building new coalitions. At the same time, there's some conventional wisdom out there that many politicians are running scared from their primary election constituents, rather than their general election constituents. And to the extent that some of these survey artifacts lead them to misperceive what their primary electorates actually want, then the behaviors they exhibit might not reflect what the public actually wants. You would hope that in the long run any serious errors in perceptions would lead to politicians who actually do perceive things accurately to be more likely to win elections. But that's really a long-run thing. In the short run, to the extent the political class might be misled about some of these issues, I do think it could have serious consequences for compromise and rhetoric and political conflict in legislative bargaining.

    Both of you have done significant work on political disinformation, political campaigns, voting, and elections. How are your views on these challenges evolving?

    (Molly) My experience thinking about censorship and propaganda in China has really underscored to me how important truth and freedom of expression is for democracy. The main challenge of disinformation in democracy is that those two things sort of come into conflict. So, we want to have a free and open environment. We want to have a free and open exchange of ideas. Even if some of those ideas are not great ideas, we want to make sure that people feel like they're free to say what they think and share those ideas. At the same time, when those ideas undermine truth, that is damaging, particularly when our open information environment is weaponized by organized interest or in some cases, foreign governments. That's one of the most interesting challenges: how do we maintain a free and open information environment and at the same time have an information environment where people can find good information and distinguish good versus bad information? That's the question that I see myself tackling over the next few years. (Seth) I’ve thought a lot about elections and electoral competition. One of the key theories of democracy is that electoral competition can generate representation and good government. And one of the mechanisms through which that happens is challenger candidates. Those who are not currently in office are supposed to be able to bring information to the voters about ways that the incumbents have failed to represent the voters. Now that theory of representation and democracy obviously depends on voters’ willingness to listen to the challenger and respect that the information the challenger is bringing them is actually relevant. If a polity were to get to the point where most voters felt that they could not trust the information a challenging candidate was bringing to them, that would undermine that mechanism of democratic representation. In my view, we're not at that point in the United States or in other advanced democracies, but Molly's work in China is totally consistent with this. She finds that what China does when there's threatening information is it floods the world with lots of other information to distract its constituents. The basic idea is: if there's so much information out there that individual citizens can't distinguish truth from fiction, it breaks the link between a government's actions and citizens evaluations. Again, I don't think we're there in the United States, but what we need to be mindful of is: are there enough voters who are open minded and able to evaluate the information that's brought to them by political entrepreneurs and political challengers? Is that electoral mechanism still strong enough to remove incumbents who aren't serving the voters’ interests?

    If there was one takeaway from research on conspiracies that you would like U.S. policymakers to know, what would it be? And what would you want ordinary Americans to know?

    (Molly) I would want policymakers to think about the data they're using about what the American public wants and look at those surveys and think about acquiescence bias through that lens. For ordinary Americans, one of the difficulties of communicating science and social science to the American public is that it's really hard to communicate uncertainty about our estimates. We need to do better at communicating the challenges of measuring public opinion. (Seth) For policymakers, I also would encourage remembering that measuring social phenomena is incredibly challenging, not just endorsement of conspiracies, but in general and particularly when asking people about things they don't think about that often. It’s important to take it with a grain of salt and ideally engage in much more careful interrogation and measurement and looking at things from different angles. That complements the suggestion I might have for the public, which is, let's take a pause whenever we see a single news headline from a single poll and say. It could be an accurate reflection of what the public thinks or believes, but it also could be something that's specific today and if we ask the same question tomorrow, the answer could be different, or if we ask the question in a slightly different way, it could lead to different a conclusion. Don't take any single piece of information as conclusive. Use your critical judgment and try to gather information from multiple sources. [1] The topics covered in the surveys did not differ widely between the U.S. and China, with one exception: in China the authors also asked about genetically modified organisms (GMOs), because of the prevalence of conspiracies about GMOs in China.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    773 0 0 0 Concern is growing that disinformation, spreading at an unprecedented speed and scale, is causing grave damage in the U.S. and globally on everything from elections to vaccine uptake. But do as many people believe in conspiracies as is generally assumed? In the latest Talking Policy episode, we talk with political scientists Molly Roberts and Seth Hill about why the way researchers measure public opinion may inflate the supposed prevalence of belief in conspiracy.]]>
    <![CDATA[Is There a Path to Peace in Northeast Asia?]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/is-there-a-path-to-peace-in-northeast-asia/ Thu, 06 Jan 2022 23:10:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1066 Six-Party Talks as a mechanism for security dialogue established. Today, however, that goal is receding, though the determination to continue to pursue it remains. Ultimately, participants rejected accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, yet a plausible solution to the problem seemed elusive. Learn more about The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue.]]> 1066 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Maximizing the Benefits of Trade for Africa]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/maximizing-the-benefits-of-trade-for-africa/ Tue, 08 Mar 2022 23:31:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1071 1071 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Global Pursuit of Defense Innovation: IGCC Series in the Journal of Strategic Studies]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/the-global-pursuit-of-defense-innovation-igcc-series-in-the-journal-of-strategic-studies/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 19:56:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1186 Journal of Strategic Studies, IGCC affiliated researchers examine defense innovation in small countries with advanced defense innovation capabilities (Israel, Singapore), closed authoritarian powers (North Korea, Russia), large catch-up states (China and India) and advanced large powers (U.S.). A Conceptual Framework of Defense Innovation | Tai Ming Cheung Military-technological innovation in small states: The cases of Israel and Singapore | Richard A. Bitzinger North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs: Foreign absorption and domestic innovation | Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung Defense innovation in Russia in the 2010s | Kashin, Vasily China’s quest for quantum advantage—Strategic and defense innovation at a new frontier | Elsa Kania Examining India’s defense innovation performance | Laxman Behera The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge | Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky This series was produced with support from IGCC. To access the special edition, visit the Journal of Strategic Studies.]]> 1186 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Ukraine and the Specter of Great Power Conflict]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/ukraine-and-the-specter-of-great-power-conflict/ Thu, 10 Mar 2022 18:59:40 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1536 We’re here today with Vice Admiral Charlie Martoglio, a former deputy commander of US forces in Europe, who spent much of his career focused on Russian and East European issues, who is now a lecturer at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy. Thank you very much Lindsay. I appreciate being here.

    We're here today to talk about the crisis that is unfolding in Ukraine and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In a context where we're used to thinking about hybrid warfare—economic warfare, cyber warfare, war fought through unconventional means—the Russian offensive in Ukraine has been carried out along decidedly old-fashioned lines, with airstrikes, heavy artillery, tanks. Do you think the West saw this coming?

    Yes, we did. We have been watching activity in Ukraine since about 2007. Ukraine is really part of a larger Russian construct of building a USSR-like Russian sphere of influence, which includes many parts of the Russia near periphery that used to either be part of the Soviet Union, or the Warsaw Pact. And so you look at Ukraine as a piece of this—albeit a very major piece, and from Putin's perspective, a particularly irritating piece. What's happening today has as its predecessors what happened in Estonia in 2007. What happened in Georgia, with gray zone conventional attempted large-scale invasion in 2008. What happened in Belarus, with Russian military forces going in to ensure the government stayed in power in 2021. We see the same thing with Russian forces again, in Kazakhstan in 2022. And now we see this large invasion into Ukraine. As I think about what is the objective of the Russian leadership and Putin in particular, it seems to me that it's this reconstruction of the USSR-like Russian sphere of influence, all along that periphery.

    So, it was decidedly not unexpected. The headlines in the run up to this invasion on February 24, were dominated with warnings of a Russian invasion. Why the West didn't stop Putin?

    Well, one of the primary responsible responsibilities of leadership is to ensure the security of the areas they're responsible for. And as you look to the various tools that national governments can use to try to deter conflict, they’re economic, diplomatic, and informational. We’ve used all three to varying degrees over the last year. In the military dimension, especially when you're not looking to precipitate a conflict, your military preparations are all about deterrence, and deciding where and how you are going to deter, especially because we're talking about a nuclear armed superpower. Now, that doesn't mean you need to be in awe of them. But it does mean you need to act very prudently and responsibly.

    Given all of these tools, which have been exercised in varying ways over months and many years, why was and is Russia able to proceed?

    The answer is something like this: President Putin views this as a crusade, which means he is entirely objective-focused. The guard rails that constrain normal international relations come off when you're doing a crusade, because your sole focus is achieving that objective. For the first 12 or 13 years that Putin was involved in this campaign, things tended to roll his way, in part because the geography was a little bit difficult for the Western nations to really step up and help, and in part because Putin saw a lack of cohesion among the principal players in Europe and among democracies on how to challenge him. If you ask why did Putin invade Ukraine now, I believe part of the timing was because Putin saw growing cohesion, which was being enabled by America, that was the bringing together NATO and democracies from around the world, and was actually having some real-world impact. And the more cohesion there is, the less likely his strategy of taking over countries, occupying them, causing instability, was going to succeed. Quite honestly, most Western nations never thought that the cohesion would come together so incredibly quickly at the very beginning of this kinetic campaign. And that has been a positive, a very sobering thing for Putin to have to grasp, as well as other authoritarian nations around the world, because they didn't count on the democracies coming together as quickly as we appear to have done.

    Can you give us a sense of what is happening now on the ground? What is happening now and what do you think is Russia's ground strategy?

    Things are moving quickly, and things are moving slowly. Things are moving quickly in the Russians punishing the Ukrainians with indiscriminate bombing, indiscriminate killing. One of the things we know about the Russian way of war, is there is often a huge chasm between what's actually happening that you can observe either with your own eyes or through other sources, and what the Russians are saying. This indiscriminate killing is an attempt to get the campaign back on a timeline favorable to Russia. It’s very reminiscent of how he cowed Grozny in the Caucuses and how his troops won the campaign at Aleppo in Syria. This grinding away at the civilian infrastructure until the will for war just isn't there. This is what we're seeing happening today. At the same time, there are a lot of things going very, very slowly. Putin’s intent was to launch a very pointed military campaign, install a government that was friendly to Russia, and move on to the next event. That has not happened. So it's really a combination of things moving fast and things moving slow. And all of it creates the potential for a miscalculation.

    U.S. officials have said that the United States and its NATO allies would defend “every inch” of NATO territory if Russia attacks. Why is the United States willing to intervene in defense of NATO countries but not Ukraine?

    We have a signed agreement, a NATO charter that commits America and all nations that are part of NATO to come to each other's defense. This came out of World War II, the coming together of nations to form a balance of power against the Soviet Union, which was itself developing an equal balance of power against Western Europe called the Warsaw Pact. Throughout history, these balances of power have been very, very good ways to set very high levels of deterrence. But it's not just about a military alliance. If you think about the great power competition that is led by China on one side and America on the other, and you look at the gross domestic products (GDP) of the principal players—the gross domestic products being the summation of goods and services that are produced inside a particular nation—if you look at America and our allies, defined as NATO, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and nations that we have defense treaties with, add all those GDPs together, and it comes to a total well north of $50 trillion per year. Americans is somewhere in the range of $20 to $23 trillion depending upon how you count it. Russia's GDP is $1.6 trillion per year, China, again, depending upon how you count, it's about $18 trillion a year. If you're looking at economic heft as a principal tool of either deterrence, coercion, or punishment, that heft is incredibly on the side of the alliance, if the alliance can maintain solidarity, come together and maintain that solidarity. That is what has been, surprising is probably a good word for it, how quickly all of these disparate—not desperate—disparate nations have come together, because they recognize that this isn't so much about Ukraine, per se. Getting back to your question about why we're not fighting in Ukraine. This is about democracies versus authoritarian governments. And they know that they want to be on the democracy side when this shakes out. Each nation is posturing in light of the great power competition, and Ukraine will turn out to be a seminal event in the history of the world, in terms of pulling together the various sides of that great power competition. And we don't know how this is going to impact China. There were initially some hopeful signs that China may f keep a hands-off attitude, and we're seeing some of that. But in the end, how will China buttress Russia? Because without China, Russia doesn't stand a chance. Even with China, Russia will be a pariah for a long, long time. And they will pay an economic consequence, which has a deterrent value to aggression from other authoritarian nations as well.

    What are the West's options militarily? And in raising the point about the great economic power of the West and its allies, are you suggesting that the economic warfare obviates the need for military warfare?

    No. The reason we don't go into Ukraine is because we have no commitment to do so. There is nothing that we are committed to in writing in terms of agreements or defense treaties. One of the other responsibilities and goals of NATO, in addition to defending NATO territory to the last inch, is to not widen the war in Ukraine. However good your intentions are, if you're saying I'm going to do humanitarian corridors, if you're saying I'm going to do no-fly zones in order to protect civilians, what you're doing is you're putting into place an architecture where, without question, NATO troops, perhaps American troops, will fire on and kill Russians and Russians, in turn, will fire on and kill NATO troops. And then you've got something that's no longer contained to NATO. Everybody's heart is wrenched when they see the pictures coming out of Ukraine. You can't not be moved. At the same time, you can't forget that the primary objective is protecting NATO. Next is helping Ukraine where you can economically. The military is about providing them the supplies they need to continue to operate militarily, and if necessary, to go to some sort of insurgency. But that will take time to play out. I would also add that we have been doing that for about the last five or six years. But again, you need to watch that carefully because you don't want to go over whatever is perceived as a tripwire where now America or NATO is a belligerent inside the Ukraine crisis. Because remember, we're still trying to contain that crisis to Ukraine.

    What are the long-term implications of the sudden and dramatic change in Germany's military posture in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

    Coming out of World War II until about a year ago, Germany was of the mindset that we are not going to invest in the military hardware that was associated with Germany in World War II. Germany played a very, very active role in the security of the West. Germany hosts U.S. military forces, Germany hosts NATO forces, Germany has immense economic heft inside of Europe. But there was a reluctance to get involved in the military dimension of national power. It takes time for that mindset to change. What it really takes is some sort of precipitating event. I always go back to Maslow's hierarchy of needs: once I've got oxygen, the next thing I'm concerned about is are you going to kill me? It's security. So all of a sudden, you get this precipitating event, not in Georgia, not in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, but right on the European NATO border. You talk about a wake-up call. I have always maintained that both President Putin and President Xi have overplayed their hands dramatically in the last five to seven to eight years. They thought they just had to bide their time, the West was on this disarmament curve. They played their hands too quickly. This has been a phenomenally cohesive wake-up call for the democracies versus the authoritarian nations. And we'll just have to see how China shakes out: will they be more moderate or are we going to get into a position where the fabric of the world is being pulled further apart into a bipolar future? Authoritarian nations versus democracies free markets versus state sponsored capitalism? That was already happening. Ukraine will either speed that up precipitously, or slow it down.

    A recent piece in the Financial Times by Tim Harford was titled, “Putin's Actions Make No Sense, And That is His Strength,” or something along those lines. How do you engage with an adversary who is willing to do anything?

    Yeah, that's a great question. And there are many parts to the answer, with some nuances, depending on how it unfolds, but the core is, you really need to go to your strengths. And the strengths in this case are the bedrocks of how nations are governed and how they run economies, and then bringing all of those nations together in a balance of power. NATO has been around for a long time—that is a balance of power in Europe. You see the beginnings of balances of power in Asia, whether they're economically oriented, like the comprehensive Trans Pacific Partnership, or whether they are pretty broad, but still focused in military cooperation, like the Quad. There are a variety of things that Putin has done that concerns the Chinese. But what concerns the Chinese is, how quickly all this came together, and what it represents in real terms of how they need to think about their future plans. And it does raise the deterrent bar a little bit higher.

    What does victory mean, for the West in this conflict? And what does it mean for Ukraine?

    That's a great question. Theories of victory are always very, very difficult. Ukraine is a real challenge here. Putin will keep going until he achieves his objective. But he has the luxury of defining what that objective is. Is his objective pushing out to the Ukrainian borders and then annexing Ukraine? Is his objective pushing to the Ukrainian borders and installing a puppet government or a friendly government? Is his objective to just capture Ukraine, keep the country occupied, and install a puppet government? Was he looking to just capture, say, east of the Dnieper River, or to unite Crimea with the separatist regions? He has a variety of ways that he can claim victory. And he will not know what that is himself until he can't go anymore. It's a crusade and crusades don't stop until they run out of energy. And it's not all about Ukraine. It's about support back in Russia. It's about oligarchs. It's about the population. It's about world opinion. It's about his legacy. There are lots of pieces to this that he considers. Having said that he is objective-focused, and his objective is subjugating Ukraine. For the West, at this point, to talk about victory is premature because in greatest probability, the conflict in Ukraine will eventually either go down to some level of insurgency, maybe peter out, probably come to some sort of negotiated settlement with Russia that is not favorable to Ukraine. And then the strength of the insurgency determines a follow-on course. For the democracies however, this has now turned into a long-term confrontation, different than the Cold War, but with the same mentality: Russia contained, Russia not trusted. As time goes on, we need to get back to: how do you negotiate down from these two very, very high levels of readiness, that are deterrent in value, but really do impact economies on both sides? The democracies have the huge advantage, because they have the economies. Russia doesn't. Even Russia bolstered by China doesn't. China's big fear is they're left alone with Russia. Russia becomes an economic basket case, Russia becomes an economic drain on China. Putin on the other hand envisions a Russia that is powerful on the world stage, that is part of a multipolar, not a bipolar world, where Russia is one of the poles independent unto itself, subordinate to no one, especially China. This is Putin's vision for Russia.

    I want to ask you one last question, which is for your personal reflection as someone who has spent your life working on global conflict and cooperation: what is it like to watch this unfold?

    It's extraordinarily disappointing. I spent a fair amount of my time in senior positions in Europe as Europe formed the EU, and as NATO expanded. You leave the emotionalism and the sadness of, of the way the world is going, beside and come back to what has been going on in history for thousands of years. And that's this idea of a balance of power, whether at the tribal level, the community level, the regional level. It is interesting to note that the U.S.-Chinese relationship, which started literally 50 years ago last week with President Nixon's visit to China, is all about the balance of power, with China and the U.S. on one side, and the Soviet Union on the other. Now we have come not full circle, but half circle. Now we have Russia and China, and the biggest thing they have going for them, actually almost the only thing they have going for cooperation, is their intense dislike of America and an authoritarian governance model versus a democratic governance model. They're very different nations. Having said that, it's a classic balance of power teeing up Russia, China versus America and the democracies. And that's what's happening. It's sad to watch. You need to be ready to pony up resources across all the elements of national power. There's an economic cost, there's a diplomatic energy that needs to go into this. There are informational capabilities that you need: cyber defenses, cyber offenses, and there are military expenses associated primarily with deterrence. What makes military deterrence effective are the capabilities, the capacity, the readiness, where they're located (the posture), and the national will to use them if deterrence fails. You’ve got to have all five of those pieces to deter an adversary. If you have all of those pieces, then you don't have to fight to win. And you won't lose. So the big takeaway from a grand strategic perspective for President Xi, for our government, is, as you think about the future, build a strategy. This bipolarization of the world, which has started and is going to get a shot in the arm, if the world continues this way, neither side has to win, but neither side can lose.

    Vice Admiral, thank you so much for being with us today on Talking Policy.

    Thank you, Lindsay. And thank you to IGCC as well, take care.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1536 0 0 0 The war in Ukraine is challenging assumptions about the world among policymakers and ordinary citizens alike. To help listeners understand what is happening, what it means, and what might happen next, a new Talking Policy series will explore the political, economic, security, and humanitarian implications of the Ukraine invasion. In this episode IGCC’s Lindsay Morgan interviews Vice Admiral Charlie Martoglio about events unfolding in Ukraine and how they relate to growing great power rivalry between democracies and authoritarian regimes. This interview was recorded on March 7, 2022. ]]>
    <![CDATA[Beyond Blood Avocados]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/beyond-blood-avocados/ Mon, 14 Feb 2022 16:00:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1700 reportedly abducted by armed men in Loma de Bácum, an indigenous Yaqui community located in Mexico’s northwestern state of Sonora. The remains of seven were found months later in clandestine graves. Over the last decade, dozens of Yaqui leaders and activists have been killed or disappeared by criminal groups for mobilizing against the overexploitation of their natural resources. Such headlines are not unique to Sonora. From illegal gold mining in Colombia to deforestation in Honduras, criminal groups in the Global South have diversified their profit-making activities toward a variety of primary commodities with destructive consequences. Why are criminal organizations diversifying into natural resources? And what is the impact on violence in developing countries like Mexico? Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1700 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, IGCC Dissertation Fellow Joel Herrera analyzes violence connected to criminal organizations diversifying into natural resources. ]]> <![CDATA[Are Russia's Threats Credible?]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/are-russias-threats-credible/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:00:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1794 permanently reversing the expansion of Western military power into Ukraine, backed by the threat of military attack on Ukraine in the absence of compliance. Western policy seeks to deter such an attack by threatening painful economic sanctions and arming Ukraine to make such an attack more costly to Russia. How credible is the Russian threat? Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 1794 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom, both Associate Professors of political science at Southern Illinois University, analyze the brewing tensions between Russia, Ukraine, and the West.]]> <![CDATA[How Germany's Coalition Change Contributed to Putin's Strategic Miscalculation in Ukraine]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/how-germanys-coalition-change-contributed-to-putins-strategic-miscalculation-in-ukraine/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 16:00:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1798 “reassess” the situation. While the move didn’t stop Putin from invading Ukraine—by that point Putin already had too much skin in the game to risk the loss of face from backing down—it has substantially raised the costs for Russia. Why did Germany do this, and why didn’t Putin see it coming? Inflation is up around the world and so are gas prices—especially in Europe. If access to Russian fuel benefits Europe in normal times, it’s even more critical now. If you happen to be one of the world’s top exporters of petroleum and natural gas, as Russia is, a global squeeze is a great time to maximize your leverage. On top of this, Germany and other European countries have invested heavily in developing renewable energy sources. Putin can’t help but see this shift as a threat to Russia’s position in Europe. The more time passes, the less reliant Europe, and especially Germany, will be on Russia. The oil crisis and Europe’s shift toward renewables likely influenced Putin’s decision to escalate conflict with Ukraine as his leverage will likely never be higher. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 1798 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Debra Leiter and Rebecca Best, both Associate Professors of political science at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, analyze the role of Nord Stream 2 on the conflict in Ukraine.]]> <![CDATA[Putin's Playbook]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/putins-playbook/ Tue, 01 Mar 2022 16:00:54 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1804 border with China, and expended considerable resources, with no concessions to show for it. He has wrong-footed his advocates in Europe and America pleading for accommodation and arguing he would not invade. He has sent unwilling conscripts into battle. Why? Putin’s motives might seem a puzzle, had he not been so consistent in expressing them since 2006. In his February 21 televised address, a rambling forty-five-minute speech that—unironically—decried oligarchical corruption and depopulation in Ukraine while proposing a distorted historiography and threatening Kyiv, Putin again articulated Moscow’s position as a revisionist power. Beyond Ukraine, he rejects an international order that undermines Russia’s standing, as he defines it. He demands veto power over the foreign relations of key states in Russia’s near abroad. He seeks the “democratization” of international relations that would give Moscow a greater role in the international system. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1804 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, IGCC Postdoctoral Fellow Noel Foster analyzes the motives for and possible outcomes of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. ]]> <![CDATA[What Americans (Really) Believe About Chemical Weapons]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/what-americans-really-believe-about-chemical-weapons/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 16:00:52 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1811 poison political opponents around the world. But at least the norm is strong in democracies like the United States—right? On the surface, it does appear to be strong. For example, the US Army recently announced that it has almost completed destruction of the United States’ chemical weapons stockpile ahead of a September 2023 deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention. But public actions like these may mask waning private commitment to the non-use norm. One of the primary ways to measure the strength of norms among the general public­—like norms in support of democracy—is to directly ask people about their attitudes in surveys or polls. The problem with this approach is that sometimes people conceal their true beliefs when asked directly. People are particularly likely to hide opinions that might be embarrassing or unpopular. For instance, sexist and racist Americans often lie about their beliefs on direct-question surveys. In a new peer-reviewed study, we show that a significant proportion of the American public also hides their private support for chemical weapons use. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1811 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Joshua Schwartz, a Fellow at Harvard University, Jonathan Chu, Assistant Professor of international affairs at the National University of Singapore, and Christopher Blair, PhD Candidate at the University of Pennsylvania, analyze public support for the use of chemical weapons.]]> <![CDATA[Ukraine as an Instance of State Repression]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/ukraine-as-an-instance-of-state-repression/ Thu, 03 Mar 2022 16:00:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1815 Ukraine as a distinct part of Russia, in which case what is taking place would be best evaluated as state repression. Here, a part of the “real” nation has acted in a threatening manner and the “true” political authority is attempting to put down and re-establish dominance. On the other hand, clearly contradicting the position above, Putin and his supporters have occasionally yielded that Ukraine is a separate nation but noted that they are engaging in behavior that threatens Russians in their midst: genocide. Norms against invading other countries are strong and longstanding, so there is perhaps no other justification for moving into another nation than to save its occupants from large-scale, violent, state-sponsored repression. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1815 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Christian Davenport, Professor of political science at the University of Michigan, analyzes the Russia-Ukraine crisis through the lens of state repression.]]> <![CDATA[Are Digital Technologies Helping Autocrats Stay in Power?]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/are-digital-technologies-helping-autocrats-stay-in-power/ Mon, 07 Mar 2022 16:00:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1819 Twitter and Facebook. Part of the likely rationale for this was to limit Russians’ access to outside news and information, but another likely goal was to prevent Russians from coordinating anti-war and anti-regime protests. Social media tools, the same used by activists to mobilize protests during the Arab Spring and elsewhere, are now more difficult for Russians to access and use for similar efforts. These events renew questions scholars have asked for decades: Do digital technologies—mobile apps, artificial intelligence, etc.—empower groups and individuals living under authoritarianism to challenge the state’s power? Or do these same technologies instead allow the state to tighten its grip on power, crushing organized opposition before it can pose a meaningful challenge to the state? Answering these questions is crucial not only for improving our understanding of the role of technology in state-society relations, but also because this issue has important implications for the survival of authoritarian regimes and the future of human rights. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1819 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Tiberiu Dragu, Associate Professor of politics at New York University, and Yonatan Lupu, Associate Professor of political science at George Washington University, analyze whether social media, artificial intelligence, and other technologies help or hurt those living under authoritarianism.]]> <![CDATA[Why International Women's Day Matters]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/why-international-womens-day-matters/ Tue, 08 Mar 2022 16:00:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1823 first Women’s Day. One might wonder whether the world still needs a Women’s Day, given progress made in women’s access to the workforce, political representation, and legal protections against gender-based violence. But these gains are not distributed equally around the world. And recent cases like Russia and Afghanistan suggest that progress on women’s rights can be reversed. Even where women and men are seemingly on equal footing, persistent obstacles to gender equity remain. For example, in only 4 countries are parliaments comprised of at least 50 percent women. In the United States, women still disproportionally carry the burden of unpaid domestic and childcare work and have no guaranteed access to paid parental leave. And gender-based violence—including intimate partner violence, sexual violence, and femicide—remains shockingly high in many parts of the world. The COVID-19 pandemic may have exacerbated this already bleak picture. Meanwhile, the invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder of the devastating costs women pay in conflict. Women exposed to armed conflict are especially at risk of experiencing sexual violence, a deterioration in mental health, and higher morbidity and mortality rates. But does having an International Women’s Day actually make a difference for ordinary women? Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 1823 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Helen Kras, Assistant Professor of history and politics at Regis University, analyzes the effects of Women’s Day, including on civil society mobilization, political efforts to combat violence, and reporting in the news media.]]> <![CDATA[Are UN Peacekeeping Leaders Held to Account?]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/are-un-peacekeeping-leaders-held-to-account/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 16:00:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1827 60 allegations of misconduct and child sex abuse. One of them concerned a 12-year-old girl allegedly raped by a UN peacekeeper. With more than 75,000 uniformed personnel across twelve ongoing missions, UN peacekeeping is a crucial tool for maintaining international peace and security. UN peacekeepers have been credited with contributing to a number of the positive outcomes you’d expect from peacekeepers: preventing the spread of conflict, protecting local populations from rebel violence, enhancing civilians’ economic and psychological well-being, and helping parties sign peace agreements. But they have also been the targets of justified criticism. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1827 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Magnus Lundgren, Senior Lecturer at Gothenburg University, Kseniya Oksamytna, Lecturer at City University London, and Vincenzo Bove, Professor at the University of Warwick, analyze the United Nation’s mixed record of holding UN peacekeepers accountable for abuses.]]> <![CDATA[Containment 2.0: Sanctions for the Long Haul]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/containment-2-0-sanctions-for-the-long-haul/ Wed, 09 Mar 2022 16:00:51 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1831 Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1831 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, IGCC affiliate David Lake, a Professor of political science at UC San Diego, explains why current sanctions against Russia won’t end the conflict in Ukraine, and should instead be seen as part of a “Containment 2.0” strategy reminiscent of the Cold War.]]> <![CDATA[Can Nonviolent Civil Resistance Stop Putin?]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/can-nonviolent-civil-resistance-stop-putin/ Fri, 11 Mar 2022 16:00:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1835 one study—refuse to collaborate with the regime and thereby undermine its economic, military, and economic power. Putin is fighting a two-front war, one against Ukraine, and one against his own population. Opinion polls show that only 8 percent of Russians supported war with Ukraine before the invasion, and since the invasion, many have participated in anti-war protests all over the country. These protests are yet to reach a critical mass, and almost 14,000 Russians have already been arrested for challenging the war. However, evidence from past nonviolent campaigns suggests that anti-regime protests can grow rapidly, especially if ordinary citizens believe that the government is responding with too much force. Research also shows that large nonviolent campaigns can sow division within the security forces, which can lead to loyalty shifts within military ranks and prompt military coups. Thus, as the massive economic sanctions wreak havoc on Russia’s economy and start affecting ordinary citizens, Putin has good reason to be worried. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1835 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Isak Svensson, Professor at Uppsala University, and Sebastian van Baalen, Researcher at Uppsala University, analyze domestic and international civil resistance against Russia's invasion of Ukraine.]]> <![CDATA[From Manama to Baghdad and Kyiv: Limiting the Risk of Violent Intervention by Authoritarian Neighbors]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/from-manama-to-baghdad-and-kyiv-limiting-the-risk-of-violent-intervention-by-authoritarian-neighbors/ Mon, 14 Mar 2022 15:00:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1839 global decline of democracy and the growing repression of political pluralismStrongmen such as Erdogan, Putin, Modi and Xi Jinping—and perhaps even Ali Khamenei and Mohammed bin Salman—dominate regional or global politics and offer the world an alternative political and economic model based on authoritarian control. Not only do these autocrats rule in their own countries, they push their model into what they consider their spheres of influence—places such as Georgia and Belarus for Russia; Hong Kong and Taiwan for China; Iraq and Syria for Iran; and Yemen and Bahrain for Saudi Arabia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine underlines a point that recent history has made several times already: Strongmen that intervene militarily in neighboring countries to impose or restore authoritarian rule reveal the shaky foundations of their own political order and increase its vulnerability if they fail. Putin is showing the world that notions of Russia as the linchpin of “Slavic brotherhood” and custodian of “Kievan Rus” get their meaning mostly from the barrel of a gun. And yet the Russian regime itself derives some of its legitimacy from such imperial notions. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1839 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Erwin van Veen, Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute, investigates what makes countries more susceptible to invasion by authoritarian neighboring countries.]]> <![CDATA[Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting Their Revenues]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/fighting-organized-crime-by-targeting-their-revenues/ Sat, 05 Mar 2022 16:00:56 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1844 paper, we study one of the ways criminal groups enmesh themselves in the legal economy: by setting up shell companies or infiltrating businesses, criminals apply to and obtain European subsidies created to spur economic growth among firms, especially in economically disadvantaged areas. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1844 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Gianmarco Daniele, Assistant Professor at the University of Milan, and Gemma Dipoppa, Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University, analyze the involvement of organized crime in the legal economy, especially in Europe.]]> <![CDATA[In Autocracies, A Little Media Freedom Can Go A Long Way]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/in-autocracies-a-little-media-freedom-can-go-a-long-way/ Wed, 16 Mar 2022 15:00:52 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1848 recent article, we show how even partial media freedom can make a major difference to nonviolent mobilization in autocracies. It is often assumed that media freedom is limited to democracies, and that autocratic regimes fully control the media and suppress independent information. But many autocracies have some degree of media freedom, and many news sources are not fully controlled by the authorities (see Figure). The editor of the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, for example, was awarded the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for efforts to safeguard freedom of expression. Moreover, the number of nondemocracies with partially free mass media has increased notably since the end of the Cold War. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1848 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Martín Macías Medellín, PhD Student at the University of Michigan, Mauricio Rivera, Senior Researcher at PRIO, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Regiua Professor at the University of Essex, analyze the effect of media in nondemocracies.]]> <![CDATA[Ukraine As A Watershed Moment for Europe]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/ukraine-as-a-watershed-moment-for-europe/ Fri, 18 Mar 2022 15:07:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1891 We're here today to talk with Christina Schneider, who co-leads IGCC's Future of Democracy Initiative and is a professor of political science at UC San Diego. Christina’s research focuses on the domestic politics of cooperation and bargaining in international organizations with a focus on the European Union. In 2013, she was awarded the Jean Monnet Chair of the EU, Jean Monnet being one of the founding fathers of the EU. Christina, welcome to Talking Policy. Thank you so much. I'm happy to be here.

    Is the invasion of Ukraine a 9/11 moment for Europe? What are the long-term ramifications of this invasion?

    While it is early, the current actions of the European Union, and academic research on political development and integration in the EU more broadly, indicates that the war in Ukraine indeed has the potential to create the momentum to lead to a significant shift in how the political, economic, and military order is structured in Europe. The EU has always been about war and peace. But the urgent sense of security that existed right after World War II has faded over time and is barely remembered, especially by younger Europeans. To understand just how big the current policy shifts are, consider how the EU was structured and how little progress it has made in terms of integration. So, for the last 30 years, EU members have been more or less unwilling to delegate serious fiscal responsibilities such as taxing, spending, and borrowing to the EU. The EU also had tremendous problems dealing with the refugee crisis, especially in 2015, because EU members denied a centralized policy on asylum and did not allow for a common control over its external borders. There has also been very minimal security and defense coordination, which has fallen far short of what would be needed to respond effectively in times of an act of aggression from an outside state. And finally, the EU proved relatively toothless in its response to the far-right extremist parties promoting Euroskeptic views and leading to democratic backsliding across a number of European states. But paradoxically, the EU has also been most likely to move toward greater integration in times of deep crisis. So, for example, the decision to integrate fiscal policies was a consequence of the European debt crisis, and the decision to centralize health policies further is a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. A decision to move forward with deeper security and defense cooperation was made after the UK’s decision to exit the EU. In all of these crises, there was a prediction that the EU would implode and fail, but it oftentimes has muddled through and come out stronger as a consequence. The current situation is a far, far greater threat to Europe than any of the threats the EU has faced in the last 30 years. This war has shown Europeans that Russia is a serious threat to European collective security. And it confirms that European integration is still in essence about war and peace. So, for example, in the draft conclusions of this week's Versailles Summit, they stated that Russia's war of aggression constitutes a tectonic shift in European history. This aligns with the unprecedented policy shifts that we see right now in Europe. EU members have implemented an unprecedented number of financial and economic sanctions on Russia. There is now a very serious attempt to develop a long-term policy to reduce gas and oil dependency on Russia, something that seemed unthinkable even after Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014. There's increased political unity within the European institutions and also within European countries. Strikingly, Hungary and Poland, who have been quite obstructive in their decision making, suddenly stopped being obstructive. They are now supportive of sanctions, and have reduced their pro-Russian rhetoric. There's also increased cooperation on refugees. Back in 2015, during the Syrian refugee crisis, Europe was in political turmoil, and the Central and Eastern European countries especially pushed against an opening of their borders. And now it's exactly those countries that have not only opened their borders, but welcomed refugees almost unconditionally. And there is also the potential of actual EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. We're also experiencing a momentous turn in the EU defense strategy, which includes greater cooperation and strengthening of EU Collective Defense Article, and an increased commitment to military and defense spending. Germany is a very good example. The invasion of Ukraine has achieved what the EU has pushed for for years and what seemed unthinkable even in January, which is the revolution in German security and defense policy. This includes a $113 billion Defense Fund to modernize the German military, which will be anchored in German Basic Law so it cannot be used for any other purposes. Our commitment will increase annual defense spending to more than 2 percent of GDP. The current level is below 1.5 percent. Germany will also supply Ukraine with lethal weapons, something that has been previously rejected as being incompatible with German Basic Law. And it will purchase armed drones. The German Chancellor also announced that Germany would indefinitely suspend Nord Stream 2 pipeline projects. These shifts really are tremendous and many of them will be ingrained in domestic law. And this means that they're likely to shift policies in the long term.

    Jean Monnet said that Europe would be forged in crises. And it sounds like he was right—these are extraordinary policy shifts. I want to back up and ask you about some of the European strategic choices in the lead up to the invasion of Ukraine. One of the questions on a lot of people's minds is why didn’t European institutions, why didn’t the United States, or the West more broadly, stop Putin? What do you think have been some of Europe's most important strategic errors in the lead up to this invasion?

    This is the million-dollar question. But let me just make a few observations. It is important to remember that even though Ukraine is officially sovereign, unofficially NATO and the EU have always accepted informally that Ukraine was seen by Russia as a buffer country between the West and the East, and a country that Putin also sees as really belonging to Russia. That has created more hesitancy in terms of any response. There is, of course, a huge concern that we're dealing with a country that has nuclear weapons, and any military involvement on the side of the EU or NATO could lead to another world war. In previous conflicts—Georgia, Crimea, the eastern Ukrainian regions—Putin has always been very good at finding justifications that have a kernel of truth to justify the intervention. He doesn't have that right now. There was also until, until just a few days ago, a lack of belief that the security of NATO members would be threatened. And that has radically changed over the last few days. Then there's the high dependency on Russia in both the agriculture and energy sectors. I talked about this in 2014, during the last war in Ukraine, and one of the suggestions was to radically reduce European dependency in these sectors. And that hasn't happened. I see this as one very big strategic mistake, along with the belief that Russia would stop at Crimea, Donbas and Luhansk, and that it wouldn't militarily intervene in the west of Ukraine. Another observation is the close relationship that many countries have, especially Germany, with Putin and with Russia. All of these factors lead to a foreign policy that was focused on cooperation, and friendly relations and economic integration. Europeans really had a false expectation that this would be the right strategy to achieve peace in Russia without causing a war and without facing serious energy repercussions. It explains why Europe had little appetite for taking collective defense seriously.

    The new German Chancellor, Olaf Schultz, indefinitely paused certification of the Nord Stream 2, which is a set of offshore natural gas pipelines in Europe that go under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. Why did Germany do this? And do you think that they will hold to this?

    So, it is quite a tectonic shift. The speech of the German chancellor in the Bundestag was a watershed moment for any German given its pacifist views and its very close relations with Russia. To understand the significance of this, it's important to know that most of Germany's gas, oil, and coal comes from Russia—almost 40 percent of its gas—which is in line with the average European dependency on gas. On top of that, Germany's gas storage levels are at an historically low level, after Putin refused to increase gas during the shortage last winter. So, the expectation is that if Putin cuts the pipelines, Europeans will face rationing of gas, and their prices for energy will skyrocket. The current discussions at the EU level indicate that leaders plan to reduce dependency more rapidly now than initially planned. The current discussions that I just heard this morning center on a target of 2027, or even 2023. It is unlikely that we will see an immediate ban on oil and gas similar to the U.S. ban. In my view, the decision to freeze Nord Stream 2 coupled with the persistent reluctance to join the U.S. ban on oil and gas imports completely and immediately can be seen as part of a strategy to face our dependency on Russia in the long term, while averting a serious energy crisis in the short and medium term. It is an extremely delicate balance to navigate.

    Less than a week after the invasion, the Ukrainian government, followed by the governments of Moldova and Georgia, applied to join NATO and the EU. There has been some historic skepticism about their joining but now there are some signals of openness. Is Europe changing its mind on this?

    Yes, this is a great question. I've spent years researching EU enlargement, especially with a focus on Eastern European countries. In some ways it does. But looking back at the discussions during the 2014 war, I actually unfortunately have not seen significantly different rhetoric, at least in terms of actual membership. For example, back in 2005, even the Commission president said that Ukraine's future is in the EU, which is very similar to statements that the Commission made in recent days. I would argue that the likelihood of a rapid succession is still low, and if it happens, it will be far in the future. It's important to remember, though, that the EU already has an association agreement with Ukraine, which has established greater economic ties. These association agreements are typically seen as an initial step toward membership. The EU was built to promote security, peace, and stability in Europe by fostering democracy and creating economic prosperity through economic integration. Any European country that wants to be part of the EU is welcome to join if it can fulfill these criteria of democracy and stable economics. So what are the major challenges to enlargement? First of all, there is Russia's strong objection to Ukraine's membership in the EU. We often focus on NATO as the red line. But it is important to remember that it was the refusal of pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to sign the association agreement with the EU that led to the 2013 Maidan protests, which then gave Russia the pretext to invade and occupy Crimea. The EU has been seen as a redline for Russia in terms of Ukraine; they do not want Ukraine to become a democratic Western oriented country. Public support for EU membership for Ukraine itself is divided, especially in the east. Although that might change, of course, with the invasion in the Ukraine. And the rules of accession are quite demanding and require the support of all 27 EU member states. That's not an easy feat to achieve and accession negotiations have often taken many years. Turkey is still negotiating, and it received official candidacy status in the 1980s. If the EU governments agree on official candidacy in the Council, applicants need to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, which include the requirement of being a full democracy. The state also has to be sovereign, which means it has to have control over its borders, and it has to have a functioning market economy. They also have to be able and willing to implement the EU body of rules and law, the so-called  Acquis Communautaire. The problem is, Ukraine is not a stable democracy right now, according to Freedom House; its sovereignty is contested and has been ever since the annexation of Crimea; and it's far from being a functioning market economy, not to mention other concerns about the rule of law and corruption. And then, of course, there’s the EU’s Defense article. So there's Article 42(7), which is akin to NATO's Article 5, which makes it clear that an attack on an EU country is an attack against all of the EU. So that means that if Ukraine became a member today, the EU would have to respond to Russia potentially militarily to defend it, likely leading to another world war. Fast tracking countries is also not likely to happen because it would require a change in treaties that all members would have to agree on. And this is politically highly controversial, because negotiations are the only leverage the EU has to get countries to implement the necessary political and economic reforms, right? And this in itself is seen as vital for the political unity and stability of the EU. So, there are tremendous concerns that a premature accession of Ukraine could lead to an unraveling of the Union itself. I cannot emphasize enough how problematic these issues are for European integration. All this indicates to me that the EU isn't likely to fast track Ukraine succession. The much more likely outcome would be that the EU grants Ukraine applicant status, with a more long-term prospect for membership. But all of that depends on what status Ukraine will have going forward. And it is not clear at all that candidacy status would deter Putin. It might actually further provoke him.

    What about the former communist countries who are members of the EU and are now on the frontlines of a war? I'm thinking of Romania, the Baltic states, Poland—do you think that their voices will carry more weight in the EU now, given the circumstances?

    The view that EU policy is entirely driven by powerful members is not quite true. All states have carried significant weight within the decision-making process of the EU because compromise and consensus-building has always been an important norm within the EU. That has been challenged recently especially by countries that have experienced democratic backsliding, but my sense is that the war will likely reinforce the importance of political unity and these principles, as it becomes clear that the EU has the potential to be larger than the sum of its European parts.

    What are the implications of the crisis for European domestic politics? Obviously, we just went through Brexit. Macron has an election next month. How do you see things shifting? Or do you see things shifting?

    They’re absolutely shifting and the implications for domestic politics will be large, in the short term and potentially also in the long term. The war in Ukraine has necessitated and facilitated a reapproachment between the UK and the EU. It's been quite a toxic relationship. And we see that already, there is more cooperation. In the long term, I think there is some hope for the currently strained relationship and for closer bilateral cooperation in the future. In France, it is likely that Macron will benefit politically, as the current crisis exposes the limits of Europe to act on its own. But it also provides Europe with a rationale to make the changes that France has pushed for. Macron has benefited from this. It has been a huge challenge for far-right parties, which have been largely pro-Russian. They're now very busy backpedaling their statements, and they've seen a decline in support. In Hungary and Poland, right-wing governments have become much less obstructive within Europe. I already mentioned that Orban said that he will not sanction Russia; in Italy, the far-right under Salvini has come under really hot water because of its close ties to Putin. In Bulgaria, there has been a shift in public opinion, which was historically pro-Russian. A minister was forced to resign because he said we shouldn't call the invasion a war. So, there is a huge public pushback against the pro-Russian rhetoric of far-right wing parties, and that might have electoral consequences that could be quite long lasting.

    I’d like to ask for your personal reflections as someone who has spent your professional life devoted to looking at issues of European integration and cooperation. What is it like to watch these events unfold?

    It feels horrifying. It's extremely emotional. My family has roots in Western and Eastern Europe; we have many friends and we have family who were directly exposed to the war. It has torn through some of the family because we have members of the family who were very exposed to Russian media and viewpoints are very different. So, it is highly emotional. As someone who very strongly identifies as a European, it is unimaginable to see not only that there is another war in the middle of Europe, but also the inability to respond to the human suffering that is happening right now. There's this very strong sense of a moral obligation to do something. As a researcher, I can tell you why neither the U.S. nor NATO nor the EU will do what Ukraine actually needs in the short term. And that is incredibly frustrating on a personal level.

    What do you think Europe, European countries, and the EU should be doing to help Ukraine?

    Personally, I think it would have helped to fast track integration of Ukraine into Europe and potentially NATO much earlier, before the war started. It still would have been a highly risky move, but the hope would have been that Russia would be much less likely to invade a country that has NATO troops stationed. I believe it is crucially important for the West to supply Ukraine with military equipment and financial support, and to open up borders for refugees and to provide humanitarian support. It’s also important that they really move forward extremely rapidly on the oil and ban gas ban here in Europe.

    How do you think the Russian invasion of Ukraine will affect academic study of international security and international relations?

    I think there will be renewed interest in studying these issues. Much of the work has focused on domestic conflict and civil war, because of the decline in interstate conflicts. This [invasion] will probably lead to a renewed interest in studying big interstate conflicts. It will also lead to a much-needed focus on the international relations of authoritarian states, and how authoritarian states cooperate. That's the big question right now about China and Russia, for example, and what implications that has for the West. And then finally, I would also like to see more on how these actions affect domestic politics, and especially the future of democracy, not only in Europe, but also beyond. Because we've seen states such as Russia become increasingly bold and aggressive. They have pushed back against democratization efforts quite successfully. And we see a decline around the world in the number of democracies and the number of stable democracies with consequences that will be far lasting. We need to understand what policies need to be implemented to protect against those changes.

    And as we mentioned at the beginning of the interview, you are co-leading an initiative with IGCC that will coalesce and mobilize research across many different dimensions of democracy, governance, threats to democracy, inclusive representation, technology and democracy. We're really excited to see how that initiative develops and brings together the incredible minds across the University of California. Listeners should stay tuned to that initiative as well. Christina, thank you so much for taking time to talk with us this morning.

    Thank you so much.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1891 0 0 0 In the latest from Talking Policy’s series on Ukraine, we talk with UC San Diego professor of political science, Christina Schneider, who co-leads IGCC’s Future of Democracy initiative, about the already-significant implications of the invasion of Ukraine on European economic, military, and humanitarian policies. This interview was conducted on March 10, 2022.]]>
    <![CDATA[Catalyst Hosts Five Eyes Event on Emerging Technology]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/catalyst-hosts-five-eyes-event-on-emerging-technology/ Fri, 18 Mar 2022 17:36:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1519 “As we look at the rate of change in both the challenges we’re facing, and the emergence of new technologies, it is apparent that none of our nations will succeed alone. We must find more and better ways to collaborate with our close allies, and that is the purpose of this panel.” Col. Elliot Schroeder, Ms. Lois Nicholson, Mr. Bruce Gilkes, and Ms. Joanne Smail discuss ways to improve collaboration on national security innovation. Panelists discussed which technologies would likely be most important; whether governments, established industry, or start-up companies would be most important in leading development and operationalizing capabilities; where national and international barriers would hinder collaboration and innovation; and where examples of success might be built upon. The discussion revealed several areas of common perspective and interest. There was consensus among participants about the importance of considering how new technologies will be used in the field. Can innovations be easily integrated into existing work routines or do they require new training and operational concepts? Many also stressed the need to develop durable multinational partnerships across government, military, industry and academia. The prospect of forming multinational communities of practice linking research, development and capabilities generation in technology areas was of keen interest among panel participants. And many expressed hope that new venues will be created to bring together operations concepts, human factors and new technologies to rapidly evolve effective capabilities. Ms. Lois Nicholson, Ms. Joanne Smail, and Rear Adm. Angus Topshee provide remarks at the evening social. There were also contrarian warnings voiced, including the caution that many of the barriers that are in place that slow the adoption of new technologies by militaries—both nationally and internationally—are both useful and necessary. Although requirements such as acquiring international patents, and national reviews for release of key technologies may slow the security innovation process down, they also reduce risk by forcing rigorous review; protecting the intellectual property of those involved; and reducing the chance that potential adversaries gain access to key emerging capabilities. Greater standardization was proposed as a way to improve cooperation, but this was noted as potentially a dangerous double-edged sword, as greater standardization might hinder the ability to innovate and create barriers to entry for incumbent providers that could influence the development of standards to thwart new approaches. Overall, the panel agreed that the current era of competition is fundamentally different, as it represents the first time in the modern world that great power competition has truly included every element of national power—military, geoeconomic, and geopolitical—and that it was unlikely that any nation could prevail on its own. Great power competition will require close allied cooperation.

    Panel participants included:

    • Joanne Smail (Senior Trade and Investment Commissioner, Australian Embassy, Washington, DC)
    • Lois Nicholson (Counsellor, Defence Acquisition and Technology, UK Embassy, Washington, DC)
    • Marv Langston (former Navy CIO, former DoD Deputy CIO, and former head of Communications and Intelligence at DARPA)
    • Rear Admiral (Ret) Jim Rodman (CEO, XSite LLC)
    • Captain William Quinn, RCN (Canadian Naval Attaché to the U.S.)
    • Colonel Elliot Schroeder, U.S.A. (Commanding Officer, U.S. Army 75th Innovation Division, Southwest)
    • Damien Tyrrell (Regional Director for Americas and Japan, Sentient Vision Systems, Australia)
    • Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Bruce Gilkes (Sr. Business Development Manager, VizworX Inc., Canada)
    • Scott Tait (Executive Director of the National Security Innovation Catalyst and CEO of Pacific Science and Engineering).
    Learn more about Catalyst]]>
    1519 0 0 0
    <![CDATA[Ukraine and the Risk of Nuclear Confrontation]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/ukraine-and-the-risk-of-nuclear-confrontation/ Fri, 18 Mar 2022 17:53:37 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1530 On February 24, after weeks of headlines warning that Russia might invade, Russian troops crossed the border into Ukraine. Why didn't—and why couldn’t—the West stop Putin from invading Ukraine? Well, of course, Ukraine is directly adjacent to Russia, so they have a tremendous geographical advantage. We have NATO forces in Western and Eastern Europe, but in smaller numbers. It was a totally asymmetric situation in terms of the U.S. physically preventing Russia from invading Ukraine.

    Why is Russia doing this now?

    It goes back to when Putin became the President of Russia in 2000. He said at the time that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. Putin was deeply aggrieved, as were many Russians. Putin’s [also] got a totally authoritarian personality and background; he's spent his whole life in the KGB. He was in counterintelligence in East Germany—among the most challenging positions for Soviet intelligence. His whole instinct is to rollback that terrible defeat from 1991, when Russia became independent and the Soviet Union collapsed. He’s tried different things. He invaded and attacked part of Georgia. He seized Crimea, a part of Ukraine, in 2014. This was largely unnoticed by most of the American people. And then he invaded the so-called Donbas region of Ukraine, which is Russian speaking. This was a precursor to what happened a few weeks ago. Russia had guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty in 1994, in order for Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Ukraine agreed as long as they received assurances about sovereignty being respected, and by getting energy assistance, which was endorsed by Russia, the United States, and England. That's how we've got to the start of the war.

    You worked with the Obama administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. How have different presidential administrations impacted Putin's calculations and sense of how he can maneuver?

    They are very, very different. Obama thought he could possibly deal with Putin. But that collapsed in 2014, when Putin seized Crimea. Under Trump, it was a totally different situation. Trump has been a supporter and an apologist for Putin and Russia from the beginning. Trump never criticized Putin once, [about] any activity. On the contrary, he talked about withdrawing from NATO, which gave Putin tremendous encouragement. Biden, however, returned to traditional aspects of American foreign policy. He warned Putin not to invade Ukraine. He supported the transfer of defensive weapons to Ukraine. But I think Putin felt that the West was divided. You have senior figures of the Republican Party, like Trump, like Pompeo and others, who praised Putin, who say what a genius he is. I think Putin fundamentally miscalculated about the response to the invasion. He also miscalculated in two other key respects: the tenacity of the Ukrainians to defend their territory and opposition to the invasion in Russia itself.

    Putin has put his nuclear forces on high alert, escalating tensions and raising fears that this could lead to a nuclear confrontation. Do you think that's a real possibility?

    I actually unfortunately do think it is a possibility. I put it at maybe at 20 percent. But it's not zero. I think this is the most serious danger of a nuclear crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Russia has a military doctrine called “escalate to deescalate,” which was developed by the Russian chief of the military, General Gerasimov. It calls for, after a Russian conventional attack on a sovereign state and the threat of retaliation by NATO to that attack, limited use of low-yield nuclear weapons by the Russians to deter conventional retaliation by NATO. The original scenario that the West envisaged [for this scenario] is in the Baltics—in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. You may have seen just yesterday that the Lithuanian president met with senior U.S. officials, and warned them that Putin will not stop at Ukraine, and that security of the Baltic States must be enhanced.

    Last year, I interviewed Brad Roberts at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Lab. He said that the stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons has come down from about 30,000 in the mid-1980s to 5,000 today, and that the newest intercontinental ballistic missile went into service in 1971. The newest nuclear weapon dates to 1991. Russia, by contrast, has replaced 80 percent of its delivery system and every single warhead over the last decade. Should we be worried about our position relative to Russia?

    The only way to deter this threat is to have a very credible retaliatory capability against it. No words mean anything to Putin. It's only about the guns and the bullets. Now at the strategic nuclear level Brad is completely right. In terms of long-range nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers and submarines that could attack the Soviet Union and can attack the United States, Russia has a slight advantage in the total numbers. But I think most observers believe that there is stable strategic nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia. Neither side believes that they could strike the other side with impunity, because the retaliatory attack would be devastating to society, and both societies would be destroyed. But that's not true at the tactical level, where Russia has about 2,000 short-range, low-yield weapons, some in the Western military districts of Russia, compared to no more than 200 short-range tactical systems that the U.S. has on five NATO bases in Western Europe. I think Russia believes that they could perhaps get away with an attack with a short-range system without the U.S. and NATO retaliating, which would be a hyper dangerous mistake on their part.

    You have been a Russia watcher for a long time. As you've watched this unfold over the past several weeks and months, I'm curious what you have been seeing that other people might miss?

    Let’s talk about Putin's strategy. Of course they said they [wouldn’t] invade Ukraine. The Russians lie all the time on all subjects. Nothing can be believed by any Russian spokesman on any subject at any time. They say what they think the opponent wants to hear. Just like now they say they're not shelling citizens. And you see tens of thousands of Ukrainians being attacked and many killed. They have no compunction at all about saying black is white and green is yellow. That's been a constant, and that was not unexpected. What was unexpected was that he encircled the country with forces and then invaded from the north, the east and the south. But he did it somewhat gradually. And it took quite a while for the troops to penetrate into Ukrainian territory. I think he thought that just the sheer shock of the invasion would lead Ukrainians to surrender, which of course didn’t happen. They became tremendously resilient and deeply nationalistic, deeply anti-Russian. There's been a lack of coordination of the artillery and the armor capability with the Air Force and missiles; they don't seem to be doing a very good job of coordinating what they're doing. They have this huge convoy that's been stuck on the way to Kyiv for over a week now. The Ukrainians have been attacking their supply lines. It's alleged that Russian forces there have low morale—many of them had no idea what they were getting into. The Russians not only don't tell us, they don't tell themselves what's going on. The media has finally been totally locked down in Russia. So there's absolutely no Western information getting in. All the Russian people are being told on television is that Russia is de-nazifying the Ukrainian government—Ukraine, which is the only country in the world besides Israel that has a Jewish president and a Jewish prime minister. And he's saying that there is a Nazi threat in Ukraine. It's total fabrication.

    What have we learned about NATO through this conflict over the last month?

    NATO has been amazingly resilient and unified. And President Biden gets a tremendous amount of the credit for that. Because under Trump, NATO was on the brink of collapse. It was widely held, and I certainly believe it, that if Trump [had been] reelected in 2020, the U.S. would have withdrawn from NATO and NATO would have collapsed. His entire policy in Europe was pro-Russian. It was unprecedented in American history. From Harry Truman in 1947 to Obama in 2017, we’ve always had a super supportive U.S. policy towards NATO. I had an opportunity to chair the NATO high-level group for two years, which is the group that reviews NATO nuclear policy. I've met many times in Belgium and elsewhere with NATO officials. And it was a very cordial positive relationship. Trump made every effort to destroy NATO. Now NATO is totally revived under Biden. Biden made tremendous efforts to coordinate every single step and be totally clear on what he was going to do. There is a disagreement on one issue that had just come up this morning, which is that Biden has agreed to turn off all U.S. imports of Russian oil. Germany said that's not feasible, because they depend on Russian natural gas for heating and other elements of German society.

    What percentage of U.S. oil or gas imports come from Russia?

    Three percent.

    So, a tiny amount.

    Tiny. It’s trivial. There's nothing that Russia produces that Americans want. Nothing. Zero.

    What should the U.S. be doing right now to help Ukraine?

    I think we're approaching a very important decision, which is: Ukraine wants aircrafts that Poland has, that were Russian built, which Ukrainian pilots can fly. The U.S. would then replace them in Poland with modern U.S. aircraft. Poland has said that they're willing to do it. But the U.S. was still considering it. I believe it's risky, but it's worth doing. Now Russia has said that any country that supplies weapons to Ukraine is combatant in the conflict. But we've been supplying all kinds of weapons to them already. The Stinger and Javelin missiles, and many advanced defensive weapon systems, measured in a couple of billions of dollars of aid. So, this isn’t about Americans flying them. It's about Ukrainians flying them, after they're obtained from Poland. I think that's a bluff that we can call on Putin. But it's dangerous. I'm not saying any of this without risk. We know from biographical assessments of Putin that he's in tremendous isolation, that he hasn't been speaking to people, really since the COVID-19 pandemic. He's a germaphobe. He's very afraid of the virus. You see in all these photos that he's at one end of a long table. And even his top generals are at the other end, so he has nobody to speak to. And those who speak to him are primarily the intelligence and military personnel who are hyper hawkish on this. So, he's got no one to counter these instinctive hawkish views. I think he’s committed to the destruction of Ukraine, and thinks that if he keeps bombing them into submission, they will ultimately surrender. This is what he did in Grozny in the Chechen war, and it’s what he did it in Aleppo in the Syrian war. He bombs hospitals, churches, and schools—those are his favorite targets. He's a ruthless, deeply paranoid individual.

    We've been reading more and more about waning democratic norms and the rise of authoritarianism globally. To what extent is what’s happening between Russia, Ukraine, and the West about that bigger conflict?

    The tendencies toward authoritarianism in various countries—Turkey, Egypt, China, Belarus, and in many other countries—only reinforces Putin's aggressiveness. It’s especially important to the U.S. that he's made very close relations with Xi Jinping and China. The early Cold War was initially a Soviet-Chinese alliance against the U.S. Nixon's visit to China back in 1972 broke that. It wasn't that we were pro-Mao, or pro-Communist China. But China had already had a border war with the Soviet Union in 1969, and had been denied weapons by the Soviets. So it was a ripe time for China to be wooed away by the United States from the Soviet Union. And that lasted well into the Deng Xiaoping era of the 1980s and into the 1990s, when China began to assert itself economically. When I was in government in the early Obama years, Jiang Zemin was the president of China. And he was rather cordial with the United States. This has changed dramatically after Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping is now the key authoritarian figure in China, the most powerful figure in China since Mao Zedong, who died in the 1970s. Putin and Xi Jinping have made very close ties. Putin just came back for the Chinese Olympics just a few weeks ago, and they have signed all kinds of military cooperation and intelligence cooperation agreements. They're working hand in glove, which means, among other things, that it's not impossible for China, seeing the U.S. embroiled in the NATO nuclear problem in Russia, could move against Taiwan. And we can have a two-front war. So I do think that the global trends with more authoritarian regimes have emboldened Putin and Xi Jinping.

    As someone who has spent your career focusing on issues of conflict, Russia, and nuclear weapons policy, what has it been like, personally, watching this unfold?

    It's been very disturbing and very alarming and very concerning. We had hopes at the end of the Cold War; there was talk about even Russia becoming part of NATO, and even Russia making all kinds of new deals aimed at coming into the modern world. Boris Yeltsin and [Bill] Clinton had very good relations. I was at several summits between them, and they used to get drunk together. But that was then, and this is now. Since 2000 with the expansion of NATO to the east and the rise of Putin, things have totally changed. I am now very disappointed, but I am more concerned than I am disappointed. I am very concerned that this conflict could spread, that it could lead to new conflict, and that it could lead to a third world war. And then you have the possible play of nuclear weapons, which could threaten the lives of all of us.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1530 0 0 0 In the latest from Talking Policy’s series on Ukraine, Michael Nacht, who holds the Thomas and Allison Schneider chair in public policy at UC Berkeley and is a specialist in U.S. national security policy, nuclear weapons, and regional security issues affecting Russia and China, shares candid thoughts on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Putin's strategy, and the risk of nuclear confrontation. This interview was conducted on March 8, 2022.]]>
    <![CDATA[The War in Ukraine, Food Prices and the World's Poor]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/the-war-in-ukraine-food-prices-and-the-worlds-poor/ Thu, 31 Mar 2022 17:00:44 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1705 FAO food price index—which shows monthly price changes in a basket of commodities—had already risen to an all-time high in February, before the full effects of the war in Ukraine were visible. More recent data for individual commodities—tracked by Trading Economics—shows prices spiraling to levels not seen since past crises. These pre-invasion trends were driven primarily by vegetable oil, where droughts and floods last year led to major stock depletion and price surges. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 1705 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Jennifer Burney, Associate Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy (GPS) at UC San Diego, and IGCC affiliate Stephan Haggard, who is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Professor at GPS, analyze the effects of the conflict in Ukraine on food prices and availability. ]]> <![CDATA[Taking Nationalists Seriously: Historical Grievances and Revisionist Warfare]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/taking-nationalists-seriously-historical-grievances-and-revisionist-warfare/ Mon, 21 Mar 2022 14:39:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1853 chaotic,” or are analysts using the wrong conceptual map? Much points to the latter. Indeed, the most influential approaches to international politics fail to make sense of Russia’s radical revisionism. Liberals have been slow to grasp the shift from globalization to geopolitics. From their welfare-oriented and border-less perspective, the Russian assault on Ukraine appears truly puzzling. After the end of the Cold War, liberals anticipated that democratization would spread into Eastern Europe, accelerated by the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union. Realists criticize liberals as being hopelessly naive about the power realities of world politics, pointing to their alleged failure to realize that NATO’s expansion could provoke Russia. Yet, viewing Putin as a security-driven actor, realists such as John Mearsheimer have expected Russia to refrain from moves beyond the 2014 annexation of Crimea. It would seem that this underestimation of Russian revisionism stems from realism’s tendency to overlook the role of nationalism and its subversive impact on international borders. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1853 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Lars-Erik Cederman, Professor, Guy Schvistz, Postdoctoral Researcher, and Seraina Rüegger, Affiliate, all of ETH Zurich, analyze the role of nationalism in the changing world order.]]> <![CDATA[Putin's Aspiration to Control Reality]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/putins-aspiration-to-control-reality/ Tue, 22 Mar 2022 15:06:00 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1857 tens of thousands of Russians have protested against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and potentially millions of Russians do not believe that Russian soldiers have attacked and killed civilians. Indeed, even relatives of Ukrainians living in Russia don’t necessarily accept that there is anything taking place other than a “special military operation” designed to benefit Ukraine. While arrests and beatings of protesters are well-known forms of repression, the Russian state is showing it has a broader array of repressive tools available—including many focused on shaping beliefs. In addition to traditional forms of repression, such as physical surveillance of, and physical attacks against, street protesters, the Russian repression repertoire also includes a large dose of digital repression, which, in a recent review of research on digital repression, we show can take many forms. Two broadly different categories of repression are evident in Russia. The Kremlin has prominently paired an escalating amount of censorship, which is a kind of repression focused on controlling and limiting information, with substantial cheerleading and disinformation campaigns, which are forms of repression focused on distracting or misleading. Significant disinformation campaigns are also being used, on some of the same platforms that are being restricted, including TikTok, where key influencers have been coordinated to amplify a pro-Putin message. While these efforts are not brand new, they are important escalations. Do censorship and disinformation need each other to succeed? Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1857 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Jennifer Earl, Professor of sociology at the University of Arizona, and Tom Maher, Assistant Professor at Clemson University, analyze authoritarian use of disinformation.]]> <![CDATA[Yucatan as an Exception to Rising Criminal Violence in Mexico]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/yucatan-as-an-exception-to-rising-criminal-violence-in-mexico/ Wed, 23 Mar 2022 15:12:59 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1861 a firefight between rival cartel members left two dead in one of Tulum’s most elegant restaurants. In the neighboring state of Yucatán, however, things are—and have been—very different. The international and national press routinely publish articles about Yucatán as a safe destination. In 2019, CEOWORLD Magazine ranked Mérida, the capital of Yucatán, as the second safest city in North America and the safest city in Latin America. For decades, despite rising criminal violence across Mexico and an ongoing War on Drugs, the state of Yucatán has registered a very low homicide rate of 2.5 per 100,000 people (akin to Connecticut), compared to the Mexican national average of 29 per 100,000. That’s not to say that violence doesn’t occur at all. Both police and gender violence have risen in the past few years, and there have been instances of unsettling narco-related violence. The most serious incident occurred in August 2008 when 11 decapitated corpses draped with narco messages were found on the outskirts of Mérida. High-ranking leaders of several OCGs have been arrested in Mérida in recent years, and Lantia Intelligence, a security consulting agency, documented the presence of the Sinaloa Cartel, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, and the Gulf Cartel in Yucatán state between 2019–20. On the whole, though, and despite the criminal presence, levels of violence are low in Yucatán. What explains the historically low homicide rate in Yucatán state even as neighboring states have exhibited much more visible violence? Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 1861 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Shannan Mattiace, Professor of political science at Allegheny College, and Sandra Ley, Associate Professor at Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, analyze why Yucatan is an exception to Mexico’s widespread criminal violence but subject to increased police and gender violence.]]> <![CDATA[Will NATO Fight Russia Over Ukraine? The Stability-Instability Paradox Says No]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/will-nato-fight-russia-over-ukraine-the-stability-instability-paradox-says-no/ Thu, 24 Mar 2022 15:18:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1865 recently argued that the Ukraine war could easily escalate to a large-scale conventional war because of the “stability-instability paradox, in which states, stalemated in the nuclear realm, might be more willing to escalate in conventional terms.” The stability-instability paradox, combined with incentives to escalate, accidents, and efforts by allies to supply Ukraine with more controversial weapons like fighter aircraft, could push the two sides to war. They argue that painful concessions may be necessary to resolve the conflict and avoid disaster. Escalation is obviously a central concern in this conflict, given that both sides have nuclear weapons and that an all-out war would be catastrophic. But the stability-instability paradox actually gives hope that escalation may be avoided, rather than additional reasons for fear. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1865 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Andrew Kydd, Professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, applies the stability-instability paradox to NATO’s perspective of the war in Ukraine.]]> <![CDATA[Stop Trying to Convince Americans that Torture Doesn't Work]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/stop-trying-to-convince-americans-that-torture-doesnt-work/ Mon, 28 Mar 2022 16:28:26 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1870 torture doesn’t work. That argument is weak, even dangerous. There have always been good philosophical, historical, and technical reasons to reject the effectiveness argument. There is now a fourth reason to reject it, grounded in public opinion. Two surveys that I administered to more than 2,000 American adults show that Americans believe torture is very effective at extracting crucial information. The participants in my survey were not persuaded to oppose torture when I told them that it might not provide crucial information. But when I told them that torture was cruel, their support for torture dropped significantly. They rejected torture not because it was ineffective but because it was immoral. Criticizing torture because it doesn’t work is a bad idea for several reasons. First of all, it’s a dubious philosophical claim. If torture is morally wrong, who cares how well it does or does not work? We don’t debate how “efficient” genocide, terrorism, or human rights abuses are either. How good or bad torture is at extracting information has no bearing on its morality either, unless it never ever yields useful information. But as history shows, that is not the case. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1870 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Ron Hassner, Professor of political science at UC Berkeley, analyzes why the U.S. public is soft on torture, and how anti-torture activists can push back.]]> <![CDATA[Can Israel Remain Both Neutral and Part of the West?]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/can-israel-remain-both-neutral-and-part-of-the-west/ Tue, 29 Mar 2022 16:38:54 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1874 early March. This attempted mediation did little if anything, but it was better than nothing and if Israel can possibly play a positive role because of its neutrality, then its neutrality might be in the best interest of peace. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1874 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Michael Barnett, Professor of international affairs and political science at George Washington University, analyzes Israel's increasingly tenuous neutral stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.]]> <![CDATA[What Coups and Elections Have in Common]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/what-coups-and-elections-have-in-common/ Wed, 30 Mar 2022 16:48:25 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1878 swift victory. But things have not turned out as planned. The invasion has been met with stiff resistance, unprecedented economic sanctions, and increasing domestic discontent. Even worse for Putin, there are now serious questions about whether someone within his regime will stage a coup and remove him from power. But just as he has sought to protect himself from potential financial sanctions, Putin seems to have anticipated this threat from within. He did this not because he has unique foresight, but because coups are something all autocrats face. Coups are not just isolated events—something that happens on a particular day, where the conspirators either succeed or fail. Rather, they are a close cousin of elections. Both are mechanisms for the transfer of power with one mostly found in dictatorships and the other in democracies. Shadow an elected official as they perform their daily tasks, and it becomes quickly apparent that the policies they advocate for, the people they meet with, and the fundraisers they stage are all geared towards the goal of winning the next election. Far from mattering only on the day when citizens cast their vote, the influence of elections is ever-present in democracies and profoundly shapes what elected officials do on a day-to-day basis. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1878 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Josef Woldense, Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota, and Jun Koga Sudduth, Senior Lecturer at the University of Strathclyde, analyze the similarities between coups and elections as transfers of power.]]> <![CDATA[China’s Evolving Relationship with Russia]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/chinas-evolving-relationship-with-russia/ Tue, 29 Mar 2022 17:48:46 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1886 The invasion of Ukraine has put a spotlight on Russia's relationship with China—the world's other authoritarian great power. How much did China know in advance about Putin's plan to invade Ukraine? That's a great question, and I'm sure lots of people want to know the answer. There's all sorts of speculation that when Putin visited Beijing for the Winter Olympics, he could have informed Xi Jinping [about the invasion], or that, because China and Russia have a very close relationship in the military sphere, that information could have been shared. But we don't know. What we do know is that China was, to some extent, taken by surprise. Chinese authorities had a difficult few days at the beginning to work out its position. This suggests that the Chinese may have been told some things, but may not have been given full insight into what was taking place by the Russians.

    If the Chinese were surprised by what happened, do you think it's likely that that would introduce some element of distrust in Russia-China relations?

    It's possible. But trust has not been well-established in the China-Russia relationship. While the Chinese and the Russians have developed a pretty good relationship, there's significant distrust in many areas of that relationship. In many ways, Beijing and Moscow operate on the classic Ronald Reagan formula: trust but verify. It's a conditional relationship, where they have lots of things in common—like sharing a deep disdain and hostility towards the U.S., deep nationalist roots on both sides—but at the same time, both countries have had many, many decades, if not centuries, of hostility towards each other, even in the recent past. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the two countries have spent as much time at each other's throats as they have been comrades in arms. When you have this sort of very mixed history, trust is often in short supply.

    How much disagreement is there between Russia and China about what their relative status should be?

    For the first 50 years after the founding of the People’s Republic, the Soviet Union was the senior partner and the country that provided enormous amounts of economic, industrial, and military assistance to China. There was a clear hierarchy in the relationship; the Soviet Union was very much the big brother, and China was a junior partner. After the Sino-Soviet split, there were long decades of hostility. They got back together at the end of the 1980s / the beginning of the 1990s. The Soviet Union still acted like the senior partner, especially in the military and security realm. And even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians continued to see themselves as the more senior partner. But on the economic side, China was more prosperous, and trade was much more in China's favor. So you had this bifurcated relationship where China was wealthier and more powerful on the economic side, while on the military side, the Russians had a lot more than what the Chinese offered. In the last decade or two, especially when Xi Jinping came to power, there's been a recognition that it's a more balanced relationship, where both occupy sort some sort of equivalence or balance in that relationship.

    How much does China's nuclear weapons program and its size relative to Russia play a role in the disagreements or relative status?

    I don't think it plays that much. The Russian nuclear arsenal is much, much bigger than the Chinese, but that's a function of nuclear competition with the U.S. The Chinese nuclear weapons program has been relatively minimalist. The Russians and the Chinese have had a pretty engaged dialogue and nuclear weapons is not one of the key aspects of their military relationship. They talk to each other to mitigate any issues and tensions, but I don't think the Russians see nuclear war with China as a likelihood or vice versa on the Chinese side. It's the conventional side that is the key part of how the two sides see each other from a military balance perspective. In terms of strategic deterrence capabilities, for example, hypersonic capabilities in space, there's been a lot of interest on both sides to cooperate and develop joint programs. And that's because a lot of these strategic deterrence capabilities that are non-nuclear are in both of the two countries interests to develop joint jointly because they have a common foe which is the U.S.

    Just before Russia invaded Ukraine, Xi met with Putin during the Beijing Olympics, and they issued a joint statement saying that the friendship between Russia and China had “no limits,” and that there were “no forbidden areas of cooperation.” What did they mean by this? And is there a disconnect between the politics and the rhetoric of China-Russia relations?

    There's a lot of flowery rhetoric. The joint statement also mentioned that they thought that their relationship exceeds the political and strategic alliances they had back in the 1950s, which is an exaggeration. But the intent was to signal to the U.S. and the West that the Chinese and the Russians might engage and cooperate in some of the strategic deterrence capabilities areas that the two countries have had danced around.

    In just the last few days, China has been assisting Russia's disinformation campaign by spreading false claims that the United States was conducting research on biological weapons in Ukraine. At the same time, Chinese officials have been gradually using stronger language to describe the invasion of Ukraine with Xi Jinping recently calling it a war rather than a “special military operation.” How should we make sense of this?

    On the Chinese side, there are different voices. China would like to demonstrate that its vast bureaucracy is unified, but it's much harder to implement in reality. There are a lot of competing interests in Chinese state society when it comes to Russia. You have the military national security coalition that tends to side much more closely with the Russians and to be much more on board in terms of disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Then you have other elements, like the economic operators, who are much more closely aligned in terms of interests with the West. It's not surprising that you get major debates and nuances from the Chinese authorities, even though it's a very top down, disciplined system. I think also that the Chinese are very pragmatic. They're not dogmatic in their approach towards Russia. They're much more willing to adjust their positions tactically. From an operational perspective, they can play two different sides at the same time.

    It was recently reported that Russia had asked China for military aid. Is China likely to provide aid or other forms of military assistance?

    That's interesting news reporting. I don't know if that's actually happened. But here's some useful context. Historically, military aid and weapons transfers between Russia and China have been one way: from the Soviet Union/Russia, to China. Especially in the last couple of decades, the Chinese have bought tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian military equipment. The Russians have had very little interest in what the Chinese military industrial complex has had to offer. Although in the last few years, there's been some limited and burgeoning interest, as the Chinese begin to develop advanced technologies. But by and large, the Russian military has not looked to China for military assistance. But given the enormous resources they are investing in their invasion of Ukraine, Russia will no doubt be keen to get whatever military assistance they can get. There's one interesting anecdote that sheds light on how the Chinese may be thinking if there is this type of Russian request. Back in 1989, China found themselves in a similar position as Russia today. There was the June 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, where the Chinese used force against their citizens, and became an international pariah with sanctions from across the international system. The Chinese military, worried about their access to military capabilities, reached out to the Soviet Union and said: we want to reestablish a relationship with the goal of getting military assistance. And the Soviets said yes. Within the next couple of years, this provided the foundations of this very close Chinese-Russian military relationship. The Chinese put a lot of stock in these types of gestures. When they get assistance and help from other countries, they might be more inclined to reciprocate. Russia today is in an even more dire circumstance than China in 1989. The Chinese would no doubt be reminded by Moscow that Moscow said yes when the Chinese were in a difficult spot. It's one important reason why the Chinese will be willing, whether it's right now or after a few months, to say yes to Russian outreach for military assistance.

    Does that also apply to economic sanctions? Is China going to help Russia to cushion the effect of international sanctions?

    The military component of the relationship is in many ways compartmentalized, or in a very different lane from the economic and energy side. The military side tends to be much more nontransparent. They can keep a lot of what's going on away from the international community—they can hide a lot of what is taking place. The Chinese arrangement on the economic side is very different, because the Chinese are much more integrated with the West, and they do much less trade and investment with Russia. So they have a fundamentally different set of interests to consider itself. I think the Chinese will be wary of circumventing or ignoring the international sanctions. The Chinese will find ways to try to develop alternative financial mechanisms to do trade in the international system. But I think the Chinese will be very, very cautious in allowing economic relations to develop with Russia that may impede their own economic circumstances.

    Turning to Taiwan, has Russia's invasion of Ukraine affected Beijing's decision making or Beijing's calculus regarding the use of force against Taiwan?

    We'll have to wait and see for concrete evidence, but it's clear that it would have a profound impact. A lot of people have asked: because the U.S. and the West are distracted over Russia, does this provide an ideal opportunity to invade and take over Taiwan? But that makes no sense. First of all, the People's Liberation Army is still woefully unprepared to undertake a full-scale military invasion into Taiwan and be confident of success. It will be years before they can have any sort of a confidence that they will be able to win a war against Taiwan. Invading Taiwan is so much more difficult than what the Russians are doing in the Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine war has been a land invasion from Belarus and from the east of the country. There's a significant amphibious portion in the south, but much of the focus has been on the use of Russian ground forces in Ukraine. And it’s not gone very well. In the Taiwan context, for China to go across Taiwan requires an amphibious invasion. It requires a significant number of joint operations from the Air Force, the Navy, and the ground forces on the Chinese side. And the Chinese have had very, very little experience in doing that. I think the campaign in Ukraine will have set back whatever the Chinese military plans are to invade or not invade Taiwan by at least five years, if not longer. And we still don't know what the end result of what's happening in Ukraine will be. If it continues to be a stalemate, if the Russians are not able to gain their military goals, then this may even push back even longer what the Chinese military plan is when it comes to Taiwan. And it should be pointed out that Xi Jinping is much more risk averse when it comes to the use of military force than Vladimir Putin. Putin has used military force on a number of occasions—in Chechnya at the end of the 1990s, and in Georgia in 2007, and Crimea in 2014. Xi Jinping hasn’t been willing to use military force directly. He's used other elements of the national security apparatus—in Xinjiang, in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea—but he hasn't put himself in a position where he uses military force for incursions or invasions. He's much more pragmatic, and much more risk cautious when it comes to the use of force.

    What aspects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is Beijing likely to be following most closely? What are the lessons of Ukraine for Beijing, strategic or tactical or operational level?

    From a military perspective, all the reporting seems to suggest that the main success that the Russians have had in capturing Ukrainian territory has been in the south. The Chinese will pay attention to that. The Chinese will also look at the use of ground forces, although it's less relevant. If you look at how the Chinese military have been modernizing and reforming over the last decade or so, especially the high command system since the mid-2010s, a lot of this has been based on the Russian model. For example, in 2016, the Chinese established a system of theater commands to replace military regions. An important reason was the lessons that the Chinese learned from the Russians, especially from the Georgia campaign.  The Chinese command-and-control apparatus, especially at the operational level, has also been called into question because of the Russian failures. Another lesson that the Chinese will pay particular attention to is that the invasion of Ukraine has taken place in different domains. The military domain is the most brutal and bloody part of it. But tied in with that is economic warfare. The Chinese will have seen that warfare in the 21st century is not just about the military. It's much more comprehensive. You have to factor in the economic and financial and trade dimensions. As the Chinese think about building up their military capability, they're also having to think about great power competition with the U.S. They are emphasizing the importance of building up resilience in their economic security to ensure that their economy can deal with the kinds of economic sanctions that the West has thrown at the Russians, and done so at a speed and an extent that's taken almost everyone by surprise.

    Many analysts have been surprised at how much difficulty Russia has faced in gaining air superiority in Ukraine. Would China face similar difficulties in a conflict over Taiwan?

    I think the Chinese will face even more difficulties than the Ukrainians. When you compare, for example, the Ukrainian and the Taiwanese air forces, the Taiwanese air force is significantly bigger and significantly more advanced than the Ukrainian air force. The Ukrainian air force is a good air force, but it's been run down because of a lot of its capabilities historically came from Russia and the Soviet Union itself. One of the lessons that the Taiwanese will have taken—and they've known this for quite a while—is the importance of investing heavily in their air defenses. In the last couple of years, the Taiwanese have pursued a major modernization program, upgrading and buying new F-16 fighter aircraft from the U.S. The Taiwanese have invested heavily in Patriot air defense systems and I would not be surprised if we see a major spike in Taiwanese acquisitions of fighter aircraft. Now there is a debate whether the Taiwanese should buy the most advanced fifth generation fighter aircraft from the U.S., the F-35, which hasn't happened, because the U.S. hasn't been willing to sell it. But that might change. And the Taiwanese will look to buy significantly more quantities of air defense systems like the patriot and other similar systems.

    Russian armed forces have had much more combat experience compared to the PLA. And yet the Russian armed forces have conspicuously underperformed in Ukraine. Does that mean that combat experience is less important than we might intuitively think, or does it mean that the PLA is likely to be even less effective as a fighting force compared to the Russian military?

    Combat experience is very important. The Russian military have waged a number of military campaigns against much weaker forces. The Russians haven’t had an adversary like the Ukrainians. Their military experiences, while significant, didn't sufficiently prepare them for a major adversary, especially at a state-to-state level, like Ukraine. But it still was useful. The Chinese, by contrast, have not fought a major military campaign since its border war against Vietnam in 1979. And even then, it did very badly. If you look at the Chinese military leadership today, as far as I can tell, of the top 100 generals, there was one general who was a junior officer in the 1979 war. So, by and large, the Chinese military leadership has no combat experience at all. Combat experience is an important experience to have. You can train, you can exercise, but it never prepares you for what war is. I think the Chinese will reflect on this and say: we really need to develop our military training and exercise capabilities so that it's much more realistic.

    As an experienced analyst of security issues and a director of a think tank focused on specifically how to mitigate and prevent large-scale conflict, what has it been like for you personally to watch this unfold, and what worries you most?

    It’s been very depressing, of course, that in the 21st century, many of the experiences, the mechanisms, the international frameworks to prevent large-scale state-on-state war haven’t really done anything to prevent Russia from going into Ukraine. The research and the work that's been done to understand the nature of international security over the last couple of decades is now outdated almost overnight. We have to think very differently going forward, both in terms of policy and as academics. We need new out-of-the-box thinking. When we talk about war and state-to-state conflict, it's no longer in just the military domain. It's much more comprehensive. We will have to do a lot more work to understand what the new dynamics of the global order post-2022 are going to be.

    Tai, thank you very much for sharing your insights with us.

    Thank you, James, for all these questions.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
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    1886 0 0 0 In the latest from Talking Policy’s series on Ukraine, James Lee, an IGCC postdoctoral fellow and Taiwan expert, talks with IGCC director and UC San Diego professor Tai Ming Cheung about how Russia’s invasion of and campaign in Ukraine may impact Chinese military strategy; the implications of the war for Chinese-Russian relations; and how he thinks the academic and policy worlds need to shift amidst the latest global upheaval. This interview was recorded on March 14, 2022.]]>
    <![CDATA[Why Widespread Sexual Violence Is Likely in Ukraine]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/why-widespread-sexual-violence-is-likely-in-ukraine/ Wed, 06 Apr 2022 17:04:33 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1959 warned about this risk. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba recently claimed that Russian soldiers have committed rapes. Norway’s representative Mona Juul recently issued a warning about sexual violence in Ukraine in the UN Security Council. As a researcher on wartime sexual violence, this warning is merited. Research on wartime sexual violence suggests that a wave of cases of sexual violence is likely underway in Ukraine. These are the main reasons why research indicates we can expect a wave of cases of sexual violence. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 1959 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Ragnhild Nordås, Assistant Professor of political science at the University of Michigan, analyzes the risk and prevention of sexual violence in Ukraine.]]> <![CDATA[IGCC In Review (2018-2022)]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/igcc-in-review-2018-2022/ Wed, 13 Apr 2022 16:21:12 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1974 This report looks back over the last five years at IGCC and highlights what we are learning, and where we think we have made a difference. It also sketches a path for where we want to go. At this critical moment, the role of engaged scholars matters more than ever. Over the next five years, IGCC will continue in our commitment to policy-relevant research and engagement on issues ranging from great power competition, global catastrophic risks, geoeconomics, and nuclear policy, to migration, global health, and the environment.

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    <![CDATA[The Economic War Against Russia]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/the-economic-war-against-russia/ Mon, 04 Apr 2022 15:00:30 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1978 The Russian offensive in Ukraine has been carried out along fairly traditional lines—airstrikes, heavy artillery, missiles, and tanks. But the West’s response has been primarily through economic means. What economic instruments is the West using right now against Russia? Jana Grittersova: The important sanctions have been financial, and as a result of these sanctions, Russia is now effectively locked out of international finance. First, the Central Bank of Russia was prevented from accessing its reserves denominated in euros and dollars. The United States has sanctioned other central banks in the past. For example, in 2019, it sanctioned Venezuela and Iran. But a coordinated action by all Group of Seven (G-7) major industrial countries against a central bank as important and internationally active as the Central Bank of Russia, is unprecedented. Currently, roughly half of Russia's $630 billion of foreign exchange reserves have been frozen by international sanctions. At the end of 2021, 16 percent of Russia's foreign reserves were held in dollars and 32 percent in euros. Countries hold reserves for two reasons: to intervene in currency markets to mitigate currency fluctuations, and, as a war chest or a national strategic buffer. When Russia's financial system and its national currency come under pressure, then dollars and euros could be sold for rubles. The Russian central bank can support the value of the ruble and slow its devaluation. This would provide a relief to domestic importers and consumers. But without reserve funds to support the ruble, there is very little the Russian central bank can do to prevent the value of the ruble from collapsing. The second sanction, which is consequential, is that seven Russian banks were disconnected from the SWIFT. SWIFT stands for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. It was created in 1973 and is a communication platform that connects 11,000 banks around the world and enables them to make fast and secure cross-border payments and currency conversions. It's not the payment system itself. It can be replaced by other channels such as emails or telephones. But this would be obviously very lengthy. Roughly 300 Russian banks communicate through SWIFT. The ban was selective. This selective ban on Russian banks was imposed because Europe continues to rely on Russia for its energy. And there were also concerns that removing all Russian banks would create further turmoil in global energy markets. Since 2014, following the U.S. and EU sanctions after the annexation of Crimea, Russia has developed an alternative platform called the System for Transfer of Financial Messages, which is used as the primary messaging system in 20 percent of Russia's domestic transactions and includes about 23 foreign banks. But this Russian alternative platform is not as technically advanced as SWIFT and is mostly used domestically. Vinnie Aggarwal: Jana covered the most important kinds of sanctions that the United States has imposed on the Russians. I agree that what's distinctive from 2014 is that there's much more unity now.
    What Putin has done is unite the Europeans and the Americans.
    It’s also interesting to look at civil society. I have some realist tendencies so I do not believe that civil society on its own can do a lot to the Russians, particularly Putin, who is quite aggressive in these matters. But I still think it's worth noting that American multinational corporations have now been withdrawing from Russia. For many years, Russia was very interested in attracting foreign investment and the fact that you have multinational corporations like Boeing and Airbus withdrawing from the market and refusing to supply Aeroflot and other aviation groups with spare parts, will have some impact on the Russians. I don’t think that the boycotts we've seen in the United States against vodka will make a difference. But it's something interesting to think about. I also think that there's been an effort to talk about the International Olympic Committee, and that also puts some pressure on the Russians.

    Sanctions are a blunt instrument meant to induce behavior change by causing economic hardship. Vinnie, do sanctions normally work in general? How often do they achieve their goals? And Jana, do you think sanctions will work in this specific case, against Russia?

    Vinnie Aggarwal: Sanctions have had a very mixed history. We've tried to sanction Iran, we've tried to sanction Venezuela. We've seen some behavioral changes. But most of the changes are just running their economy a bit into the ground, and I think that is effective. In the case of Russia, they do have reserves. So, I think going after those reserves was important. But if you're a very highly motivated actor like Russia, then it's not clear to me that sanctions will actually force them to pull back their troops. The fact that Ukraine is doing a very good job in resisting the invasion, attacking troops, attacking tanks, is more critical. Once you start using sanctions, people start looking for alternatives. And as Jana pointed out, the Russians have developed an alternative system. People say we should be sanctioning the Chinese. But of course, this leads them to the next iteration of what we might call the economic sanctions game to develop alternatives. We have to be very careful when we're using sanctions because global interdependence can be weaponized. In this case, what I'm most impressed by, and here one has to give Biden credit: he's been able to get the European allies and other countries to take this very seriously. And the Russians are very annoyed by this and call this economic warfare. It shows that this is having some effect. But whether this will immediately cause a pull out, we have not seen that, nor would I anticipate that. Jana Grittersova: I agree with Vinnie.
    Economic and financial sanctions have become a foreign policy weapon of choice for the United States.
    They were used after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for example, and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014. But it looks like this time is different. The size, speed, and sweep of existing sanctions against Russia, supported not only by the United States but also by the entire European Union and several Asian countries, are exceptional. For example, Bruno Le Maire, France's finance  minister, described sanctions against Russia as an “all-out economic and financial war.” It’s clear that Putin underestimated Western capabilities and resolve. The only question now is whether the sanctions will be enforced and sustained. We have already seen some immediate effects of sanctions. For example, half of Russia's foreign exchange reserves are frozen. The Russian stock markets are closed. The value of 31 Russian stocks that are traded in London has plummeted by 98 percent. Russia's credit rating was downgraded to junk status by all major credit rating agencies, which led to plummeting bond prices and the risk of sovereign debt default. And as Vinnie mentioned, Western firms are departing. In 2014, Western sanctions caused the value of the ruble to drop by 50 percent against the dollar. After that, Russia tried to sanction-proof its economy by building substantial foreign reserves, diversifying those reserves to include more euros and renminbi, reducing the national debt and keeping foreign debt relatively low, around 20 percent of GDP. But Russia is still heavily reliant on the dollar system and on Western markets. For example, the value of the ruble has now dropped nearly 40 percent against the dollar and it's expected to continue to plummet. The central bank has also decided to stop exchanging rubles for foreign currencies, which means that the ruble is no longer convertible. The effectiveness and cost of sanctions, including Russia's isolation from global markets and loss of access to products and technologies from the West, will depend on two factors. One is the ability of Russia to keep exporting oil and gas to generate export revenues. Europe continues to buy large amounts of oil and natural gas from Russia. And the second is the extent to which China decides to support Russia.

    That leads perfectly into my next question, which is: what are the unintended consequences of sanctions? You've referred to several of them—they can hasten the formation of alternatives to the dollar and to SWIFT; they can hurt ordinary people more than the government; they can promote nationalism and anger at the sanctioning countries.

    Can you both reflect on the unintended consequences? I'm particularly interested in what you think China’s role has been so far and what are you anticipating in that role?

    Vinnie Aggarwal: That's a very important question. There’s still a great unknown in terms of to what extent President Xi wants to throw his lot in with the Russians. A lot of people were looking at the Russian invasion of Ukraine as somehow very strongly related to what China will do with Taiwan. I think, if anything, this has provided a signal that the Western countries are likely to sanction China very aggressively. But in the case of Taiwan, we have a defense alliance, and we'll probably work directly with the military and go after the Chinese and Taiwan, which would be quite dangerous and lead to a lot of escalation.
    The future geopolitical structure is a complicated question because, in my view, at the end of the day, the Russians’ greatest fear is not the United States or the Western Europeans, but the Chinese.
    And if I was in demographic decline, as the Russians have been for several years, I would have to start thinking about Siberia and the fact that the closest place to Siberia is China. The Chinese have a very large population. And if I were to make predictions, I would say 20 years from now, we will likely be in an alliance with the Russians against the Chinese, and the Russians will want an alliance with the United States about how they're going to deal with China. In the short run, however, I think this has cemented the democracies against authoritarian countries. We have a Sino-Russian alliance in some ways, and the Europeans have been very reluctant to be aggressive towards the Russians. They're much more reliant on Russian oil and natural gas. And there was, if I may say, some naivety on the part of the Europeans that engaging with the Russians would somehow control Putin's behavior. So, I think the unintended consequence is that this is bringing the EU together in a way it wasn't before. There was no unified EU military position. If I were a betting man, I would say now there will be some effort to create a unified European force. Typically, it's a crisis of some kind that leads countries to act in a more unified way. And I can't think of a better crisis or worse crisis, to lead the Europeans into much more unity and cooperation with the United States. Jana Grittersova: The war in Ukraine and sanctions fuel commodity prices increases. This heightens concerns about energy security and food security. And so many countries, including the members of the European Union, have to rethink their energy systems. We know that most of Russia's exports are oil and petroleum products and gas and half go to the European Union. And so, one positive unintended consequence of sanctions is that they may accelerate the process of the green transition. European nations will probably seek to diversify their energy supplies and possibly delay plans to close or phase out nuclear and coal power plants. The problem here is that not all EU member countries have enough fiscal capacity to absorb the costs related to the green transition and simultaneously boost their defense spending in response to new security threats. Some countries, such as Italy, have high levels of public debt, while other countries like Germany are more exposed to the effect of sanctions. Another unintended consequence of sanctions is that in the short term we may see an expansion of oil production to stop the rise of oil and gas prices. And similarly, as in the area of energy policy, many governments, including European governments and governments in the Middle East, may want to examine their food and agricultural policies more closely. I know that in Germany, for example, they’ve tried to scale back meat consumption and popularize alternative protein products.

    Last Friday, G7 countries said they would end normal trade relations with Russia, which includes revoking the status that allows Russia to trade goods on preferential terms with many Western countries. How will the global trading system be impacted and remade with the exclusion of Russia? And what will China's role be in this ecosystem?

    Vinnie Aggarwal: I think we need to recognize that the Russians are actually a bit player in global trade. They're very important in the global trade of energy and gas products. But when it comes to goods and services, they account for less than 2 percent of global trade compared to the 8 percent for the United States and 13 percent for China. To put it in stark terms, Taiwan exported more than Russia did in 2020. Despite being a very large country in terms of population and size, they're actually quite a bit player. And under Putin, they've let their economy run down in terms of manufactured goods. So really, it's an all-liquid country: vodka, oil, and gas. I'm not terribly impressed by the Russian economy. The direct effect on the global trading system is very minimal. Having said that, one should note that oil and gas prices are crazy. And when oil and gas prices go up, that obviously affects global trade because shipping costs become higher and that indirectly affects supply chains. And don't forget that we are emerging from a time where the economy was very slow [because of COVID-19]. When oil prices are low, some parties that I won’t mention always get very excited, like, isn't this a good sign of American leadership? No, it's not. It just means the economy is in bad shape. It's natural for oil prices to be somewhat high when the economy is booming. Even without this current invasion, oil prices would have continued to rise as the American economy and the European economy recover from the pandemic-induced depression of the global economy. Jana Grittersova: In terms of global economic impact, there are several channels, through which war and sanctions have global effects. Vinnie mentioned higher energy and food prices, which lead to higher inflation. Higher inflation reduces the purchasing power of households. And obviously, it leads to lower demand. We know that in the United States, for example, inflation reached 40-year highs of 7.9 percent year-on-year in February 2022. Food and energy prices, in addition to rents, were the greatest contributors to this rapid increase in inflation. And we know that central banks facing high inflation may be forced to tighten monetary policy, particularly the Federal Reserve Bank and the European Central Bank. Yesterday the Federal Reserve raised interest rates by 25 basis points. It was its first hike since 2018. But when the Fed increases interest rates to fight inflation at home, this will likely raise the cost of issuing new debt in developing countries and it will also be harder for developing countries to access international capital markets. They can face destabilizing capital outflows, which will lead to weaker currencies and then inflation itself. And there are fears that inflation could become a source of political instability worldwide.

    We've all heard about IKEA and other big brands pulling out of Russia. What’s happening in critical sectors like energy and I.T. and transportation?

    Vinnie Aggarwal: I've always been bothered by the fact that there is often a divergence of interest between the interests of the state, that is, the U.S. government or the European governments, and multinational corporations. I teach in the business school, so I am somewhat favorable to global business. But I think naively, a lot of multinational corporations tend to believe that they can go into China and sell a lot of things and everything will be wonderful. What they found out was that the Chinese were able to either borrow, copy, or replicate that technology and sell goods back to Europe. So, that’s an awakening among multinational corporations. Turning to Russia, Russia has been seen as the frontier market that's going to be very great. American companies are quite happy to go into Russia thinking that the Russians have an interest in protecting them and everything will be fine. People are now very critical of multinational corporations going into these countries, and we may see more consumer boycotts of companies that are unwilling to cooperate, although, at the end of the day, if you're an authoritarian country run by a guy like Putin, you can do with a lot of deprivation. And the Russians have a long history of dealing with deprivation under Stalin, and under other leaders as well. It's naive to think going in is not going to be problematic, and it's also naive to think they're pulling out will somehow change Russian or Chinese policy.

    In the Financial Times this morning, the chair of one of the major European banks was quoted as saying that the sanctions are the equivalent of a nuclear bomb. And these are international lenders who have lots of Russian staff, Russian customers. Jana, can you tell us a little bit about what this means for the international banks who are engaged in Russia?

    Jana Grittersova: The global banks have not fully cut ties with Russia. Some of them departed—Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, for example. But Citibank, as well as many European banks with large exposures to Russia, such as Deutsche Bank or Commerzbank, have large exposures in terms of loans and deposits have stayed. It's harder for them to leave the Russian market. Even major global banks like Goldman Sachs continue to sell Russian debt to hedge funds, for example, on the secondary market because trading in secondary markets is still allowed under U.S. sanctions. For the banking sector, departures are more difficult than for manufacturing firms. As Vinnie mentioned, reputable Western companies, some 400 of them, are not only unwilling to continue buying from or selling to Russia, but they are also walking away from sizable investments there. Companies as diverse as British Petroleum or Shell or Ferrari or IKEA and Mercedes-Benz are leaving Russia. But saying you are leaving Russia is one thing. Getting your factories, equipment, goods and components out of Russia is another thing. And Russia is beginning the process of nationalizing the assets of these companies. It's going to be financially very costly for Western companies to stay in Russia. But even if they leave, their remaining assets will be nationalized. There are still some Western corporations that continue to operate in Russia. For example, Hyatt and Marriott continue running hotels there. Halliburton has continued to operate oil fields. Some corporations benefit from this conflict: arms makers, cable news, commodities firms, especially outside of Russia, mining firms and steelmakers, for example. The share prices of U.S. Steel have climbed by 38 percent since the beginning of the invasion. Carmakers are able to pass their costs on to the consumers. For example, Tesla has recently increased prices. Vinnie Aggarwal: Bankers all get very excited that we're never going to lend again. But I've written a book on debt rescheduling. And the leading explanation is what a banker once told me is the generational theory of lending, which is that after somebody defaults and you go into a big default, whether it's Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or Peru, you tell your children: listen, never lend to that deadbeat country again. But the children don't tell their children. Debt rescheduling is kind of a 50-year cycle. Those bankers who are saying “we're never going to lend again” probably will not lend, but it doesn't mean that a new generation of bankers will not start lending again. And we've seen this repeatedly in countries that have defaulted. I mean, for God's sake, Argentina is still able to borrow money despite default after default. And a lot of people, as Jana was pointing out, are able to trade debt on the secondary market. And if you settle with the government, you can actually make a lot of profit if you buy debt cheap enough.

    As two experts who have long studied, long watched global political economic shifts, as you have watched this unfold over the last month or so, what has surprised you most about what's happening and what has not?

    Vinnie Aggarwal: What has surprised me is that a number of University of Chicago's students would like to cancel my friend John Mearsheimer. In 2014, John did this video in which he said the Americans are leading the Europeans and the Ukrainians down a path that will be very problematic. And from a realist point of view, John made a very simple prediction that this is going to be a big problem for Ukraine, and the best option, given the Russian sphere of influence, is to have a neutral Ukraine. Everybody gets very excited about this, but if you look at the current negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, they're actually along these lines: probably some kind of neutrality, probably some kind of giving up some territory and some commitment not to join NATO.

    What about you, Jana?

    Jana Grittersova: The size, the speed, and the sweep of economic sanctions and financial sanctions, and also the fact that they were supported by all major industrial powers, is a very surprising element.
    But I’m worried that sanctions may trigger a reversal in globalization and maybe the creation of two blocs: one oriented around China, and another around the United States.
    Countries such as China and India have signaled initial willingness to continue doing business with Russia. Russia’s abundant resources and a desire to break away from the current U.S.-dominated financial system may motivate these countries and other countries to continue economic relations with Russia and move further away from the West. And so, the sanctions may contribute to the global reorientation of economic relationships. Europe will reduce its reliance on Russian oil and gas, while Russia will have to rely primarily on non-Western allied nations for trade markets. And that could be beneficial to Russia’s relationship with China because Russia is a major provider of key resources that are critical to China's long-term developmental plans, including energy and critical minerals used in semiconductor industries. On the other hand, Russia imports roughly 68 percent of its computers, semiconductors, and smartphones from China. Russia has expanded its Eurasian Economic Union, a free trade zone, which includes even countries like Vietnam, in addition to Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. So I am worried about a new Cold War, but definitely about some negative implications of sanctions or globalization.

    Is Ukraine the signal that globalization is finally dead or at least on life support?

    Vinnie Aggarwal: I've always been somewhat skeptical of the view that globalization is inevitable, and that it keeps moving in a unilinear fashion. I'm working with Tai Ming Cheung, who is the director of IGCC, on the Oxford Handbook on Economics and Economic Statecraft [forthcoming 2023, Oxford University Press]. And the point we're trying to make in this book is that one must understand political economy and security in a combined fashion. Most liberal economists, i.e., free market economists, view globalization as an unalloyed good. But the notion that globalization prevents war has simply not been the case. Economists tend to be so focused on the benefits of trade and finance that they forget about the downside and the very great importance of security and security intruding on the global economy, whether it's business or trade or investment. We really need to have a much more integrated approach of politics and economics. Jana Grittersova: In terms of the academy, I fully agree with Vinnie that we need to pay greater attention to and explore to a greater degree, the interconnectedness between trade, finance, economics, and security, as well as geopolitics. And we need to look more closely at the role of international factors in domestic policymaking. For the last 20- 30 years, scholars have been exploring the role of various domestic factors influencing foreign economic policies, such as institutions or domestic interest groups. But I think we should take into consideration or look more closely at the role of international politics: interdependence, dependency of countries on, for example, energy or food imports, and on the role of bargaining. So maybe we need better models, game-theoretical models of strategic interactions among governments and of their various bargaining strategies.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1978 0 0 0 In the latest from Talking Policy’s series on Ukraine, Lindsay Morgan talks with Jana Grittersova, an Associate Professor of political science and cooperating faculty in the Economics Department at UC Riverside, and Vinnie Aggarwal, Distinguished Professor and Alann P. Bedford Chair in Asian studies at UC Berkeley, about the economic implications of the war in Ukraine. Grittersova is a former central banker at the National Bank of Slovakia and worked as an economist at the European Commission in Brussels. She specializes in monetary and exchange rate policies, and global banking. Aggarwal specializes in the intersection between business and politics and the role of international economic and trade organizations. This interview was recorded on March 18, 2022.]]>
    <![CDATA[Emilie Hafner-Burton Introduces Future of Democracy Initiative]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/emilie-hafner-burton-introduces-future-of-democracy-initiative/ Tue, 12 Apr 2022 21:45:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1991 You co-lead, with IGCC expert Christina Schneider, a new IGCC initiative on the Future of Democracy. What will the initiative do and why it is being launched now? We’re launching this initiative because we're deeply concerned about democracy's future, both around the world and in the United States. And we're not alone. There are many people who share this concern. When I started in this profession two decades ago, the future for democracy looked really bright. Countries like Myanmar and Tunisia appeared to be transitioning, and that was supposed to lead to a more peaceful, secure and just future. But today, the world looks very different. We’re confronted with many existential threats to national and global security. And a central, if not the most central, threat is the attack on democracy. Many countries are facing significant democratic backlash and erosion at home. And authoritarian states are rising in number and power. And it's not just simply that the number of democracies is in decline. It's that some of the worst reversals are happening precisely in places like Myanmar, which were supposed to have been these beacons of hope. The quality of democracy is also in decline around the world. In the context of the pandemic, that's even more important, because many democratic governments have adopted, frankly, questionable restrictions to the fundamental human rights of their populations that mirror the practices of authoritarian regimes. And this is happening while authoritarian systems are ramping up their coercive practices. The thing is, democracy has always faced challenges. So the problem that we're identifying isn't new, but it's accelerating. And there's a unique flavor to this crisis. It's not just that authoritarian tactics and anti-democratic rhetoric are spreading. It's also that a growing number of states and actors are using seemingly democratic tools for the very purpose of undermining representative democracy. So democracy, or at least its appearance, is being used to undermine itself in ways that are not fully understood or fully transparent.

    What specifically will the initiative focus on?

    This initiative aims to build networks of concerned stakeholders, both within the academy and in government and civil society organizations, to build a foundation for better understanding the causes and the consequences of these phenomena, not just in the U.S., but globally. The purpose is to generate cutting-edge research and to support and inform the next generation of thought leaders about how to build and support democratic resilience. We will have workshops, public roundtables, keynotes, podcasts, teaching, and other forms of collaboration with government and civil society. The focus is on trying to understand how and why actors are using the pretense of democracy to undermine democracy itself. That means focusing on things like elections, and the adoption of good governance rules and mandates, inclusion and exclusion, and new technologies that are accelerating the spread of disinformation. It also means thinking through the notion of what's happening to democratic representation.

    Why is the initiative is housed at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation?

    The goals of our initiative are in perfect alignment with IGCC's mission, which is to address global challenges to peace and prosperity through rigorous, policy-relevant research, training and engagement. And IGCC is a network of policy-engaged scholars across the University of California; given the importance to us of activating and building a network, IGCC is really the natural home for this work, and it's our belief that IGCC can be a leader in this space. And we are pleased to partner with UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy. There's tremendous expertise across the state of California and across UC campuses, in many different fields and disciplines. We have extraordinary researchers on all of our campuses. We're also very institutionally focused. So that makes it a perfect place for this type of research to unwind, because so much of this discussion around the future of democracy involves understanding institutions, and people's incentives, and why actors act the way they do, and how you can encourage preferences to change. So we have this vision; the problem has been one of collective action. We don’t always speak to one another. Even within a given campus, not all the players know each other, and not all the players are talking. And they're certainly not doing it across campuses. So that's the challenge. The UC system can be more than the sum of its parts on the future of democracy, and it’s our hope that this initiative will help mobilize this expertise and put it to work.

    Who will you be collaborating with?

    We have formal partnerships among five UC campuses: UC San Diego, UC Berkeley, UCLA, Irvine and UC Merced. Each of these institutions has its own comparative advantage in this space, and its own distinct flavor.

    What makes you excited, personally, about this initiative?

    I’m excited because our aim is to bring the tools of sound social science to study this real-world problem in an effort to generate new lessons and knowledge that can help to pave the way for the future. We academics too often work in silos. And that's not productive when you're trying to figure out a way to tackle an issue as big as the future of democracy. It's not enough to just tackle it from the American perspective, or from the perspective of what's happening in the electoral system. You need multiple facets of expertise.

    When you look back on the initiative in, say, five years, how will you know that you've been successful?

    In the short term, success for us is going to mean building meaningful networks and partnerships. And that's going to take time. It means starting forums and processes and meaningful dialogues about how social science can inform and help those in the trenches who are making and implementing policy and programs, but also vice versa. So that's success goal number one for us: the building of these networks. In the longer term, success means producing quality research and communicating what we learn to stakeholders outside the academy. Education is also really important to us. If we train and educate students through this initiative to take up these issues, and become thought leaders, that's going to be a huge marker of success. We hope to get the University of California system on the map as a place you want to go if you think about how to think about the future of democracy. So we're starting this process very modestly. But we're aiming high.

    The problem you are tackling is huge. How can social science have an impact on things like democratic backsliding? How can social science strengthen democracy?

    Social science is one part of a larger system and process that can lead to change. The only way the academic piece works is if the information that we generate is communicated in a palatable way to the right stakeholders, and if those stakeholders have a say in what we're doing. That's why building the network is the critical first step. Some of my previous work in democracy has been focused on the promotion of human rights. I have written quite extensively on the utility of international law, and where international laws can help promote democracy and human rights, and where international law can actually backfire. That research has had a lot of buy-in quite apart from the academy, and has generated discourse within international institutions about what their policies should be. I know firsthand that it’s possible for research to have an impact in the real world. I absolutely believe it can matter. Education is important too. Many of our students end up in the field—they end up with the World Bank, or working in government or with NGOs [non-governmental organizations]. And they inform those discussions. Training people to care about these issues, and seeing them secure in positions of power and authority to shape what's actually happening on the ground, that's critical. But that's not a five-year goal. That's a much longer term goal.]]>
    1991 0 0 0 Around the world, democracy is being challenged as never before. Authoritarian states are proliferating. And new technologies are fueling the spread of disinformation and empowering autocrats and extremists. In this interview, UC San Diego professor Emilie Hafner-Burton discusses IGCC’s new Future of Democracy, which she co-leads, and why she thinks collaborative social science research and engagement can help to strengthen democracy around the world, and in the United States. ]]>
    <![CDATA[Miscalculations, Unexpected Resolve, and How the War Might End]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/miscalculations-unexpected-resolve-and-how-the-war-might-end/ Mon, 11 Apr 2022 15:00:20 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1997 Most military crises diffuse well short of actual armed conflict. Why do you think in this particular episode negotiations failed and we actually saw armed conflict? I have to admit that before the Russian invasion, I did not think that it would be on the scale that it turned out to be. I thought there would be an intervention in Eastern Ukraine, but I did not expect this kind of size. And that actually brings me to the explanation. The reason that negotiations could not have worked is because the Russian aims started out such that no Ukrainian government would have given them to the Russians without a fight. And now the question is: if the aim is so expansive, why fight over this? And this is where we get into what in the [academic] literature is known as the mutual optimism problem. I think the Russians—and not just the Russians, by the way, the Pentagon as well—wildly overestimated Russian military capability and the Ukrainians’ will to resist. Now, this second part is very key. I lived in the western part of Ukraine, and nobody who's analyzed this country would have thought seriously that the Ukrainians would simply meet the Russians with bread and salt as the expression goes. Everybody loves to talk about NATO expansion and Russian security interests. But that is not [the reason for the invasion]. And it's not just me saying that. Putin essentially said this when the war started and he laid out the reasons for intervening. His thinking is that Ukraine is a serious problem for the security of his own regime, but not because of any military considerations. It is not because NATO's threatening. Nobody in Russia could possibly believe this is the case. The problem [was] the way Ukrainians were dealing with their independence after the fall of the Soviet Union. They took to the streets three times to get rid of governments they didn't like. The Russians have done that zero times since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians managed to oust Kremlin puppets from the government several times as well. So for all the warts and all the problems that they had internally, this was a democracy that was working. When Zelensky was elected with 70 percent of the vote it was a huge blow to Putin's initial strategy, which was to destabilize the country and take it over internally by supporting the separatists in the Donbas area. Zelensky is originally a Russian speaker—he's from Donbas. He was from a simple family. He was the bridge that was going to unify Ukraine, and it was working. Personally, he wasn't very good as a president. He got mired in all sorts of problems. But Putin's strategy in the Donbas was failing. And the evidence for this is if you just look at the intensity of the fighting there, right after Crimea, you have serious fighting. The Russians had to intervene to push the Ukrainian forces out. But over the past couple of years, it had dwindled. So this idea that this is going to destabilize Kyiv and force them just wasn't working. So that necessitated an overt invasion to deal with this problem. When Zelensky came to power, he basically said—there was actually a press conference when he said—to all other post-Soviet republics, this is what you can do. And imagine the context.
    Putin’s staunchest ally in Belarus, Lukashenko, had to steal an election and use violence to remain in power. In Kazakhstan just a month ago, Putin had to send 2,500 Russian troops to keep the president in power. So as far as he's concerned, yes, Russia is surrounded, but it's not by NATO. It's by people who do not like these kinds of regimes.
    And he's very interested in implementing this Russia-centric Slavic kind of orthodox faith version of Russia that includes Ukraine, includes Belarus, includes the Baltics. And heck, in the more feverish dreams include Poland and Finland. So Putin comes and tells the Ukrainians: I want your country and I don't think you're really different from us. You're all Russians anyway. Who would agree to this? Nobody. You would only capitulate to a demand like this if you're facing extinction. A government will never accede to anything he wants them to agree to. He wants them to agree to losing more territories in eastern Ukraine. Nobody would give this without a fight unless you're sure you're going to lose. And that's where the optimism part comes in, because Putin was misled, apparently. He believed his own propaganda that there are many Ukrainians who support Russia. This was actually true before Crimea. There was a lot of sympathy for Russia, and a lot of admiration for Putin. But things started to change drastically after Crimea and he doesn't seem to have updated. So the thing that was a huge domestic success for him in Russia was also a watershed in Ukraine because it switched many people from supporting him to realizing what he's actually after. Putin seems to have thought that the army, which vastly outnumbers the Ukrainians, would go in, and that it would take them 2 to 3 days. The Ukrainian government would run to its Western sponsors because it's a traitorous government run by Nazis and all this other crap, and Putin’s supporters will then rise and install a regime that friendly to him and he'll deliver all his goals. So, yes, I can absolutely explain why the war broke out the way it did. The part I did not expect is that he so wildly underestimated the resistance that the Ukrainians would put up. Today, in the east of Ukraine, they cannot even recruit ethnic Russians to help them fight. That's how bad it is.

    It seems that the U.S. and the Pentagon were expecting that, however big the Russian invasion was, if there was a big invasion, the Russians would win pretty quickly. But then you have an insurgency. They weren't expecting the stalemate on the battlefield that we have today. In the recent days, we’ve actually seen successful Ukrainian counter offensives. So, the Russians might still have the upper hand, but certainly the Ukrainians have been fighting a lot more effectively than anyone expected. Do you have any inkling why the U.S., NATO, and all the others seem to underestimate the Ukrainians?

    We bought Putin's hype about the state of his own military. We knew that they’re not great. I mean, we know they're behind in technology. They’re not a serious opponent in conventional weapons like a NATO force. However, look at their performance. In all past interventions in Georgia, in Chechnya, the second time in Africa and Aleppo in Syria, they did their job. It was ugly, it was nasty. It was inelegant, in some sense, militarily. But they just pounded everybody into submission. So, people thought this exact same thing is likely to happen here. It's not that they're brilliant tacticians or strategists. They're not. They're fighting in a very old-fashioned way. But their mass is just so big that it still works for them. So, I think that was the thinking. The other thing is, while we were helping the Ukrainian military modernize, I don't think we realized how far ahead they've gotten. They're fighting 21st century style warfare against the Russians. But as brave and determined as the Ukrainians are, they could not have brought the Russian war machine to a standstill in Ukraine without our support. And this, frankly, was not a given.
    I was astounded by the speed and the scale with which the West managed to mobilize the world, especially the Biden administration. I was stunned. The European Union, which many people consider incapable of making any decisions whatsoever, managed to do crazy things. The Germans upended 60 years of foreign policy. If anybody told you they could have predicted this, I would bring water to douse their pants because they'd be on fire.
    There is no way anyone could have predicted it. It was a massive realignment, which happened virtually overnight. And that is part of the reason why I think the initial optimism from Putin's perspective was warranted because he thought “ah they’ll slap some sanctions like in Crimea, they'll pull us out of SWIFT…” That was apparently the top sanction that they considered, which actually doesn’t do much. It's good PR [public relations], but it doesn't matter. But he certainly did not expect the kind of sanctions we slapped on them. He did not expect the mass exodus of Western multinationals from Russia, disinvestment, and things like this, which are wrecking the Russian economy in ways that even the Soviets never experienced. From that perspective, I think it is important to realize how much of this was actually not predictable.

    NATO has not directly intervened militarily, and it seems unlikely it will. The Biden administration, for weeks and weeks and weeks before the war, was very clear that the U.S. was not going to have direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine. And that has been borne out so far. Would it have been more beneficial if the Biden administration left that on the table and said, even if it was a complete bluff, “well, maybe we will intervene”?

    No, I don't think we could have done anything. Before the war started, our resolve to deal with it the way we are did not exist. This was created after the war began, after the Ukrainians put up the defense, after Zelensky decided to stay, after rallying the Ukrainians when it became clear that they will, in fact, fight to protect their way of life and their homeland and we could not just stand idly by. The only thing that might have possibly done something [would have been] to actually put serious NATO and American troops in Ukraine. That was never going to happen. I do not think we could have prevented it. I mean, they can analyze our politics. They knew what was happening. There was no way. And in fact, had we made these threats and our bluff had been called…. I don't think the response would have been as effective as the Ukrainians have been on their own, in the way they resisted. Nobody can be as effective, from a moral and an emotional perspective. It works [better] in a way than it would have if the U.S. was trying to protect its “puppet” regime and “look, it failed because they always lie.” In this way, it probably worked better for the Ukrainians this way because it enabled our response. The fact that what we do now is different from what we imagined doing just a month ago should also alert you to the possibility that we might do more in the future than we are imagining that we're doing now.

    Right.

    These red lines that the administration is drawing—"We will never intervene under any circumstances” —they're not realistic. No world war started as a world war. None of them. They all started as localized conflicts that draw in other powers because of developments on the ground. What if Putin unleashes mass chemical warfare and starts murdering civilians by the tens of thousands daily? Are we sure we'll be able to resist intervening? Are we sure that if Belarus intervenes in the war—and there are signs that they are increasingly getting ready to do so—that we won’t intervene as well?
    Once you get engaged in these crises, your resolve changes. It evolves. So as a result, things that seemed impossible before the crisis become not just possible, but desirable.
    It is not like you come with some fixed ideas of exactly what you're going to do under all circumstances, and then you have to signal your resolve or not, which is how a lot of people seem to think about this crisis. Your resolve evolves with the situation. And so I think it's a bit actually irresponsible to make these kinds of statements. The last time a popular president made these kinds of statements was Franklin Roosevelt. “No American boys in foreign wars,” which he said how many months before the war?

    Another question has recently come up about chemical weapons. At the beginning of the conflict, the Russians put their nuclear forces on a higher alert, although there was some confusion in the West among nuclear policy experts [about] what this meant. But clearly it was meant to convey at least an implicit threat or reminder of: hey, we have a lot of nuclear weapons. Then more recently, there's been suggestions that Putin might use chemical weapons.

    With any crisis like this, there's plenty of historical analogies, but one that comes to mind with chemical weapons and red lines is the 2013 crisis in Syria. As a reminder for listeners, this was during the Syrian civil war. President Obama said the U.S. was not going to intervene, but, if chemical weapons were moved around or used, that would be a red line. Chemical weapons did end up being used, and there was a big push for the U.S. to intervene. The president seemed somewhat reluctant and eventually a deal was concluded where the Russians were going to come in and destroy the chemical weapons. But that didn't work out as planned and it was seen as a debacle.

    What consequences do we possibly have out there, aside from direct military intervention, if chemical weapons are used? It seems like we're almost down to the bottom of the barrel—like there's not a lot left that we can threaten outside of direct military action. Do you think that's an accurate reading? Do you think there's a likelihood that chemical weapons might be used?

    I think the administration is doing the right thing in being very vague about what this would mean, because if there's anything worse than saying “I will under no circumstance intervene” it is to say “these are the circumstances” and then not intervene. In terms of the likelihood of use, unfortunately, I actually think it's high. The reason is, Putin's strategy right now has switched. Now it's clear to him that he cannot have what he wanted initially. So he now is trying one of two things. One is to see if he can grind the government in Kyiv into submission by mass civilian casualties, because this worked in Chechnya. The Chechens were so bent on independence and even they collapsed in the end. And he was able to install a puppet regime that hunted down all the other pro-independence people, because the calculation of that particular government was, “we're facing extinction now.” Now, of course, Chechnya’s much smaller than Ukraine. The population of Kyiv is several times the size of Chechnya itself. But this is the kind of the thinking: we'll put so much pressure by murdering civilians relentlessly that the government will have to concede. But what will they have to concede now is the question. have now heard reports that the Russians are trying to organize sham referenda in occupied territories in eastern Ukraine so they can start declaring independence. So far, they haven't found willing collaborators because Ukrainian morale is sky high right now. But this would be an indicator that they intend to dismember the country because they cannot have all of it. They will take part of it. Even this strategy is predicated on Kyiv agreeing to this. And as you mentioned, right now, the situation on the ground does not favor the Russians. In fact, many people are now beginning to think they may not actually win this even with brute force. But they can still inflict mass casualties [in an effort to] grind the will of the Kyiv government to resist by mass casualties and then chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are a possibility. They're not perfect. Now that we also deny them access to weather predictions and satellites, they may not be able to figure out how to safely use them, meaning so that they don’t hurt their own forces with them. They’ve shown themselves willing to do what Russian governments have always been willing to do, which is to throw thousands of people into a meat grinder. What can we do about this? We actually can do more with the sanctions. They're not fully tight yet. But again, this is long-term issue. With the chemical weapons, we need an immediate response, not something that is going to be painful a month down the road or even a week down the road. That's where the big uncertainty comes in. Can we do something short of direct intervention to, for instance, disable the places that are launching these chemical weapons? I actually do not know. That’s why
    I think we're entering a very dangerous phase of the war, because Putin's entire strategy is predicated on inflicting harm on civilians, which is precisely what might actually trigger a more massive and direct intervention.

    What needs to happen for a war to end?

    Two other factors will be important. First, they need to reassess their war aims in light of the new situation. There seemed to be some realization in Moscow that the original unlimited aim is not attainable, [but] their fallback aim is equally unattainable, but they don't seem to agree to that. Taking half of Ukraine is not something that, given the situation on the ground, Kyiv would agree to. At the same time, Kiev's position has hardened because they have found that they actually are more capable than probably even they imagined. So, reassessment has not happened sufficiently to enable any sort of convergence. It is also, I think, unlikely to happen while Putin is in power. That's the troubling part. This brings me to my second point. When you cannot [reassess your] strategies, then you have to attack their ability to continue fighting. So, the idea here is that maybe you don't want to agree to the terms, but if you cannot continue fighting, it doesn't matter that you're not agreeing. So that's been our strategy: basically to destroy Russia's ability to sustain this war. Now, this will take a couple more weeks, maybe before it's really, really felt, although there are some signs that it's already being felt on the front lines. And then we have to see what Putin will do next because he desperately needs Belarus to intervene to relieve pressure on his forces around Kiev and to stop the Ukrainians from being resupplied. You're going to see more and more people [Russians] not willing to send their sons to the front to die in Ukraine. But in the short term, frankly, you could end this very quickly by stopping aid to Ukraine.

    Of course. Right.

    As long as we continue to support them [Ukraine] and they can keep at it, they will win. I have no doubt in my mind that they will win and that we are unwilling to just pull the plug on them doing so. Zelensky rightly said, this is not just a war for Ukraine. It’s a war for Europe and us as well. And even the Russians have said [that] this is a war for the new world order. So bottom line is the convergence hasn't happened because both sides still have the ability to keep going. And I don't think we can influence Putin, frankly, given the vision of what he's articulated. And I don't see any reason not to believe that he himself believes that vision. He will not stop unless he's removed somehow.

    One thing that I've seen put out there is the idea that: what if Ukraine said we're not going to pursue NATO membership and make that their official policy?

    They've already said this. Zelensky said: I want to be in NATO, but we understand it's not going to happen. Look, the idea that this is somehow going to end the war is predicated on the idea that this is somehow related to the cause of the war. And that's just not true.

    You don’t think it is.

    No. Aside from people who should stop playing Risk in their offices a long time ago, nobody actually thinks that. Please. I’m not going to mention names. But we all know who I'm talking about. So that's just the bogus argument with NATO. It was clear in Kiev, in Washington and Brussels and in Moscow that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO for the foreseeable future, if ever. Everybody knew that. So. This idea that somehow magically NATO membership is the key to ending the conflict. No, it's not. It never was. And it never will be. What the Russians want is for the country to demilitarize, which basically means they will get to control it.

    The last big question we wanted to ask is about international relations as an academic discipline and its focus going forward. There is somewhat of a narrative, although not everyone buys into this, that after the end of the Cold War, there was less focus on inter-state conflicts, and more of a focus on civil wars, human rights, [and other things]. And therefore, there's now a sense, because now we have a major war again in one of the key areas of the world, that there might be a shift in the discipline. Do you think that there's any truth to that?

    Some of the shift is inevitable simply because people always chase the latest fads no matter what they are. When I was on the job market, people told me: “you should do international political economy, this conflict stuff is obsolete.” But I kept going, not because I had some insight that it's not obsolete, but because I was interested in it. And then 9/11 happened and suddenly there was huge interest in conflict. [That kind of shift is] likely to happen again. What I would dispute, however, is that there's been some huge shift in the discipline away from studying conflict. The American public’s interest has waxed and waned depending on the news. But in the discipline, there has been very vibrant research. I do expect some people will start dealing with direct military security matters more. Especially because the problem with Russia is not going to disappear even if Putin were to have a heart attack tonight. We have entered a new world in which Russia will be a pariah for decades to come. They will not have a democratic government anytime soon. And as long as it's not democratic, it's proven itself a threat. We will have to deal with this. Basically, it's Cold War on steroids again. Then there's the question of China. We've been very focused on the economic aspects of this relationship, but the developments in Russia signify that perhaps we should be thinking more about the military aspect. I expect some people will start doing this just because there'll be more interest in analyses like this.

    It seems like there is kind of a fusion between the economic and the security sides that may not have been as prominent as the past. Famously during the Cold War, there wasn’t a ton of economic exchange between the two blocs. But today, at least until the last few weeks, we had a ton of economic exchange with Russia. And even more economic interdependence with China. The entire western strategy so far [has been] to respond to a security intervention with economic tools, so this cross section of security and economic interdependence seems to be a fusion that will continue to develop in the coming years.

    That is one [area] where I think some reassessment is necessary. I think interdependence in absolutely key in ways we have not come to understand. Big companies are leaving the country and selling their shares and all sorts of things like this. That’s not what we usually think about when we talk about interdependence, but now we will. I just saw this morning that Nestle is quitting, which is a huge deal. It’s one of the hold outs. Apparently public pressure is getting to them as well as the realization that the Russians will expropriate their assets. So that will be an interesting development for graduate students.

    Unfortunately, I’m a little too late to shift gears.

    What do you mean you are late? I’m late.

    Even later. In any case this has been great, Branislav, thank you so much.

    These are great questions, I very much enjoyed the questions.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    1997 0 0 0 In this interview, IGCC affiliate Patrick Hulme interviews Branislav Slantchev, a professor of political science at UC San Diego who studies military coercion, intrawar negotiations, the conduct of war, and how wars end. A native of Bulgaria, who previously lived in Ukraine, Slantchev offers candid thoughts on the limits of analysts’ predictions about war, the true cause of Putin’s aggression, the futility of red lines. This interview was recorded on March 23, 2022.]]>
    <![CDATA[When Civilian Protests Facilitate Coups d'Etat]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/when-civilian-protests-facilitate-coups-detat/ Thu, 14 Apr 2022 15:00:19 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2051 coup d’etat. In April 2019, the military intervened amid a wave of sustained civil disobedience. Mass demonstrations against the ruler, originally spearheaded by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), had filled the streets since late December 2018. Due to further civilian pressure after the coup, the armed forces entered a political agreement with pro-democracy groups and political parties known as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) to navigate a transition toward democratic and civilian rule. Today’s context is unfortunately much different than what many hoped for in those early days. Sudan’s officers are violently consolidating their authority in the country. In late October 2021, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan staged a coup against the transitional government and ended the power-sharing arrangement with the FFC. Days before the power-grab, former rebel groups and rogue members of the government organized protests in Khartoum, demanding that the military intervene and take power. Although much larger pro-civilian demonstrations followed, the armed forces answered the calls of the pro-military protestors. Now, the military is drafting a new transitional agreement with its civilian allies to entrench its power. Despite protests preceding both events, the 2019 coup was ultimately followed by a democratic transition whereas last year’s power grab reintroduced authoritarianism. Why?
    Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance. ]]> 2051 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Salah Ben Hammou, Ph.D. student of security studies at the University of Central Florida, analyzes why the power grab in Sudan resulted in authoritarianism. ]]> <![CDATA[Shifting Dynamics Between States and Militias in War]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/shifting-dynamics-between-states-and-militias-in-war/ Mon, 11 Apr 2022 15:00:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2055 cheap force multiplier. With Russian forces continuing their slow advance in Ukraine, and despite attempts at peace negotiations to reach a settlement, Ukrainian officials recently indicated they have uncovered a plot to assassinate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky by the Kadyrovtsy: a pro-government militia (PGM) based in Chechnya. The Pentagon believes Russian forces are recruiting foreign fighters from pro-Assad militias to join pro-Moscow forces in Ukraine. Simultaneously, militias aligned with the Ukrainian government have been increasingly used by the Ukrainian security forces in a joint effort to halt the Russian advance across northern and eastern Ukraine. PGMs such as the Azov Battalion and the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps act as a resistance mechanism against Russian tank columns and troops, often using guerrilla warfare-style tactics with small arms and light anti-tank weapons systems.
    Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.
    ]]>
    2055 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Dale Pankhurst, Ph.D. Candidate at Queen’s University Belfast, analyzes the strategic use of militias by both Ukraine and Russia. ]]>
    <![CDATA[The Risk of Russian Chemical Weapons]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/the-risk-of-russian-chemical-weapons/ Thu, 07 Apr 2022 21:45:39 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2059 allegations of US chemical and biological weapons labs in Ukraine may end up serving as a pretense for Russia to use chemical weapons. What is known about the intentions and capabilities of Russia to use chemical agents in Ukraine?
    Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.
    ]]>
    2059 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Doreen Horschig, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at MIT’s Security Studies Program, analyzes Russia’s intentions and capabilities for using chemical agents in Ukraine, and how the West can respond.]]>
    <![CDATA[Beware the Backlash]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/beware-the-backlash/ Thu, 21 Apr 2022 15:00:15 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2072 United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), two prominent international organizations that depend heavily on Russian cooperation. As the horrors of the war become more apparent, pressure from international organizations has intensified. On April 7, Russia was forced out of the UN’s main human rights body, the Human Rights Council. The last and only other time this has happened was in 2011, when Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council was suspended in response to its government’s violent repression of the pro-democracy activists. And on April 13, the OSCE accused Russia of committing war crimes. Will criticism from international organizations make a difference? Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 2072 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Brian Greenhill, Associate Professor at the University at Albany, SUNY, and Dan Reiter, Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor at Emory University, analyze international organizations and their potential effect on public opinion about the war in Ukraine. ]]> <![CDATA[Between Conflict and Cooperation: The World in 2021]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=117 Fri, 08 Jan 2021 21:24:35 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=117 117 0 0 0 Tai Ming Cheung is the director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and a Professor in the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego]]> <![CDATA[Prospects for Cooperation in Northeast Asia—An Interview With Susan Shirk]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=303 Tue, 07 Jul 2020 23:20:47 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=303 You founded the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in 1993, an unofficial track 1.5 forum for discussions about security among officials in the U.S., Japan, Russia, and North and South Korea. How did this come about? At the beginning of the Clinton administration, I was the director of IGCC, and we organized a small workshop on Asia-Pacific security together with the Council on Foreign Relations. We brought together the East Coast foreign policy elite, and some academics from California. Interestingly, the Californians promoted the idea that the U.S. couldn’t rely on a “hub and spokes” model of influence in the region—maintaining its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific on the basis of bilateral alliances. This should be supplemented with regional, multilateral arrangements. At the time, I was interested in the idea of a “concert of powers” for East Asia, the idea being that the United States would work together with the other major powers in Asia, especially China and Japan and Russia to keep the region peaceful. The idea was a way to diversify the U.S. position in the region to make it more resilient to an uncertain future. The Clinton administration was willing to experiment with our idea of a Northeast Asian multilateral arrangement including the four major powers and the two Koreas, especially Winston Lord who was the new Assistant Secretary for East Asia. Winston helped arranged meetings for me in Asia with foreign ministries to see if they would be interested in a track 2 security dialogue for Northeast Asia. The North Koreans were actually quite enthusiastic. The Chinese were worried that regional multilateral institutions meant that other countries would gang up and point fingers at them. We got U.S. government financial support from the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Bureau. And then we got the support of the State Department and from the Clinton administration. That’s how the whole thing started. When NEACD began, did you think it would be something that would last for almost 30 years? The long-term goal was that it would be a kind of testing ground for the idea of a Northeast Asia security arrangement, and that it would evolve from track 2 to track 1. It was an experiment to see if governments would want to turn it into a more permanent arrangement at the official level. What was it like the first time you all sat down together? Were there funny moments, or moments when you thought it wasn’t going to work? The initiative coincided with a growing awareness on the Chinese side that they could increase their influence in the region in a nonthreatening way by participating in these meetings. In the beginning, they were scared of it. They thought they were the big gorilla, and everybody would blame them for everything. But it didn’t work out that way. Because I’m a China scholar, I was able to work pretty well with the Chinese participants. The Chinese foreign ministry sent a woman about my age who was a mid-level official in the Asia department, and she and I would plan out what we were going to do each day. Maybe we worked well together because we were the only two women, but she had the creativity and the vision to see that this could be good for China. She introduced me to her boss, who is now the foreign minister, and he was very supportive. The Chinese really turned around to become big fans of regional multilateralism. The other thing that was interesting was the North and South Koreans had a wonderful time together. They got along very well. Isn’t that interesting. We had some amazing meetings. We tried to go to places outside the capitols to have a retreat-like atmosphere. One of the most amazing meetings was in ’96 at a retreat that the Russian central committee used to have outside of Moscow. Beautiful place. There was hardly any food in Russia in the 90s, and when we met in a hotel, you could see the truckloads of food going out from the kitchen to some black market. At that time, the Russians were very gung-ho on democracy. Every now and then they would needle the Chinese about being an old-fashioned authoritarian regime. I remember one dinner at my home in which the North Koreans, the Russians, and the Chinese were all needling one another. The Russians were needling the Chinese about having no democracy, and the Chinese were needling the Russians about how poor they were, and the Russians, who were feeling very liberated, said to the North Koreans, “And what about you? You only have one radio station.” The North Koreans dropped out in 1994. What happened? Relations got very tense with the nuclear crisis of 1993-94 [tensions increased when North Korea refused to allow international inspectors to inspect its nuclear sites]. Pyongyang basically dropped out for a decade. But then they came back. The first meeting with the North Koreans back again was in Moscow in 2002, and I remember being really worried about it. After the first session, during the break, I went up to the head of the North Korean group and asked how it was going. He said, “Oh I think this is really wonderful. People are very frank but friendly.” We had a few years with a lot of good North Korean participation, but it’s been increasingly difficult. That’s been disappointing, but NEACD has never been about just North Korea. If they don’t come, we can still make progress. Why do you think that this kind of model—track 1.5—is important for reducing conflict? Track 1.5 means that there are more officials in the room than there are private people. So even though the whole process is unofficial, there are a lot of political officials there. The people who participate really get to know one another. They’re able then to follow up informally afterwards. It became a kind of back channel that wasn’t as scripted with talking points, and you could develop a better understanding that could move the official process forward. We’d always have a lunch for the foreign ministry officials, and I would say: when we have an official Northeast Asia security dialogue, then NEACD can go out of business. And they would say: “Oh no this is so much better because the formal meetings are so constrained.” Even when we have a formal security arrangement, they’d always say they wanted to keep NEACD. What is the biggest impact of this over the years? What are you most proud of? I am proud of the fact that it was the template for the six party talks. I think it remains a foundation for a concert-like arrangement among the four major powers in the region, and I believe that eventually we could have a security arrangement for northeast Asia. But now it’s very hard to sustain the momentum, with U.S.-China relations being as strained as they are. South Korea and Japan have extremely strained relations. The Russians frankly have never really cared that much. Most of their focus is on Europe or in the Middle East. Due to the uncertainties surrounding travel, the 30th meeting of the NEACD will be held in 2021. Researchers from the six parties will meet virtually for a mini-session in July to discuss regional implications of the pandemic and bilateral relations. Susan Shirk is research professor and chair of the 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. She served as director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 1991-1997 and 2006-2010. Shirk first visited China in 1971, and has been teaching, researching and engaging China diplomatically ever since. From 1997-2000, Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, with responsibility for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. Shirk's publications include China: Fragile SuperpowerThe Political Logic of Economic Reform in ChinaCompetitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China; and her edited bookChanging Media, Changing China. She co-chairs a task force of China experts that issued its second report Smart Competition: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy in February 2019. She also co-chairs the UC San Diego Forum on U.S.-China Relations.]]> 303 0 0 0 Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and leading U.S.-China relations expert, reflects on nearly 30 years of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which she founded, and the prospects for improved cooperation in the region. The interview has been edited for length.]]> <![CDATA[China: Fragile Superpower Revisited]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=307 Mon, 01 Jun 2020 23:22:01 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=307 You are one of the most influential experts working on U.S.-China relations and Chinese politics. How did you become interested in Asia and China? I went to Nagano Japan as an exchange student right after I graduated from high school and lived with a Japanese family above their small grocery store, and that just opened my eyes to Asia. I had no high school education about Asia but then I started taking college courses and got interested in China. Pure serendipity.

    Your book “China: Fragile Superpower” helped frame the policy debate on China and the U.S. How has the world and China changed since you wrote that book? Do you still consider it a fragile superpower?

    Yeah, I do actually. China’s economy, its military and its global influence have all grown, but the fragility that comes from this deep insecurity of the Communist Party leadership is still there. They’re even more insecure because the more affluent, open to the world, and better educated the Chinese public is, the more pressing is the question: can an autocratic, communist party rule a vibrant open market economy? The Chinese leaders saw the fall of the Soviet Union, which happened very suddenly, and of course they also experienced the Tiananmen protests, which was quite a trauma. Under Xi Jinping, not only do they have to worry about a bottom-up upheaval, but also a possible split in the leadership. I think the split in the leadership, even though there’s no sign of it, is the greatest potential risk, even more than some bottom up opposition.

    Are we at the low point in U.S.-China relations?

    We are definitely at a low point in the post-Mao period. This is as bad as it’s ever been. During the time I’ve been studying China, life for Chinese people has improved. It’s not a straight line—it hasn’t improved as fast politically as many people in China would like—but still. There’s a lot more individual freedom, living standards have increased dramatically, opportunities to move, travel, pick your job, all that. U.S.-China relations have also been managed pretty well. That all ends in the mid-2000s, even before Xi Jinping. The global financial crisis tainted the image of the United States in the eyes of many people in China. It’s been a downward spiral ever since. Compared with his predecessors, Xi Jinping is a much more ambitious leader internationally, and also more focused on Chinese Marxist ideology, party rule, party discipline, and social control. Under Xi Jinping, it no longer looks like China is gradually converging to global norms. And of course, the pandemic has revealed how hostile relations have become. Previously, the U.S. and China have coordinated very well on public health threats. This time they did not.

    It’s interesting to see how the leadership in China recast the pandemic as a win for a centralized system. Do people in China buy that?

    Yes, it looks like they do. We’ve been doing some polls, and it looks like they do despite their earlier anger at the cover up when the disease first emerged.

    Is there anything that gives you a glimmer of hope in China-U.S. relations, or are you feeling bleak these days?

    I am hoping that after the election here in the United States, the new administration might take a more practical approach to China. That’s what I would say—a practical approach—because our approach has become highly ideological. Both Xi Jinping and the Trump administration are stoking a Cold War type contest of systems and values.

    What was it like to go from academia to government and back again? Many students have ambitions to be relevant in a policy space. What advice would you give them?

    Going into the policy world, in a job in the State Department, was extremely challenging. I didn’t know how to play the game at all. I got a lot of good advice from people, but it was a pretty steep learning curve. There are some academics who just really love being academics. They love being the lonely monk sitting in their office and writing books. I like research and writing too.  But if you have other skills like working well in teams with people, it’s really great to have the opportunity to do it and use the parts of your personality that are not used that much as an academic. Teaching is a social activity but you’re not working collectively with people in order to achieve something. I really liked doing that. I liked managing things. I liked being entrepreneurial, I liked to start new things. So being in policy was a great opportunity to use parts of me that weren’t getting used in academia. I also think that what you learn in academic life substantively and theoretically helps you think about policy in a more sophisticated and rigorous way. You just have to communicate it to others without jargon. And then when you go back to academia, you have to produce good work in order to prove to people you aren’t totally braindead. Susan Shirk is research professor and chair of the 21st Century China Center at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. She served as director of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 1991-1997 and 2006-2010. Shirk first visited China in 1971, and has been teaching, researching and engaging China diplomatically ever since. From 1997-2000, Shirk served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, with responsibility for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. Shirk's publications include China: Fragile SuperpowerThe Political Logic of Economic Reform in ChinaCompetitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China; and her edited bookChanging Media, Changing China. She co-chairs a task force of China experts that issued its second report Smart Competition: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy in February 2019. She also co-chairs the UC San Diego Forum on U.S.-China Relations.]]>
    307 0 0 0 Susan Shirk, director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and leading U.S.-China relations expert, revisits her book, China: Fragile Superpower, discusses the prospects for U.S.-China relations, and shares how she became interested in Asia. The interview has been edited for length.]]>
    <![CDATA[Defense Transparency in Northeast Asia]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=928 Thu, 11 Feb 2021 23:51:06 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=928 Defense Transparency Improves Modestly in the 2020-21 Defense Transparency Index Japan ranked first in the 2020-21 Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index, a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, with the United States and South Korea coming in second and third place. Amidst growing distrust in East Asia, especially in the security arena, a modest average increase in defense transparency among ranked countries—China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the United States and Russia—is cause for cautious optimism. ]]> 928 0 0 0 <![CDATA[New Research Program Analyzes Public Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=1098 Thu, 11 Nov 2021 00:26:13 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1098 Nuclear Weapons and Public Perceptions project aims to tackle three questions related to public attitudes about nuclear weapons in the United States. Here, Narang shares his plans for the project.

    What does the public know about nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy?

    This is a really good question, and the short answer is: we don’t really know, but probably less than would be ideal. Our aim is to fill several major gaps in our understanding of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons. In many ways, public fascination and knowledge of nuclear weapons peaked during the Cold War. After Fat Man and Little Boy were dropped on Japan at the end of World War II, public revulsion towards the horrific effects of the atomic bombings fueled a widespread belief that nuclear weapons were not merely larger bombs; they constituted a new and entirely different class of weapon. Indeed, American leaders famously lamented this perception in the early 1950s, when Dwight Eisenhower complained that a “public taboo” in the United States and Europe prevented him from using nuclear weapons against Chinese forces in the Korean War. Some scholars have argued that this distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons is a key reason why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. However, several trends are converging to weaken this distinction, including technological advances to make nuclear weapons more useable and increasingly hawkish rhetoric from leaders in Russia, North Korea, and also the United States. Meanwhile, we are now many decades from the days when students would perform civilian defense drills like hiding under their desk, so there is also less collective memory of nuclear risks. Recent survey research suggests that the U.S. public may be growing increasingly indifferent to the idea of nuclear war. For example, one study showed that the U.S. public is quite willing to support the use of nuclear weapons, especially if doing so might save American lives. If the public comes to believe that nuclear weapons can be used “just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else,” as Eisenhower once suggested, then the use of these weapons may become dramatically more likely. I know many foundations and policymakers that are very worried about public indifference to nuclear weapons growing at a dangerous time. To this end, several foundations—like the Carnegie Coporation of New York, the Stanton Foundation, the McArthur Foundation, and others—are funding educational initiatives on this topic, and I know a recent Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security that toured college campuses just to raise interest in nuclear security among future generations.

    How strong are the public’s views about the use of nuclear issues, and under what conditions can they change?

    This is a good question, and it is one we’re hoping to help answer. What perceptions—and misperceptions—about nuclear weapons exist in the public mind? Although recent survey research suggests that the public can be quite willing to support the use of nuclear weapons, especially if doing so might save American lives, it is not clear that this trend yet extends to military or civilian officials who most immediately control the use of nuclear weapons. It’s also unclear how strong and stable these preferences are. A recent study by Sechser and Post 2018 suggested that the public’s support of nuclear weapons is driven largely by its ignorance of nuclear issues, and that they were easily swayed by small amounts of new information. Understanding the factors that shape public opinion on nuclear weapons may help to identify and combat public indifference. If we think the public can play an important role in nuclear restraint during crises and in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is critical to understand the kinds of information and arguments that shape and sway public opinion in this area.

    How do views in the United States compare to attitudes in other nuclear countries and among U.S. allies?

    This is also a good question, and it is an important long-term ambition for us to explore this. Strategic stability depends not only on U.S. nuclear attitudes, but also attitudes in other nuclear states and U.S. allies—countries like China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Previous survey research has shown that public attitudes towards nuclear weapons acquisition and use vary considerably across these societies, but also over time within them. South Korea is a particularly well-documented example of this, where public support for nuclear weapons acquisition has risen and fallen dramatically over time in public opinion polls. We’re interested in what kinds of information and messaging is most likely to shape nuclear attitudes in these countries. Messages that reshape nuclear attitudes among American voters may not necessarily succeed abroad. Interested in more? Read, Is Arms Control Over?, a policy brief by IGCC expert Andrew Reddie, and listen to our interview with Brad Roberts, director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, on the future of U.S. nuclear policy on the IGCC podcast, Talking Policy.]]>
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    <![CDATA[Recommendations for the Next U.S. Administration]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=1145 Thu, 10 Mar 2022 18:13:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1145 1145 0 0 0 The task of creating a new vision—and practical strategy—for protecting and strengthening America, is urgent. Here IGCC experts Peter Cowhey, Michael Davidson, Bethany Goldblum, Steven Helfand, Jeannette Money, George Rutherford, and Susan Shirk chart a path for the next U.S. administration on trade policy; climate change; nuclear weapons; global development and aid; migration; COVID-19; and China.]]> <![CDATA[The Rise of Authoritarian Regional International Organizations]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=1225 Thu, 12 Aug 2021 19:58:40 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1225 1225 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Defense Transparency is on the Decline Among Global Superpowers]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=1656 Thu, 27 Feb 2020 19:59:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=1656
    “Scores on the 2018-19 Defense Transparency Index decreased on average by 8 percent compared to 2015-16, marking a significant decrease in transparency, a worrying trend in an era of intensifying regional security tensions, where the potential for miscalculation is growing.” 
    Meanwhile, China, which continues to assert itself internationally in a context of rising trade tensions with the U.S., has also seen a decrease in its score. China has not issued a defense white paper since 2015, leaving neighboring defense establishments in the dark. Chinese reporting to U.N. has also gone down. However, China has been fairly transparent on cybersecurity and scores well on defense media even though China imposes significant restraints on the media in other areas. news_graph_defense-transparency-rankings-chart.jpg Japan regained its 1st place ranking in 2018-19, though its overall score decreased by 7.6 percent, driven by limited information on the English version of its Ministry of Defense website. Japan’s consistently high score on the index highlights Japan’s leadership in defense transparency, including its commitment to frequent publication of its defense posture. The Republic of Korea (ROK) largely maintained is a relatively good performance on defense transparency. It did well in media oversight and in the clear, public announcement and acknowledgment of its international military activity. But ROK scored poorly in reporting to the UN (it didn’t) and cybersecurity (it lacks a focused cybersecurity strategy document), putting it in third place overall. Russia is the only country in the 2018-19 Index that saw a marginal increase in its overall score (mainly driven by recent publications of several policy documents related to its cybersecurity strategy), but it has been and remains a poor performer overall. Although Russia publishes a defense white paper, the information provided is limited and vague, and the state asserts significant control over the press.  A more bellicose Russia, expelled from the G8 following its invasion and annexation of Crimea, has drawn far closer to China, publicly flaunted its obligations under the INF Treaty and heavily invested in modernizing its military capabilities in order to strengthen its position in confronting the West. A decade of DTI reports shows the leaders being Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea; followed by much less transparent Russia and China. North Korea remains at the bottom of the DTI. The 2019 results, which were presented at the 29th Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Hong Kong, are a worrying trend in an era of intensifying regional security tensions and increased geostrategic competition among great powers. The DTI was established in 2011, and has helped to inform dialogue in Northeast Asia among defense professionals looking to improve regional cooperation and confidence-building. Representatives of defense ministries that have attended NEACD have said that the lessons and findings from the DTI reports have been useful in helping the writing of defense white papers and other transparency mechanisms back home. To learn more about how the DTI is calculated and how countries are measured, read the 2019 DTI Policy Brief and check out the 2019 DTI data.]]>
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    <![CDATA[What Does Ukraine Mean for the Future of Democracy?]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/what-does-ukraine-mean-for-the-future-of-democracy/ Thu, 21 Apr 2022 20:02:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2063 In a speech in Warsaw on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, President Biden framed it as a battle between democracies and autocracies. He's certainly not alone in characterizing what's happening in Ukraine in those terms. Is the Ukraine war really about a battle between democracy and autocracy? And when people use this language, what exactly do they mean? That's a really good place to start and a pretty insightful question. When this language is used by elites on the global stage, it's often misinterpreted. What people often go to is: the U.S. often allies with authoritarian regimes, so obviously we can't be sincere in talking about democracy as part of our foreign policy objectives. I think we will probably be unpacking what this war is really about for a long time and I don't know what it's really about in a deep sense. But it is definitely a battle between a democracy and an authoritarian regime that invaded them for no real reason. And that's something that carries a lot with it. We haven't seen too many cases historically, or recently, of unprovoked attacks on democracies. But another way to consider this question is to ask: when Biden talks about this as a battle between democracy and autocracy, what does he really mean? One of the ways I like to think about it, without getting into the psyche of Joe Biden, is that:
    It means something to have values and ideals as a basis for your foreign policy.
    That's something that great political thinkers, going back to some of the earliest scholars of international relations—Hans Morgenthau, for example, [have noted]. Having principles and values undergird a country's foreign policy is common in democracies. Another way to think about it is that a lot of countries that are allied around this are focused on trying to reflect and represent the people that live within their borders. And sometimes we see leaders turn against them. And I think that is something that we're seeing in this case, too.

    Recent research, including research produced by IGCC affiliates, shows that democratic backsliding is happening all over the world, including in long-established democracies like the United States. You are a part of a new IGCC initiative called The Future of Democracy that is going to be studying this phenomenon. Can you give us a little bit of context about what is happening globally to democracy? And is what's happening now or something that has been on a slow burn for a long time?

    It depends on what you mean. Over the course of human history, we've had countries that we've labeled as democracies. The global primacy of democracy has waxed and waned. And we're definitely in a period of it waning. There was a pretty short period, which happens to be a period that was influential in my life, between 1990 and 2003, where there was a lot of really pro-democracy rhetoric from most countries in the world. This is where a lot of my research is coming from. So, yes, democracy is eroding in many countries throughout the world. And it is a slow burn thing. It's not a particular moment in which you flip a switch in a country that was democratic and it becomes more authoritarian. But we're seeing really similar trends occurring in many countries around the world and with similar causes.

    Why is democratic backsliding happening in so many places at the same time?

    It’s a big question and a lot of us spend a lot of time on it. There are two things that I think are important to keep separate in terms of causes. One is the internal set of causes, which can be contagious across borders but are essentially things that come from within countries. And [one of] those [things is] the domestic reaction to what is a high point in the global movement of people. There’s lots of migration, and that can produce a backlash. There's rising populism, which is a global trend, but [it has] an internal cause in a lot of countries. I also emphasize this in a lot of my speaking and writing the international dimensions.
    In the immediate post-Cold War period, there was a lot more consensus about the international value of democracy. There were a few events that started to chip away and undermine that. One was the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which was a body blow to the credibility of the U.S. and its allies in its promotion of democracy and sullied the name of democracy promotion.
    You can [also] look across U.S. presidents and U.S. presidential rhetoric. Most U.S. presidents between the end of World War II and fairly recently have been very pro-democracy. Of course, the U.S. had authoritarian allies, but the rhetoric was still there and that led a lot of countries in the world to lean in the direction of democracy, sometimes insincerely. Some of the backsliding we're seeing is actually a revelation of what was there all along. It's a dropping of the democratic mask, so to speak.

    How important is Trump in all this? Do you think his importance is exaggerated?

    He's more of a symptom than a cause in my book. He certainly was more unabashed in the way he went about it. But the weakening of consistent U.S. support for citizen movements in other countries that were pro-democratic in nature has been going on for a while. What [Trump] did was just blatant public cozying up to, not just authoritarian regimes that have long been allies, but to the worst leaders. It wasn't just countries that allied with the U.S. in foreign policy; it was countries that were opposed to us in foreign policy and were dictators and were very repressive to their people. That brazenness really undermined anything that the U.S. could do rhetorically in terms of democracy promotion. But you know, other countries do it, too. Trump is coming out of this populist, nationalist, anti-immigrant thing that has happened in a lot of countries. Look at the French elections. A lot of countries are experiencing these same dynamics so it's hard to just say it's just all about Trump.

    What will autocrats learn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? Will the crisis embolden autocrats? Or will it chasten autocrats?

    There are two sides of this coin and it's very complicated to figure out where we should be looking. But I think it's clear that autocrats are taking a lot of lessons from this. One of the scarier ones has to do with what China is learning from this and what they think they can get away with in terms of Taiwan and some of the other countries in their orbit. I do think that it's clear to people who are receiving accurate information that this war is quite costly for Putin. And it maybe it depends on what's driving the particular autocrat. But for some of them, I think they might not want to have a war go the way that this one has been going. And it's been very interesting to watch what's been happening with NATO in recent days and weeks—it seems like it's shoring up the strength of the NATO alliance, which people were thinking was relatively irrelevant not that long ago. There are probably both things at work, right? Some learning about what one can potentially get away with. But
    It's also pretty clear that there are limits to invading other countries without consequence. And my hope is that there's still going to be a real international response, not just towards Russia, but towards future deterrence of unprovoked territorial aggression.

    There are many concerns about the strength of democracy here in the U.S. Is Ukraine shifting attention that is needed for Americans to be focusing on the magnitude of the problems at home?

    I think all countries, and especially great powers, have to be able to deal with what's going on at home and what's going on the global stage. It's just the nature of foreign policy. You can't really ignore one for some period of time. I've been reading commentary that says something like: we need to get our own domestic house in order before we can do anything on the international stage. I think that that's a little bit wrongheaded. If we leave the international stage or ignore it for too long, it changes in a way that does not advantage us. Russia could be shifting its attention away from previous efforts to encourage democratic backsliding in the U.S. They may have bigger fish to fry at the moment and may stop some of that. It would be nice if they would stay out of U.S. elections in the next round. I do think having an enemy abroad can be good for democracy at home.
    One of the things that's been concerning me the most about the health of U.S. democracy is that some U.S. citizens are starting to view their fellow citizens as their worst enemies, which is a very dangerous place to be.
    Not that I'm saying we're headed to a civil war or something like that, but we certainly are headed towards political violence. We're already experiencing it. We've been experiencing it for a while. Having an “other” helps with the nationalist narrative and the ability of the U.S. to unite around something, which I think is really positive. The problem is we have a leader of one of the two political parties who's going far out of his way to align himself with Putin. And as my colleague Gabe Lin says, there's a lot of evidence to suggest that partisans follow their party leaders, regardless of the logic of what the party leaders are saying.

    The confrontation between democracy and autocracy has been building up for many years. Even during peacetime, authoritarian powers were exploiting the liberal international order to advance their own interests and develop economic dependencies and, in some cases, undermine democratic governments. Can this kind of order be maintained in a way that safeguards the democracies from the threats posed by autocratic states like Russia?

    I tend to not describe things in the democracy versus autocracy framework, in part because I think it leaves out citizens, and they're a really important factor in thinking about this. I do think that it's unrealistic to expect that the U.S. and all of its allies will become democratic and stay that way without struggle. I think that's an unrealistic expectation for humans as we are currently constructed. What I like to emphasize about the pro-democracy international order, and in a world in which the most powerful state is democratic, is that, this doesn't cause the most powerful authoritarian countries in the world to become democratic. But it affects a lot of the medium-power countries and the countries that are not necessarily as geopolitically important. That means that those governments are pressured to act better than they would absent that pro-democracy international pressure. The relationship between countries that are at least trying to have some plausible deniability that they're still democratic, and democracies, is one that I think works relatively well for stability, for economic exchange, for anti-poverty efforts, for global public health. Even if some of the leaders are hanging on to power through somewhat manipulated elections, they're still trying to keep this veneer of democracy. So they're not murdering their number-one political opponent. They're not torturing journalists. They're not controlling all of the sources of information within their country. And that, I think, is improving the lives of a lot of people around the world in a really powerful way. That said, I think it's really dangerous to have a foreign policy strategy that's like, oh, we're against all authoritarian regimes. Why? Because some of the other large nuclear powers in the world are authoritarian regimes. And it just doesn't make that much sense to completely antagonize them and say it's you're either with us or against us.
    I think it makes sense for the U.S. to have a foreign policy that's defined by supporting governments that are responsive to their own citizenry, and to not ally with governments that are the single greatest threat to their own citizenry. That's the logic that underlines, for example, the UN's policy around the responsibility to protect. And it's consistent with state sovereignty.

    Over the next year, what are the most important things we should be watching if we care about democracy?

    This war is clearly big and it's going to have reverberations throughout the world. I am really interested to see how China handles this relationship. It's not their war in a lot of ways. At the same time, they're experiencing internal movement, from being a party-based dictatorship to one that's more personalist in nature, which can be destabilizing as far as I understand it. I do think that's a really big thing to watch: how does China react to this conflict? If we care about democracy, it's important to pay attention to the degree to which the U.S. public cares about democracy, specifically whether the U.S. Republican Party can get its house in order on this front, because it can't be a political party and can't continue to have a democratic government if one of the two political parties will not accept election results in which they lose, which is a really troubling thing. I also think it's interesting to watch how the European Union and some of the more powerful states within Europe react to all of this, including those experiencing democratic backsliding. If their citizens are upset about something, are they engaging in more repression or are they cracking down on free speech or are journalists being targeted? There's lots to worry about. But the good news is that there are a lot more people than leaders in the world. And many times, again and again in the course of human history, they've been able to use their power and numbers to press for a better life for themselves.
    The music featured in the IGCC podcast is courtesy of Gato Loco de Bajo.
    ]]>
    2063 0 0 0 In the latest in the Talking Policy series on Ukraine, Susan Hyde, a Professor of political science at UC Berkeley and IGCC researcher on the Future of Democracy initiative, talks about the relationship between the war in Ukraine and the global war for supremacy between democracy and autocracy. This interview was recorded on April 14, 2022.]]>
    <![CDATA[Why a Settlement in Ukraine Remains Out of Reach]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/why-a-settlement-in-ukraine-remains-out-of-reach/ Fri, 22 Apr 2022 15:00:41 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2079
    Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.
    ]]>
    2079 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Valerie Sticher, Research Fellow at AI Singapore, analyzes why imperfect information is hindering the goal of a settlement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. ]]>
    <![CDATA[Understanding the Humanitarian Implications of Ukraine]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/understanding-the-humanitarian-implications-of-ukraine/ Tue, 26 Apr 2022 16:45:55 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2094 ]]> 2094 0 0 0 In the latest in the Talking Policy series on Ukraine, Asli Bali, a professor at the UCLA School of Law and expert in human rights law and comparative constitutional law, talks about the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Ukraine and beyond, what obligations the international community has to protect civilians, and why ending the war should be the most important priority. A graduate of Williams College and University of Cambridge, Yale Law School and Princeton University, Bali previously worked for the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and currently serves as co-chair of the advisory board for the Middle East Division of Human Rights Watch. This interview was recorded on April 18, 2022.]]> <![CDATA[What Russian Military Disloyalty Means for the War in Ukraine]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/what-russian-military-disloyalty-means-for-the-war-in-ukraine-2/ Mon, 25 Apr 2022 15:00:07 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2128 run over by a tank and killed at the hands of his own brigade. Other examples include intercepted phone calls with Russian soldiers expressing grievances, complaining of frostbite and a lack of food. The quagmire that the Russian military now finds itself in is a far cry from the assertive dominance over Ukraine that many observers expected. Putin, being a forward-thinking, regime-securing strategist, has taken serious measures to ensure that his top generals cannot stage a military coup against him. Given these measures to secure power, consensus is forming that it is unlikely that Putin will be ousted at the hands of his own military in the immediate future. However, coups are not the only meaningful form of military rebellion. Read the full blog at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 2128 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Jaclyn Johnson, Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Kentucky, analyzes what mutiny and defection might mean for Russia in Ukraine.]]> <![CDATA[How Historical Analogies Woke Up the West]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/how-historical-analogies-woke-up-the-west/ Tue, 26 Apr 2022 15:00:02 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2132 the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century.” In doing so, people hope to better understand surprising events and develop a plan of action for themselves and others. Vladimir Putin employed historical analogies to justify his invasion of Ukraine, while Western leaders drew on their own understanding of World War II history to mobilize a surprisingly muscular response to Russian aggression. Putin justified his February 24 invasion of Ukraine with faulty “historic analogies and metaphors.” He claimed that Ukraine is a mere part of historic Russia with no “stable traditions of real statehood,” whose ruling junta of “far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis” had seized power and killed innocent Russian-speakers just like “Hitler’s accomplices” eighty years ago. “We will not make this mistake [of appeasing Nazi Germany] a second time,” declared Putin in his invasion announcement. Historical analogies also help us understand why Western democracies suddenly “woke up” after years of weak responses to Russian aggression against Ukraine. For many world leaders, parallels between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Nazi Germany’s 1939 invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland became impossible to ignore. Both Russia and the West have cast themselves as the protagonists in a shadowy reprise of World War II. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 2132 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Eric Mosinger, Assistant Professor at Santa Clara University, analyzes how historical analogies shape understanding of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and whether their influence will continue]]> <![CDATA[Why Offshore Finance Limits U.S. Sanctions Against Russia]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/why-offshore-finance-limits-u-s-sanctions-against-russia/ Wed, 27 Apr 2022 15:00:10 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2136 targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin? Sanctions are the foremost policy tool available to Western leaders short of entering the war alongside Ukraine. However, sanctions on individuals, especially asset freezes, are only effective when there is complete transparency over where the assets are. The sheer amount of assets that are held anonymously or concealed through hard-to-trace shell and front companies present significant challenges for freezing assets as a coercive measure. It is estimated that over $1.3 trillion of assets from Russia are held in offshore accounts. As long as the assets of oligarchs remain untouched, sanctions cannot hurt them. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance]]> 2136 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Menevis Cilizoglu, Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Olaf College, and Chelsea Estancona, Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of South Carolina, analyze sanctions against Russia, and how offshore financial services might get in the way of sanctions as a policy tool.]]> <![CDATA[How Blowback by Armed Groups Is Turning Civil Wars into International Conflicts]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/how-blowback-by-armed-groups-is-turning-civil-wars-into-international-conflicts/ Thu, 28 Apr 2022 15:00:28 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2140 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are just the latest in a growing trend turning civil wars into international ones: blowback, or violent retaliation at home in response to intervention abroad. Civil war is the most common form of conflict in the 21st century, yet few civil wars have their violence confined within the borders of a single state. Most civil wars involve military intervention by foreign states who arm local proxies and/or launch airstrikes against their local adversaries, making the conflicts longer and deadlier. Often unable to shoot down their planes and unsatisfied by fighting their proxies, these adversaries seek to hit interveners where it hurts most—back at home. The deadliest and most protracted civil wars in recent history, including Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen—where the Saudis and Emiratis have militarily intervened—have all spread significant violence to surrounding states. In addition to the blowback attacks by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the war in Afghanistan has caused insurgent violence in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. And as we document in a new article, the conflict in Syria triggered a violent bombing campaign inside Lebanon that nearly escalated into another civil war. This example of blowback by a non-state actor (Sunni jihadi groups) against a non-state actor (Hezbollah) reveals the importance of understanding the transnational capabilities and strategies of civil war combatants who increasingly operate across borders and pose significant threats to international peace. This dynamic is particularly salient in the Middle East and North Africa region, where non-state actors like Hezbollah and the Houthi movement now rival state structures in military power and governance capacity. In this article, we argue that non-state armed groups are the most common agents of conflict diffusion, and that the increasing empowerment of these armed groups by state actors will accelerate the trend of internationalized civil wars. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 2140 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Peter Krause, Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston College, and Nils Hägerdal, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Tufts University, analyze how civil wars can spread to conflict abroad.]]> <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2145 Mon, 02 May 2022 01:49:11 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2145 ]]> 2145 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Does Putin Need Street Support to Stay in Power?]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/does-putin-need-street-support-to-stay-in-power/ Mon, 02 May 2022 15:00:17 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2162 people across the world have taken to the streets to show their solidarity with Ukraine and condemn Russian aggression. Ukrainians are protesting against the occupation and in Russia, thousands have been detained for speaking out against the war at dozens of demonstrations across the country. On March 18, Russian state TV painted a different picture. According to official sources, 200,000 supporters of President Putin gathered in the packed Luzhniki stadium to celebrate the anniversary of Crimea’s annexation. Participants waved Russian flags, sang patriotic songs, and expressed their unconditional support for their leader and the ongoing “special military operation” in Ukraine. In addition to Vladimir Putin, several celebrities and athletes attended the event. Was the gathering an organic outpouring of support for Putin? Independent journalists quickly revealed that it was not. Participants were bussed in from outside Moscow; they received food or money in exchange for turning out. Those who depend on the government—like public sector employees—were pressured to attend. Every detail of the event was choreographed to make sure that the message of broad-based popular support for Putin came across. This is not to say that there was no genuine support for Putin at the event. Although surveys from Russia should be taken with a grain of salt these days, recent polls show strong patriotic attitudes among Russians, and Putin has enjoyed high levels of popularity throughout his time in office. The annexation of Crimea further boosted his popularity. Still, events like the mass rally in Moscow are top-down efforts to signal regime support. More puzzling than Putin’s public appearance at the event is that pro-war mobilization in Russia has been limited so far. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 2162 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Sebastian Hellmeier, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, analyzes mass demonstrations in authoritarian regimes.]]> <![CDATA[Are Gender Inclusive Militaries Better at Integrating Disruptive Technologies?]]> https://ucigcc.org/publication/are-gender-inclusive-militaries-better-at-integrating-disruptive-technologies/ Fri, 06 May 2022 15:51:38 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2252 2252 0 0 0 Why is the integration of new technologies often so difficult? This policy brief by IGCC fellow Shira Eini Pindyck highlights an important and overlooked reason, namely how gender policy can affect resistance to organizational change.]]> <![CDATA[Other Peoples' Wars]]> https://ucigcc.org/blog/other-peoples-wars/ Mon, 09 May 2022 15:06:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2261 to fight in foreign wars for many reasons. Some volunteers join resistance groups or terrorist organizations because they feel a pull to help people with whom they share an ideological or religious identity. Some Americans, for example, have joined ISIS for this reason, while others have joined groups that fight against ISIS for the same reason. Some do it for the money: they work as mercenaries, government agents, or as employees of security contractors and private companies. We spoke with two volunteers from Brazil—Pedro and Carlos (made-up names to protect their identities)—to understand what drove them to participate in a faraway foreign war, specifically the war against ISIS. When the civil war began in Syria, the Islamic State in Syria—ISIS, or ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah—saw a chance to conquer territories and build a modern kingdom, or Caliphate, in the region. Given the reticence of the United States and the West more broadly to engage and employ ground troops, popular armed organizations were the most effective resistance to ISIS. Groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Democratic Union Party, Women’s Defense Unit, and especially the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) were able to retake cities, protect civilians from the war, and combat jihadist efforts. In response, Western volunteers began joining their efforts to counter ISIS from 2014 to 2015. Read the full blog post at Political Violence At A Glance.]]> 2261 0 0 0 In analysis for Political Violence At A Glance, an IGCC-supported blog dedicated to political violence and its alternatives, Mayara Santos Bueno, an independent researcher in Brazil, and Joe Young, a Professor in the Department of Justice, Law and Criminology at American University, explain why someone from across the globe would want to fight in someone else’s war.]]> <![CDATA[How the War In Ukraine Is Affecting African Economies]]> https://ucigcc.org/podcast/how-the-war-in-ukraine-is-affecting-african-economies/ Mon, 16 May 2022 18:51:23 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2365 The reverberations of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are being felt worldwide. What is the impact of this crisis right now in sub-Saharan Africa? I think about the impact on sub-Saharan Africa along four different dimensions. One is the impact on food supply. Africa is a net importer of food. What is happening now is you are seeing a rise in food prices and there is a potential for food shortages. Morocco gets a lot of its grain supply, like wheat, from Russia and Ukraine. Tunisia imports half of its soft wheat from Ukraine alone. A country like Libya gets 75 percent of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. But the good news is that some of these countries have strategic reserves. So, Morocco says its strategic reserve could last for about five months, and that was two months ago. And Tunisia’s strategic reserve could last them for about three months. They made that announcement about a month ago. Now let's turn to oil. Gas prices have been increasing across the continent. The gas inflation problem is compounded by prior policies introduced during the COVID era—border closures for example. So gas and basic supplies were not getting across the border. Now you factor in the Ukraine-Russia war. This has compounded the problem some of these countries are facing. Another shock that is important for us to talk about is cooking oil. Many people don't know that Ukraine is the hub of sunflower oil, which a lot of homes in Africa use as a substitute for vegetable oil. Sunflower oil is a little bit cheaper than soybean oil. So, the challenge now is that the price of this has increased dramatically. The price of sunflower oil is now four times what it was in 2019 in Africa. Soybean oil that used to sell for $765 per liter per metric ton in 2019 is now $1,957 per metric ton. This has hit people's pockets significantly. Palm oil is up almost 200 percent. This has created more problems for countries in Africa, especially east African countries that depend on the import of this cooking oil. All of this has also impacted the cosmetic industry because crude palm oil, and some of these cooking oils are basic ingredients in the production of things like soap. And so you can now understand how just one incident is having a chain effect.

    Is there concern that rising prices will lead to like social unrest? How are people responding to these exponential increases in the costs of basic goods?

    I think it's also important to first take a step back and look at the impact on multiple levels. So, the impact I already talked about is the immediate impact. There are longer-term impacts related to the costs and supplies of other things like fertilizer, which will affect productivity in the agriculture sector. Therefore, we are seeing potentially that next year, the next harvest season might be lower in yield. If we don't get the fertilizer to be able to boost production, Africa will have to import more food. If we are talking about social unrest, it's not only immediate concerns, but what will be the long-term repercussions like the number of people falling back into poverty. Governments are introducing immediate mitigation measures. For example, some of the countries like Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda have cut taxes on some basic goods to be able to accommodate price increases. But that means lost revenue for governments that are already struggling to mobilize revenue.

    At least 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are at risk of high debt distress. Can you tell us about what that means and what is causing this?

    The debt situation is a very complex issue. The IMF 2022 report states that 20 African countries are either at high risk of debt distress, or already in debt distress. Out of the 20, eight are already in debt distress. And then there are countries that are under leverage in terms of their debts on the continent as well. But compounded in this situation is the issue of exchange rates. I started off by saying Africa is a net food importer. So, if Africa is already a net importer of food, and 70 percent or more of the continent’s population are employed in the agriculture sector, then you can imagine what happens to manufactured goods and luxury goods. Demand for the currency means they're having lower exchange rates. Debt servicing also becomes more expensive for them. And you also have the issue where the credit rating agencies have been very brutal towards African countries. They've been downgrading their creditworthiness significantly—60 percent of African countries had some kind of credit downgrades during the pandemic. Ghana's credit rating went from okay to barely good by both Fitch and Moody. The downgrades have implications for financial markets. They have implications for capital flights, and for the cost of financing these debts. All of these have compounded the problems in the sense that it is making African debt way more unsustainable. Nigeria right now has an 80 percent of debt to revenue ratio. With the credit rating downgrades I talked about earlier, you have a perfect storm.

    What is the role of China as a creditor?

    Western creditors hold most of the debts in Africa—Bretton Woods Institutions, and Western private financial markets that are buying the bonds of some of these countries. The myth is that China is the one saddling African countries with debt. China actually holds less than 25 percent of the total debt on the continent. 

    What are the creditors able to do to respond to major shocks outside the control of borrowing countries? And what are they actually doing?

    First, what are they doing? Some of them, especially Western creditors, have been really good. Well, let me roll that back a little bit and take the “really” out. They've been doing okay in the sense of restructuring some of the debt. They paused payments during the pandemic and provided some relief, including the Bretton Woods institutions—and that is where the difference is between China as a creditor and Western creditors. So in the money markets, there are different rules for different players and different actors. Sovereign borrowing is treated a little bit differently from commercial borrowing. China does not have that differentiation. China treats all loans as commercial business deals. If you signed a deal that you have to pay, you can’t use the pandemic as an excuse. That's what happened to Kenya. Kenya had to pay over $300 million on some of its loans that were due to China. And that caused currency devaluation and a lot of fiscal problems for Kenya during the pandemic because the Chinese lenders were not ready to be as flexible in dealing with a sovereign entity compared to what the Western financiers and creditors were doing.
    It's important that China start playing a meaningful role in this space. But I do understand people who argue that that also gives an incentive to some of these governments to borrow recklessly. And so there has to be some mechanism in place to discipline the borrower. But we cannot forget that without providing relief during COVID, it is the poor citizens of those countries, not the ruling elites, that have to pick up a significant portion of the impact.

    Given the significant impacts on African economies, some analysts have questioned the apparent reticence of some African leaders to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. For example, South Africa was one of 58 countries that abstained from the vote that resulted in the UN resolution to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council, and several African countries voted ‘No’ including the Central African Republic, Congo, Algeria, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and others.

    One commentator writing in Foreign Policy said: “Russia’s war in Ukraine will kill more Africans from starvation than Ukrainians on the battlefield. Africa should get off the fence and condemn Russian aggression.” What is going on here? How is this war viewed in African capitals?

    I think that the criticism by itself is a gross misunderstanding of what has been happening. And it also provides a clue into something that not only the Africans have been saying, but that Asians and South Americans have all at different points pointed out, which is that sometimes Western commentators lack a deeper understanding of the politics of the developing world. So, what really is happening when it comes to the Russia-Ukraine war? African countries, a number of them actually, have been on record condemning the war. Kenya on February 22—before Russia invaded—used their chairmanship of a UN Security Council proceeding to call on Russia not to invade, using words like “we are representing the whole of Africa” to tell Russia that “we came from oppression and colonialism and therefore we will not tolerate, or we will not stand for a new kind of imperialism.” The chairperson of the African Union, who is currently the president of Senegal, came out to condemn Russia's aggression on behalf of the African Union. The African Union Commission itself issued a statement calling for Russia to stop the war. Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia all have expressed different levels of concern. Yes, there are multiple African countries that have been silent in terms of condemning Russia, but we cannot minimize the level of courage it takes for the people who have come out against [Russia]. When they [African countries] were oppressed, when they were under colonial rule, China and Russia were countries that were there for them. Countries in Africa don't think about relationships only from a transactional perspective. It's something you invest in, something that you build over time, which doesn't mean you don't call the other party [out] when they are wrong. You still call them out, but not in the same way that is done in the West. Some people talk about the nonaligned movement simply as a movement that was not ready to take a side in the Cold War between the Western sphere of influence and the Eastern sphere of influence. But the nonaligned movement means a lot more than that. It is a statement by these countries to say, we want to reserve the right to determine our foreign policy. We want to reserve the right to determine who we will choose as friends and who we choose not as friends. And maybe our neutrality could be a force to prevent war from happening between these two countries or these two spheres of influence. The nonaligned movement was not simply a passive thing of “we don't want to choose.” It was a statement of intent. A self-determination movement—I think that is a better word for it. What is happening here is [not the same thing] that happened in the past. Because now, African countries are more vocal and ready and willing to take a stand. Let's look at the UN General Assembly vote you were talking about. The first vote to condemn Russia's aggression is a better measure of Africa's political temperature than the second vote. And the reason is simple: the first vote is to tell your partner that what you are doing is wrong and I don't approve of it. The second vote is to punish that partner. And the question is, what kind of punishment is appropriate? I don't think the African side has worked out yet what the appropriate punishment is. And so in the first vote, only one African country voted “no,” which was Eritrea. Out of the 35 countries that abstained, 17 African countries abstained. But more important is that 29 African countries (out of a continent of 55 countries) voted yes, to condemn Russia.
    The second vote, for reasons that I already mentioned, is a bit more complicated. I think that nuance is very important so we don't just label Africa as sitting on the fence. They're actually not sitting on the fence.

    I want to ask you a bit more about narratives. One narrative you see sometimes in the Western media is that China’s influence is hovering over African countries and preventing those states from responding [to the situation in Ukraine] in a way that Western states would think is more appropriate. Whatever the nuance of that narrative is, the bottom line is that China’s influence is considered a threat. What do you think about that narrative? Is that anywhere close to the truth of things?

    I like the word we're using—narrative. Because most of the world is narrative, right? Language matters. And I believe that this narrative about China—China's negative influence on the continent and China's growing influence as a threat to U.S. influence—is very simplistic. And here is why. One, China's engagement with African countries was, until recently, within the frame of what you could call geo-economics. It's trade driven, economic development driven. And these are countries that have a significant infrastructure financing gap. So, if you have a willing lender that is ready to take more risk and a willing borrower or someone who needs the resources, you'll always get a match. But that is at the elite level. Time and time again appeal research, Afrobarometer research, and a lot of the major research done on the continent on public opinion show overwhelming support for the U.S. over China in these countries. And therefore, American leaders have to ask: what are we missing in the African story? And how do we effectively partner with Africa? Because at this point, we still continue to see Africa from the humanitarian lens—a burden that we need to help. We don't see Africa as a viable trading partner. We only have one free trade agreement on the continent, with Morocco. When we talk about bilateral investment treaties, we have nine. If we talk about TIFA, which is Trade Investment Framework Agreement, we have 10. And so, our economic footprint on the continent is very minimal. And if Africa is now talking about economic growth, which is a new narrative that the elites are coming up with on the continent now against the older narrative of decolonization, we should be there with them. You know, the Trump administration at least got one thing right. They started moving in that direction. They asked Kenya, for example, for free trade agreements. The Biden administration came in and put the hold on that. So, in 2025, we have to renew the only trading instrument that ties Africa to the U.S., which is called AGOA, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. But AGOA has so many flaws. Out of the 60-something thousand-line items that can come in duty-free, most of them don't include crops and goods that Africa has a comparative advantage in.

    Right. While the U.S. protects its own industries.

    Correct. If you are giving me a gift that I can't use, is it still a useful gift? But if somebody is coming to say, what is your need? So China created FOCA, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which is the forum where they discuss cooperation and trade with Africa. If you read the declaration from the eighth FOCA, which took place last year in Senegal, you would realize that China has been listening to a lot of criticism that it’s been getting from Africa. It is treating Africa like a customer who they get feedback from. They go rethink their strategy and come back and say, is this what you want? So China is saying: we want to hire more people, we want to do more training on the continent, we want to buy more local products when we are building the infrastructure projects.
    China has been listening. I wonder if Washington is also listening, if the European Union is also listening, because a lot of the things that the European Union and the U.S. are doing are much more reactionary, rather than a strategic plan for Africa.
    We need to start creating new trade vehicles to allow Africans to be able to trade fairly and freely so that they can support and add depth to the economic growth story, and recover from all the stresses we talked about—using trade, not aid.

    What reforms are needed among international institutions to help African countries weather this storm? And do you think that reforms to international institutions is where the focus should be?

    One of the reforms that I think is needed is to start relooking at the credit rating agencies, because I don’t think they’re factoring in political risk and disasters, especially with climate change on the horizon. If that’s going to be our new normal, why punish countries for something that is not their doing? Yes, it’s good for you to be honest in reporting the creditworthiness of countries, but downgrading countries should not be taken lightly. At this point they have too much power, too much monopoly to decide these things. They should be a bit more transparent in their formulas, a bit more transparent in their decisions. Or maybe we should have more [agencies] to have some competition. Another reform that is needed has to do with how the Bretton Woods institutions provide support. So for example, they’re already earmarking money for recovery in Ethiopia after the war which is a good thing. But [that financing rests on the assumption that] the government that is fighting with its own rebels would be fair in distributing the money that is going to pass through them for rebuilding. We need a new architecture to make sure that financing gets to where it’s needed. At this point, the international development system doesn’t have a way to target financing. We are still working in the Westphalia system where the state has to be the conduit, and sometimes they are tainted conduits. And I’m not saying this to discredit the Ethiopian government. I’m making a broader statement. The last thing is, should the focus be on international institutions? I think we should be focusing on domestic institutions as well—both domestic and regional institutions. One of the paradigm shifts that is needed on the African continent is that the governors have to start shifting their mentality and start thinking: how do we make life easier for our people? Because a lot of the policies they come up with tend to create more bureaucracy rather than remove the bureaucracy and make simplified processes to make it easy for people to get documents from the government, do business, make a living, and make it easy for your citizens to actually be treated right. If you make your bureaucrats more powerful or you impose more steps between service delivery and service production you are actually creating a space for all those middlemen and women to become too powerful and on a continent where people make statements like “I will show you where the power lies,” “do you know who I am.” People become intoxicated with power. And so, the more opportunity you create for them, the more opportunity you create for sabotage. I think that African governing systems and institutions have to start evolving in a direction that limits the number of middle people, or steps, and sorts out how we can provide services in the most efficient and effective way.

    As a long-time expert of the political and economic trends on the continent, I’m curious what you make of what is unfolding and what you might be seeing that the rest of us might miss.

    I think we have grossly misunderstood the role economic interdependence plays in creating peace and stability. And that is an indictment on the whole literature that I don't take lightly. We have assumed over time that there is a direct connection between economic interdependence and peace and stability. That once you have interdependence, interdependence is going to lead to peace and security. Yes, of course, there've been different variations, and there've been different nuances, but the logic and the framing continue. Countries that trade with one another, don’t go to war with each other.
    We’ve forgotten that economic interdependence creates a political need for negotiation, that calls for some level of adjustments to be made on each side. The current stalemate [in Ukraine] is going to have to end with some level of compromise. So why don't we start now developing frameworks that allow us to make those compromises a lot sooner rather than wait until we have a war?
    Because a lot of the posturing before the war sounded as if negotiation was more like a political play, for people to be able to say, “you see, we tried negotiation.” Thumbnail credit: WFP/Katharina Dirr]]>
    2365 0 0 0 How is the war in Ukraine impacting African countries? In the latest Talking Policy episode, Lindsay Morgan talks with Prince Paa-Kwesi Heto, a doctoral candidate at UC Irvine and Ghanaian political economist, about food price increases, the risk of debt distress, and Western calls for African countries to “get off the fence” and condemn Russia.]]>
    <![CDATA[Custom Styles]]> https://ucigcc.org/news/wp-global-styles-igcc-custom/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 01:11:05 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/wp-global-styles-igcc-custom/ 72 0 0 0 <![CDATA[/news-events/events.html]]> https://ucigcc.org/seopress_404/news-events-events-html/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 01:13:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=seopress_404&p=76 76 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Event]]> https://ucigcc.org/seopress_schemas/event/ Wed, 02 Feb 2022 13:56:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=seopress_schemas&p=91 91 0 0 0 <![CDATA[experts/leadership/index.html]]> https://ucigcc.org/seopress_404/experts-leadership/ Thu, 03 Feb 2022 14:01:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=seopress_404&p=107 107 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Great Powers Summer Training]]> https://ucigcc.org/training/gp-workshop/ Fri, 11 Feb 2022 15:47:04 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=training&p=232 232 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Study of Innovation and Technology in China Workshops]]> https://ucigcc.org/training/sitc/ Fri, 18 Feb 2022 00:09:45 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=training&p=301 Workshops in Washington, D.C. are open to advanced graduate students, junior faculty, and early- to mid-career analysts. The workshops typically examine some aspect of the relationship between national security, defense modernization, technology, innovation, and China's rise as a world power. Of central interest is how China is mobilizing and applying its economic, political, strategic, corporate, financial, intellectual, and scientific capabilities in conjunction with leveraging external resources to achieve its grand ambition of catching up technologically with the world’s advanced military powers. The workshops incorporate the most recent developments in China’s defense science, technology, and innovation domain.

    For more information email info@ucigcc.org]]>
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    <![CDATA[The Latest]]> https://ucigcc.org/?search-filter-widget=the-latest Fri, 18 Feb 2022 01:27:13 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=search-filter-widget&p=312 312 0 0 0 <![CDATA[IGCC In Review (2018-2022)]]> https://ucigcc.org/reports/2022-impact-report/ Tue, 22 Feb 2022 17:09:08 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=reports&p=378 This report looks back over the last five years at IGCC and highlights what we are learning, and where we think we have made a difference. It also sketches a path for where we want to go. At this critical moment, the role of engaged scholars matters more than ever. Over the next five years, IGCC will continue in our commitment to policy-relevant research and engagement on issues ranging from great power competition, global catastrophic risks, geoeconomics, and nuclear policy, to migration, global health, and the environment.

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    378 0 0 0 IGCC’s goal is to use rigorous research, training, and engagement to improve policies and practices in ways that help reduce conflict and build lasting peace. This report looks back over the last five years at IGCC and highlights what we are learning, and where we think we have made a difference. It also sketches a path for where we want to go.

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    <![CDATA[Public Policy and Nuclear Threats]]> https://ucigcc.org/training/ppnt/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:33:53 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=training&p=425 nuclear policy issues. Support for this program is provided by the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and The Stanton Foundation.]]> 425 0 0 0 Program dates and times: July 31 - August 12, 2022 Location: We are planning for an in-residence program at UC San Diego in La Jolla, CA.]]> Program dates and times: July 31 - August 12, 2022 Location: We are planning for an in-residence program at UC San Diego in La Jolla, CA. Applications for professionals are accepted on a rolling basis and will be reviewed starting June 1, 2022.]]> <![CDATA[igcc/news/alumni-confidential-steven-lobell-2]]> https://ucigcc.org/seopress_404/igcc-news-alumni-confidential-steven-lobell-2/ Mon, 07 Mar 2022 18:28:14 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=seopress_404&p=875 875 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Defense Transparency Policy Note 2020-21]]> https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=reports&p=1648 Fri, 31 Dec 2021 17:00:09 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=reports&p=1648 1648 0 0 0 <![CDATA[publication/2026]]> https://ucigcc.org/seopress_404/publication-2026/ Wed, 13 Apr 2022 17:22:29 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=seopress_404&p=2032 2032 0 0 0 <![CDATA[]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2151 Mon, 02 May 2022 03:31:24 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2151 2151 0 0 0 <![CDATA[The Advantage of Disadvantage: Costly Protest and Political Representation for Marginalized Groups]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2179 Tue, 03 May 2022 17:32:57 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2179 2179 0 0 0 <![CDATA[Inter-Disciplinary Workshop on the Management, Economics, and Biology of Transferable Effort Rights-Based Management]]> https://ucigcc.org/?p=2349 Mon, 09 May 2022 22:38:43 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?p=2349 2349 0 0 0 <![CDATA[research/future-of-democracy/authoritarian-international-organizations/]]> https://ucigcc.org/seopress_404/research-future-of-democracy-authoritarian-international-organizations/ Wed, 11 May 2022 18:33:08 +0000 https://ucigcc.org/?post_type=seopress_404&p=2363 2363 0 0 0